140

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

23 FEB 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "To Develop the Theory of Soviet Military Art", by Admiral V. Tributs

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Artilces of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
30 JUN 1992

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT [redacted] MILITARY THOUGHT: "To Develop the Theory of Soviet Military Art", by Admiral V. Tributs

DATE OF INFO : October 1960

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "To Develop the Theory of Soviet Military Art", written by Admiral V. Tributs.

This article appeared in the 1960 Third Issue of a special version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It is distributed within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. The 1960 Third Issue was sent for typesetting on 17 October 1960.

Headquarters Comment: The article cited on page 11 was disseminated as [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

To Develop the Theory of Soviet Military Art

by

Admiral V. Tributs

The decision of the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, on the publication of a Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", in which materials dealing with the most pressing problems of today in the development of the theory of military art will be published, merits a salute. This decision will find wide approval and support from all command personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The development by marshals, generals, and admirals of new military-theoretical problems, and the publication and comprehensive discussion of the corresponding materials, will facilitate the development of Soviet military art and the working out of unified views on the nature and methods of waging armed combat with the use of means of mass destruction, missile weapons, and the newest military equipment.

It must be noted that up to the present time the development in our Armed Forces of the most acute and pressing military-theoretical problems has been of a timid nature. This work, which is very important in content, scope, and rate of execution, is still limited.

As a result of this, for a number of years we have not been able to overcome the gap which has arisen between the level of development of the means of destruction and their delivery vehicles and the theory of military art. The latter obviously lags behind and does not keep up with progress in the area of means of mass destruction, missile weapons, and combat equipment in general.

In developing the theory of military art, we must proceed from a quite clear understanding of the fact that under modern conditions wars will not proceed as in the past.

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

They will bear little resemblance to previous wars. In view of this, one should speak not so much of the necessity for revising the theory of military art, which will lead us only to partial solutions, as of a new, revolutionary approach to the development of the most vital military-theoretical problems which have appeared before us in recent years.

Modern armament which permits, in essence, an unlimited increase in the speed and scope of destruction, demands not simply a revision but the fundamental development and creation of a new theory of military art, conforming completely to the potentialities of the latest means of combat. At present it must be developed in conformity first of all with the means of mass destruction and missile weapons, the development of which leads to a radical change in the structure of the armed forces as a whole.

Among modern military problems, one of the most important places undoubtedly belongs to the problems of the situation of threat and the initial period of war. To approach the solution to these problems correctly, it must be quite clearly understood that the situation of threat and the initial period of war are not farfetched, but are completely objective strategic categories. It is impossible, therefore, to agree with those authors who assert that under modern conditions war can begin suddenly and that the situation of threat will not occur at all. Such assertions are patently false. The situation of threat will always occur but its characteristic indicators and duration may be extremely diverse. Specifically, there may also be a variant of the situation of threat when its duration will be very, very short.

However, one cannot even conjecture such helplessness of our military leadership and intelligence in which the direct preparations of the aggressor for surprise attack on our Homeland will not be detected to a certain extent. There exist a significant number of indicators which we must know, consider, and know how to uncover. These indicators will enable one to proclaim in advance the period of threat, accomplish the necessary measures for the

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

final completion of preparation for war, bring to complete combat readiness all forces and means for the delivery of immediate and crushing strikes on the aggressor, and also for the organization of defense, protection, and speedy elimination of the consequences of the first strikes.

The threat situation may be characterized by such a status of international relations that as a result of a sharp aggravation of contradictions between the states of the Anglo-American imperialist coalition and countries of the Socialist Camp, the threat of the immediate outbreak of war will become so real that it will be necessary to reorganize the armed forces, the economy, and the entire life of the country quickly in accordance with wartime demands. The situation of threat does not appear at once and its tension will increase in accordance with the aggravation of contradictions, complication of the international situation, and the execution by the aggressor of a series of military, economic, and other measures directed at immediate preparation for military attack. On the eve of the Second World War, the German-Fascist command carried out similar operations over a long period. This complex was to some extent known to the leadership of our country and the military command.

Specific signs of the rise of the situation of threat comprise a complicated number of socio-political, economic, mobilizational, and military measures being executed by the probable enemy with the goal of the immediate unleashing of a war. Not only the birth, but also the nature, of the situation of threat may depend on these measures.

