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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Intelligence-to the Level of Modern Tasks", by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

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Enclosure

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Intelligence-to the Level of Modern Tasks", written by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov.

This article appeared in the 1960 First Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. The First Issue of 1960 was the initial issue of this special collection.

Headquarters Comment: Related articles from the same Soviet publication were published as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. The Field Service Regulations cited on Page 11 were disseminated as [REDACTED].

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Intelligence-to the Level of Modern Tasks

by

Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov

The development of new equipment, the use of nuclear explosives, and of such delivery vehicles as missiles, have confronted military science with one of the urgent problems of the present day -- that of preserving the combat effectiveness of troops. The solution of this problem in almost all the armies of the world takes the form of perfection of the organization of troops and of their technical equipment, of the development of means of antiaircraft defense, of reconnaissance (razvedka) equipment, of methods for the antiatomic protection of troops on the field of battle, and of a number of other measures.

All the types of operational and combat support of troops must be developed and perfected in harmony with the development of the armed forces as a whole. One can have perfect organization of troops, unexceptionable means of controlling them, excellent missile equipment at all levels of the military organism, and strong and mobile means of antiaircraft defense, but if we forget one aspect of troop support, especially the development and perfection of reconnaissance equipment and the issue to intelligence subunits of this equipment, this will immediately influence all spheres of combat activity of troops, and especially that of the use of missile weapons.

Even so important a type of support of the troops as antiaircraft defense will also depend entirely on the ability of reconnaissance equipment to detect targets in good time and to warn the means of combat with the enemy in the air.

Our probable enemies are devoting very great attention to the development of technical reconnaissance equipment at both tactical and operational levels. They are introducing in divisions and armies, on a very wide scale, such reconnaissance equipment as: radar, television, heat sensors (teplolokator), and photographic equipment for ground and aerial photography. From divisional level upwards, all this reconnaissance equipment is available in both ground and aerial versions. Specially equipped aircraft and helicopters have been introduced into the Tables of Organization and Equipment (shtat) of divisions and armored regiments. Intensive work is being conducted on the evolution of pilotless equipment for aerial tactical and

operational reconnaissance. Several modifications of pilotless equipment for aerial reconnaissance have already been developed and tested.

In the armies of the North Atlantic bloc countries, no less serious attention is devoted to the training of intelligence units for reconnaissance and diversionary operations in the rear of our troops. Thus, in the armies of Great Britain, intelligence regiments specially assigned to the conduct of reconnaissance against the disposition of our troops have been introduced into the composition of an army corps.

NATO member-countries must include in the composition of their divisions assigned to the allied armed forces, reconnaissance equipment which is capable of performing reconnaissance tasks against objectives which are liable for destruction by nuclear weapons.

The development and improvement of reconnaissance equipment will permit more successful use of missile units and of aircraft to combat the enemy's means of nuclear attack. Attention must therefore be paid to reconnaissance not only as a type of combat support for the troops in the development of theoretical situations at command-staff and troop training exercises; it is mainly necessary to possess the necessary reconnaissance forces and equipment during peacetime and to prepare and perfect them carefully.

In actual fact, how do our present army and division intelligence subunits differ from those of the Second World War? The difference lies only in the fact that amphibious tanks and armored carriers have been brought into the composition of the intelligence subunits of divisions and armies, as a result of which these subunits have acquired great mobility. However, just as there was previously no technical reconnaissance equipment in intelligence subunits, there is still none today. The Tables of Organization and Equipment do not provide intelligence subunits with equipment for optical reconnaissance, or with infrared equipment, heat sensors, or other technical reconnaissance equipment.

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It should be noted that the technical reconnaissance equipment of a front has not experienced any fundamental changes. Agent networks and radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance, with the exception of aerial reconnaissance, are not capable of carrying out reconnaissance tasks for the missile troops with the necessary precision in determining the location of the target in a particular area.

It must be admitted with complete frankness that modern reconnaissance equipment, in the form in which it appears organizationally and in the way in which it is technically supplied, has lagged far behind the level of development of weapons of destruction. Without belittling the role or the significance of tried reconnaissance equipment or of its methods of operation, one can say without exaggeration that this equipment can no longer fully meet the tasks imposed on reconnaissance in furnishing missile units with intelligence data.

