

CONFIDENTIAL
Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 9, No. 2, Spring 1965

Miscellaneous

I CAN TELL IT NOW. Edited by David Brown and W. Richard Bruner. (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1964. 362 pp. \$5.95.)

This is a collection of almost two score past news stories, some hitherto untold, which stood out in the recollections of the contributors, members of the Overseas Press Club. Several of them touch, not sensationally, on intelligence interests.

Drew Middleton recalls how widely the Nazi invasion of the USSR, 21 June 1941, was foreknown not only in intelligence circles but to the public, to "everyone but Stalin." Middleton first heard in March from a British intelligence officer in Lisbon that the German plan called for the attack that spring. In May the word in Lisbon was that it had been delayed by the unexpected Balkan campaign (as indeed it had) but would take place about 20 June. In the first week of June Anthony Eden told correspondents that 120 divisions were deployed along the Soviet frontier and would move in sometime during the last half of the month. Middleton, paying tribute to British intelligence for getting this information, says "Soviet intelligence must have known of Hitler's build up"; he apparently hadn't heard of Sorge's warning to Moscow.

Sigrid Schultz reports, not very credibly, end of war conversations with Germans which revealed the Germans' intent to play the Russians and the Western capitalists off against each other as they had after World War I. One "carefully planned move" to this end was to preserve the Reich intelligence files on the United States and turn them over to the Russians, while on the other hand "Gehlen and his friends managed to put over a deal with the Americans by using his ample files [on the USSR] as bait. Germans boast . . . that we allowed him to set up his own 'Gehlen outfit' that retained its files, sent out its own agents, and handed over to the Americans only what Gehlen himself considered suitable while we were footing the bill for all these operations."

Bob Considine tells the story of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg's espionage activity and trial and ends with a gruesomely detailed eye-witness account of their electrocution, hers bungled and prolonged.

Four of the selections are centered on Communist leaders. Harrison Salisbury relates the mysterious apprehension in the Moscow atmosphere culminating in the announcement on 13 January, 1953 about the

CONFIDENTIAL
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
17 NOV 1993
6410

Recent Books: Misc.

Doctors' Plot and then the "frozen terror" that reigned until Stalin's death two months later. William L. Ryan, taking off from his recollections of Soviet leaders' indiscretions at an October Revolution banquet in 1953 which Khrushchev did not attend, reviews the former Premier's career. Jules Dubois writes about Castro's coming to power; he begins by quoting "Dick" Rubottom on the question whether Fidel was a Communist. "Every week we had a high-level meeting with all intelligence agencies in Washington and I always asked for such information and always received a negative reply." And Martin A. Bursten, with dubious authority, portrays Janos Kadar as a eunuch whose sole aim in life has been to survive.

Jules Bergman tells "The Unfinished Saga of the U-2," emphasizing not the political embarrassment of the Powers shoot-down but the compelling need there was for reconnaissance, the answer in "one of the most astounding demonstrations of intelligence work in modern history," the "colossal" value of the photographic take, and the role of the U-2 as forerunner of the A-11 and spy-in-the-sky satellites. Edward Hyme II reviews his own past coverage of the U.S. and Soviet space-flight programs. Although he complains that "the United States has been just as . . . secretive as the Soviets," he has managed to get hold of a number of secrets, including the fact that U.S. radar stations in Turkey monitoring Soviet missile launchings are huge installations with some "screens"—he must mean antennas—"as long as football fields."

Daniel C. Van Acken writes about the Cuban missile crisis, less from the intelligence angle than from the viewpoint of the UN and with gratitude that "enough men . . . took time out to think." And Jess Corkin, *Parade* editor, tells how he spent almost two years promoting a hot line to Moscow, winning approval from Eisenhower, Nixon, Kennedy, and Khrushchev but no action, before that crisis lent sufficient impetus to the idea.