



Central Intelligence Agency  
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Admiral B.R. Inman, USN (Ret.)



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This is the revised text as promised.  
I am just as glad you didn't read the earlier  
version -- I think this one is better. Would  
appreciate any thoughts or comments.

As always, it was a pleasure to talk  
with you.

Sincerely,

*Bob.*

Robert M. Gates  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

## CIA AND THE UNIVERSITY

I welcome this opportunity to come to Harvard and speak about the relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency, especially its analytical/research arm, and the academic community. Recent events here have sparked a broader discussion of both the propriety and wisdom of university scholars cooperating or collaborating in any way with American intelligence. On December 3rd of last year the Boston Globe stated "The scholar who works for a government intelligence agency ceases to be an independent spirit, a true scholar." These are strong words. In my view they are absolutely wrong. Nonetheless, there are real concerns that should be addressed.

My remarks tonight center on three simple propositions:

- First, preserving the liberty of this nation is fundamental to and prerequisite for the preservation of academic freedom; can there be anyone who believes that the university community can prosper and protect freedom of inquiry oblivious to the fortunes of the nation?
  
- Second, the Federal Government -- including the Department of Defense and intelligence agencies -- is charged with and essential for preserving our national freedom.

-- Third, the Federal Government needs to have recourse to the best minds in the country, including those in the academic community, to help carry out its charge to defend the nation. Tensions inevitably accompany the relationship between defense, intelligence and academe, but mutual need and benefit require reconciliation or elimination of such tensions.

### The History of CIA-University Relations

In discussing the relationship between the academic community and American intelligence, and specifically the research and analysis side of intelligence, it is important to go back to antecedents which, coincidentally, have important links to Harvard. In the summer of 1941, William J. Donovan persuaded President Roosevelt of the need to organize a coordinated foreign intelligence service to inform the government about fast moving world events. He proposed that the service "draw on the universities for experts with long foreign experience and specialized knowledge of the history, languages and general conditions of various countries." President Roosevelt agreed and created the Office of the Coordinator of Information under Donovan's leadership.

Donovan named James Finney Baxter III, President of Williams College and an expert on American diplomatic history, as the chairman of a board of analysts that would draw together information relevant to the course of the war. Baxter in turn

recruited the prominent Harvard historian, William L. Langer, as the Director of Research. The two then set to work to invite outstanding scholars in the social sciences to join their board of analysts and enlist additional staff.

A large number of university professors were brought into the OSS, as the intelligence organization was renamed in 1942. They included G. T. Robinson, professor of Russian history at Columbia (who was made chief of the Russian section); Hajo Holborn, professor of history at Yale; Franz Neumann of the New School for Social Research; and, interestingly, Herbert Marcuse. Harvard made no small contribution to this intellectual talent bank, contributing scholars such as Crane Brinton and H. Stuart Hughes in history, Carlton Coon in anthropology, John King Fairbank in oriental studies, Bruce Hopper in government, Henry Murray in psychology, and others.

This is not the time or place to detail their contribution. Let us simply say it was significant. And when the war was over, along with the nation's soldiers, those of the scholars who were members of OSS team demobilized.

Events in East and West Europe, the Soviet Union and China between 1945 and 1947 made apparent the need to strengthen the nation's defenses, and especially the need to be well-informed about developments around the globe. The result was the National Security Act of 1947 which created the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. Again, outstanding scholars were recruited. Langer came back to establish the Board of National Estimates. Robert Amory of the Harvard Law School

faculty was named CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence in 1952, and served in that capacity for nearly ten years. Other academicians who joined included: historians such as Ludwell Montague, Sherman Kent, Joseph Strayer and DeForrest Van Slyck; MIT economist Max Millikan, who organized the economic intelligence effort; Yale and MIT economist Richard Bissell, who later headed the clandestine service; and even William Sloane Coffin who left the Union Theological Seminary to join CIA for the duration of the Korean War before becoming Chaplain at Yale. He is quoted by political scientist Richard Harris Smith as recalling that he joined the Agency because "Stalin made Hitler look like a Boy Scout." It was a common reason for academicians to join the Agency in the early years.

