

*File
Landseer 10*

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MAS-A-984

Chief, Foreign Division M
Attention: [] []
Chief of Station, Vienna

15 November 1951

Operational
Landseer 10 Progress Report

1. Transmitted herewith is Contact Report #2, which covers the meeting between Landseer 10 and [] [] held in Bregenz on 30 October 1951.
2. The ground that was covered at this meeting, as outlined in the attached Contact Report, revealed little that would call for optimism as far as our future relationship with Landseer 10 is concerned. Although Landseer 10 would appear to be absolved of the suspicion that he was wittingly fabricating reports, it will be impossible to arrive at any definite conclusion until Landseer 10 has been thoroughly debriefed, on the same matters, at the next meeting. It is, however, certain that Landseer 10's basic attitudes towards the gathering of intelligence are such as to be conducive to the dissemination of even the most dubious of information falsely labeled as fact.
3. [] plans to attack all of the weak points in Landseer 10's explanations at the next meeting and to do some more extensive digging in his files. It also will be interesting to debrief Landseer 10 on his meetings with KVASHITKA, subsequent to his meeting with [] []. If, after talking to KVASHITKA, Landseer 10 is still of the opinion that KVASHITKA is his best and most productive source, it will be apparent that our concept of a source is so alien to Landseer 10's way of thinking, that there could be little hope that the quality of Landseer 10's sources and information could be improved.
4. In order to acquire as much material as possible for our final assessment of Landseer 10, [] [] plans to visit [] [] in order to get whatever information they may have, especially as regards Landseer 10's Swiss contacts. At the very least, it should be possible to acquire information with which to test Landseer 10 at the next meeting.
5. [] would also like to visit [] [] to discuss the matter with [] [] the day before the next meeting with Landseer 10, which tentatively is scheduled for the last week of November. If Headquarters should have any objections to a visit by [] [] to [] [] a cabled reply would be appreciated.

- 2 - Wash w/incls.
- 2 - Vien w/incls.
- 2 - Gals w/incls.

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CONTACT REPORT #2

SUBJECT: [] Meeting with Landseer 10, 30 October 1951

1. Opening of Meeting:

- a. The meeting was arranged by means of a letter to Landseer 10, in which a meeting was requested for 30 October at 1900 hours.
- b. Because of a cancelled train, [] did not arrive in Bragens until 2110 hours. [] walked to Landseer 10's apartment and arrived at 2130 hours. After an exchange of pleasantries and apologies for the late arrival of [] the meeting began.

2. Production:

Production was limited to a number of reports, to be discussed later in this memorandum, which were passed by Landseer 10 at the insistence of []

3. Operational Matters:

The major part of the meeting was devoted to a thorough discussion of the possibility that Landseer 10 was a fabricator. The discussion is outlined below, point by point:

- a. [] told Landseer 10 that there was a sensitive problem to be discussed, which was basic to the whole relationship. Landseer 10 was told that [] had done some research on a variety of reports, that had come to us from various sources, and that the only conclusion to be drawn was that either Landseer 10 or his sources were fabricating intelligence reports. Landseer 10 was told that [] would not be satisfied only with Landseer 10's explanations concerning the origin of certain reports, but that [] wanted to have access to all of Landseer 10's files. If [] were denied access to any part of Landseer 10's files, it would have to be interpreted as an admission of guilt on the part of Landseer 10. [] concluded by saying that he was going into the problem with an open mind, but that the burden of proof rested with Landseer 10.
- b. [] first outlined the KVASHITZA-HANUS-GASSNER complex (see Contact Report #1, paragraph 3, c (2)), as presented in the following three reports, and asked Landseer 10 to explain his role in the matter:
 - (1) Report #1: Information passed to CIC by GAJENSKI in March 1951, on the basis of information from KVASHITZA, stating that KVASHITZA and HANUS had visited GASSNER in Lichtenstein in April 1951, in order to inquire about the possibility of purchasing the plans and chemical formulae for the German V-3, which GASSNER was reputed to have in his possession.
 - (2) Report #2: Report passed by Landseer 10 to his headquarters in May 1951, stating that GASSNER was involved in East-West trade with the Russians. (Information contained in MAV-2889).

