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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Indications of Hardening of Soviet Policy Prior to the U-2 Incident

1. In his blunt speech on 25 April in Baku, Khrushchev reiterated Moscow's maximum demands on Germany and Berlin in an apparent retort to high-level Western speeches on summit issues. His warning that a separate peace treaty with the East German regime would result in a total loss of Allied rights in West Berlin, as well as all means of access to it, and that "force would be met with force," was the most specific he had made since before the Geneva Foreign Ministers' conference last spring. By discussing the Berlin question in the general context of the May summit, Khrushchev again implied, without, however, specifically committing the USSR to such timing, that Moscow would take prompt unilateral action if the Western leaders rejected the Soviet peace treaty proposal.

2. Khrushchev opened the foreign policy section of his speech by noting: "I believe it to be my duty to point to negative phenomena in international life,

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phenomena which require a certain amount of watchfulness." He claimed that although there was a universal desire for relaxation of tension "a small group of adventurists, the inveterate militarists and revenge-seekers" constitute an exception to the general trend. He developed this line by expressing "some reservations" as to the summit conference:

> "The nearer May 16, the day of the meeting of heads of government, approaches, the more one-sided becomes the approach of some statesmen of the Western powers to the problems the participants of the conference will have to face. They talk about and fan those aspects of this or that problem...which cannot further the search for mutually accepted solutions. It goes without saying that such an attitude does not help the search for ways of solving important international issues. On the contrary, it leads to a maintenance of tension and consequently hinders the normalization of relations between states. There is no need to look far to find an example. Let us take a speech, recently made by the US Under Secretary of State, Dillon, and offered as a summary of US policy before the summit conference. This speech positively smelled of the spirit of the cold war.
>
> Dillon's speech reminds us, if anything, of a collection of prefabricated arguments...Dillon tried to introduce a stream of unfriendliness and mistrust on the very eve of the summit conference...If one goes by the statement of Mr. Dillon...it turns out that the US Government is ready to come to an agreement on the disarmament question and on the improvement of relations between the states of East and West only if its own viewpoint is accepted on the Berlin question."

3. Khrushchev then reviewed the questions of disarmament and Berlin, sharply criticizing American policy. "The Western powers," he said, "as in the worst years of the cold war, put the question of control first, and

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consider measures of real disarmament to be in fact something they can do without....Such control is, to give it its proper name, intelligence work—spying and not disarmament." He charged that "the aggressive circles in the Western countries hamper the reaching of an agreement on disarmament because they still hope to gather their forces and attempt once again to carry out the policy of strength, with the help of which they hope to liquidate the socialist states."

4. The Soviet Premier reserved his most belligerent language for the questions of Germany and Berlin. Asserting that Secretary Herter wished to "sidetrack" discussion of a German peace treaty at the summit, Khrushchev warned of the danger of accidental conflicts in Berlin which could lead to "catastrophe." He warned that the USSR would conclude a separate treaty with East Germany and that the "rights which the Western powers obtained as a result of the surrender of Hitlerite Germany will also lose effect, including the right to the further maintenance of the occupation regime in West Berlin." More specifically he stated: "The GDR (East Germany) will exercise sovereign rights over its entire state territory" and that the Western powers "would then obviously lose the right of access to West Berlin by land, water, or air." Khrushchev then proceeded to go beyond any of his warnings since mid-June 1958 of the consequences of Soviet action.

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He stated: "I must warn such hotheads, that when appeal is not made to right and law, when force is invoked, it is natural that force should be opposed by the force of the other side." The specific threat to Allied access and the reference to the use of force was the strongest and most far reaching since Khrushchev's speech on 19 June 1959 on the occasion of a visit by East Germans to Moscow.

* * *

A Brief Summary of Our Views of the Situation

1. We believe it likely that Khrushchev has for some time considered that the Summit Conference would be unproductive for the USSR. His Baku speech, as above indicated, showed a distinct hardening of his position. He probably saw little prospect of gain for the USSR in the Berlin issue.

2. The U-2 incident gave him an opportunity to break off the conference. By breaking on the issue of overflights rather than Berlin, he retains more flexibility to deal with the Berlin issue.

3. We also believe that Khrushchev and his associates are seriously and deeply concerned by the whole matter of U-2 overflights. They are seen as a dangerous invasion of the secrecy on which the whole Soviet system so largely rests. They feel that this serious breach in the security of the Bloc cannot be tolerated.

