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Mandatory Review

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SPECTRUM OF COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO CUBA


Accepting as valid the Attorney General's statement that there is no point in discussing courses of action with respect to Cuba until the fundamental decision is made as to whether or not it is possible for the United States to live with Castro, the following possible courses of action are listed under the headings "Can Live with Castro" and "Can't Live with Castro." Neither of these headings is absolute; the courses of action listed under each are indicative of degrees of acceptability of the Castro regime or conversely the urgency to overthrow it.

COURSES OF ACTION

A. Can Live with Castro

1. Negotiate a detente with Fidel looking towards full recognition of his regime and unlimited trade between the United States and Cuba. The negotiator of the detente would endeavor to secure from Castro commitments not to engage in subversive activities in Latin America and not to engage in polemics against the United States. He would also endeavor to reduce or eliminate, as a result of our concessions, Soviet presence in Cuba and reduce the Cuban military machine to one compatible with the requirements of a peaceful Latin American island republic.

No covert activities would be undertaken and intelligence operations would be of a nature compatible with our relations with a neutral power.



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Advantages

If the plan works, this would represent a satisfactory solution of the Cuban problem, especially if the Soviet presence could thereby be eliminated.

Disadvantages

- a. As plan almost sure not to work, it would have grave consequences throughout Latin America as well as serious domestic political repercussions.
- b. Even if plan ultimately successful there would be short term domestic political losses and short term weakening U.S. position in Latin America.

2. Do nothing. No specific efforts will be made to arrange a rapprochement with Fidel but we would remain receptive to any advances made by him. No covert operations would be undertaken and intelligence operations would not include black maritime operations into Cuba. It would be hoped that Fidel, recognizing the good faith and good will of the new Administration, would make his own advances leading towards a satisfactory detente.

Advantages

As in 1. above.

Disadvantages

- a. As in 1. above but less short term domestic and Latin American losses.
- b. Even less chance of success.

3. The present level of intelligence operations, including U-2 overflights would be continued.

[REDACTED] We would be "keeping an eye on" Fidel [REDACTED] but would be making no effort to hinder his internal development.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

Maximum effort would be made to increase the countersubversion capabilities of Fidel's foreign target countries.

Advantages

We would be maintaining a clean hands attitude towards Castro and our policy would be more compatible with that of our major allies.

Disadvantages

- a. Evidence of American inaction would be domestically assailable, would be quickly sensed by Latin American countries and would further demoralize the exile community.
- b. We would be in effect helping Castro to consolidate his position at home and establish his image abroad.

4. In addition to intelligence collection as in 3., we would engage in a "persuasive" economic denial program employing diplomatic efforts and the cooperation of U.S. corporations.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

Advantages

A carefully targetted denial program with effective subtle sabotage is capable of at least disrupting the timing of Castro's economic efforts. It may have a measurable effect on Cuba's one domestic source of economic strength - sugar.

Disadvantages

We will remain at odds with our allies on Cuba trade. We may delay but not prevent Castro's progress.

5. In addition to actions in 3. and 4. above, engage in surveillance of suspected vessels or aircraft carrying Cuban arms shipments by means of bilateral agreements with individual countries in Latin America, such surveillance to be accomplished without the use of force in international waters and the use of force in national waters.

Advantages

- a. Probably feasible within OAS.
- b. Surveillance completely legal and low noise level.

Disadvantages

- a. Does not attack principal problem of Castro's subversion in Latin America.
- b. Castro may return to policy of non-shipment of arms.
- c. Probably will not result in apprehending arms carriers.
- d. Expensive.

6. In addition to actions in 3., 4. and 5. above, engage in soft sabotage operations by supporting "autonomous" exile groups and continue to encourage internal acts of sabotage by means of radio, press and leaflet campaigns.

Advantages

- a. Some economic advantages and limited encouragement to anti-Castro sentiment.
- b. Deniability by U.S. as U.S. soil and personnel not used.