In short, in the Office of Strategic Services in World War II and in the early days of CIA, prominent scholars from America's greatest universities played a key role in the establishment of the Agency itself and in particular its research and analysis branch.

Relations between the scholarly community and CIA were cordial throughout the 1950s. The cold war was at its height and the nation's need for the Agency and its activities were seldom questioned by faculty or students. Some of the most noted university professors of the time served on a regular basis as unpaid consultants, helping CIA to form its estimates of probable trends in world politics.

These halcyon days were soon to change. There was some criticism on campuses over CIA's involvement in the Bay of Pigs

expedition in 1961 and criticism increased as the Agency, along with the Department of Defense and the rest of the government, was increasingly attacked as the war in Vietnam continued. Despite continuing academic cooperation with the Directorate of Intelligence, relationships between the CIA, the Department of Defense and other agencies and academia generally deteriorated in the mid-1960s with the breakup of foreign policy consensus. The decline in CIA-academia ties was given impetus in February 1967 by the disclosure in Ramparts magazine that CIA had been funding the National Student Association for a number of years.

Sensational allegations of wrongdoing by CIA became more frequent in the media in the early 1970s, culminating in the establishment of the Rockefeller Commission and subsequently both the Church Committee in the Senate and the Pike Committee in the House of Representatives. The Congress and the media concentrated primarily on CIA's covert actions, although there also was some discussion of CIA's contacts with academia -- particularly in the Church Committee, which tended to lump schools with the media and religious organizations in discussing appropriate CIA relationships.

The Church Committee recognized that CIA "must have unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our universities can produce." At the same time, the Committee recommended that academic advice and judgment of academics be openly sought. The Committee concluded that the principal responsibility for setting the terms of the relationship between CIA and academe should rest with college administrators and other

academic officials. "The Committee believes that it is the responsibility of ... the American academic community to set the professional and ethical standards of its members."

This paralleled considerable debate within academic ranks and led to numerous articles about the relationship between the universities and CIA. In response to a letter from the President of the American Association of University Professors, the CIA Director George Bush replied that the Agency sought "only the voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the foreign policy processes of the United States." The Director stated that where relationships are confidential they are usually so at the request of the scholars, rather than the Agency, and he refused to isolate the Agency from "the good counsel of the best scholars in our country."

This approach was adopted and enlarged upon by Director Stansfield Turner who engaged in a long and eventually unsuccessful effort to reach agreement with President Bok of Harvard on relations between this university and the Agency. (Ironically, at this time, another Harvard professor, Robert Bowie, headed the analytical element of the Agency.) Some academic institutions adopted guidelines similar to the stringent regulations established at Harvard; in most cases less severe guidelines were proposed. In a great majority of schools where the issue arose, however, the faculty and administration rejected any guidelines, usually on the grounds that existing regulations or practices were adequate to protect both the institution and individuals.

Relations between the Agency and the academic world have improved since 1977 for a variety of reasons, including recognition in the academic community that CIA, together with the Departments of State and Defense, has been an important and useful supporter of area and regional studies and foreign language studies in the United States.

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The agencies of the American intelligence community as well as the Department of State have long been a primary source of employment for specialists in these areas. The academic community also consulted closely with senior officials of the intelligence community in their successful campaign to win support for a Congressional-approved endowment of Soviet studies. Intelligence agencies informally strongly supported this endeavor.

I have reviewed this history because it is important to understand that issues about CIA and the university that are being raised today are not new. In some areas of research, such as on the Soviet Union, our cooperation for nearly 40 years has remained both close and constant. This also has been the case often in the fields of economics and science. On the other hand, there have been much more pronounced ups and downs in our relationships with political scientists <sup>and</sup> allied social



sciences, particularly among those with expertise in the Third World.

