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STRATEGIC REVIEW
Summer 1981

Of Detente and Duplicity

FACING REALITY

By Cord Meyer
New York: Harper and Row
1980. 433 pages. $15.95

Reviewed by David S. Sullivan

Cord Meyer is a romantic legend in his own time—a Yale-educated former U.S. Marine Corps officer, a wounded World War II hero who flirted with the idealism of World Federalism only to confront eventually the reality of the Soviet threat to the very institutions on which this ideal could be based. He has crafted a fine autobiographical portrait which reflects some of the noblest philosophical values of the American liberal tradition, but also depicts one man's attempt to understand, and then to enter, the "Cold War."

Cord Meyer also exemplifies what is best in another American tradition—the tradition of service in intelligence. The only official of the Central Intelligence Agency to receive three times the CIA's highest award, its Distinguished Intelligence Medal, he was one of the Agency's wisest operators and executives of covert action. At the same time, his writings betray a breadth of perception and keenness of insight that put to shame most of those who labor on the "analytical side" of the CIA establishment.

The focus of Meyer's personal odyssey and professional analysis is on the relentlessly growing Soviet threat to America. The book provides a detailed exposé of successful Soviet operations—for example, in outmaneuvering the United States in Angola in the mid-1970s. Another highlight is a sophisticated and penetrating analysis of the inner workings of the most shrouded governing body in the world, the Soviet Politburo. Meyer's analysis also details authoritatively the KGB's organization and sinister *modus operandi*, including the organization of the typical KGB station abroad. He helps us to understand how disinformation, propaganda and myth are fabricated and purveyed by the KGB to the disadvantage of the West.

If there is a central theme in the book, this concerns the Soviet grand strategy that is clothed in "detente" on the one hand, and the sad record of U.S. analysts in grasping Soviet intentions on the other. Meyer posits that the men in the Kremlin make a "deliberate and continuous effort" to "mislead and deceive the outside world":

> Soviet leaders look upon detente, the SALT negotiating process, and the expansion of international trade as temporarily expedient tactics, designed to win time and opportunity for the successful achievement of . . . the defense and the strengthening of the "socialist system" . . . and the strengthening of the ties with new governments and with revolutionary progressive movements.

The evidence that detente was brilliantly conceived and deftly executed as a screen for the Soviet thrust to military superiority is by now overwhelming: even Soviet spokesmen are openly admitting that the USSR exploited the 1969–1980 decade of "peaceful coexistence" and SALT to mislead the West into complacency, while battening upon Western financial credits, trade and technology to sustain its strategic build-up.

According to Meyer: "The Soviets in the SALT I negotiations succeeded in winning crucial advantages by hard bargaining and by the deliberate concealment of the fact that new types of ICBMs were ready for testing." He thus lends his own authority to the evidence that SALT I represented an exercise in deceptive Soviet negotiation tactics. He also supports the notion that in SALT I the United States traded away its technically superior anti-ballistic missile defenses in the mistaken belief that it was achieving the trade-off of constraints on Soviet

Mr. Sullivan was a senior strategic and Soviet foreign policy analyst with the CIA for seven years and serves currently as an expert consultant with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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THE NATION
30 MAY 1981

USA-INC. STEPS IN

SCUTTLING THE SEA-LAW TREATY

DAVID DICKSON

Late in February, Fred Iklé, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under Presidents Nixon and Ford and now an Under Secretary at the Department of Defense, is said to have received a telephone call from Martin Anderson, chief domestic policy adviser at the White House. The pitch was relatively straightforward: would Iklé agree to help reverse the Department of Defense's support for the Law of the Sea Treaty? After seven years of protracted negotiations at the United Nations in New York City, the parties seemed on the verge of agreement. The Pentagon had been among the treaty's staunchest supporters because it would guarantee passage for its ships and submarines through the world's oceans and strategically important straits. In return, Third World countries would receive a share of the profits from deep-sea mining, collected and distributed through a new International Seabed Authority.

Anderson apparently told Iklé that the White House was having second thoughts about the treaty, on which recent progress had been made largely due to the efforts of President Carter's chief negotiator, Elliot Richardson, and was seeking support for a full-scale review. Iklé had little hesitation in agreeing with the White House's position, thought to have been largely based on arguments put forward by Director of Central Intelligence William Casey; it coincided with his own view that the freedom of the seas could be guaranteed by other means, and that access to strategic minerals was an important national security issue. On March 2, an interagency committee, chaired by Deputy Secretary of State William Clark, met to discuss the Administration's position at what was believed to be the final negotiating session, due to start a week later. Following statements in favor of the treaty by representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Iklé outlined his own reservations on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. Strong opposition had also come from other agencies, in particular James Watt's Department of the Interior. Later that day, the State Department issued a short statement. In light of "serious problems" with the current draft of the treaty, the department said, it was seeking to extend the negotiations and review its position.

