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The Nicaraguan External Propaganda Apparatus: Diminishing Returns



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An Intelligence Assessment

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GI 86-10078
November 1986

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The Nicaraguan External Propaganda Apparatus: Diminishing Returns [Redacted]

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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [Redacted]
[Redacted] Office of Global Issues, with a
contribution from [Redacted] Office of
Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. [Redacted]

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Foreign Subversion and
Instability Center, OGI, [Redacted]
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The Nicaraguan External Propaganda Apparatus: Diminishing Returns



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Key Judgments

Information available as of 5 September 1986 was used in this report.

The Sandinista regime has established a substantial and highly active external propaganda apparatus that has had considerable success in generating international support for the Sandinista regime. Dominated by the Sandinista National Liberation Front Department of International Relations (DRI), the apparatus is largely modeled on Cuban propaganda organizations and includes a news agency, Agencia Nueva Nicaragua (ANN), and various front and solidarity groups. Nicaragua has used this apparatus to push its main propaganda themes: the United States is a military aggressor, the opposition is illegitimate, and the Sandinistas are committed to political pluralism.



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Nicaragua's propaganda effort is aided by a large amount of Soviet Bloc assistance. Soviet front groups have held conferences, staged demonstrations, and sent solidarity brigades to Nicaragua in support of Sandinista propaganda objectives. Furthermore, ANN concluded technical accords with Cuban and East European news services and has an agreement with the Soviet news agency TASS for unlimited exchange of information. Moreover, Moscow recently provided Nicaragua with a satellite ground station that will result in all of Nicaragua's foreign television, telephone, and telegraph communications passing through the Soviet Intersputnik communications network, a sure sign that Moscow's influence will continue to grow.



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Despite the successes of the Sandinista propaganda program, Nicaragua has begun experiencing difficulties in maintaining a positive international image. The increasingly repressive nature of the Sandinista regime, exemplified by the expulsion of several prominent clerics and the closing of *La Prensa*, Nicaragua's only independent newspaper, has resulted in a waning of support, especially in Western Europe. Nicaragua is also experiencing financial and management difficulties in its propaganda agencies that could hamper Managua's ability to disseminate propaganda abroad. Economic constraints forced ANN to severely cut back its operations abroad in 1986. In addition, the Sandinistas are having difficulty funding conferences and other solidarity activities,



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Nicaragua's growing use of disinformation and its efforts to tighten party control over the propaganda apparatus have stimulated increased support from West European and Latin American leftist and solidarity groups that have long supported the Sandinistas. Nonetheless, we believe that such efforts are unlikely to reverse the overall climate of international opinion. Although the growing international disenchantment with the Sandinistas has not translated into support for US policies toward Nicaragua, it has increased criticism of the Managua regime. Moreover, Nicaragua's growing financial problems are likely to place considerable constraints on the propaganda apparatus. To overcome these problems, we believe Managua will be forced to rely more heavily on Moscow and Havana to support the propaganda effort. In our view, revelation of these growing ties and continued public exposure of Sandinista domestic repression could further undermine Nicaraguan propaganda efforts. 

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Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Key Judgments	iii
Introduction	1
Organization and Activities of the Government Propaganda Apparatus	2
The Central Role of the DRI	2
Establishing Its Own Foreign News Service	4
Front Groups and International Cooperation	5
Judging Success and Failure	6
Other Problems	7
Outlook and Implications	8
What Lies Ahead	9

Appendixes

B.	How It Works: Nicaraguan Propaganda in the Frontline States
	15

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The Nicaraguan External Propaganda Apparatus: Diminishing Returns [Redacted]

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Introduction

When the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) came to power in 1979, it moved quickly to establish a substantial external propaganda apparatus. Within the FSLN, the Sandinistas established organizations to oversee both internal and foreign propaganda. They also quickly asserted control over the Nicaraguan media by assuming ownership of all television broadcasting, two daily newspapers, and most radio stations and by heavy censorship of the remaining independent media. To augment the regime's international propaganda capabilities, the Sandinistas created a news service. [Redacted]

From the beginning, the Bloc countries have played an important role in the development of Managua's propaganda effort. Soviet-controlled front organizations began aiding the Sandinista cause even before the new regime assumed control. [Redacted]