Disadvantages

- a. Results commensurate with limited skills of exile groups.
- b. Though fact of U.S. support carefully guarded, Castro will blame U.S. anyway.
- c. Some noise level.

7. In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5. and 6. above, engage in soft sabotage operations employing [redacted] Cuban groups against selected targets and at spaced intervals.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

Advantages

- a. More professional operations that are targetted and controlled.

Disadvantages

- a. Constant danger of proof of U.S. involvement.

b. Improvement of morale among internal anti-Castro elements. Better domestic political position as result of increased noise level.

b. Continued exacerbation of Castro without chance of delivering a mortal blow.

8. In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5., 6. and 7. above, relax the present policy banning independent Cuban exile maritime raids and air strikes against Cuba from U.S. territory.

Advantages

Improvement of exile morale and internal resistance spirit.

Disadvantages

- a. General ineffectiveness against targets.
- b. Obvious employment of U.S. soil.
- c. Air strikes however ineffective begin to arouse Soviet response.

B. Can't Live with Castro

(It is assumed that maximum intelligence collection will be continued.)

1. Engage in covert sabotage actions against larger economic impact but higher risk targets

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

Advantages

- a. This essentially minimum plan evolved June 1963, but never permitted to develop, having some chance to overthrow Castro.
- b. Measurable economic impact and strong encouragement to anti-Castro elements.

Disadvantages

- a. High risk of capture and exposure.
- b. High noise level.
- c. Possibility of some Soviet response.

2. Institute an economic denial program based upon the establishment of a "Proclaimed List" under the Trading with the Enemy Act together with all other feasible actions, overt and covert, to deny to Cuba items critical to its economy.

Advantages

- a. Considerable increase in Cuba's difficulty in procuring key imports.
- b. U.S. obviously "doing something about Castro."

Disadvantages

- a. Multiplication of U.S. problems with major allies including possible loss of allies' support of U.S. dollar.
- b. Loss of trade.
- c. Will not assure overthrow of Castro.

3. Engage in sabotage operations as in B.1. above



1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

Advantages

Improved operations and greater economic damage.

Disadvantages

- a. Technical deniability only and very high noise level.
- b. Will not assure overthrow of Castro.

4. Engage in violent large-scale non-deniable sabotage activities,



1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

Advantages

Much more effective operations and real economic damage.

Disadvantages

- a. No deniability.
- b. Very high noise level.
- c. If does not result rapidly in fall of Castro, will result in Bay of Pigs type of criticism.

5. U.S. unilateral close-in quarantine of Cuban shipping, ostensibly for the purpose of preventing export of arms to Latin America with the aim of humiliating and degrading Castro.

Advantages

Proof of U.S. intention to stop Castro.

Disadvantages

- a. Will probably not catch contraband.
- b. If vigorously pursued against all Cuban shipping, may provoke Soviet response.
- c. Very expensive without assuring fall of Castro.

6. Cutoff of all communications (except radio) into and out of Cuba

Advantages

Will at least for a period disrupt Cuba's diplomatic and economic offensive and hinder subversive efforts.

Disadvantages

- a. Considerable outcry from Europe and Latin America.
- b. Not fatal to Fidel.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

7. A Presidential public declaration making clear that the U.S. considers the continued presence of the Castro regime as intolerable, barring any rapprochement with it and encouraging anti-Castro/communist dissident elements within the Cuban armed forces to carry out a coup.

Advantages

Very effective inside Cuba and encouraging to Latin America.

Disadvantages

Must be followed by some form of effective action.

8. An official declaration that should Castro engage in certain specified proscribed actions the U.S. will in each instance destroy a major installation inside Cuba (the "Rostow Doctrine").

Advantages

- a. May force Castro to stop his subversive actions.
- b. Whether retaliation by the U.S. is required or not, it will have profound effect on anti-Castro morale.