Many observers feel that the outcome of this review will be a shift in the U.S. position that will effectively scuttle the 320-clause treaty, which covers a wide range of other marine-related activities like deep-sea fishing, research and navigation, by proposing changes unacceptable to Third World countries. The State Department made known that its main objections were to the parts of the treaty dealing specifically with conditions for deep-sea mining, and this seemed to confirm press reports that the Administration was responding primarily to pressure from mining companies. Although these companies are eager to get their hands on the vast underwater supplies of minerals such as manganese and cobalt lying in nodules on the ocean floor, they have remained strongly critical of several aspects of the draft treaty completed last summer—in particular its lack of a so-called grandfather clause protecting any investments made prior to the treaty's coming into force. The developing countries see such a concession as skewing the system in the mining companies' favor at the outset.

It soon became clear, however, that the Administration intended to expand the review to cover all aspects of the treaty, including those on which agreement had previously been reached—for example, rules for the regulation of marine research, or the protection of the marine environment. Furthermore, the U.S. delegation to the New York meeting announced that the review would not be completed until at least the fall, dashing any hopes that the treaty would be ready for signing in Caracas, Venezuela, in August, as scheduled.

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NEW YORK TIMES
28 MAY 1981

C.I.A. Ends Formal Background Briefings for Reporters

By PHILIP TAUBMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 27 — As part of an effort to tighten security and reduce the visibility of the Central Intelligence Agency, William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, has ended a long-standing agency policy of formally briefing reporters about nonclassified subjects.

The decision was made in late March but was not announced, and it has restricted formal, officially sanctioned contact between reporters and intelligence analysts. It has not affected informal communication, however.

Agency officials said the policy change reflected Mr. Casey's determination to lessen public awareness of the agency. It also served, they said, to remove symbols of openness that Mr. Casey believed had created an impression abroad that United States intelligence agencies had lessened an emphasis on secrecy in recent years.

Mr. Casey has also ordered a review of the agency's publication program, said an agency spokesman, Herbert E. Hetu. In recent years the program produced several hundred unclassified reports annually that were available to reporters and the public.

The reports and briefings have been sponsored by the agency's public affairs office, a department that some intelligence officials have long considered inappropriate for a Government agency that is supposed to operate in secrecy.

For many years the agency has sanctioned communication between reporters and intelligence analysts by arranging briefings about specific countries or issues.

Most requests for such sessions were initiated by reporters, Mr. Hetu said. On rare occasions, the agency invited a group of journalists to a briefing. In 1980 the agency, acting at the request of the White House, arranged several briefings about Soviet military activities in Afghanistan. Mr. Hetu said Mr. Casey's prohibition against briefings did not include those that might be initiated by the agency.

Requests from reporters for briefings covered a broad range of subjects, Mr. Hetu said. Journalists preparing for an assignment overseas, for example, often asked to be briefed about the region they would be covering. Others based in Washington frequently requested briefings when researching stories on the economy of a foreign country, the state of the world's oil supplies or the political climate of certain nations.

The briefings were usually held under rules that prohibited attribution to the agency or its officials.

Mr. Hetu said that the agency granted 125 briefings last year. In 1975, when the agency was being investigated by Congress, the agency arranged 247 briefings. The greater number reflected heightened interest in the agency as well as an effort by the agency to improve its public image.

The termination of briefings has not affected informal contact between reporters and agency officials. Many reporters assigned to cover national security and foreign affairs issue know agency officials whom they call for information.

Such communication is formally prohibited by C.I.A. regulations, which requires all agency officials to refer calls from reporters to the public affairs office. The regulations, however, are often ignored, particularly when reporters and agency officials meet at social gatherings or talk privately away from the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
27 May 1981

Press Access Halted To Analysts at CIA

Casey's Move Latest In Growing Secrecy

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

After years of controversy within the CIA over how helpful the agency should be to journalists, Director William J. Casey has halted a practice of making agency analysts available on a selective basis to answer reporters' questions about nonsecret subjects.

This tightening of the agency's information policy was decided upon March 27 but was not publicized. Queried about it yesterday, CIA spokesman Herbert Hetu said Casey felt that press briefings were an imposition on the analysts' time. Other sources said there were broader reasons of secrecy.

The decision came amid a general administration tightening of access to information relating to security and foreign affairs.

The National Security Council has become out of bounds to journalists. Both the State and Defense Departments are providing less information than they had in the past, with spokesmen rarely going beyond terse written material.

