A Red Sea Security System: Political, Military, and Economic Issues (U)

An Intelligence Assessment
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A Red Sea Security System: Political, Military, and Economic Issues

Key Judgments

The strategic importance of the Red Sea is likely to grow substantially over the next few years as a result of recent military and economic developments:

- US Rapid Deployment Forces rely on military facilities in the region to help counter Soviet expansionism.

- Saudi Arabia has just completed an oil pipeline to the Red Sea that will enable it to export a substantial share of its crude without going through the vulnerable Strait of Hormuz.

- Riyadh has agreed to finance a pipeline to the Red Sea from Iraqi oilfields.

- At the same time the Libyan–Ethiopian–South Yemeni pact as well as the Soviet presence in South Yemen andEthiopia threaten the stability of the southern Red Sea basin.

These developments give Arab countries from Egypt through Saudi Arabia to Iraq a stake in Red Sea security. At present, security cooperation among these and other Arab countries faces major obstacles, including longstanding political and ideological rivalries and disagreement over the role of US military power in the Middle East. If the Soviet and radical threats became more menacing, however, neutral and pro-Western countries might make common cause. In the absence of Arab cooperation, Israel probably will cite the growing importance of the Red Sea shipping lanes to the West to strengthen its argument for broader US-Israeli strategic cooperation in the region.
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Military Factors
The Red Sea is critical to Western efforts to stop 
Soviet expansionism in southwest Asia and to guard 
the oil supply routes from the Persian Gulf. The US 
Navy prefers the Suez Canal to the longer and costlier 
route around the Cape of Good Hope when sending 
ships between the North Atlantic–Mediterranean and 
the Indian Ocean–Persian Gulf. These transits— 
which have included conventionally powered aircraft 
carriers—will increase in number as the United 
States develops facilities in Kenya, Somalia, Oman, 
and Diego Garcia. The United States and Egypt plan 
a massive improvement in Ras Banas, a small airstrip 
and harbor area on Egypt’s southern Red Sea coast, 
to make it suitable for use as a staging area for US 
forces moving into the Persian Gulf. The collapse of 
US influence in Ethiopia has dramatically increased 
the importance of Sudan and Somalia as bases for 
projecting Western power into the southern Red Sea 
and northwest Indian Ocean. The United States plans 
to use air and naval facilities at Berbera, Somalia, to 
monitor the sea lanes along the southern coast of the 
Arabian peninsula and the east coast of Africa.

France stations about 4,000 troops and air units at 
Djibouti at the southern end of the Red Sea on the 
Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. Djibouti serves as the home 
port for the French Indian Ocean fleet of 14 warships, 
the second largest Western naval force in the Indian 
Ocean.

Economic Factors
The Red Sea is becoming an increasingly important 
transit route for oil. Both Saudi Arabia and Iraq look 
to the Red Sea to provide a secure alternative route 
for oil exports from the Persian Gulf. The new Trans-
Peninsula Saudi pipeline terminating at the port of 
Yanbu supplies 1.1 million barrels per day, and this 
will soon increase to the pipeline’s capacity of 1.85 
million barrels per day. Riyadh plans to double the 
capacity by the mid-1980s. Moreover, the Saudis have 
agreed with Iraq to finance construction of a pipeline 
with a capacity of from 1.6 to 1.9 million barrels per 
day to carry crude oil from Iraq’s southern oilfields to 
a terminal near Yanbu. This pipeline could be in 
operation by 1986. If the second Saudi line and the 
Iraqi line are completed, Red Sea terminals could 
handle close to 5.5 million barrels per day of oil by 
the mid-1980s; at present about 12 million barrels per 
day move through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of 
Hormuz. Riyadh plans a 1.5-billion-barrel oil storage 
facility on the Red Sea near Yanbu, although costs 
and technical considerations will delay completion 
until about 1990. Saudi Arabia is also building a 
petrochemical complex at Yanbu, which will make 
that port a major product export center.

The Red Sea basin also furnishes oil of its own. 
Egypt’s most important oilfields are near the upper 
Red Sea in the Gulf of Suez, and oil exploration is 
under way along the Red Sea coast of Egypt and 
Sudan.

As a result, the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal are 
regaining the strategic importance they held before 
the closing of the Canal in 1967 and the near-
simultaneous appearance of supertankers which made 
economical the shipment of Persian Gulf oil around 
the Cape of Good Hope. Present oil shipments 
through the Canal are about 700,000 barrels per day. 
Shipments through the Suez–Mediterranean (Sumed) 
pipeline—which crosses Egypt from the Gulf of Suez 
to the Mediterranean coast near Alexandria and is 
jointly owned by Egypt and several major oil-producing 
countries—are at the pipeline’s capacity of 1.6 
million barrels per day. Egypt has enlarged the Canal 
to permit transit by larger oil tankers, and there is 
discussion of further expanding the Canal as well as 
increasing the capacity of the Sumed pipeline. Cairo’s 
revenues from the Canal—an estimated $1 billion this 
year, about one-tenth of foreign earnings—will grow 
steadily; Sumed pipeline earnings—an estimated $75 
million this year—will also be expected to rise as more 
oil is moved through the Red Sea.

1 See foldout map at end of report.
Soviet and Radical Threats
The signing of the Libyan–Ethiopian–South Yemeni Pact in August has intensified the radical, Soviet-backed threat to pro-Western countries in the southern Red Sea area. The Tripartite Pact caps Soviet efforts since 1977 to bring about closer ties between South Yemen and Ethiopia and, more recently, Ethiopia and Libya. The Pact probably will tie Ethiopia more closely to the radical community and increase Ethiopian-backed military and terrorist activity by the Somali Salvation Front against the government of Somali President Siad Barre.