Existing divisional and army intelligence subunits (units) permit the organization of reconnaissance by observation, at best, with the help of ordinary binoculars, by the execution of raids and ambushes, and during combat by the dispatch of a reconnaissance detachment or of separate reconnaissance patrols whose range of operation is limited by the capabilities of existing means of communication which may reach 30 kms, which is obviously insufficient. Under the most favorable terrain and weather conditions the artillery reconnaissance equipment of a division and of an army can carry out reconnaissance to a depth of 10 to 15 kms, and, with their help, it is possible to obtain information on mortars, field artillery, the movements of the enemy, and the progress of engineering works, but only up to the limits of direct visibility.

We venture to assert that the function of the intelligence service is not valued highly enough by us; were this not the case, there would not be so vast a gap between the capabilities of weapons of destruction and of those of reconnaissance equipment.

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It is necessary to remember that in many respects modern operations will differ from those of previous wars. Some of the special features of these operations, it may be assumed, will consist of the tendency of both sides to carry out continuous combat operations directed, first of all, at the destruction of the means of atomic attack both on the ground and in the air; the destruction of the means of atomic attack before they are used will result in unprecedented reconnaissance activity by both sides with the goal of not only locating these means but of destroying them by all possible sabotage methods, both during the period of preparation and during the actual course of the operation.

The constant threat of destruction by nuclear weapons will result not only in the maximum possible dispersal of troops in areas of disposition but also in the carrying out of combat operations in broader zones.

No one will deny that the preservation of the combat effectiveness of troops in modern conditions, and consequently the successful execution of any operation, and especially the use of missile units, will, to a marked degree, depend upon the timely performance of the following tasks:

- acquiring knowledge of the grouping of delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads and, equally, of the plants producing fuel components, of assembly bases and warhead storage depots;
- acquiring knowledge of the control and guidance systems of guided missiles and pilotless weapons;
- immediate destruction of the means of nuclear attack, without timing this to coincide with specific operational-tactical periods.

With existing technical reconnaissance equipment, neither a division nor an army can perform the tasks listed above, because they do not have at their disposal sufficient personnel and, even more, enough reconnaissance equipment. There is now a tendency toward the reduction in force of intelligence subunits

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which have already been reduced to the maximum. We have not a single organ, even at the center, which is working on the problems of the technical equipment of intelligence subunits at the tactical and operational level.

One asks how the commander of an army or the commanding officer of a division who lacks the most essential intelligence information and the equipment necessary to obtain this information can make well-founded decisions and utilize successfully his own means for the destruction of the enemy's means of atomic attack?

With the existing organizational structure of military intelligence, almost all the technical reconnaissance equipment which is capable of obtaining information on nuclear weapons is basically present at a front. The tasks of annihilating means of nuclear attack will be decided on by the commanding officer of a division and by the commander of an army. Hence, in the very organizational structure of the intelligence organs there is a rift between intelligence assets and the command echelons which organize the immediate fulfillment of important operational and tactical tasks.

The lack of technical reconnaissance equipment in a division, corps, and even an army during the Second World War resulted in the fact that these echelons solved the majority of the intelligence tasks by requests to higher headquarters. Thus, a division forwarded its requests for intelligence to a corps, the corps to an army, and [4 or 5 words missing].

The principle of solving intelligence tasks by means of requests to higher headquarters has outlived itself long ago and is obviously not suitable in modern conditions. Firstly, it impedes the activation of all intelligence assets at division and army level; secondly, and this is most important, it impedes the development and introduction of modern technical reconnaissance equipment into a division and an army; thirdly, this principle has become a cover for inactivity by subordinate headquarters in the problems of organization and of carrying out reconnaissance.

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The limited availability of intelligence personnel and equipment and the eagerness of commanding officers at all levels to receive intelligence information on objectives of direct interest to them in the shortest possible time, makes it urgently necessary to make the concept of the prospective operation (battle) the basis for the organization of reconnaissance, in order to ensure that all available intelligence personnel and equipment are used in the most purposeful manner from the beginning to the end of the operation (battle). Such purposeful use of intelligence personnel and equipment can be determined only by the commander (commanding officer) who has detailed knowledge of the intention and plan of the prospective operation and battle.

Regrettably, there are still commanding officers of divisions and commanders of armies who do not allot proper significance to intelligence problems, who farm out all the work pertaining to intelligence organization to the intelligence chiefs, which brings about a lack of purposefulness in intelligence.