- (3) Report #2: Report passed to [] by Landseer 10 at the previous meeting, in which it was stated that HANUS had visited GASSNER in Lichtenstein on 6 September 1951 and had offered to sell him a cache of arms that had belonged to a Czech resistance group. GASSNER was known to be a weapons handler, who dealt primarily with the Arab States.

Landseer 10's first reaction was to utter a few choice words of profanity directed towards KVASHITZA. He then solemnly swore that he had known nothing of Report #1 above, and that KVASHITZA had first told him about GASSNER on 24 April 1951, which information was incorporated into Report #2 above. GASSNER had first been mentioned in conjunction with HANUS sometime in the middle of September. This was the first time that the name of HANUS had come to the attention of Landseer 10. [] then checked Landseer 10's card file. The card for HANUS indicated that only two reports were on file, one dated 9 October 1951 and one dated 30 October 1951. [] then requested and was granted permission to take these reports to his Headquarters. (The two reports are forwarded as Attachments 1 and 2 to this memorandum.) When asked where and when he had obtained the file check indicated in paragraph "d" of the report dated 9 October, Landseer 10 explained that he had obtained it through one of his German contacts shortly after his previous meeting with []. [] is requested to see the file check as received by Landseer 10. [] was shown a plain piece of paper on which the following information was typed in German:

HANUS Vladimir, single, textile worker, born 18 January 1927 in Bohusovice CSR, Czech citizen. Parents, Vladimir HANUS and Margit nee JANKOVIC. HANUS now living in Lindsau. According to an order of a German court in Lindsau on 16 January 1951, HANUS was sentenced to serve one month in prison for the passing of counterfeit money.

[] then asked if Landseer 10 did not think it likely that there was some connection between KVASHITZA's story about the counterfeit American money (See Contact Report #1, paragraph 3-e-(1)) and the fact that HANUS had already been convicted of passing counterfeit money. Landseer 10 admitted that this was possible. When asked what he intended to do as regards KVASHITZA, in view of the certainty that he had fabricated either Report #1 or Report #2 above, or both, Landseer 10 stated that he had no intention of checking KVASHITZA's case and tell him never to lie again. [] then expressed the opinion that such a course of action would be foolish and that Landseer 10 should drop KVASHITZA as quickly as possible. Landseer 10 replied that, except for a few slips, KVASHITZA was his most productive source and that his information usually "checked out".

- c. The next matter discussed was that of the Syrian Arken. The following reports were recalled for Landseer 10's consideration:

- (1) Report #1: Usage Report P/01812, dated 23 May 1950, author of which was Landseer 10. (A copy of this report is forwarded as Attachment 3 to this memorandum.) It was recalled for the benefit of Landseer 10 that this report stated that the Turkish Military Attache in Bern was seeking ex-German officers to be used for training the Turkish Army. It was also recalled that the Austrian helping in this matter was a certain Robert FITZNER, Bregenz, Vorarlberg, 3, who was serving as the middle man for weapons deals.

(2) Report #2: Report dated 21 August 1951 passed by Landseer 10 to his Headquarters. (Forwarded as an attachment to MAV-A-9610.) In this report, the source for which was listed as "G" in direct connection to Landseer 10, it was stated that Albert FITZNER, Bregenz, Weihenstr. 3, was serving in Syria as an artillery instructor. It was also claimed that one Dr. KRAFFTNER, also an Austrian military adviser in Syria, often visited the mother of Albert FITZNER in St. Margarethen, Switzerland.

NOTE: Source "G" is Kurt NUGENT. (See MAV-A-582 and paragraph "d" below.)

(2) Report #3: The Syrian Akten as given to [] and [] on 27 August 1951. This material included a summary allegedly written by MUELLER, which, in addition to a synopsis of the basic information, included a resume of the background of the material. According to this, the material had been acquired from the mother of Robert FITZNER, after the son had been killed in an automobile accident in Germany. (A copy of MUELLER's extract is forwarded as Attachment 4 to this contact report.)