[Redacted] the World Peace Council was planning a conference to support the Sandinistas well before the fall of Somoza. When the regime was established, Managua quickly linked itself to the Bloc propaganda network by establishing affiliates of Soviet-controlled international front groups. [Redacted]

In the organizations involved in external propaganda, Cuban influence is particularly evident. For example:

- The FSLN Department of Propaganda and Political Education, which implements the overall propaganda strategy and controls the state media, is modeled after the Revolutionary Orientation Department of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee. Carlos Fernando Chamorro, director of the department and the FSLN newspaper *Barricada*, has stated that his objective is to make *Barricada* more like *Granma*, the Cuban Communist Party newspaper.

- The FSLN Department of International Relations (DRI), which is responsible for foreign propaganda and dealings with "progressive" foreigners, was modeled after the America Department and the General Department of Foreign Relations of the Cuban Communist Party. [Redacted]

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- The DRI-controlled Nicaraguan Committee of Solidarity with the People (CNSP), which establishes solidarity groups abroad and maintains ties to national liberation groups, largely mirrors the functions of the Cuban Institute for Friendship Among Peoples (ICAP).

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- The General Directorate of State Security (DGSE) of the Ministry of Interior (MINT) has Cuban and Soviet Bloc advisers positioned within the office of the director and within all operational sections. [Redacted] Cubans supervise DGSE recruitment of foreign journalists as press placement and propaganda assets.

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[Redacted] Warsaw Pact assistance to the Sandinista propaganda effort has been substantial. Moscow has provided Managua with a satellite ground station and broadcasting facilities as one of its first economic aid projects in Nicaragua. The \$18 million project replaced former arrangements with Intelsat and links

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Nicaragua to the Intersputnik communications network operated by the Soviets for Bloc countries. Hailed by Nicaraguan leaders as an opportunity to replace completely US broadcasts with more ideologically sound programming, this project, [redacted] [redacted] resulted in all of Nicaragua's foreign telephone, telegraph, and television communications now passing through this Soviet network. Moreover, several Warsaw Pact countries have signed agreements to supply television programs and films to Nicaragua. [redacted]

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Organization and Activities of the Government Propaganda Apparatus

To manage and implement Managua's propaganda policy, the Sandinistas have established an interlocking network of party and government organs typical of Marxist-Leninist states (figure). The major themes and overall direction of Sandinista external propaganda are set by the FSLN National Directorate, with the Department of Propaganda and Political Education and the DRI assigned major responsibility for developing specific campaigns. We believe that, within the government, several organs also participate in the formulation and dissemination of external propaganda: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINEX), MINT, and the VDIR. These government bodies, however, do not formulate propaganda policy independent of the party apparatus. [redacted]

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The Central Role of the DRI

The DRI is the most important component of Nicaragua's external propaganda activities. It pushes the regime's propaganda agenda through several channels in coordination with other elements of the government and party. [redacted] communications between the DRI and its foreign contacts are maintained either directly from Managua, through Nicaraguan missions abroad, or in some cases through Cuban-controlled clandestine channels. The DGSE and VDIR use DRI foreign contacts to set up support networks for their operations abroad. This cooperation appears to be so close that it is often difficult to distinguish between VDIR/DGSE and DRI operations. [redacted]

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
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Structure of the Nicaraguan External Propaganda Apparatus



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Sandinista Propaganda and Disinformation Themes

Sandinista propaganda emphasizes three main themes: the United States is a military aggressor; the opposition is illegitimate; and the Sandinista regime is peaceful and democratic. To support these broad themes, Sandinista media highlight: US funding of the insurgents; alleged insurgent atrocities and human rights violations; presumed linkages of the opposition to the United States; worldwide solidarity with the Sandinista regime; and the proposed constitution as evidence of Nicaraguan democracy. [redacted]



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Although the regime continues to push these themes overtly, there are signs that the Sandinistas are increasingly turning to the use of disinformation to promote these themes:

- *In early 1986, Sandinista media began a campaign to link the Nicaraguan Catholic Church hierarchy to the insurgents and the United States. The campaign was broadened to include charges that Vatican organizations are connected to the CIA.*
- *On 11 January 1986, the Sandinista media carried an article that attempted to discredit the opposition Permanent Commission on Human Rights by linking it to the United States Government.*