But the State Department still allows a fairly wide range of contacts between its officials and reporters, if somewhat less than in the last administration. At the Pentagon the large military public relations operation continues to arrange interviews on routine subjects not involving intelligence data.

Much of the information that journalists in Washington use in writing about security and foreign affairs comes from background briefings by government officials. People who are unwilling to be quoted by name as the source of published material often provide information that is attributed only to vaguely identified sources.

For about a quarter-century, the CIA has been among the infrequent providers of background information for American journalists. Foreigners were not welcome.

A reporter with questions about the Soviet economy or the North Korean political situation or the conflict in Chad could telephone the agency's unpublicized information office and ask for a briefing. Sometimes requests were turned down because a subject was too sensitive. Requests for information on a current crisis situation were usually denied on the grounds that CIA analysts were too busy.

But often an appointment was made for the journalist to drive out to Langley and talk with analysts — not the CIA's operations people or agents; just the analysts. Last year there were 125 such briefings. In 1975, when former Sen. Frank Church's committee investigations of the CIA sparked more interest, there were 247.

CIA people say there has always been some controversy within the agency about the practice.

Some officials felt that it was a worthwhile public service, a justifiable use of analysts' time and sometimes valuable as an exchange of material with well informed journalists. Others felt it was an imposition on analysts, that it could harm overseas operations, and that it hampered the CIA's exchange of intelligence with foreign agencies who worried about leaks here.

Asked for Casey's reasons for cutting off briefings, Hetu cited only the problem of imposing upon analysts' time. But other CIA officials said that was only part of the considerations, perhaps a minor part.

"A lot of our people never liked briefing the press," according to one official who declined to be identified. "They were always walking a thin line. They weren't supposed to use classified material, but to really make briefings on most subjects meaningful they had to get pretty close to it. It was uncomfortable."

Casey's decision reversed one taken by his predecessor, retired Adm. Stansfield Turner. When he became CIA director in the Carter administration, Turner decided to become more public about the agency's work. Hetu's office became more active.

One of Turner's orders was to make more CIA studies publicly available if that could be done without compromising secrecy. As a result, the sanitized or expurgated versions of an increasing number of classified studies have been circulated in recent years to Congress, the press, academic institutions and others.

Hetu said this publications policy was now under review.

National Security Council staff members have also been sources of background information for journalists for a number of years. But in the Reagan administration that has stopped.

Richard V. Allen, the council's head as President Reagan's security adviser, has given occasional background briefings on major topics of current interest. But, as part of the new administration's policy of playing down the NSC's role, he alone is supposed to talk to journalists.

The situation has become so sensitive that journalists now need escorts to go into the old Executive Office Building, where most NSC staff members have their offices.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
25 May 1981

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

CIA Appointments

The Post on May 16 reported that members of the intelligence community were critical of CIA Director William Casey's appointment of a non-CIA professional to be deputy director for operations at the agency. The Operations, or espionage, Directorate is the most sensitive element of the CIA and requires professional leadership. Yet Mr. Casey is ultimately responsible for how well the directorate performs. He is entitled to select his own team and should be judged on the results, not the appointment.

I received similar criticism in 1977 when I made changes and reductions in the Directorate of Operations. These proved to be eminently successful. Let's give Director Casey his chance without the burden of premature criticism.

STANSFIELD TURNER
McLean

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NEW YORK TIMES
24 MAY 1981

Letters

An Able Director Of C.I.A. Operations

To the Editor:

Your luridly titled editorial on Max Hugel's becoming Deputy Director for Operations of the C.I.A. ["The Company Mr. Casey Keeps," May 22] asks what prompted the appointment.

I had observed Mr. Hugel in action for a little over a year, some portion of that time at the head of the largest of the C.I.A.'s four directorates. I liked what I saw. When the vacancy developed, I concluded, after considerable consultation with my colleagues, that his drive, clarity of mind and executive ability would, in combination with the experience and professional skills in the operational directorate, offer the best way to both strengthen and effectively run that directorate at the same time.

That decision was my responsibility, and I can assure you it was made strictly on the merits, with no extraneous influence of any kind. I believe that the relationship of Mr. Hugel's abilities and experience to the experience and professional skills available to him and the requirements of the job is widely recognized among those who have worked and those who now work with him.

WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, May 22, 1981

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THE WASHINGTON POST
22 May 1981

New Intelligence Plan Reportedly Splits Key Aides

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

High-ranking CIA officials have encountered stiff resistance from the National Security Council staff about the shape of a proposed new executive order to govern the intelligence community.

The order is in its third draft and, according to informed sources, would restore some protections for civil liberties that were dropped in an initial version leaked in March.