Landseer 10 first requested to repeat the manner in which the Syrian Akten had been obtained. He stated that Robert FITZNER, brother of Albert FITZNER, had died in the summer of 1950 in Germany. Several months later, Landseer 10, who had talked to the mother of the FITZNER brothers several times in the past, approached her and requested permission to look over the papers left behind by her son Robert. She gave the material to Landseer 10, which made up all of the material that Landseer 10 has chosen to call the "Syrian Akten". Part of this material had been given to WISSENBERG, when he was passing himself off as a CIC man. The material had been returned and Landseer 10 believed that it had been copied. The material had never been passed to his "Zentrale". (Greengrocer 1.) Landseer 10 claimed that his sources for Report #1 (the Usage Report) had been Otto WINK and Kurt NUGENT. The material for Report #2, which had been passed to his Zentrale, had come from NUGENT, who had been listed as the only source for the material. Landseer 10 then went to great lengths to explain the different roles that had been played by the FITZNER brothers and appeared to be uncertain in his own mind. He said that he did not consider the basic similarities in Reports #1 and 2 such that there was reason to believe that either or both could be fabrications.

NOTE: In paragraph 2 of MAV-A-9610, [] recalls that additional material concerning German officers serving in Syria was received from Greengrocer 1 and was forwarded to Headquarters as a raw report. This would be a direct contradiction of Landseer 10's statement that the "Syrian Akten" have not been passed to Greengrocer 1. Headquarters can undoubtedly find some interesting comparisons between this original material from Greengrocer 1 and the material that is forwarded with this memorandum. Of special interest would be the source that Landseer 10 claimed for the material given to Greengrocer 1. It would be appreciated if we could be furnished with a copy of the raw report believed to have been forwarded to Headquarters.

d. The next problem discussed was that of Kurt HUGENT. The following reports were recalled for the consideration of Landsaer 10:

- (1) Report #1: Usage Report P/01488, dated 17 May 1950 (forwarded as Attachment 5 to this memorandum). This report, which was written by Landsaer 10, claims that HUGENT is definitely a French agent, who worked with a certain ELWOOD. It also stated that HUGENT occasionally gave information to the Austrian police. This report also claims that HUGENT was very active as a smuggler from 1945 until 1948 and that HUGENT had a close connection with a certain Adalheid FURBERG, suspected of being a Soviet agent, and that HUGENT himself might be a Soviet agent.
- (2) Report #2: Verbal report submitted to [] in April 1951 (see MAS-A-582). At this time Landsaer 10 had claimed that he met HUGENT in Bregenz in April 1951 and had recruited him as a source. HUGENT allegedly had been recruited into the Israeli I.S. in late 1947. In 1950 he had gone to Israel where he was used on intelligence missions by the Syrians, had been captured by the Syrians, doubled, and finally returned to Austria in March 1951.
- (3) Report #3: Landsaer 10's statement earlier in the meeting that HUGENT had been one of the sources for Usage Report P/01512, written in May 1950.

Landsaer 10 explained that he had known HUGENT since 1947 or 1948, but that he had recruited him as an official source in 1951, after HUGENT had been released from [] subsequent to his return to Austria. If Landsaer 10 had told [], at the April meeting, that he had met HUGENT for the first time, it was either a slip of the tongue or a misunderstanding. When asked why he had said nothing to [] about HUGENT's French activity and the suspicion expressed in the Usage Report that HUGENT might be a Soviet agent, Landsaer 10 stated that he did not think that the French angle was particularly important and that subsequent events proved that HUGENT was not a Soviet agent. He admitted that his report to [] had been somewhat lacking in detail. Landsaer 10 then claimed that he had not seen HUGENT since late June or early July of this year and had no idea where he might be at the present time. [] then requested to see Landsaer 10's cards and reports file. In the reports file [] found one six-page report on HUGENT dated 4 August 1951. (Report #284, forwarded as Attachment 6 to this memorandum). The report, in addition to a detailed account of Landsaer 10's relationship to HUGENT, contains a wealth of material concerning Landsaer 10's association with WERNER W. GAJEWSKI, and MATTHE. (See MAS-A-581, paragraph 3-c.) When [] asked that he would like to take the report with him for closer scrutiny, Landsaer 10 became quite nervous and expressed the fear that someone might ask for the report while it was gone. He then suggested that [] read the report and take notes on it. [] insisted that there was too little time for a thorough digest of the report and that, in any event, it would be necessary for the report to be photographed for our files. Landsaer 10 then read the report carefully and tried once again to dissuade [] from taking it. When [] still insisted that he wanted to take the report with him, Landsaer 10 agreed and requested that it be returned