- *To discredit US troop presence in Central America, in February and March 1986, pro-Sandinista media in Nicaragua and Honduras carried articles alleging that US troops in Honduras were guilty of molesting Honduran children and spreading AIDS among the population.*

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- *On 13 March 1986, Barricada carried a 12 March article from a small-circulation Swedish Maoist party newspaper that alleged that US intelligence services arranged Swedish Prime Minister Palme's death.*

- *A 28 June 1986 El Nuevo Diario article, sourced to Prensa Latina, carried remarks by the Nicaraguan Minister of Health who alleged that the United States may have caused an outbreak of meningitis in Nicaragua.* [redacted]

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became the official press agency of the Nicaraguan Government.



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Establishing Its Own Foreign News Service

Beyond the party and the government, the Sandinistas have made a considerable investment in developing a media presence overseas. In 1979 the Sandinistas created their own news agency, Agencia Nueva Nicaragua (ANN). Although ANN for several years maintained an appearance of being independent, it recently

To extend its reach, ANN established a network of bureaus overseas and pooled its resources with Bloc and leftist news agencies. By 1985 ANN had 10 foreign bureaus—in New York (UN), Washington,

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Paris, Mexico City, Brussels, Stuttgart, The Hague, Stockholm, San Jose, and Panama. ANN also joined a left-leaning pool of "nonaligned" agencies and formed a consortium with press agencies of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan insurgents, which operates from the ANN bureau in Mexico City. ANN concluded technical accords with Cuban and East European news services in 1980 and has an agreement with TASS for unlimited exchange of information. The Nicaraguan Journalists Union is allied with Soviet Bloc journalist associations, and the Sandinista television system has ties to the International Radio and Television Organization, a Soviet-controlled front.

[redacted]

Bloc press services have been very active in replaying Sandinista propaganda and disinformation. In August 1985, for example, TASS printed an ANN disinformation piece accusing the CIA of planning the assassination of a Nicaraguan bishop. In a campaign we believe was directed by Managua, Honduran media alleged US chemical weapons testing in Honduras last February, a story that was quickly replayed by Nicaraguan domestic media, TASS, and Prensa Latina.

[redacted]

Front Groups and International Cooperation

Building international support for the Sandinista regime has been one of Managua's main propaganda goals. Accordingly, the Sandinistas quickly established national affiliates of the major Soviet front groups, such as the World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), and the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY). Separate international solidarity committees and friendship associations also sprang up in 1979 in an effort to reach a broader audience than the Soviet-controlled fronts could provide. The Sandinistas, jointly with the Cubans, also created their own regional front, The Anti-Imperialist Tribunal of Our America (TANA), as well as affiliates of Latin American regional front groups.

[redacted]

Solidarity Brigades—Nicaragua On \$25 a Day

The Sandinista program of hosting solidarity brigades from abroad is a valuable propaganda tool for the regime. This program helps the regime:

- *Indoctrinate brigade members, especially US citizens and West Europeans, in Sandinista propaganda themes and encourage them to put pressure on their governments to support Nicaragua's policies.*
- *Recruit and exploit assets for propaganda and solidarity activities abroad.*
- *Demonstrate to both the Nicaraguan populace and foreign audiences international support for the Sandinista regime.*
- *Free up the Nicaraguan population for military duty by providing an alternative rural labor force.*

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[redacted]

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The activities of the brigades are coordinated by the Nicaraguan Committee of Solidarity with the People (CNSP), aided by Nicaraguan Embassy personnel abroad. Many of the brigade members are drawn from foreign Communist or leftist parties, Soviet front groups, peace groups, and solidarity and friendship groups.

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The Sandinistas use various methods to indoctrinate brigade members and exploit their presence in Nicaragua. Sandinista cadres work alongside the international brigades to indoctrinate them with Sandinista propaganda themes.

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International brigades have participated in Nicaraguan-sponsored, anti-US demonstrations in Managua.