In order to accomplish the tasks of discovering the grouping of the enemy and especially of his nuclear weapons, it is necessary to have strong, technically well-equipped intelligence subunits at division and army level which are capable of performing tasks which are within the range of their own means of destruction. The need for the availability of a variety of technical and other reconnaissance equipment in a division and an army is also expressed by the fact that information obtained from one source should not be considered as reliable until it is confirmed from two or three sources.

At the present time statements of opinion are appearing in periodicals on the formation of some type of joint centers for the utilization of reconnaissance equipment, for the collection and processing of intelligence data, of fire delivery centers and, about the endeavor to provide more reliable communications for all intelligence organs of the front with artillery headquarters, etc. All of this appears to be linked with the noble intention of finding ways to resolve the basic problem -- the reconnaissance of the means of nuclear attack and the provision to the missile units of targets for destruction. However, this has nothing in common with the problems of intelligence organization. The

resolution of the problems of intelligence organization and the acquisition of intelligence data should be sought not by the creation of some type of improvised centers, but by the correct distribution and structural organization of reconnaissance assets able to perform intelligence tasks for a division, an army, or a front, and also in the centralized utilization of the reconnaissance equipment of the arms of troops.

The real centers for the organization of intelligence must be combined-arms staffs in the form of intelligence sections, departments, and directorates (otdeleniye, otdel i upravleniye). However, in order not to exclude the chiefs of other arms of troops from the intelligence system, provision must be made for an organizational structure in the composition of these arms of troops, with intelligence equipment capable of performing intelligence tasks for the given arm of troops.

The approximate layout of the organization of intelligence should be as follows. The combined-arms staff, with the active participation of the arms of troops, organizes reconnaissance, collects, analyzes, and collates all intelligence data. On the basis of a thorough analysis it determines the general grouping of nuclear means, the grouping of tanks, the means for control of nuclear weapons, and the grouping of the pilotless weapons and aircraft of the enemy. On the basis of this information, the commander (commanding officer) decides on the execution of the operation (battle). The chiefs of arms of troops, having received specific tasks and targets for destruction, study these targets together with the divisional, army, and front intelligence chiefs before delivering the strike, and organize additional reconnaissance of the objectives (targets) with their own and with the combined-arms assets. From this it follows that in the combined-arms staff a single intelligence plan must be developed which provides for the use of all the intelligence personnel and equipment of the arms of troops. Specific intelligence tasks, such as: the topographic and geodetic work of the artillery, engineer reconnaissance of terrain, of the passability of roads, etc., must be reflected in great detail in the intelligence plans of the appropriate arm of troops. In our opinion, such a principle of organization and execution of intelligence will permit the tasks of reconnoitering those objectives of the enemy which are liable for destruction by nuclear weapons to be fulfilled more successfully.

Conditions for the conduct of modern operations urgently demand a most attentive and serious review of the organizational structure

of military intelligence organs from top to bottom.

The idea of providing command echelons with reconnaissance equipment in accordance with the tasks levied on any particular troop element must be implanted in the organizational structure of the intelligence organs. Therefore, in the composition of an army and a division, it is necessary to have reconnaissance equipment that could obtain data of interest to the commander of the army and the commanding officer of the division. This necessity results from the fact that the role of armies in modern operations and, correspondingly, the role of the division in a battle, has increased. The modern army (combined-arms and tank) is capable of the independent performance of operational tasks concerned with the destruction of the enemy in wide zones and to a great depth, and of the conduct of combat against the enemy's means for nuclear attack. The absence from an army (combined-arms and tank) of organic (shtatnyy) reconnaissance equipment puts the army commander and the army headquarters into a position of dependence upon the front headquarters, and this paralyzes their initiative in questions of the conduct of combat against the nuclear means of the enemy.

The high mobility of the use of nuclear weapons (as a rule there will be only one firing from each position) calls for a highly mobile means of reconnaissance. Today such a means is aerial reconnaissance, which is capable of penetrating enemy positions to a great depth, and of obtaining in a brief period of time the most reliable documentary (dokumentalno-podtverzhdayemyy) intelligence data on sizeable areas.