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as quickly as possible, with the two other reports, by registered mail. [] then asked how it was that [] had ~~not~~ been told that HUGENT had been recruited by the Israeli IS in 1947, when the police report clearly showed that HUGENT had not been recruited until 1961, when he reported to the Israeli Military Attache in Ankara, Turkey, when he was returning to Austria from his journey to the Middle East. Landseer 10 believed that this had also been either a slip of the tongue or a misunderstanding. When asked how it was possible that HUGENT could have been one of the sources of the Usage Report written in May 1950, at which time HUGENT had not yet left the Middle East and presumably had no sources for such information. Landseer 10 said that he might have been mistaken in stating that HUGENT was one of the sources of this report and that the second source might have been Robert FITZGER.

NOTE: At this point Landseer 10 became very irritated and insisted that police report #884 dated 4 August 1961, which [] intended to have photographed, contained everything that he knew about HUGENT and that all of the information was completely true to the best of his knowledge. The portions of this report that pertain to the WINGENTHAL-GAJEWKI-MATTERS-LANDSEER 10 complex might be compared with the GAJEWKI interrogation report, forwarded as an attachment to MAJ-A-888. Unfortunately, no copy of this report was retained for the Halsburg files.

- e. Landseer 10 and [] then discussed the implications of the previous discussion and Landseer 10 expressed the veiled threat that he did not like to be "blackmailed". [] told him that it should be obvious that we were interested only in determining whether or not information had been fabricated and if so, by whom. Landseer 10 stated that he understood our concern and said that he also worried about fabricators and had recently taken extra precautions to check out the information given to him by his various sources. [] expressed the opinion that these extra precautions were in no way evident and that at best Landseer 10 had been guilty of extreme gullibility, carelessness, and a total lack of critical judgement.
- f. Landseer 10 then became philosophical and expressed his views on the gathering of intelligence. He said that he viewed the intelligence field as an apple tree and that the agent was the man who climbed the tree and shook down the apples. He felt it was the duty of others to sort out the good apples from the bad. When [] made the comment that agents of the genre of KVASHITKA and HUGENT were destined to shake down ten bad apples for every good one, Landseer 10 expressed the opinion that they were the only type of persons who travelled in circles that allowed them to find any good apples at all.
- g. Landseer 10 and [] also discussed the current status of Landseer 10's sponsorship. Landseer 10 claimed that for his October salary he had received 360 DMarks from MUELLER. This resulted in a discussion with MUELLER, during which MUELLER admitted that he had received the previous month's salary in D Marks but had changed them into Schillings. Landseer 10 then claimed to have told MUELLER that he had learned through ~~an~~ American contact that his funds were supposed to have been cut off.

Upon hearing this, MUELLER tried to get a physical description of Landseer 10's American contact, which Landseer 10 claims not to have given him. Landseer 10 told MUELLER that the American contact received no reports. Landseer 10 demanded to know from whom his salary was coming and MUELLER said that as far as he knew it was still coming from Utility. He added that he knew, however, that a statement had been given to the Americans to the effect that the payments had been stopped.

NOTE: Such a statement was requested from MANIE by [] and should have been received by now.

- h. At this point, [] asked Landseer 10 if STERNBACH would be suspicious if the funds from MUELLER should ever be cut off. Landseer 10 evinced great surprise and stated that STERNBACH knew nothing of his contact with MUELLER or the fact that he received funds from MUELLER.

NOTE: This statement would appear to be a flat lie if there is any truth to the information originating with MUELLER contained in NAVA-4833. According to this report, MUELLER was working directly for STERNBACH as early as 1949 and claimed to be employing Landseer 10 as an informant and to have paid him with confidential funds from STERNBACH, a fact which must have been known to Landseer 10. In view of this, it seems highly unlikely that STERNBACH is not fully informed as regards the present relationship between Landseer 10 and MUELLER. [] intends to take this matter up with Landseer 10 at the next meeting.

