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4 May 1987 P & PD 1

Libyan Activities in the South Pacific [redacted]

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Summary

Tripoli has intensified its efforts to expand contacts in the South Pacific in the last several years, and, despite the region's orientation toward the West and its conservative Christian values, has made some gains. Libyan adventurism apparently is driven by Colonel Qadhafi's desire to pose as the leader of Third World revolution and to undermine US and French influence in the South Pacific by exploiting local political frustrations against the West. [redacted]

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Working primarily through its People's Bureaus in Kuala Lumpur and Canberra, Libya is supporting proindependence elements in French New Caledonia, expanding diplomatic relations with Vanuatu, which will allow Tripoli to open a People's Bureau within the next few weeks, and sponsoring the travel of South Pacific and Southeast Asian delegates to Libya's annual liberation conference. In our judgment, Tripoli will also carefully scrutinize the new government in Fiji as yet another opportunity to gain influence, because the recently elected coalition says it is intent on adopting a nonaligned foreign policy. [redacted]

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This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] Southeast Asia Division, Office of East Asian Analysis, and [redacted] Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Research was completed on 4 May 1987. Comments and questions are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA [redacted]

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
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Libya's Regional Strategy


We believe Tripoli's heightened activities in the South Pacific are part of Colonel Mu'ammur Qadhafi's ambitious global initiative to increase Libyan ties to leftist and radical groups and guerrilla and terrorist organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and Western Europe. Qadhafi has sought to redouble this effort since the US airstrikes on Libya in April 1986. The pattern of Tripoli's intensified activities in the Pacific over the past several years suggests that it is trying to build a regional network to support Libyan subversion in much the same way it has operated in the Caribbean. Libyan officials have been laying the groundwork for such a network and may be verging on success. 

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Qadhafi has grandiose plans for this network. He has stated publicly that he is trying to forge a united front of "revolutionary forces" to engage in a "collective struggle" against imperialism. In our judgment, however, Qadhafi has more immediate aims as well:

- To promote his radical ideology and burnish his revolutionary credentials.
- To undermine US, French, and British interests in retaliation for their pressure on Libya, and erode the influence of friendly nations in the region that promote Western interests.
- To cultivate indigenous radicals and identify potential surrogates to carry out violent activities. 

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Tripoli's determination to pursue subversion in the region probably has increased in the wake of Libya's defeat in Chad by French- and US-backed Chadian government forces. The visit of Israeli President Herzog to several South Pacific countries last fall probably is an additional spur to Qadhafi's efforts to expand Libyan influence. Tripoli has been trying to blunt Israeli efforts to strengthen its ties in the Third World. 

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The Role of the Anti-Imperialism Center

Libyan policy in the South Pacific appears to be the responsibility of the Tripoli-based "World Center for Resistance to Imperialism, Zionism, Racism, Reactionism, and Facism" -- commonly known as the "Mathaba" or Anti-Imperialism Center. Founded in 1982, the Center's overt purpose is to coordinate Libyan assistance to liberation groups and generally expand Libyan influence. [redacted]

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The Anti-Imperialism Center has sought to contact and penetrate various organizations in the South Pacific by inviting them to conferences in Tripoli. [redacted]

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Tripoli is intensifying its efforts this year, organizing a "Conference of Revolutionary and Progressive Forces and Peace Movements in the Pacific" on 18-20 April. The Libyan press claimed over 60 groups from the region -- including an individual from Hawaii -- attended. At the conference, Qadhafi vilified France, Britain, and the United States, and called on the attending groups to form a united front with Libya to resist Western imperialism. In particular, he played upon popular grievances among Pacific islanders, such as sensitivity to French nuclear testing and nuclear-powered ship visits. [redacted]

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Targeting New Caledonia


New Caledonia's independence appears to be one of Tripoli's major interests in the region. Libyan officials have publicly stressed that they share the view of the South Pacific island nations that this French territory should be independent. We believe that Qadhafi's public proposal of a campaign to "liberate" French colonies, including New Caledonia, is partly in reaction to French support for pro-Western governments in Africa, particularly Chad. [redacted]

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


Libya Unlikely To Let Up

Tripoli has no doubt concluded that its financial and political support and military training to proindependence elements in New Caledonia and Indonesia have increased regional tensions, and in our judgment will look for additional opportunities to stir up trouble. Libyan officials are probably studying the recent change in government and underlying racial tensions in Fiji as an opportunity to expand their influence. In any case, the prospective People's Bureau in Vanuatu would provide Tripoli a centrally located base in a relatively benign operating environment and facilitate subversive efforts elsewhere in the South Pacific.