Why CIA Needs Academe

There are, however, other constants in the history of this relationship and in its future as well. These include our need for your help, and the opportunity you have to contribute to a better informed policymaking process by cooperating with us. Let me describe how and why.

CIA and the American government need your help today more than ever before. If you joined CIA, or as a professor dealt with CIA, during the first quarter century of its existence, the odds are that you would have worked on the Soviet Union, China, or in the latter part of that period, Southeast Asia. But just in the last dozen years, we have been confronted with new issues and developments and also have had to pay attention to some problems too long neglected. The oil embargo of 1973 and subsequent skyrocketing of oil prices; the related dramatic changes in the international economic system and growth of debt in Third World countries; revolutions in Iran, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua; the final passage of European colonialism from Africa; a more aggressive Soviet Union (with its Cuban and other allies) in the Third World;  changing patterns in international trade; and the growth of technology transfer, international narcotics networks and terrorism have demonstrated vividly that our national security is greatly affected by

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developments and events in addition to the number and capabilities of Soviet strategic weapons.

Accordingly, the subjects we deal with today are staggering in their diversity. They include problems such as the implications of the enormous indebtedness of key Third World countries; problems of political, economic and social instability and how to forecast them; human rights; narcotics; the illicit arms market; the implications of immigration flows in various regions of the world; population trends and their political and security implications; the global food supply; water resources; energy, technology transfer; terrorism; proliferation of chemical/biological and nuclear weapons; changing commodity markets and their implications for Third World countries; and others too numerous to recount. In each of these there are subsets of problems. Take, for example, our knowledge of Shia Islam and its roots in the twelfth century and the importance of that for understanding problems in the Middle East and Southwest Asia in the 1970s and 1980s. The problems of developing economies in the third world and how they go awry and what opportunities there are for the United States to play a constructive role are all difficult.

But nearly all of these problems have something in common: ~~most of~~ *virtually all subjects of concern,* while CIA has experts in ~~all these areas,~~ there is a vast reservoir of expertise, experience, and insight in the community of university scholars that can help us, and through us, the American government, better understand these problems and their implications for us and for international stability.

With this diversity of issues and problems in mind, the Directorate of Intelligence several years ago initiated an intensified effort to reach out to the academic community, think tanks of every stripe,  and the business community for information, analysis, advice and counsel. ~~We took the following~~ <sup>Some of the</sup> specific steps <sup>we took included:</sup>

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- Senior managers in charge of each of our substantive areas were directed to undertake an expanded program of sponsorship of conferences on substantive issues of concern to us and to encourage participation of our analysts in such conferences sponsored by the private sector. Since 1982, CIA has sponsored more than 300 conferences, nearly all of them involving considerable participation by the academic community and touching on many of the issues I noted. In addition, our analysts as overt CIA officers have attended more than 1500 conferences sponsored by others on such problems.
  
- We have increasingly turned to the academic community to test our own assessments in ways consistent with protecting intelligence sources and methods. We have helped scholars get security clearances so that they could examine the actual drafts of our studies. A growing percentage of our work is reviewed by specialists in the academic community (as well as by those in various think tanks, retired senior military officers, independent specialists, and others).

-- We have established panels of cleared specialists from business and the academic community to meet with us regularly not only to help improve specific research papers but to help develop new methodologies, review performance, and help us test new approaches and hypotheses.

-- Our analysts are required to refresh their own substantive credentials and expand their horizons by obtaining outside training at least every two years. This requirement can be met through taking university courses, participating in business or other outside sponsored seminars and conferences, attending military training courses, and so forth.

Our involvement with the academic community is as follows:

-- Consulting: This can be formal, under a contractual arrangement in which the individual is paid a set government rate, or informal and unpaid -- an exchange of views between interested specialists. We are particularly interested in ideas that challenge conventional wisdom or orthodoxy. We know what we think, but need to know what others think also.

- Sponsorship of conferences: We generally organize our own, but occasionally we contract with others to organize a conference for us. And, of course, our analysts attend conferences sponsored by business, think tanks, and universities.
  