The backstage debate apparently pits CIA Director William J. Casey and his top deputy, Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, against national security affairs adviser Richard V. Allen and his NSC staff.

The dimensions of the debate are not entirely clear, but sources said it involves both the content and the form of the new rules to be submitted to President Reagan for approval.

The NSC staff reportedly wants to abandon more of the restrictions on domestic spying imposed by the Carter administration than Inman and Casey have proposed on behalf of the intelligence community. The current draft is known as "the Casey-Inman version," but as one source put it, "it is probably more Inman than Casey."

In addition, Allen and his aides reportedly feel that it would be better to write an entirely new order rather than rewrite and edit the Carter decree.

"Remember the history," one source said. "The first executive order [for the intelligence community] came out under President Ford. The next one [in 1978] was Carter's, but it was really a cut-and-paste job from the Ford order."

As a result, another source said, the NSC staff is already "working on a totally different approach" while the intelligence community staff directed by Inman and Casey is considering still more revisions in its current draft.

"If you're thinking of buying stock in either side, don't do it yet," one source said. Asked when an executive order would likely be ready for submission to Reagan, he added:

"Either it's going to come very soon or very late. Either some people are going to be told what to do, or they're going to enter a very long process of negotiations."

Allen could not be reached for comment, but many of his views on the structure of the intelligence community are already on record by virtue of his chairmanship in 1979 of the Republican National Committee's Advisory Council on National Security.

The council urged, among other things, upgrading the Defense Intelligence Agency as a "new source of alternative analysis" and assigning to the president "his own chief adviser for intelligence matters" who would communicate the president's priorities to the intelligence community. The CIA director does that now in his dual role as director of central intelligence (DCI).

Inman made plain in March that he intended to do all he could to temper the initial proposal and limit the scope of changes it suggested. It would, for example, have given the CIA the power to conduct covert operations in the United States and allow it to use intrusive techniques now barred to it in this country.

Seeking to counter the furor accompanying the leak of the first proposal, Inman assured the Senate Intelligence Committee that "the job of the CIA is abroad" and stated publicly that he was doing his best to head off "a series of repugnant changes" that had neither his nor Casey's approval.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
22 May 1981

Attorney General Urges Repeal of Prosecutor Act

By Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writer

Attorney General William French Smith yesterday called for immediate repeal of the Watergate-inspired special prosecutor act, saying it had "severe constitutional problems" and is "unfair and wasteful."

At a news conference, Smith said that if Congress rejects his suggestion he will recommend that the act be narrowed to cover only the president, vice president and attorney general.

Smith also said that the attorney general, rather than a special court, should appoint the prosecutor, and that the outside attorney should be bound by the Justice Department's usual standards of prosecutorial discretion.

A Senate subcommittee heard testimony Wednesday from three Carter administration officials, who criticized the act but said the law should be retained after changes to prevent massive investigations of minor crimes such as the alleged use of cocaine by Carter aides Hamilton Jordan and Timothy Kraft.

Jordan and Kraft were not charged after lengthy investigations by special prosecutors. Critics of the act noted that it was unlikely that the two officials would have been investigated under normal Justice standards because federal drug enforcement authorities target mass distributors rather than individual users.

The news conference was the second held by Smith as attorney general, and aides acknowledged that it was scheduled in part to rebut a recent report in Business Week magazine that said he was off to a slow start and that the White House is decreeing policy on many issues.

Smith denied that the White House had set up a "pre-clearance procedure" to review department policy announcements, as the article reported. Any concept that there is White House "interference in the discretion that would normally be applied here is just plain wrong," he said.

On other subjects, Smith said:

- He is taking a serious look at combining the Drug Enforcement Administration and the FBI to increase the drug enforcement effort. He said the State and Treasury departments must play a more active role in fighting narcotics abuse.
- He would not characterize the American Civil Liberties Union as part of a "criminal lobby" as White House counselor Edwin Meese III did in a recent speech.
- He could not comment on the possible indictment of interim Teamsters Union President Roy L. Williams, but he noted that if he were a member of an organization whose leader was under indictment he would vote against "somebody who had that cloud."
- He supported the administration's effort to amend the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits American companies from paying bribes overseas. He said some of the act's provisions inhibit U.S. international trade, but he rejected a suggestion that his position could be seen as advocating bribery.
- He said he agreed with the stand of CIA Director William J. Casey in seeking authority to make warrantless searches of newsrooms in search of evidence about the disclosure of CIA agents' identities.

Smith said the reasons Casey "has advanced are persuasive" but resisted saying why he supported the idea. "He's better able to articulate his position," Smith said.

The administration is pushing a bill to ban the unauthorized disclosure of the names of CIA officers.

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