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This network of front and solidarity groups plays an important role in promoting Sandinista propaganda.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Soviet front activities in support of Nicaragua have included a conference on Nicaragua sponsored by the WPC in Lisbon in 1984, and a solidarity week with Nicaragua sponsored by the WFTU in July 1985. In December 1985 the WFDY sent an international brigade to harvest coffee in Nicaragua in support of the "Nicaragua Must Survive" campaign. Several leftist West European peace groups have established a "peace center" in Managua to monitor alleged US aggression against Nicaragua. [Redacted]

TANA, founded in Managua in 1981, conducts propaganda activities against US policy toward Latin America and Nicaragua in particular. TANA publications describe the organization as being founded by Nicaragua sympathizers from Cuba, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, and Bolivia,

[Redacted]

[Redacted] TANA sponsors show trials of US policy and publishes a bilingual monthly magazine that features sensationalist anti-US stories. [Redacted]

In its propaganda campaigns, TANA works closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Nicaraguan solidarity groups overseas also play an important role in Nicaragua's propaganda apparatus. These groups coordinate campaigns on a regional basis and target international organizations in a fashion similar to Soviet-directed front groups. In October 1985, for example, a European Congress of Nicaraguan Solidarity Committees was held in Lisbon. The Congress, attended by the Nicaraguan consul general to Italy, reportedly discussed a plan to exploit the November European Communities meeting on Central America. [Redacted]

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We believe Nicaragua, until very recently, funded at least part of the activities of solidarity groups. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] We suspect that the Soviets and Cubans fund Nicaraguan solidarity groups in Western Europe, [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Judging Success and Failure

The Sandinista propaganda apparatus has had considerable success in generating international sympathy and backing, and the recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling will give it additional ammunition. Leftist groups, particularly in Western Europe, continue to stage frequent pro-Nicaraguan demonstrations, and European media still portray Nicaragua largely in a sympathetic light. Moreover, economic aid from Western countries, while decreasing, continues to flow into Nicaragua. In addition, Norway has recently opted to send a Peace Corps contingent to Nicaragua. [Redacted]

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Nevertheless, the regime's recent crackdown on opposition elements, particularly the closure of *La Prensa*, the country's only independent newspaper, and the

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expulsion of several prominent clerics complicate the ability of the Sandinistas to maintain a positive international image. Indeed, in Western Europe, early expressions of both public and government support for the Sandinistas have waned recently, especially after the state of emergency in Nicaragua imposed in October 1985. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Recent Embassy reporting indicates that the Italian Government and media, while falling short of endorsing US support of the Nicaraguan insurgents, now tend to be much quicker to criticize Managua's harsh domestic actions. [redacted]

[redacted] the Socialist International is becoming more critical of the Sandinista regime. In addition, [redacted] the Nicaraguan-sponsored "Nicaragua Must Survive" campaign has largely been a failure in West Germany. [redacted]

The Sandinistas also are experiencing trouble in getting their propaganda message across in Latin America, especially with regard to some Latin American governments. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Embassy reporting indicated that Venezuela had attempted to pressure Managua to sign the latest Contadora draft treaty and that Venezuelan officials warned Nicaragua that, if it did not sign the agreement, Nicaragua would become isolated and lose much of its support and credibility. Nonetheless, despite growing disenchantment with the Sandinistas, most South American democracies will not publicly support US aid to the Nicaraguan armed opposition and will continue to refrain from publicly condemning the regime to avoid antagonizing their domestic leftists and to demonstrate independence from the United States. [redacted]

Though the Sandinistas still receive considerable support from leftist constituencies in Latin America, there are indications that the public may not be as supportive as in the past. In December 1985 a "peace march" through Central America, which was organized by a WPC-affiliated Norwegian peace group and partly financed by Managua, fell drastically short of expectations. United States Information Agency public opinion surveys conducted in Costa Rica and Honduras in February 1986 revealed an overwhelmingly negative opinion of Nicaragua among the public, with the vast majority viewing the Sandinistas as an increasing military threat. [redacted]

[redacted]

Other Problems

[redacted]

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
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[Redacted] ANN seems likely, therefore, to function even less as a news agency and become simply a conduit for the distribution of propaganda abroad. [Redacted]