- Research: There are cases in which basic research can be carried out for us by scholars in universities who have experience and expertise in areas in which we are interested. Basic demographic and economic research are examples of the kind of work for which we contract.
  
- Scholars in Residence: We have had a scholars-in-residence program for a number of years under which individuals from the academic world can spend a year or two working with us, with full security clearances, on topics of interest to them. The individuals who have participated in this program have found it an intellectually enriching experience, as well as a uniquely valuable way to observe the real workings of government. For our part, it has given us the opportunity to debate alternate views and interpretations in a depth that simply is not possible when those with whom we are discussing things do not have access to the full range of information available.

-- Information: Finally, we are interested in talking with scholars who volunteer to share with us their impressions after traveling to places of interest or participating in events of interest abroad.

A principal factor in our pursuit of contact with scholars is our perception that quality analysis on the incredible range of issues with which we must cope requires not only dogged research but also imagination, creativity, and insight. Large organizations, and particularly government bureaucracies, are not famous for their encouragement of these characteristics--although there is surprisingly more than you might think. Similarly, to rely solely on intelligence sources or on information funneled through government channels inevitably would constrict the range of views and information needed. We are looking for people to challenge our views, to argue with us, to criticize our assessments constructively, to make us think and defend and go back to the drawing board when we have missed something important. In short, the last thing we want from a scholar is for him or her to tell us what they think we want to hear. That would make our entire effort pointless.

Finally, this relationship is not necessarily a one-way street. Just as we are conscious of our need for the injection of ideas and information from outside government channels, I think you should concede that there is at least the possibility that you might learn something from discussions with us.

Your Concerns

Let me now address some of the major concerns that have been raised by scholars, deans, and institutions about dealing with us. I would note that certain of these concerns reach well beyond just CIA and involve the entire question of relations between government, business and academe.

1. Doesn't Research or analysis under CIA auspices of events abroad inevitably compromise academic freedom and the honesty of academic research?

-- First of all, when we contract for research, we insist on honest work. We do not permit our analysts to cook the books and we would never consult or contract with a scholar a second time who did that. Our research must stand up to close scrutiny, not only by other intelligence agencies, but by other elements of the executive branch, the oversight committees of the Congress, the Congress as a whole, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and a variety of other panels and organizations that have access to our information. While we acknowledge we can be and have been wrong in the past, our very existence depends on our reputation for integrity and for reliable and objective assessments. Any research we use should have the same qualities.

- As I noted earlier, the whole purpose of our effort is defeated if the scholar tells us what he or she thinks we want to hear. Indeed, there is consistent pressure in our organization to seek out people whom we know disagree with us and against whom to can test our ideas to make sure we have seriously considered all the possibilities.
  
- Third, we assume, unless shown differently, the integrity of the scholars with whom we deal. We expect that scholars with whom we deal will be straightforward both with us and with their colleagues.
  
- Fourth, it seems to me that academic freedom depends on a scholar not being beholden to any outside influence or rigid ideological conceptions but only to the pursuit of truth. The scholar should be free to search where he or she wishes and should not be constrained by any influences, including the preferences of colleagues or prevailing cultural winds. Actually, improper influence potentially can be exerted on a scholar by any source of funding: contracts and consultantships with business, foundations and foreign governments. Indeed, American academics have long consulted with officials of foreign governments, including authoritarian regimes at both ends of the political spectrum. In light of this,



singling out a US government agency as a particular threat to honest inquiry seems to me to represent a double standard. If a university requires public exposure of any relationship with CIA, then surely logic and equity require a similar practice for relationships with foreign governments and, in fact, all other outside relationships. You are rightly proud of your ability to do objective research. CIA does not threaten it.

-- Finally, I agree with the proposition that it is the responsibility of the university itself to establish and monitor the rules governing all these relationships. And it is both foolish and irresponsible to do so by isolating the scholar from any outside contact under the guise of protecting academic freedom.