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BOOK I

U. S. AND SOVIET STATEMENTS

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Sequence of Events

3 - 25 May 1960

1 May -- Aircraft missing.

2 May -- Release by Base Commander, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

3 May -- Release in Turkey that NASA plane missing near Lake Van on weather reconnaissance mission (UPI)

5 May -- First statement by Soviet - - Khrushchev tells Supreme Soviet that American aircraft shot down over USSR.

White House announced President has ordered complete inquiry, results to be made public by NASA and State Department.

12:45 P. M. -- State Department announces unarmed plane with unconscious pilot may have violated Soviet air space.

1:30 P. M. -- NASA holds press conference, releasing statement on flight near Lake Van with background on U-2 and weather research.

6 May -- U. S. note to Soviet Union requesting full facts on Khrushchev's 5 May statement and information on pilot.

7 May -- Second Khrushchev speech to Supreme Soviet revealing information pilot alive, showing photos, and excerpts from Powers' statement.

6:00 P. M. -- State Department issues statement about intelligence collection.

9 May -- Khrushchev makes further statement at Czech Embassy reception. Reveals knowledge of previous flights, including July 1956.

DCI briefed Congressional leaders.

3:55 P. M. -- Secretary Herter issued statement on secrecy and authority for general program.

10 May -- Soviet Note protesting U. S. "policy" on overflights.

U. S. Note requesting permission to interview Mr. Powers.

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11 May -- Khrushchev gives press interview at Gorky Park exhibition of U-2. Cast doubt on invitation for President Eisenhower to visit Soviet Union.

12 May -- U. S. Note denying aggressive intent, stating willingness to participate in 16 May Summit meeting.

10:30 A. M. -- President made statement at press conference, stressing need for intelligence, nature of intelligence, attitude toward intelligence and main problems of which U-2 incident merely a symptom.

14 May -- NASA statement on Release of U-2 Aircraft for Flights.

16 May -- Khrushchev states preconditions for Summit meeting in Paris.

18 May -- Khrushchev issues statement before press conference breaking off Summit meeting.

25 May -- President's TV address on Collapse of the Summit.

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NAC

The Secretary in his statement of May 9 set out the compelling considerations of Free World security that motivated the United States to put into operation intelligence programs that included extensive aerial surveillance of the Soviet Union by unarmed civilian aircraft. The President in his statement of May 11 further stressed the essential nature of intelligence collection activities. He pointed out that intelligence contributes greatly to our security and thereby to the effectiveness of the deterrent.

These intelligence programs have been of great value to the security of the North Atlantic Alliance. They have enabled the U. S. to make military estimates, and to contribute with considerable confidence to those made by the military authorities of the Alliance. These contributions have substantially enhanced NATO military planning and hence the effectiveness of the NATO deterrent.

Soviet allusions to the invulnerability of their air defenses, based on the alleged "shoot down" of a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, are highly suspect in light of the known facts. Careful analysis of these facts raises serious doubt that the plane was brought down by a surface-to-air missile battery, as Premier Khrushchev has alleged, or by any Soviet defensive action. The Soviet press has printed the pilot's statement that he did not believe he was shot down, but that he had had engine failure. This supports the previous statements made by the designer of the U-2, who also believes that an engine failure occurred.

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Both Soviet official statements and press reports attributed to the pilot indicate that the pilot deliberately parachuted from the plane. Rather than a missile hit, the engine failure explanation is confirmed by the time element required for the pilot to assess his trouble as an engine malfunction and then control his aircraft for a safe bailout. A direct missile hit would deny the pilot any of the above actions. Moreover, the Soviet statements about the scattered wreckage and the numerous articles found in the cabin indicate that the damage to the plane occurred on impact with the ground. Further doubt is cast on the validity of Soviet allegations by the designer's statements that the wreckage first shown in photographs appearing in the Soviet press, and alleged to be those of the U-2, is in fact not of that aircraft.

Perhaps the most significant inference that can be drawn from the Soviet statements is the continuing great concern of the Soviet rulers over their vulnerability to attack from aircraft. Mr. Khrushchev admitted in his May 9 speech at the Czech Embassy in Moscow that the Soviet military had, "speaking mildly, slipped up" when they had an opportunity to shoot down an aircraft on April 9. The responsible Soviet military personnel had been appropriately dealt with for the failure, he said. The boasting and bluster of the Soviets about the effectiveness of their missiles probably are part of an effort to cover up concern about their air defenses and to convince the Soviet people and allies

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that the defenses are more effective than they really are. The fact that a single unarmed civilian aircraft, without benefit of protective countermeasures equipment and evasive and saturation tactics available to military aircraft, could repeatedly penetrate in daylight deep into the territory of the USSR, and that the Soviets, despite admitted knowledge of their presence, were unable to prevent such reconnaissance emphasizes the vulnerability of Soviet air defenses.

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