For this reason, the composition of combined-arms and tank armies must include organic means for tactical aerial reconnaissance. These must be capable of performing a great number of tasks, for example, of carrying out visual reconnaissance by day and night, of taking aerial photographs of objectives (areas) and of correcting the fire of the army's artillery. Aerial reconnaissance in support of the army must be carried out to a depth of not less than 200 kms. Reconnaissance aircraft must carry one-step photographic processing equipment capable of independent processing of the results of aerial reconnaissance directly in the aircraft in order to shorten to the minimum the time needed for processing and montage. In our view, in order to perform the tasks indicated, a combined-arms or tank army must have in its composition a tactical aerial reconnaissance regiment $\sqrt{3}$ or 4 words missing $\sqrt{7}$.

The means of radiotechnical intelligence are mainly concentrated at the front. Combined-arms armies have very weak radio intelligence companies, while tank armies have none at all. Radiotechnical intelligence can obtain highly valuable data on enemy troop groupings, on his posts and radar means for guiding missiles, pilotless means, and aircraft. On the one hand, the fact that radiotechnical intelligence equipment is available only in the front significantly reduces the potentialities of radio intelligence, since the front's means are not capable of intercepting tactical, operational, and aircraft radio nets, and on the other hand, because the transmission of radiotechnical intelligence data to an army, and also, occasionally, to a division, requires much time.

Because of this, the need has grown for a substantial improvement in the radio and radiotechnical intelligence of an army in order that the latter may perform the tasks of uncovering radio nets from battle group to field army level inclusive, and the radar stations of guided-missile subunits and the control centers and posts of his pilotless weapons, and of the tactical aviation located in the tactical and immediate operational depth. For the performance of these tasks it is necessary to introduce an OSNAZ (osoboye naznacheniyе-special designation) radio battalion into the composition of an army (combined-arms and tank) and to give it organizational strength. Such a radio battalion should be equipped with more highly-perfected radio and radiotechnical equipment with good protection against jamming, which should be mounted on mobile means with good cross-country ability.

In order to improve the capability of an army's long-range radio intelligence surveillance of ultra-shortwave and radio-relay nets, helicopters equipped with radio reception and tracking (priyemo-slezhechnyy) apparatus are needed in the composition of OSNAZ radio battalions.

The presence of breaches, gaps, and exposed flanks in the operational and tactical disposition of enemy troops creates conditions for the deep penetration of the enemy's positions by strong reconnaissance detachments with the aim of reconnoitering the approaching reserves of the enemy and of his nuclear means, with the destruction of the latter. To perform reconnaissance

tasks against exposed flanks and breaches and for penetrations into the deep rear areas of the enemy with the aim of reconnoitering and destroying means of nuclear attack, it is desirable to bring a reconnaissance regiment into a combined-arms army, and to retain it in a tank army. It is desirable to have reconnaissance battalions in motorized-rifle and tank divisions.

The reconnaissance regiment of a combined-arms and tank army must have a uniform organization, and must include in its composition no less than three reconnaissance battalions: two battalions to carry out reconnaissance as reconnaissance detachments and one battalion to carry out reconnaissance in depth. Reconnaissance battalions, in their organization, armament, and equipment, must be capable of the independent performance of reconnaissance tasks both as whole battalions and by companies, as well as by platoons, at a considerable distance from the main forces of the first echelon of the army. As regards firepower, the armament of the battalions must be powerful and mobile, and the tanks must be equipped with perfected equipment for underwater operation.

Troop exercises have shown that groups specially trained for reconnaissance in depth are a most valuable source of intelligence data on enemy means of nuclear attack. A deep reconnaissance battalion should provide, from its own composition, for the formation of 30 to 40 reconnaissance groups. The presence of such a battalion in the composition of an army will provide for reconnaissance of the enemy's means of nuclear attack up to a depth of 100 kms.

In the composition of a regiment there must also be suitable communications facilities to ensure the control of deep reconnaissance groups and of the reconnaissance detachments of the army to a depth of not less than 100 kms. The composition of an army must include aircraft and helicopters specially designated to land deep reconnaissance groups in the enemy's rear area. The technical equipment of the helicopters must enable them to make night landings on unprepared terrain.

The need for effective reconnaissance equipment in a division is dictated by the fact that a divisional area of advance of up to 12 kms is already established by the Field Service Regulations.

The possibility that a division will operate on even broader areas in the future is not excluded. Under these conditions, a division will have to perform independently numerous reconnaissance tasks such as: reconnaissance of the enemy's tactical nuclear weapons; discovery of his troop groupings and of the nature of his defense in tactical depth; reconnaissance of water barriers for the purpose of enabling tanks to cross on the bottom, and a number of other tasks. To perform the above-mentioned tasks, the reconnaissance battalion of a division must have in its composition not less than two reconnaissance companies, a deep reconnaissance company, an engineer-chemical and radiation reconnaissance platoon, a communications platoon, and a maintenance subunit.