2. Won't Publicly acknowledged contacts with CIA hinder a scholar's access and freedom of inquiry overseas? I acknowledge this might be a problem in some cases. However, many who have worked with us for years have not had any difficulty.
  
3. Can't<sup>a</sup> colleague's contacts even with the analytical side of CIA compromise an entire department? I have been asked before about the danger of one scholar's association with us involving his or her faculty colleagues through some sort of guilt by association. I would simply offer two

observations. First, the university community is a remarkably diverse one and I am sure that in many departments there are scholars who are involved in some sort of activity with which their colleagues disagree or which they do not support. So, again, this problem is not limited just to CIA. Some form of reporting to the university on such relationships that could be kept confidential would seem to me an appropriate way to minimize this problem. My second observation, however, is that at some point it seems to me a little courage is called for. Remember the adage that "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." At some point, the freedom of those who do wish to consult with us is infringed upon <sup>by</sup> ~~because~~ of the fears of their colleagues. We do not believe that working with your government to help bring about better informed policy is a shameful activity; indeed, it should be a source of pride and satisfaction. Contributing to a better understanding of some of the most difficult and occasionally dangerous problems of the world, in my view, should satisfy the scholar's highest calling.

4. Isn't prepublication review tantamount to CIA censorship?

No. Our review is to ensure that no classified information is in a book or article that draws on earlier research carried out for us. We also want to be certain there are no revelations of intelligence sources and methods in the text. We have no interest in altering the substance or

conclusions of writings we review and take great care to avoid asking for such changes. Nearly all books and articles submitted for review by scholars who have worked with us on unclassified projects emerge with no changes at all. Indeed, our retirees and former employees seem to encounter far more frequent difficulty -- especially when they are writing about sources and methods. Finally, we leave it to the judgment of the scholar which of his or her writings are subject to review -- and we have <sup>had occasion to</sup> ~~not~~ challenged such judgments in many years.

5. What about the view that CIA engages in covert action as well as collection and analysis and a variety of "immoral" acts and therefore association with any part of CIA is unacceptable? Activities at CIA are carried out within the law, with the approval of appropriate constitutional authorities, and with the oversight of the Congress. They are activities mandated by the decisions of elected officials in both the Executive and Legislative branches. As we have seen recently Congress can and does deny funds for legal intelligence activities thereby terminating such activities.

-- The Central Intelligence Agency is a foreign policy instrument of the elected representatives of the American people, just like the military, USIA or the Department of State. If you find its activities

distasteful or incompatible with your personal values, you can do three things: you can vote for someone else next time,

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or you can decline to have any association with us at all. But in the latter case, the decision whether to associate with us should be left to the individual. One individual's freedom of association should not be denied because of another's personal point of view. A university steps on precarious ground and itself endangers academic freedom if it starts making arbitrary rules about which organizations a scholar may participate in or talk with -- and, I would add, especially if one of those organizations is a branch of its own democratically chosen government.

### Our Rules

Before I close, let me review the rules and policies of the analytical arm of CIA for dealing with the university community:

-- First, while the Directorate of Intelligence presently has no contracts for classified research at any academic institution, the Directorate of Intelligence can and will let contracts for classified research where university rules permit and appropriate facilities and circumstances allow.

-- Second, when we contract for research to be done for us, we spell out explicitly for the scholar the conditions governing use of that research. In some cases, the research will be done strictly for us, and we will be the only recipient. In other cases, once we have received the research and assured ourselves that the terms of the contract have been carried out, we will acquiesce in a scholar's request to publish a book or article drawing on that research. We do not commission or contract for books or articles. We are realistic about pressures on scholars to publish, however, and, in order to attract some of the best people to work with us, we try to accommodate their desire to draw on unclassified research they have done for us for publication under their own name. And, finally, there are cases where we even allow research done for us later to be published under the scholar's name without any prepublication review on our part.

But in any of these circumstances, our review is simply to ensure that the work we contracted to be done has been done, meets acceptable standards and does not contain classified information. Taxpayers justifiably would be outraged if we were not to ensure that we had received true value for their money.

