

Meeting No. 23

1. Subject arrived at 1510 hours on 20th July, 1961

2. Subject opens package and shows EXACTA camera. Q: They have 4 types of camera: one EXACTA, one cine-camera, a new German one, and two ordinary Soviet ones. I got this from PAVLOV, yesterday, for my trip to STAMFORD. This camera is now loaded with a British made film (ILFORD). I brought this for you to take the number etc. in case operational use is made with this camera in the future - and secondly I'd like to have the photographic instructor to tell me how best to use it. I have an exposure and time chart here which they gave me, and I would like it checked. Q: That is fine, we will do all this before you go on your trip.

3. S: I have one very interesting thing to tell you. I was even thinking of calling you yesterday. SHAPOVALOV came up to me yesterday after I had had my conversation with PAVLOV, and said "Oleg Vladimirovich I would like your advice, you are my former boss, I've some trouble concerning my work". Before that I had read a telegram from SEROV enquiring about his family, a reply has been sent mentioning the £20 loan and the shopping expedition. PAVLOV has already sent off the telegram about ANITA, here is the text: "During the British Industries Fair in MOSCOW, such and such a firm exhibited two prototypes of a portable computer ANITA. At the present time the firm has signed a great number of contracts with certain capitalist countries for the supply of this machine (mentioning October). During the fair our specialists in MOSCOW considered the advisability of acquiring the ANITA computer. The English firm had then replied that they can only sell it on the basis of one thousand at a time. The English specialist who maintains scientific - technical relations with the Committee has promised (Subject's name) to obtain an ANITA machine against cash down and subsequently pass it on to us. The price of the machine is \$400. Please reply urgently whether it is advisable to give this sum, via (Subject's name) to the British specialist or there may be the possibility of repayment after delivery of the machine. Let us have your instructions."

4. Q: Did you mention the dates of the exhibition? S: No, I gave PAVLOV all the other details orally. He asked me to thank YEGOR and to arrange a meeting with WEGNER at the Embassy at 10 o'clock on Monday. VOROVIN came in and told PAVLOV and me that he is leaving LONDON by air on either Saturday or Sunday.

5. S: Then I went with SHAPOVALOV to his office. I have been in five rooms already which are involved with intelligence work, I will draw it up for you later. SHAPOVALOV's trouble consists in the fact that the "Centre" had ordered him to drop his Indian contact as he was suspected of being an "agent-provocateur". The Indian in question is a journalist, a young man, representative of an insignificant Indian paper. I reported this to you in the Spring. His name begins with K, and on the 23rd July he is supposed to have gone on a trip to PRC, as a member of a delegation of journalists

...../invited

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21. Subject then refers to Van VLIET and how displeased he was by his transfer from MOSCOW. G. Explains that van VLIET was removed because of woman trouble. S. The people in the (Soviet) Ministry of Foreign Trade, who have spoken to me about him, were of a very low opinion as to his abilities. They thought him a fool. Subject then repeats that SMITH, the Ambassador, treats him (Subject) in a very friendly manner.

22. S: Now, about MERRIMAN, I am to ring him? H: Yes.
S: All right. And think about McBRIDE. On the 31st I will take WYNE to meet PAVLOV. Prior to my departure I need receipts, hotel bills, which WYNE should obtain for me.

23. Subject mentions the Zenith radio, and George tells him to be silent and look. The radio is shown him. George explains in detail that this radio is being given him to show him we are sympathetic to his wishes as good friends. The gift is from the heart against our better judgement and should show him that money is no problem but security is. Therefore, the tape recorder (personal use) is out since he would be suspect having it and risk a disaster by trying to record VARENTSOV if the latter should visit subject.

24. Furthermore Subject should abide by our advice and decisions re future requests of a security risk nature and minimize his acquisitive desires. Subject was visibly touched and thanked us profusely.