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Libya almost certainly will seek to identify itself with local grievances against the West. We expect Tripoli to step up support for opposition to the French presence in New Caledonia, to French nuclear testing in Mururoa, and to port visits by nuclear-powered vessels -- a strategy intended to discomfit Libya's primary Western antagonists -- the United States, France and Britain. Tripoli will probably increase its support to more radical proindependence factions in New Caledonia -- probably in the form of further military training. Libyan propaganda will probably portray Australia and those elements among the



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independent island nations supportive of the West as agents of Washington, unconcerned with local interests. [redacted]

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Nonetheless, we believe Libyan adventurism in the South Pacific will be constrained by the region's prevailing orientation toward the West and its dominant conservative Christian values. In addition, Australian and New Zealand [redacted] will limit Tripoli's ability to maneuver secretly. Extensive press coverage of Libyan contacts in the Caribbean last year undercut Tripoli's ability to operate there, and we expect that similar press coverage in Australia would retard, at least temporarily, Libyan headway in the South Pacific. [redacted]

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Libyan arrogance and unpredictability also are likely to hinder Tripoli's search for clients. Qadhafi almost invariably promises more than he can deliver and usually demands more allegiance than his local contacts are prepared to give. Libyan insistence that "armed struggle" is the only means of Third World liberation offends many groups from small democracies. [redacted]

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Libyan Presence in the South Pacific Area



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.
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Typescript: **Libyan Activities in the South Pacific**

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Original--OEA/SE/IB
 1--OEA/SE/ITM
 1--CH/OEA/SEAD
 1--DC/OEA/SEAD
 1--PDB Staff (7F30)
 1--NIO/EA (7E47)
 1--NIO/W (7E47)
 1--NIO/NESA (7E47)
 1--NIO/ECON (7E48)
 1--C/NIC (7E62)
 5--CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
 1--C/PES/DDI (7F24)
 1--DDI (7E44)
 1--D/DCI/DDCI Executive Staff (7D60)
 1--C/DDO/IAD (3D00)
 1--C/DDO/EA (5D00)
 1--D/NESA (7G15)
 1--C/AI/D (7G15)
 1--C/AI/M ((7G15)
 1--D/OEAA (4F18)
 1--Senior Review Panel (5G00)
 1--CPAS/ILS (7G15)
 1--OEA/NEA (4G43)
 1--OEA/CH (4G32)

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1--OEA/Production Officer (4G48)
 1--NESA/Production Officer (7G15)
 1--C/EA/RR (5D10)
 1--D/OGI
 1--CH/LDA/AB
 2--DO/EA (5E28)

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Outside:

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 1--David Lambertson, Deputy Assistant Secretary
 1--J. Stapleton Roy, Deputy Assistant Secretary
 1--Michael Ussery, Deputy Assistant Secretary
 1--Edward Djerejian, Deputy Assistant Secretary
 1--Robert Duncan, Office of Economic Policy
 1--Richard Solomon, Director, Policy Planning Staff
 1--Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, Ambassador-at-Large
 for Counterterrorism
 1--Russell Surber, EAP/PIA
 1--Caryl Courtney, EAP/PIA
 1--Robert A. Benzinger, EAP/PIA
 1--David E. Zweifel, Neareastern and South Asian Affairs
 1--Director, INR/EAP
 1--George Harris, INR/Neareast and South Asia
 1--Paula Causey, INR/EAP

- 1--Judy Byrd, INR/Neareast and South Asia
- 1--Janean L. Mann, INR/North Africa and Arabian Peninsula

White House:

- 1--Donald Gregg

Defense:


- 1--Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs
- 1--Karl D. Jackson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
- 1--Edward W. Gnehm, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
- 1--Sandra Charles, Director, Neareast and South Asia, ISA
- 1--Charles Duelfer, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
- 1--Rear Admiral Edward B. Baker, Jr., ISA/ East Asia & Pacific Region
- 1--Rear Adm. William O. Studeman, Director of Naval Intelligence
- 1--Col. Jeffrey Levy, Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff
- 1--Lt. Gen. Leonard H. Perroots, Director, DIA
- 4--Chuck Downs, OSD/ISA/EAPR

- 1--John J. Sloan, DIA/DIO
- 1--Carl Taylor, Office of Foreign Policy Advisor, CINCPAC
- 1--Thomas W. Shubert, Policy & Plans, J-5, CINCPAC

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NSC:

- 1--James Kelly
- 1--Doug Paal
- 1--Robert B. Oakley



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