We have regulations and policies governing our relationships with the academic community, we continually review these in the light of new opportunities, new problems and new issues. For example, well before the recent controversy here at Harvard, we decided to revise our policy with respect to prepublication review, narrowing that review -- which again, is simply to avoid the compromise of classified information -- to the specific subject area in which the scholar had access to classified information.

We have again looked at our rules and policies as a result of the controversy here at Harvard, and this too has produced some modifications. For example, we are now stating explicitly to any organization or individual organizing a conference on our behalf that the participants in the conference should be informed in advance of our sponsoring role. Quite frankly, because we organize the overwhelming majority of our conferences ourselves, this problem had not arisen before.

We also have looked at the question of whether our original funding of research that is subsequently used in a publication by a scholar should be openly acknowledged, as funding from foundations and other sources are often acknowledged. We have concluded for now that such a change would be inadvisable. If we were to confine our relationships with the academic community to traditional intelligence subjects such as the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact or other adversaries of the United States, quite honestly, open acknowledgement would not be a problem for us.

However, as we increasingly are required by the policy community to address issues such as instability in Third World countries, international economic problems, the development of new technologies overseas, international energy issues, the implications of Third World debt and others, it occasionally could be awkward, if not seriously embarrassing for the US government, to have official confirmation of CIA research or work on issues that sometimes involve countries that are friendly to us. Additionally, formal confirmation that CIA was financing research or was interested in a specific subject, such as the financial stability of a particular country, could affect the situation itself. Also, we would confront a situation in which readers of a publication that officially confirmed it drew on CIA funded research might believe that the conclusions were in fact CIA's, that CIA drove the authors to those conclusions, or that they even represented official US policy. Finally, official, public confirmation of our support likely would <sup>sometimes</sup> be used for promotional purposes. All that said, I want to stress that while we cannot <sup>now agree to</sup> ~~accept~~ public confirmation or acknowledgement of our support for specific research, our contract support is privileged -- not classified -- and <sup>we</sup> will always agree to a scholar reporting our support of research to the university and otherwise meeting university rules and standards.

We expect any scholar or individual who consults or works with us to abide fully by the rules of his or her home institution in terms of reporting the relationship with us. But, in our view, it is the responsibility of the institution to set

such rules and to enforce them, and the responsibility of the scholar to comply. CIA cannot and should not monitor or enforce such compliance.

### Conclusions

The world is increasingly complex. The challenges to the security and well being of the American people are increasingly diverse and subtle. Director Casey and I, and others in the Executive Branch and our Congressional oversight committees believe that contacts with universities and others in the private sector are imperative if we are properly and effectively to carry out our mission of informing, improving understanding, and warning the government about developments around the world -- the same mission identified by General Donovan and President Roosevelt. Our ability to carry out our mission, as in the days of Langer and Donovan, depends on voluntary cooperation between those of us who carry this responsibility in intelligence, and those in the university, business, retired military, and others who can help us understand these challenges better and forecast them more accurately. The country is the ultimate beneficiary.

Consultation and cooperation with CIA on the problems facing our world are not threats to academic freedom. *On the other hand,* ~~Rather,~~ I believe that freedom of inquiry is limited, a desire to render public service sometimes tragically thwarted, and the nation disadvantaged by those who would deny a scholar's willingness to work with the national intelligence service in assessing the world around us.



~~A final word~~ <sup>9</sup> As I said at the outset, prerequisite for academic freedom is preservation of the liberty of the nation. Those who believe that the university community can prosper and protect freedom of inquiry and yet be oblivious to the fortunes of the nation are blind. The government cannot coerce any scholar to cooperate or work with the Department of Defense, Department of State, or CIA. By the same token, no scholar should be ~~forbidden to do~~ <sup>prevented from doing</sup> (so). And none should have to worry that his reputation will suffer because of a public-spirited, patriotic willingness to help us better understand and forecast global developments affecting our national well-being and the forces that threaten our freedom.