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
Outlook and Implications

In the near future, the Sandinista regime will be faced with a major propaganda challenge. Though support from leftist groups and solidarity committees in both Western Europe and Latin America is still strong, the Sandinistas have lost ground both in support from Western governments and in some areas of public opinion. The negative fallout from the Sandinista regime's repressive domestic actions, such as the expulsion of Bishop Vega and the closing of *La Prensa*, has made it increasingly difficult to sustain an image of political pluralism. Though the growing disenchantment with the Sandinistas has not translated into public support for US aid to the Nicaraguan insurgents, it has increased criticism of the Nicaraguan regime. [Redacted]

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To cope with these problems, ANN has recently become the official press agency of the Government of Nicaragua. This move will reduce confusion among diplomatic personnel abroad, who sometimes shunned ANN because they were unsure how to deal with a quasi-official entity. [Redacted]

ANN also is currently reorganizing its structure, funding, and services to make itself more competitive and economically viable. Other changes include the reduction of ANN staffs abroad by one-third in 1986; the merger of the ANN bureau in New York into the Washington bureau; and the closing of bureaus in Paris, Brussels, Stockholm, Stuttgart, and The Hague. [Redacted]



We doubt that these changes will alleviate ANN's problems given the poor quality of ANN material and increasing international criticism of the Sandinista regime. [Redacted]



The overall structure of the propaganda establishment is unlikely to undergo any major restructuring in the near future, but we believe the FSLN will exert greater control over all elements of the propaganda apparatus. The expansion of the number of party cadre at Nicaraguan missions abroad to ensure the implementation of foreign policy and propaganda objectives will, in our view, reduce the role of MINEX in the propaganda program and lead to stronger political control of propaganda operations. [Redacted]

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
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After the closings and staff reductions in its foreign bureaus, ANN will probably depend more heavily on TASS, Prensa Latina, and leftist sources to provide material and assist in disseminating stories worldwide. ANN has already begun attempting to fill these gaps.

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There have been some indications that the Nicaraguan regime wishes to establish a measure of independence from Moscow in its propaganda efforts.

[redacted] the Sandinistas have for some time been trying to establish direct linkages to West European leftists and peace groups without working through Moscow's network of front groups. Nonetheless, we are doubtful that Managua's propagandists will be able to step out effectively on their own. [redacted]

[redacted] the Soviets have been suspicious and resistant to Managua's efforts to work directly with European peace activists. Moreover, we expect Managua's financial problems to continue, forcing the Sandinistas to rely more heavily on Moscow and Havana and conceding further control over their propaganda effort to their Bloc allies. [redacted]

What Lies Ahead

In the upcoming months, we can expect the Sandinista regime to make an all-out effort to promote three current propaganda themes: exploiting the 27 June ICJ decision, advertising the draft Nicaraguan constitution as evidence of Nicaragua's commitment to democracy, and promoting President Ortega's 2 August "Chicago proposal" as evidence of Nicaragua's willingness to engage in constructive dialogue. Nicaragua has so far been successful in gaining positive international reaction and publicity for these proposals and will work hard to maintain its propaganda advantage. [redacted]

Nicaragua welcomed the ICJ decision, which largely upheld Nicaragua's charges that the United States is waging a war of aggression against Nicaragua, as an ideal situation to support its claims of the United States as a military aggressor and violator of international law. Managua used the resulting United Nations (UN) resolution, sponsored by Nonaligned Movement caucus in the Security Council, that called for US compliance with the ICJ ruling to its best advantage. Following the US veto in the UN Security Council, Nicaraguan press characterized the United States as an "international delinquent" and a menace to the international legal order. President Ortega, in several press conferences, took the opportunity to portray Nicaragua as a champion of international law. [redacted]

The Sandinistas' energetic promotion of the draft Nicaraguan constitution has paid off in the large amount of favorable publicity generated. Trips abroad by Nicaraguan officials in 1985 to hold "consultations" on the constitution have provided the Nicaraguan regime with numerous opportunities to portray the regime's commitment to political pluralism. As part of the regime's open town meetings to discuss the new constitution, a "National Conference on the Nicaraguan Constitutional Process" was held in New York in April and was judged a complete success by the Nicaraguan Government, according to Embassy reporting. The constitution has also given the Sandinistas further fuel for anti-US rhetoric. The Soviet news agency TASS replayed accusations by Nicaraguan officials that the United States was attempting to thwart the constitutional drafting process by pressuring Nicaraguan opposition parties to boycott the constitutional debate. The regime has tried to minimize opposition criticism of the constitutional process by lifting some political restrictions during debates on the draft. The Nicaraguan Government, in a MINT press communique, stated that the opposition parties represented in the National Assembly would be allowed free access to media to discuss the constitution. [redacted]