At the present time, for the imperialist states, socio-political measures acquire exceptionally important significance among the various directions of preparation for future war. Characteristic indicators of the birth and development of the situation of threat in this area may be, for example, acute activation of ideological indoctrination of the population, arousing in it a national-chauvinistic and revanchist mood, intensification of propaganda of an alleged military threat from the states of the Socialist Camp, and broadening the activities of various fascist and pro-fascist organizations. To these ends, the enemy will make broad use of radio, television, the press, and various forms of socio-political activity.

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

At the same time, active preparation of the population for various types of defense will be carried on.

In the area of economics, there may take place such phenomena as a sharp increase in the rate of output of military industry, expansion of its reserve potential, conversion of enterprises of various branches of industry to intensive fulfilment of military orders, limiting the supplies of raw materials having a strategic significance for enterprises producing articles for civilian consumption, and a number of other measures directed at supporting the development of the armed forces and accelerating the preparation for war. The nature of the ocean and sea transportation of the probable enemy and activities of his merchant fleet will change.

The relatively high readiness of a portion of the forces and means of the probable enemy in peacetime which supports the possibility of sudden initiation of military operations, does not preclude the necessity for him to conduct mobilization, even though it be a partial one. Its basis will obviously be the extensive preparation of the forces and means of the second and subsequent strategic echelons of the armed forces which are impossible to maintain under peacetime conditions. These measures will include the callup from the reserves of enlisted and officer personnel and the intensification of their training, transfers of leading command personnel, dispersal of material-technical stocks, taking military vessels out of storage, mobilizing ships of the merchant fleet, developing mobile shore bases and new bases on the unimproved seacoast, etc.

One of the most important indicators of the situation of threat may be measures of the enemy in preparing his naval forces for specific operations: changing the areas and nature of operational and daily combat training of aircraft carrier large units and missile-carrying submarines, movements of aircraft carriers under the guise of training cruises, training exercises, or movements to bases and ports of states continguous to us, the appearance of aircraft carriers and missile-carrying submarines in zones of ocean

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

and sea theaters of military operations from which they can utilize missile weapons and carrier aircraft against our coast and rear areas of the country.

Significant changes in the nature and setup of military communications, radio counteractions, etc., can be observed. The deployment of forces and means of various types of defense and protection, especially antimissile and antisubmarine ones, will obviously assume wide proportions.

It is especially important to consider that there will occur a significant intensification of all types of intelligence and the activiation of intelligence operations of the enemy with broad use of various technical means. The number of flights of his reconnaissance aircraft and pilotless means of observation, and also violations of our air space will increase. The number of enemy submarines conducting systematic observation of the coast and possibly also the number of violations of our territorial waters by various vessels and ships will increase.

This enumeration of possible indicators which can accompany the beginning and complication of a situation of threat is far from complete (the majority of them, to one degree or another, appeared before the start of the Second World War in 1941). Careful monitoring, study, and comprehensive appraisal of these indicators in their dynamics and interdependence has, for us, very important significance. In this it is necessary to bear in mind that the basic measures executed by the enemy with the aim of preparing for the immediate unleashing of a war will be carefully concealed and conducted with great secrecy.

In view of this, the activity of our intelligence, which in the threatening period must be activated to the maximum extent, gains paramount importance. It must uncover the nature of the enemy's preparations to begin a war and make it possible for us to frustrate all attempts for a sudden attack on our Homeland. The

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

development of modern technical means of intelligence will have decisive significance in the first place to assure effective operations of submarine and air forces against enemy aircraft carrier and missile carrier large units.

Considering the intentions of the probable enemy and his preparation for the sudden and perfidious unleashing of a war, we must orient ourselves to the least favorable variant of the situation, when the duration of the situation of threat will be extraordinarily short.

Considering these conditions, our Navy is faced with a number of difficult requirements:

-the basic forces of the fleet (submarine and aviation) must be continually maintained at the highest level of combat readiness for immediate use of their weapons;

-indispensable stocks of weapons and means of material-technical support must be dispersed and made invulnerable to strikes on them by the enemy beforehand (in peacetime);

-duty forces and means and also forces and means of all types of defense, antiaircraft (PVO), antisubmarine (PLO), antimine (PMO), etc., and protection must be at a high level of readiness for their immediate use;

-efficient organization and method of preparation of missile weapons for their immediate dispatch to large units, units, and vessels, which still requires a significant amount of time, must be worked out beforehand;

-advanced organization and performance, in specific threatened areas of ocean and sea theaters of military operations, of systematic and reliable reconnaissance, with the aim of uncovering first and foremost the nature of the operations and intentions of missile carrier and aircraft carrier forces of the enemy;

-maintenance at a high level of readiness of the means of controlling forces and the entire communication system.