- i. When asked what further details he had obtained concerning KVASHITZA and the counterfeit American dollars in Germany, Landseer 10 was extremely vague and said that he had not had time to discuss the matter with KVASHITZA. He said that he was sure that KVASHITZA was still investigating and that he would try to get some samples of the counterfeit money for []. [] told Landseer 10 that it was obvious that this story was a complete fabrication on the part of KVASHITZA and expressed surprise that Landseer 10 could still believe that there was any truth in the story. [] then requested Landseer 10 to get the full details of the affair when he confronted KVASHITZA with the fabrication of the GASSNER story. Landseer 10 promised to do this and said that he would have a complete report for [] at the next meeting.
- j. When asked if he had written the report that had been promised on the "New German IS Service", Landseer 10 was equally vague and said that he had decided that he could not do so because he had been sworn to secrecy. He added that many of the members of the new service were old friends of his from the war period and that he felt that he could not betray their trust. [] did not press the point.

4. Operational Matters:

a. Control:

It would now appear that our potential control over Landseer 10 had definitely improved. In the process of pulling together many of Landseer 10's old reports, several very interesting documents came to light. The most important of these was Landseer 10's report to Usage (F/02446, dated 19 December 1960) concerning the French resistance move-

ment in the Tirol and Vorarlberg. In addition there are numerous reports concerning the activities of French IS personnel in the Vorarlberg area. All of these could be used to good advantage to turn Landseer 10 to the French. Although Landseer 10 was not threatened, he knows that this material is in our possession and it was made clear to him that we would not be beyond burning him if he did cooperate fully.

5. Personal Matters and BI Data:

Landseer 10 was the target of a mild attack by the Bregenz Communist Press as the result of some difficulties he had with his wife in the course of getting his divorce. He showed [] articles from the "Neue Tagesschau" of 2 and 3 October, in which it was claimed that he had thrown his wife down three flights of stairs when she had come to his apartment in the middle of the night to pick up two of their children. Landseer 10 claimed that the newspaper articles were full of lies and that the articles had been printed only to discredit him.

6. Close of Meeting:

Shortly before 0100 hours, 31 October, [] told Landseer 10 that in spite of the fact that many points of interest had not been fully discussed, he would have to leave in order to be certain of getting a room for the night. Landseer 10 offered to let [] sleep in his apartment, but [] politely refused. Before his departure, [] was given a brief lecture by Landseer 10 to the effect that his only desire was to be of as much help to the Americans as possible, that he would do everything in his power to correct any doubts that [] still might have about his integrity, and that he would look forward to meeting [] again for further discussion. [] thanked Landseer 10 for his cooperation and told him that the next meeting would probably be held the last week of November, but that Landseer 10 would receive a letter in which a definite meeting time would be suggested. [] left the meeting at 0101 hours.

7. Case Officer Comments:

- a. Although there is no indication that Landseer 10 wittingly fabricated or knowingly passed fabricated reports, there is every indication that his methods of operation are such that he disseminates many worthless reports. One, or both of the stories from KVASHITZA concerning GASSNER, is definitely fabricated. It is also certain that KVASHITZA's legend about the counterfeit U.S. dollars is a fabrication. Moreover, it is evident that Landseer 10 has been extremely careless in organizing his material and his facts, perhaps to the point of intentionally embellishing them, as in the case of the information he gave Landseer concerning HUGENT.
- b. One explanation for this might be Landseer 10's apparent conviction that intelligence information is worthwhile if it is interesting, regardless of the reliability of the source or the credibility of the information itself. This is adequately illustrated by his reluctance to drop KVASHITZA as a source and his childish belief that there might be some truth in KVASHITZA's legend about the counterfeit U.S. dollars, even after [] had proved that KVASHITZA was a low level fabricator.

Lansdale 10 still insisted that some of EVANS' information was found to be authentic. Moreover, he was not nearly so disturbed by that fact that EVANS was a fabricator as he was by the realization that EVANS had lied to him.

- c. One thing is certain, Lansdale 10 has demonstrated an abysmal lack of critical judgment. Information that he receives apparently is never correlated with information on the same subject that has come to his attention on previous occasions. He seems to accept most everything at its face value.
- d. [] intends to cover much of the same ground at the next meeting that was covered at this meeting. It will be interesting to observe Lansdale 10's reaction to the continuing process and also to record any possible alterations in his story. It should also prove most interesting to learn exactly how Lansdale 10 had handled EVANS.

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