In a 2 August speech in Chicago, President Ortega announced a proposal stating Nicaragua's desire to conduct negotiations with the United States on a peace and friendship treaty, begin a dialogue with the Catholic Church, renew Contadora negotiations, and create a demilitarized zone in Central America. This "Chicago proposal" touched off a flurry of diplomatic and propaganda activity. President Ortega delivered messages to the governments of Contadora and support group countries, along with the governments of other Central American countries. Ortega also sent a message to Vatican officials to express a willingness to engage in dialogue on church matters. Vice President Ramirez traveled to several Latin American countries where he touted the "Chicago proposal" as a peace initiative. All of this activity was widely reported by Nicaraguan and Soviet Bloc press services as a major diplomatic coup. [redacted]

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The Sandinista regime will continue to push hard on these propaganda initiatives in the next several months, in an effort to recoup some of the support it lost because of its repressive domestic measures. Although Nicaragua has acted to put its domestic and foreign critics on the defensive, we believe the Sandinistas are vulnerable to public diplomacy campaigns that would expose the Marxist-Leninist nature of the Sandinista regime:

- Article 169 of the proposed constitution gives the president broad powers to direct the public administration, which appear to include the power to fill all government ministry positions with FSLN cadres.
- Article 149 grants the National Assembly, controlled by the FSLN, the power to cancel the legal status of the "entities of a civil or religious character," which could empower the suppression of opposition groups and the church.
- Article 177 names the national military as the "Sandinista Armed Forces," which clearly shows its political partisanship and makes it a true "army of the party."
- Article 214 prohibits the amendment of the constitution regarding the "popular character of the revolution," a FSLN phrase that is synonymous with "Sandinista revolution" and serves to impose the FSLN imprint on the constitution.

In addition, international exposure of Nicaraguan domestic repression and disregard for basic human rights could continue to undermine Sandinista diplomatic and propaganda initiatives.

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

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Appendix B

**How It Works: Nicaraguan
Propaganda in the
Frontline States**

Because of the presence of Nicaraguan resistance forces in Costa Rica and Honduras, the Sandinista regime sees these two countries as among its most important propaganda targets. Aside from the two main themes pushed by the Sandinistas in these countries—condemnation of the Nicaraguan armed opposition and opposition to US policies in Central America and Nicaragua—the Sandinistas also conduct some propaganda campaigns specific to each country. In Costa Rica, a large part of the propaganda effort is aimed at countering what the Sandinistas see as an anti-Nicaraguan bias in the Costa Rican media by focusing on general pro-Nicaraguan themes. In Honduras, the Sandinistas have been conducting an aggressive campaign against the US military presence there and have consistently portrayed the Honduran Government as being totally subservient to the United States. [redacted]

The Sandinistas employ a variety of propaganda methods in each country. Nicaragua makes a considerable effort in Costa Rica to cultivate leftists and work through them to influence the media, while in Honduras the emphasis tends to be on cultivating and manipulating journalists. In both countries, the Sandinistas seek to influence student groups. [redacted]





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

Honduras: Media Manipulation

The Sandinista campaign against the US military presence in Honduras has been extensive and aggressive. The campaign has consisted of allegations ranging from US chemical weapons testing to US troops spreading AIDS among the population and molesting Honduran children. Nicaragua also generates propaganda alleging human rights abuses by the Nicaraguan armed opposition present in Honduras. 

In the next few months, we expect Nicaragua to conduct a propaganda campaign in support of its case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accusing Costa Rica and Honduras of violating Nicaraguan sovereignty by allowing the Nicaraguan armed opposition to operate from their countries. Nicaragua will continue to rely on leftists and front groups in Costa Rica and sympathetic journalists in Honduras to aid in getting their propaganda message across. 

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