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

Under modern conditions the initial period of a war acquires extremely great importance. Our entire strategy must be purposefully directed so that in this very period of armed combat we may make maximum utilization of the full might of nuclear and other means of destruction and thoroughly predetermine the fate of the enemy.

The top-priority mission in the initial period of a war must be the frustration of a sudden attack by the enemy and the infliction on him of immediate and crushing strikes with the use of all the latest means of destruction.

The determination of the specific content and duration of initial operations does not enter into our mission. Very many diverse variants may be proposed for this. However, one thing is clear -- that the main content of the combat activities of our armed forces in the initial period of war will consist of missile operations in which missile and strike forces of the fleet missile-carrying submarines and missile aviation will also take part.

The effectiveness and success of combat operations in the initial period of a war, to a great extent, will depend on the degree of understanding of the missions assigned to us and the knowledge of the peculiarities of war under modern conditions. It seems expedient to us to point out that further elaboration of problems of the initial period of a war must lead to the singling out in the theory of military art of a special and relatively independent area - the initial period of a war. This will make it possible to raise to a higher level the elaboration of problems, both of the situation of threat and the initial period of a war.

Without touching on the general and extraordinarily important problem connected with determining the structure of the armed forces, which will be solved under the influence of the new situation, when the basis of their entire striking power even now is the missile troops, we shall attempt to throw light on some questions relating to the Navy.

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

Undoubtedly the structure of the Navy under the influence of the development of weapons and technology has changed sharply and will change in the future.

Now the basic striking power of the Navy will be composed of submarine forces equipped with missile weapons and long-range torpedoes, and also missile aviation. At particular stages of a war, these strike forces may be strengthened by allocating missile large units from the reserve of the Supreme High Command. The basic composition of the Navy will also include the forces required for protection of the coast and our own sea communications lines. These will be surface vessels equipped with missiles and antisubmarine weapons, and coastal missile units. Finally, the Navy must have special forces required to accomplish the missions of antisubmarine and antimine defense (antisubmarine defense vessels and aviation and minesweepers), intelligence forces (reconnaissance aviation), and a number of other forces.

Not only in a structural but also in a qualitative sense, the modern Navy will radically differ from the Navy of the period of the Second World War and the subsequent years.

We must bear in mind that in a future war we will have to deal with an enemy with a strong Navy, who places great significance on ocean and sea axes with the goal of preparation for and execution of sudden attack by aircraft carrier and missile carrier forces. Therefore, the simplification and narrowing of the missions of the Navy which are going on are premature and completely unjustified measures. On the contrary, under modern conditions the missions of the Navy will become especially critical and more complicated, and the role of the Navy in a future war, if the imperialist aggressors unleash it, will, undoubtedly, grow.

First of all, it is necessary to point out that our Navy will perform missions of an offensive and defensive character in close coordination with the missile troops and other types of armed forces in complete conformity with the unified strategic concept and war plan. Obviously, such missions may be:

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

-destruction of the main aircraft carrier strike large units, missile-carrying submarines and groupings of antisubmarine forces of the enemy;

-frustration and disruption of ocean and sea communications lines by destroying convoys and transports at sea and annihilating naval bases, ports, and economic centers located on the coast;

-supporting our troops in their offensive and defensive operations in coastal areas, in the capture of straits and the coastline in straits zones;

-protection of our own naval communication lines.

The destruction of strike aircraft carrier large units and missile-carrying submarines of the enemy will have paramount significance for the elimination of the threat of strikes launched by the enemy from the direction of the ocean and sea. This is one of the most important missions of the Navy, the fulfilment of which becomes most pressing during the initial period of a war.

The destruction of various coastal objectives, including naval bases and ports, and also the destruction of enemy vessel forces located in them, will be executed by naval forces, both independently, and jointly with the missile troops.

The accomplishment of the enumerated basic missions of the Navy in ocean and sea areas contiguous to the theaters of military operations in Europe will support our troops in the execution of swift offensive operations. At the same time we shall note that in various naval theaters of military operations, depending on the general course of armed combat, other missions of a most diverse character may face the Navy.

In the series of new missions now facing the Navy, it is necessary to single out an especially important mission, which is that we must assimilate missile weapons at an accelerated pace and learn to use them skilfully and

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

effectively from submarines, surface vessels, and aircraft, as well as from the shore. New weapons become a real and formidable force only when they are thoroughly and skilfully mastered by the personnel of the armed forces. This applies in full measure primarily to missile weapons.