25. S: However I'll have WYNE take it in, rather than taking it now. (The set was removed from its packing box and Subject was shown its components, operation etc. Its unpacked size permits it to be carried in a normal suitcase easily. Subject reassured us that he can easily legend his having obtained the set in the Commission store. He explained how it is registered, how easily it can go through customs, etc. Since WYNE had requested to postpone his trip to the USSR till 26th August due to his son's sudden appendectomy, the schedule was reviewed and to permit Subject's leave Janet and husband's leave and WYNE's arrival to fit in, the 23rd August was decided upon.)

26. G: Regarding the military article you wanted our help to write; it seems that since you are an artillery officer and have been given access to the PTURS data by VARENTSOV, and other artillery studies; you should look over the material in the GRU stafford to see what manuals or data there is on the same subject - anti-tank weapons, are from Anglo-American Military material - and give us the bibliography.

S: I'll consider this and I will get a list of subjects and magazines dealing with Anglo-American forces which KORENETSKI's people hold in the GRU Information Directorate. I will even expend the subject matter, maybe an infantry topic would be O.K. I will also try and send photocopies of my other papers and articles which I can get - through WYNE.

27. G: Just send us a bibliography. S: I will send you a complete list of what we have on your forces. Then if you can send me the material back I'll work it over properly.

28. G: Now to reassure you that your information is definitely reaching our leaders - here is a report on President KENNEDY's speech. I won't read it to you but I can point out to you that in a number of statements, exactly those thoughts which you suggested were mentioned. (Subject was delighted).

29. S: I reported to you last Spring about the situation at the time of KHRUSHCHEV's coming to power. When he kicked out the opposition - MALENKOV - etc. There was even three days when he was not in power. KHRUSHCHEV is adopting the same technique with the Army he had previously with the Party officials. During his "reign" he has personally promoted approximately 1500 officers to Generals out of a total of 4 - 5000, and also promoted a number of old Generals to higher ranks, up to the rank of Marshal, and even Chief Marshal. He relies on their support. But both in the Praesidium and in the Central Committee there are still a number of people who supported MALENKOV, MOIOTOV, BULGANIN, etc. PERVUKHIN is one of them. There are also unconfirmed rumours that KHRUSHCHEV fights occasionally with MIKOYAN. MIKOYAN is in opposition with regard to some of KHRUSHCHEV's opinions, arrangements etc. KHRUSHCHEV is not popular with the masses. They do not care for his jokes, comments, etc. They blame him for the miserable life they have to live. We know he is a political adventurer.

30. S: Among the leaders (rukovodstvo) there exists a secret opposition, which remains secret because the majority are still KHRUSHCHEV's proteges and the others don't want to lose their jobs. But there could be a distribution of forces and a split as a result of the BERLIN question. All of them who are aware of the weak points, with regard to the economic and military situations, who will say "It is too early to go to war. We've got to wait. What's the point of heating up the situation because of a BERLIN which has existed for the last 16 years." Should this occur, it is possible the KHRUSHCHEV will carry the day and win once again, on the other hand the reverse might happen. We have to take this into consideration. They could either remove KHRUSHCHEV, saying he was ill or else he might resign - as MALENKOV did, or they could say "You go on being the boss, but let's treat on the BERLIN question, let's think something up." Let's say outright that we are defenders of the peace, the Anglo-Americans have taken the extreme view of our declaration and are preparing for war, we don't want war, there's no hurry, we'll settle the BERLIN question oneday". There are lots of diplomatic words that can be found in order to meet the situation and to fool the people and lie again.

31. The 22nd Congress will decide what action is to be taken. It doesn't appear on the Agenda, but as I have told you before whenever there is one of these big gatherings they have secret sessions, the plenum, the praesidium, and I am positive that this matter will be discussed, it might even be discussed before the official opening of the Congress. So we must keep in mind these three possibilities. (Subject continues on this theme for some time, repeating roughly what he has already said.) - Namely:

- 1) KHRUSHCHEV may crush all opposition and proceed to sign East German peace treaty, inviting local hostilities and risking general war.
- 2) KHRUSHCHEV may be forced to compromise and delay signing peace treaty in view of Western opposition and propagandize this more as his desire for peace - still postponing possible action re East Germany and Berlin to a further date.
- 3) KHRUSHCHEV may be deposed.