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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

JAN 25 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT : CIA Comments on Proposed Handling of the Recommendations
of the Report to the President by the President's Board
of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
dated December 20, 1956

Herewith are the CIA comments, subject as above, as requested
in your memorandum of January 17, 1957.

Allen W. Dulles
Allen W. Dulles
Director

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
JUN 17 1997

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR NL 95-2 Doc 2 158913 #
p. 1 of 7

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JAN 25 1957

CIA COMMENTS ON
PROPOSED HANDLING OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE PRESIDENT'S BOARD
OF CONSULTANTS ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
dated December 20, 1956

1. We do not believe that drastic changes in the structure of our national intelligence organization are required to make progress toward some of the objectives we outline below. We do suggest that the Director of Central Intelligence be encouraged to exercise a more comprehensive and positive coordinating responsibility and we feel that he can do this within the intent of existing laws. If directed and supported by you in discharging this responsibility, the Director of Central Intelligence can accomplish much in the direction of integration, reduction of duplication, and coordination within the national intelligence effort without change in present statute or organization.

Suggested handling: Approve, and refer to the Director of Central Intelligence for action.

CIA Comment: Concur.

2. To insure the proper functioning of the Intelligence Community and to guarantee proper coordination with the military in times of war, we suggest that a realistic appraisal of the Community's organization and responsibilities be undertaken at once. This should be undertaken directly by the Director of Central Intelligence, and he should report his appraisal and recommendations to the Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

Suggested handling: Approve, and refer to the Director of Central Intelligence for action.

CIA Comment: In concurring it is our understanding that the entire paragraph relates to the functioning of the intelligence community in times of war. In preparing the above-mentioned report the Director of Central Intelligence would as a matter of course consult with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of the service intelligence agencies.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR NL 95-2 Doc 2
p 2 of 7

~~TOP SECRET~~

3. We urge that action be expedited to bring the National Intelligence War Plans to the highest feasible state of readiness and that a realistic war-gaming of them begin as soon as practicable.

Suggested handling: Approve, and refer to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for action.

CIA Comment: It is our understanding that the term "National Intelligence War Plans" refers to "planning for intelligence activities in time of war" and we suggest this change be made.

We also suggest that the proposed handling be changed to: "Approve, and refer to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence for action."

This revised suggested handling is proposed since we believe that it is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence to plan for intelligence activities in time of war; this planning may differ depending upon whether these activities are carried out in or outside of theaters in which American Forces are engaged in active combat operations. For example, we consider that:

a) over-all intelligence planning should be conducted by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

b) intelligence requirements for support to Military War Planners by CIA should be developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence;

c) planning for those intelligence activities to be conducted by Military elements should be the function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

d) planning for those intelligence activities conducted by Central Intelligence Agency elements, whether or not in or through theaters of war, should be the function of the Director of Central Intelligence and coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate.

e) war-gaming of activities planned under both b) and c) above should be conducted under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence.

4. With regard to the integration of the Intelligence Community, we are convinced that a strong centralized direction, under which the resources of the various elements would be brought closer together, would do much to strengthen our national intelligence effort and to contain its cost. We therefore recommend that action be taken toward this end, both through the National Security Council and the Director of Central Intelligence.

Suggested handling: Approve, and refer to the Director of Central Intelligence for action together with 1 above.

CIA Comment: Concur.

5. With regard to clandestine operations, we urge that present practices be regularized to insure that in all appropriate instances these projects (1) receive the benefit of proper joint staffing and formalized approval, and (2) that both the State and Defense Departments be kept abreast of the developments of these projects on a need-to-know basis and, of course, under tightly guarded security procedures.

Suggested handling: Refer to the representatives designated under NSC 5412/2 for study, consulting with their principals, and report thereon to the President.

CIA Comment: Concur.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR NL 95-2 Doc 2
p. 4 of 7

- 6. We feel that a definite need exists for the coordination of the "unattributed" programs of the United States Information Agency and of the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly in the field of propaganda, and we urge that action toward this end be initiated at once. It is our opinion that such action could well begin with a review of the actual practices which have grown up under the "Principles to Assure Coordination of Gray Activities" enumerated by the Operations Coordinating Board on 24 October 1953.

Suggested handling: Refer to the Director, United States Information Agency, and the Director of Central Intelligence for study and report thereon to the National Security Council.

CIA Comment: Concur.

- 7. To give proper high-level direction to Communications Intelligence Activities and to insure that their tremendous capabilities can be exploited to the fullest, we believe that they should have the direct management attention of a single Assistant Secretary of Defense. We therefore suggest that one be designated for that purpose.

Suggested handling: Refer to the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent and the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman, USCIB, under NSCID No. 9, for study and report thereon to the President.

CIA Comment: Concur.

- 8-a. We suggest that you lend your prestige to the recruitment of personnel to study [redacted]. This program, at your request, might possibly be managed by the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization; or by the Weapons System Evaluation Group of the Department of Defense.

1.5(e)(g)
3.4(b)(1)(2)
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Suggested handling: Refer to the Director of Central Intelligence as Chairman, USCIB, to prepare, for consideration by the [redacted] (Secretaries of State and Defense) in consultation with the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommendations to the President as to the best channel and method for recruiting such personnel.

1.5(e)(g)
3.4(b)(1)(2)
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CIA Comment: As we understand it, there are two points to this

recommendation; first, a successful mobilization of the best

available talent to attack the problem of [redacted]

1.5(e)(g)
3.4(b)(1)(2)
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[redacted] and second, to use this talent to search out the

most promising lines of research and development. In view of the

fact that the Department of Defense is Executive Agent of the Government for the production of COMINT information (NSCID No. 9), and that the National Security Agency with the approval of USCIB has been developing a program for dealing with the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] problem referred to in recommendation 8-a. above, we suggest that the handling be as follows: "Refer to the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Chairman of USCIB, the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization for report promptly to the President. This report should deal with the two recommendations required; namely, (1) who should be recruited and how; and (2) what body in the executive branch should supervise the development of the most promising lines of research and development."

1.5(e)(5)
3.4(b)(1)(2)
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8-b. We strongly support efforts now undertaken by the Department of Defense to develop [REDACTED]

1.5(e)(5)
3.4(b)(1)(2)
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Suggested handling: Approve, and refer to the Secretary of Defense for action.

CIA Comment: We concur, but suggest the substitution of the word "material" for "information".

9. We recommend that the National Security Council review their Intelligence Directives and substitute a more coherent, consolidated Directive or set of Directives for the conduct of our intelligence activities under today's conditions.

Suggested handling: Approve, and refer to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for review of all NSCID's and for early submission to the National Security Council (through the NSC Planning Board) of recommended revisions.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CIA Comment: We concur in the reference to the Intelligence Advisory Committee for review of all NSCID's, and recommend that the revised Directives be submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence to the National Security Council.

10. To relieve the Director of Central Intelligence of the many management responsibilities he is presently called upon to discharge as Head of the Central Intelligence Agency, we suggest that he be provided with a Chief of Staff or Executive Director who would act as his "Executive Vice President". This assistance would thereby enable him to direct his efforts more toward the integration, reduction of duplication, and coordination that is necessary within the national intelligence effort.

Suggested handling: Refer to the Director of Central Intelligence for recommendation to the President as to the best method of accomplishing the purpose of this recommendation.

CIA Comment: Concur.