

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3 August 1961

For 41+42
encl. 10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD :

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SUBJECT : Developments re [REDACTED]

Set forth chronologically below are several developments re [REDACTED] some of which will require follow-up action on the part of addressees:

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1. Yesterday (2 August 1961) I authorized ACSI to disseminate certain [REDACTED] material to EUCOM and USAREUR. I had previously consulted Timm, and we had agreed that we could not dodge this. Today I informed Helms, and he approved.

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2. I talked to [REDACTED] about the pros and cons of cutting Bohlen in more deeply in the [REDACTED] case -- in view of the obvious advantage of getting his cooperation in the matter of internal support after [REDACTED] returns to Moscow. We agreed that if [REDACTED] comes out again, there might be some advantage in having Bohlen actually meet him, since [REDACTED] would be flattered by such attention. However, if [REDACTED] is ever picked up, his having met Bohlen would certainly be an embarrassment to the Department. I later mentioned this possibility to Helms, and he said let's defer consideration of it for the present.

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3. Yesterday afternoon Mr. Helms and I showed Bohlen the [REDACTED] material of the Vienna meetings. Bohlen reacted enthusiastically, saying it was "terribly exciting" and "the real thing beyond any shadow of a doubt." Bohlen went on to say that the significance of the material lay in:

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a. The extent to which Khrushchev had disseminated it abroad, especially among underdeveloped nations, and

b. The extent to which this dissemination constituted a commitment by Khrushchev from which it would be hard for him to back down.

4. Immediately after reading the material, Bohlen said the Secretary should be informed and went to the Secretary's office to do so. At

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

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Helms' instructions, I hurried to intercept the Director before the Secretary was informed. However, I missed connections since the Director was at that moment in the White House. As a result, the Director went to a meeting with the Secretary at four o'clock still unbriefed on the Vienna material, and at the meeting the Secretary mentioned the material to him.

5. Later when the Director met and talked to me, he was incensed and threatened to fire Bissell, Helms, and me. I explained how the situation had come about, assuring him that the Secretary had not gotten a piece of paper, but had only been told briefly of the existence of the material by Bohlen. I also explained to him our fervent efforts to get him before Bohlen got to the Secretary. The Director was entirely pacified and asked for a write-up of the material which he could show the President this morning.

6. When we talked to Bohlen, we obtained from him the very closely held American version of the Vienna talks to aid our translation. I assured him it would be used by only one officer and would be returned promptly.

7. Bohlen also informed Roger Hillsman of the existence of the Vienna material. This morning the Director briefed the President and showed him the Vienna material.

8. The Director later told me that the President was most enthusiastic and would like to be informed, after the transcript is completed, of the extent to which it varies from the American version.

9. This morning I delivered to Bohlen a translation of the decree calling for circulation of the Vienna material among the Communist Parties and the underdeveloped nations. He was pleased, and he said he would also like to have a copy of the Russian text, which we provided him this afternoon. In delivering it, [REDACTED] strongly emphasized the security aspects of this material.

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10. I also talked to Bohlen today about the British aspect, explaining that the British had the Russian transcripts and were awaiting word from us as to how to handle them. Bohlen said that since the President, Secretary, and top Agency and Department officials have

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now seen the material, he thought we could tell the British that for obvious reasons it was being very closely held in Washington, and we would appreciate their treating it with maximum safeguards on a most limited possible basis. I have asked [REDACTED] to include this instruction in a cable to London tomorrow.

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11. The Director told me this afternoon he had given one copy of the material on an 'eyes only' basis to Sheldon and would show the Director's own copy to Kent. The Director asked what we should do about getting the material to the Defense Department. I suggested that he consult Helms on this and later informed Helms of the foregoing.

12. [REDACTED] who has been in charge of pulling together for Bissell problems we have had with State Department ambassadors, and has been talking to Roger Hilsman in this connection, tells me that Hilsman has thrown at him [REDACTED] Thompson's recent agreement for the use of Abidjan. Hilsman argues that this proved that the State Department is always ready to cooperate if we have a legitimate need. I informed Helms of the resulting security implications of this discussion, but he and I agreed that there was nothing we could do about it at this stage.

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13. I received from Oldfield and turned over to [REDACTED] interesting material from [REDACTED] about GRU use of a specially equipped automobile. [REDACTED] will examine this material and recommend the best way of getting it to the Bureau.

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John M. Maury

JOHN M. MAURY
Chief, SR Division

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