A reconnaissance battalion must be capable of carrying out reconnaissance both in companies and in platoons, and groups equipped for movement away from roads and able to force water barriers without additional crossing equipment. Under modern conditions these demands are best met by amphibious tanks and combat reconnaissance patrol vehicles (boevaya razvedyvatelnaya dozornaya mashina - BRDM) which have high cross-country ability over any terrain and which can pass any water barriers. The armament of a battalion must not impede its mobility. It must be equipped with recoilless weapons and machine guns mounted on BRDM's, i.e., the armament of each individual battalion and company must enable it to engage in a brief battle with a high volume of fire in the interests of reconnaissance. Battalion subunits must be equipped with the requisite optical, infrared, and lightweight radiotechnical means of reconnaissance.

The reconnaissance equipment of a front element (zveno) should consist primarily of technical means and of a competent agent net capable of performing intelligence tasks throughout the entire depth of the front's offensive operation. The organizational structure must ensure that intelligence data are rapidly collected, processed, and transmitted to interested commanding officers and troops without passing through unnecessary intermediate channels.

For the performance of a large number of reconnaissance tasks in the discovery of means of nuclear attack and for the carrying out of continuous additional reconnaissance of targets already detected, it is desirable to have in the composition of a front

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one or two regiments of operational, and one regiment of tactical, aerial reconnaissance. In the composition of each regiment of operational reconnaissance there should be squadrons of day and night photo-reconnaissance and infrared equipment. The need for night reconnaissance in each regiment is due to the fact that troop regroupings and the occupation and shift of firing positions of the means of atomic attack will be carried out by the enemy primarily during the night.

For the allocation of tasks and the control of aerial reconnaissance assets, it is necessary to have an aerial reconnaissance department in the intelligence directorate of a front headquarters.

To process the results of aerial photography, instead of a temporarily established center for photo-interpretation at the intelligence directorate of a front, there should be an appropriate number of photo-interpretation officers in the operational reconnaissance regiments capable of carrying out the operational and tactical photo-interpretation of targets and of determining their coordinates.

At present, aerial radiotechnical reconnaissance equipment is located at the air army and in the radiotechnical regiment (OSNAZ) of a front. To centralize the control and processing of intelligence data, it is advisable that this equipment should be concentrated in the radiotechnical regiment (OSNAZ) with 12 to 15 radiotechnical reconnaissance aircraft, which will enable it to conduct reconnaissance on a 24-hour basis to a depth of 400-500 kms. The radio intelligence (OSNAZ) regiment of a front should be left at its present composition.

For the conduct of intelligence collection against enemy means of nuclear attack and nuclear weapon storage depots located in the operational depth, and for their destruction, it is advisable to have one or two battalions of special designation in a front. With the goals of acquiring experience and of creating reserves of intelligence officers, it is necessary, even in peacetime, to have a company of special designation in the composition of a military district.

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The experience of troop, staff, and special intelligence exercises shows that in modern short-duration forms of combat, the control of reconnaissance equipment, the timely collection of intelligence information, and its dissemination to subordinate headquarters and troops assume very great significance. Maintenance of communications with the reconnaissance organs by command and headquarters networks is not always possible. In such cases, much time is expended in the receipt of intelligence data, and consequently the value of these data is partially lost. A need has therefore arisen for the creation of special intelligence communication nets, providing communications with reconnaissance organs which have been dispatched, with the chiefs of intelligence of subordinate staffs, and with deep reconnaissance groups and reconnaissance aircraft. In order to ensure stable communications with all reconnaissance organs it is necessary to have the requisite communications equipment, which should be included in the Tables of Organization and Equipment of divisional, army, and front communications units.

It is especially desirable to stress that our troops do not yet have radio sets which are light-weight, compact, rapid and of high-speed operation (bystrodeystvuyushchiy), ensuring the stable communications which are so necessary in providing communications with deep reconnaissance groups; this significantly impedes the operations of the groups and the maintenance of communications with them.

In our view, the realization of all these measures will permit more efficient use of all reconnaissance equipment, timely receipt of intelligence data, and more successful utilization of modern means of warfare.

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