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S U M M A R Y

According to orders from VC Military Region 4 Headquarters to TU DUC Team temporarily sheltered in BIEN HOA Province, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) prisoners of war (POW's) from the rank of officer to lower levels must receive educational propaganda close to the point of capture and then be released. Allied soldiers, especially the officers, must be carried to the Military Region Headquarters where a roster would be prepared and later sent to the Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN). Source was told in October 1966 about the capture of an Australian Major (engineer) in the vicinity of ONG NHIEN Bridge (XS 930929) and his transport to Military Region Headquarters. VC treatment of Allied and

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ARVN POW's was based on conditions set by international convention. COSVN believed use could be made of POW's by reeducating and propagandizing them so they in turn could tell the true cause of the National Front to all people and they could also be used in prisoner of war exchange.

MAP REFERENCE:

AMS Series L605, Sheet 221E - 221W, Scale 1/100,000, Edition 6.

1. The TU DUC Team, which was temporarily sheltered in BIEN HOA Province, received orders from VC Military Region 4 Headquarters regarding the policy toward ARVN POW's. POW's, from the rank of officer to lower levels, must receive educational propaganda close to the point of capture and then be released. Allied soldiers, especially the officers, must be carried to the Military Region Headquarters where a roster would be prepared and later sent to COSVN.
2. Source was told in October 1966 by a commo-liaison agent of BIEN HOA Province that an Australian (Major, an engineer) was captured by TANG NHON PHU Village guerrillas. He was captured at the time of a crossing of ONG THIEN Bridge (approximate coordinates XS 930929) located on Inter Province Route 33, BINH TRUNG Village, THU DUC District, GIA DINH Province. The Australian was carried to the Rear Section of THU DUC Team, LONG HOA Hamlet (approximate coordinates YS 062914) LONG TAN Village, NHON TRACH District, to receive clothing and equipment. He was later taken to the Military Region Headquarters.
3. In February 1967, a special action platoon of the THU DUC Team captured four Korean soldiers as they drank at a refreshment room in TANG NHON PHU Village (approximate coordinates XT 972003) THU DUC District. They were taken to the Security Section of the THU DUC Team in LONG TAN where they were recorded and issued some clothing. Later they were sent to the Military region where each soldier received two suits of clothes, one hammock, one blanket, one month's salary (240 piastres) and ten days' rice supply.
4. In 1966, Company 1, Main Force Battalion 4, combined with the special action platoon and engaged in a battle against the "Vinatexco" Textile Factory in THU DUC which resulted in 20 ARVN prisoners. After receiving propaganda about the policy and function of the Liberation Front, these prisoners were released.
5. The VC based their treatment of Allied and ARVN POW's on conditions set by international convention. Each day a POW received nine piastres and one litre of rice; in addition they also received rest and recuperation when they were ill. Surrenderers who deserted the GVN ranks during the fighting period would be treated by the Front the same as the liberation troops but would have to go through a propaganda training period and, in addition, according to their personal aspirations would be assigned to fighting units or returned to their families. During 1964 and 1965 a number of deserters joined the VC.
6. POW's were to be treated kindly, not beaten nor was their personal property to be seized. If possible, prisoners were to be carried to a safe area where the VC would release them after they had received educational propaganda. COSVN had ordered the military regions to capture U.S. soldiers rather than kill them. The slogan "It is better to capture one soldier than to kill four." was adopted. COSVN believed that advantage could be made of capturing U.S. soldiers for the following reasons: POW's educated


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propagandized to the policy and line of the National Liberation Front could tell the truth to all people; POW's could be exchanged at the end of the war; and POW's could be reeducated or killed if their misdemeanors warranted it. A record of the misdemeanors of a killer POW was maintained. 1.3(a)(4)

- 7. In November 1966 a policeman who had returned to visit his family at TANG NHON PHU Village, THU DUC District, was murdered by guerrillas. The VC accused him of incorrect action against the villagers while he had served at the THU DUC Police Branch and the villagers had denounced him. The VC in an effort to create sympathy with the people had watched the policeman and arranged his murder.



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