At the same time one also cannot underestimate those types of weapons with which we are still armed and which for some time will not lose their combat value. It is natural that we not only do not have the right to lose the skills acquired in their effective utilization but are obliged to improve them continually.

In the article of Colonel-General A. Gastilovich[1] a highly important question is raised connected with an estimate of the possibility for our troops to carry out the defense of the coast against landing forces. However, in our view, these questions did not receive proper elucidation in the article. Its author proceeds from the assumption that in a future war the enemy will not be able, and will not try, to conduct large-scale landing operations with decisive goals, and therefore the author approached the solution of this question of defense against a landing, in what may be called a somewhat oversimplified manner, with which it is in no way possible to agree.

From an analysis of the operational training of the armed forces of the Anglo-American bloc, exercises and maneuvers conducted in recent years, estimates of the nature and direction of construction of naval forces, and from official documents, one is forced to the conclusion that the probable enemy in a future war not only will not reject such an effective form of conducting offensive operations on a strategic scale as large-scale landing operations, with the aim of capturing territories and broadening the front of armed combat, but on the contrary will execute them very widely. The execution of such operations by the enemy is possible even in the initial period of a war. Therefore, one should not be guided by the fact that the enemy will not try to invade the European

---

1. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", First Issue, 1960.

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

or any remote theater of military operations by means of large forces. Our attention must be directed to the study of the operating methods of the enemy in landing operations and to devising effective methods for counter-action and elimination of his attempts to execute such operations.

Special attention in this must be paid to the study of enemy methods of landing airborne forces, subsequently reinforced by amphibious landing forces.

The postulation of such a mission is, in our view, more correct. Profound and comprehensive knowledge of these questions will make it possible to organize successful combat against enemy landings. It is known that our defense against landing forces is organized and set up basically with forces of the maritime front which are responsible for preventing enemy invasions from the direction of the ocean or sea. The Navy, participating in this defense, fulfils the missions peculiar to it.

From the arguments of Colonel-General A. Gastilovich it follows that the basic strike against the enemy's landing forces, with the aim of routing him, must be launched only after he has landed on the coast. This is a fundamentally false assertion.

At present we already have the potentialities to detect enemy preparations for a large-scale landing operation. In the future these potentialities must be increased by utilizing new technical means. But this is not the only thing which permits us to eliminate successfully the enemy's attempts to execute a large-scale landing operation. The main thing is that missile weapons and the modern development of naval forces offer us wide possibilities for pinpointing enemy landing operations both on his territory and at sea, i.e., before the landing of his troops on our shore.

Thus, the main efforts of defense (operations) against landing forces must be transferred from our shores deep into the enemy's maritime operational zones, into his territory, and into his rear areas where landing operations are prepared and forces designated for participation in them are concentrated.

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

Defense (operations) against landing forces must be given not a waiting, but an active offensive character. The mission must now consist of not permitting the landing of enemy troops on the sea coast, their consolidation there, and creation of bridgeheads for further advance. This is all the more important as every sea landing operation is accompanied and supported by large-scale airborne landing operations. The destruction of landing forces located at sea, landing and disembarking means at ports and bases, and not permitting landings of enemy troops on the shore, will greatly facilitate the combat activities of our ground troops in offensive and defensive operations on coastal axes.

In his article, Colonel-General A. Gastilovich raises the extraordinarily important question of control. However, this question is not developed, apparently in view of the author's opinion that "from the viewpoint of the substance of control of operations, new forms of armed combat will not bring about fundamental changes". If we consider that the most vital aspect of control, its heart, is the working out and adopting of new solutions, then we shall hardly ever detect any sort of evolution in it, either in the past or the present.

Actually this question is considerably more complex. We think that the opinion of General A. Gastilovich as set forth above does not conform to the objective character of the changes occurring in the entire sphere of control, its principles, substance, organization, methods, and means.

Obviously, it is not by chance that problems of control, especially its automation and the use of electronic computers, is of late in the center of attention of our military-theoretical thought. It seems to us that the substance of control has gone through a definite evolution in the past and at present is undergoing extraordinarily great changes. The most important of these is the fundamental growth of the significance of centralization of control and its concentration in strategic spheres, which is the result of the influence of equipping the armed forces with new means of destruction. One should proceed to the solution of the latest problems in the area of control primarily from this point of view.

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4)