

*June 54*

ANE's notes on handling I.D.  
if it is decided to handle him.

1. Subsidy of newspaper and personal contract for D should be used as factors of control. Since we will want strict control of operations, the paper will be useful to ease into this, as policy direction will suffice and he can gain the impression of actually carrying out the work.

2. Clandestine intelligence and possible guerilla or resistance matters, however, must find a change in D's concept, i.e., he may indicate the raw material, he and we may agree on some ultimate objectives, but we direct and handle the mechanics.

3. Intelligence. I feel that he should be called upon to review carefully potential infiltration persons - on the basis of single individuals, not teams. He should also be called upon to review possible contacts who will agree to work inside, and who are in a position to do so, and who have access to information of value. It should be stressed that a solid foundation of information must be laid first - after which consideration can be given to converting these contact inside to prepare for action, if and when it is decided to act. Also, it might be emphasized that success intelligence-wise is preliminary to, and a test of, further potential should action become advisable or necessary.

He would give us the names and identifying material and/or biographic data on (a) 5 to 10 infiltration agents, and (b) 5 to 10 internal agent possibilities. It would be stressed that he is not to stir up a lot of interest by inquiring around of his people (that is why, particularly in the case of infiltration possibilities, who would probably be refugees and on whom we will probably have some data, it would be sufficient to supply names and identifying data); somewhat more could be expected from him, himself, on the internal contacts.

He would be given to understand that these possibilities must be the cream of the crop, for on the success of this phase any consideration of continuing would depend.

After running traces and pulling together all facts available, we could consider the possibility of laying on a cross-border operation.

N.B.: If one or two ops were successful, we would have demonstrated a good potential. The actual operations would be left to the field stations involved, with D possibly as a shadowy aid to recruitment but no contact with his representatives in the region concerned.

4. Guerilla-Resistance. If and when it is decided to actively consider this phase, he should be asked to cull his ranks for up to 50 names and biographic data of persons who would be suitable for training as guerilla-resistance cadre leaders. After appropriate traces and

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2006

*Jan 54*

E

3

clearances, 10 to 20 might be selected for training (the goal being that they would not only be able to take part themselves in any ultimate action, but would be able to assist in training others). These should be selected on the basis of an all-around cadre; if, say, 15 were to be handled 10 might be general - leaders, material and arms experts (this not initially but the goal of the training), 4 W/T, and one medical man (the latter would specialize in medical needs of guerilla and resistance operations and be prepared to train medics and to take part in operations himself if necessary).

These 15 (hypothetical number) would be trained, not in Greece or Turkey, but, perhaps, in Saipan. All would emerge as qualified parachutists, trained in guerilla and resistance activities, and have added specialized emphasis, such as arms technicians, saboteurs, medical and W/T.

~~XXXX~~ I believe that, if carefully and cautiously selected, recruited and trained under, perhaps, some "Special Forces" cover, this cadre could be returned to, or placed, in some normal occupation, given refresher training (perhaps at an isolated part of some army installation) each year, and be preserved as a guerilla-resistance cadre, capable of training others and actually operating should the need arise.