Disadvantages

- a. May provoke Soviet response either before or after retaliatory action taken.
- b. Difficulty in pinning down clear-cut violations by Castro.
- c. Difficulty in avoiding civilian casualties.

9. Announce publicly and inform the Soviet Union through high level diplomatic channels that further subversion by Castro in Latin America is intolerable and that if Castro persists in his present course the United States will no longer feel bound by any inhibitions against invasion of Cuba and will take such measures as it deems appropriate. See Annex A.

Advantages

- a. Proper basis for future actions.
- b. Possible deterrence of Castro.
- c. Best method of minimizing Soviet reaction.

Disadvantages

- a. Difficulty of clear proof.
- b. Possible Soviet reactions.

10. After having established the appropriate basis for such action, impose a total blockade of Cuba.

Advantages

The most effective method of bringing down Castro.

Disadvantages

Possible Soviet reactions.

11. After having established the appropriate basis for such action, invade Cuba.

Advantages

Will bring down Castro.

Disadvantages

- a. Possible Soviet reaction.
- b. Probable heavy casualties on both sides.
- c. Increased difficulties in post-Castro Cuba.

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Scenario for B-9

A

This doctrine is based on the proposition that the decision has been reached that the U.S. cannot live with a Castro/communist regime in Cuba which continues its present course of subversion and aggression in Latin America and that we are determined to take appropriate action to put an end to these acts.

1. In the Venezuelan arms cache case now before the OAS hold out for a "blank check" resolution. Settle for a 13 vote majority regardless of Mexican, Brazilian, or Chilean support.

2. If, despite 1. above, OAS waters down resolution, vote against the watered-down version.

3. If "blank check" resolution passed, proceed to 5. below.

4. If watered-down resolution passed over our protest, announce publicly that OAS no longer represents an adequate hemispheric safeguard and therefore that the United States must unilaterally declare (see 5. below).

5. Declare publicly that further aggression and subversion by Castro in Latin America would be intolerable to the United States and, in the event of a new act on the part of Castro of the nature and magnitude of the Venezuelan

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arms cache, the U.S. will take such measures against the Castro/communist regime in Cuba as it deems appropriate in the circumstances.

6. Explain carefully through diplomatic channels to the Soviet Union that the United States finds the present behavior of the Castro/communist regime in Cuba intolerable, that Cuba's activities in Venezuela prove this to be so and that further acts of violence of comparable danger or potential danger on the part of Cuba will cause the U.S. to feel no longer bound by any inhibitions against invasion or other appropriate action. Urge the Soviet Union, in order to reduce tensions in the Caribbean and permit the U.S. to live peacefully with the Castro/communist regime in Cuba, to assure that Cuba is restrained from repeating its dangerous practices. Make it plain to the Soviet Union that further behavior of this sort by Castro will compel the U.S. to adopt drastic measures. Point out to the Soviet Union the physical vulnerability of Cuba as well as the effect a failure to resolve the Cuban problem will have on the traditional policy which the U.S. has pursued of not exerting pressures upon the Soviets' European satellites. Make it plain that the U.S. desires peace in the Caribbean and expects the Soviet Union to achieve good behavior on the part of Castro.

7. Decide upon the type of action on the part of Castro which would trigger action on the part of the U.S. A rule of thumb could be: such action as would represent serious, realized or potential, danger to the stability of a Latin American state. By this criterion 20 Castro-trained men and four tons of arms introduced into northeast Brazil might not constitute a trigger, whereas the same effort by Castro in a Central American country might. The judgment can be unilateral and subjective on the part of the U.S.

8. Formulate a program for a post-Castro Cuba giving full weight to the real changes which have taken place there during the past five years and full recognition to the need for channeling Castro's unfinished revolution into constructive lines.

The above scenario should not be commenced unless it is recognized that, although these actions are primarily designed to deter Castro from his present course, he may very well persevere in his policy. Under such circumstances the U.S., having publicly embarked on the doctrine, cannot then withdraw from the consequences.