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29 July 1958

SPECIAL

**NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 71 - 58**

FRANCE AND NORTH AFRICA

(Advance Conclusions)

Submitted by the

Director of Central Intelligence

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the

Intelligence Advisory Committee

on 29 July 1958. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

29 July 1958

SUBJECT: SNIE 71-50: France and North Africa

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable developments in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco over the next few months, with particular reference to their implications for the future western position in the area.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Developments over the next few months will be crucial to French chances of retaining a special position in North Africa. Failure of France to make substantial progress toward resolving the conflict in Algeria would increase strains in its relations with Morocco and Tunisia and would almost certainly strengthen the position of extremist leaders in North Africa. De Gaulle is trying to prepare the way for a North African solution by establishing his authority over the military and civilian "ultras" in Algeria, and by seeking to convince the Moslems that he is to be trusted. (Paras. 1-4, 7, 9)

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B. De Gaulle has been vague about his policy, but he may offer the Moslems hope by proposing some form of autonomy for Algeria. He attaches great importance to Moslem participation in the referendum and elections which are to take place in the early fall. Despite bitter FLN (Front de Liberation Nationale) opposition to Moslem participation, the French can probably secure the appearance of substantial Moslem support. We believe, however, that de Gaulle has less than an even chance to persuade the FLN leaders to cooperate with him rather than to set up a government-in-exile. De Gaulle's chances would be better if his relations with Morocco and Tunisia improved and they urged the FLN to accept moderate terms. (Paras. 2, 9, 10, 11)

C. The establishment of a government-in-exile, which could come at any time, would make negotiations between the French and the FLN virtually impossible. Although de Gaulle would attempt to develop alternative Moslem leadership, we believe that the FLN would probably continue sufficient resistance to prevent a settlement in Algeria. Morocco and Tunisia would feel compelled to recognize the FLN government, a move which would end friendly relations between these countries and France. Extremist and anti-Western forces throughout North Africa would be greatly strengthened, and their leaders would probably turn to Egypt and the Bloc for assistance and support (Paras. 12, 13, 14)

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(4)(5)