South Yemen continues to support insurgents against the North Yemeni Government of President Salih. Libya mounts subversive activities against President Nimeiri of Sudan, and Ethiopia may be considering support to Sudanese dissidents. External pressures may heighten political tensions within Djibouti.

The radical states act in the shadow of an impressive Soviet military presence. The USSR has furnished substantial military aid and training to South Yemen since the early 1970s and to Ethiopia since 1977 (the Ogaden war); at present, there are approximately 1,000 Soviet military advisors in each country. Soviet military aircraft regularly use Aden airport to patrol the Indian Ocean, and Soviet warships from the Indian Ocean Squadron make regular use of Aden port and of the anchorage at South Yemen's Socotra island. In Ethiopia, Soviet aircraft use Asmara for reconnaissance flights, and the Soviet Navy regularly visits Dahlak island in the southern Red Sea. Soviet warships transit the Suez Canal en route between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. This continuous land, air, and naval presence stands in contrast to the Soviet failure to develop a comparable presence in or around the entrance to the Persian Gulf.

The Soviets could substantially improve their overall military posture in this region by introducing relatively small numbers of men in selected types of military units. The deployment of two or three Soviet squadrons of combat aircraft to Ethiopian or South Yemeni airfields, for example, could provide air defense and ground support capabilities to a range of about 800 kilometers. A much more sustained buildup would be necessary for Soviet forces to match the kind of forces the United States and its allies can bring into the region.

A Red Sea Strategic Consensus?
These threats give several Arab countries a stake in Red Sea security. Egypt, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia explicitly recognize the strategic importance of the region. All three countries see Soviet activities in the Middle East as designed to weaken pro-Western governments and gain control of the strategic sea lanes and Persian Gulf oilfields. Cairo, Khartoum, and Riyadh also believe that the Tripartite Alliance of South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Libya was probably instigated by the Soviet Union and pursues similar objectives to the USSR.

Jordan's traditional distrust of Soviet goals has been strengthened by Moscow's strong support for Syria. Despite its recent purchase of arms from the USSR, Amman has worked to limit Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and the Yemens and is sensitive to any threat to its trade route through the Gulf of Aqaba.

Most dramatic, Iraq has been forced to recognize common security interests with its traditional rivals, the moderate Arab countries. Even though Iraq does not border on the Red Sea, its war with Iran has made the Red Sea an important alternative route for exports and imports. Baghdad has received large quantities of civilian and military supplies from Jordanian and Saudi Red Sea ports and is pursuing several road and rail projects—as well as the oil pipeline—across Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria. No matter how the war ends, Iraq will still have to contend with its longstanding strategic problem—Iran's ability to cut Iraq's trade lifeline through the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. These military and economic incentives for rapprochement with the moderate Arabs coincide with an estrangement from the USSR—prompted by the Soviet cutoff of supplies to Iraq during the war as well as Iraqi worry over Soviet expansionism in the region—and from the radical Arab states—which refused to support Iraq, a fellow Arab country, against Iran.
Soviet Tactical Air Coverage
From Selected Airfields in Ethiopia and South Yemen

Figure 1
Military Advantages of Regional Cooperation

Regional cooperation would offer important military benefits to each country, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. All of the Arab countries involved wish to limit Soviet and radical activity. At the same time, separate military problems make the Red Sea only a secondary consideration for each of them. 

With its major forces deployed to stop a potential Israeli attack across the Sinai and a potential Libyan threat from the west, Egypt has little available to guard Red Sea routes. Cairo has no plans for a strong naval presence in the Red Sea. Moreover, it lacks the capability to project or resupply forces over long distances. Egypt would respond to Libyan adventurism abroad—such as an invasion of Sudan—mainly by threatening a direct attack across the Egyptian-Libyan border rather than by confronting Libya in a third country. 

Although to date Saudi Arabia has concentrated on guarding its eastern border—through measures such as formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council and purchase of the US AWACS—it has indicated a concern about its western seacoast by beginning construction of naval stations and ship repair facilities at Jiddah on the Red Sea as well as at Jubayl on the Gulf. Saudi oil revenues could help Egypt develop sufficient forces to protect the Red Sea. The Saudis presumably see the potential military advantages in cooperating with Egypt in naval training and patrolling, with Egypt concentrating on the northern half of the Red Sea and Saudi Arabia—from its base at Jiddah—concentrating on the southern half. 

Saudi Arabia could also strengthen air defense of the southern Red Sea by shifting AWACS coverage from the northeast approaches to the country to the southwest approaches. Such a redeployment would be supported by Oman, which has long argued that Soviet-backed South Yemen is the most serious threat to the security of the Arabian peninsula. Any such shift would depend on the course of the Iran-Iraq war. 

1 Longstanding Egyptian contingency plans call, however, for Cairo to respond to a Libyan attack on Sudan by sending to Khartoum two brigades of commandos and a squadron of MiG fighters.
participate in joint military exercises with the United States such as Bright Star ’82, Cairo allows the United States to preposition equipment in Egypt and has pushed for substantial US assistance in developing a large military and communications facility at the Red Sea port of Ras Banas. In effect, Egypt and Sudan argue that pro-Western countries need a US military presence to counter the presence of Soviet and Soviet Bloc military advisors in South Yemen, Libya, and Ethiopia. Moreover, Cairo and Khartoum defend the Camp David Accords, which help both countries cement their relationship with the United States and which guarantee the return of the Sinai to Egypt.

Jordan fears an attack from what it considers an increasingly aggressive Israel as much as it fears a conflict with Soviet-armed Syria or turmoil in the southern Red Sea basin. Amman’s recent purchase of air defense equipment from the USSR was designed to introduce some balance into its arms supply relationship with the United States—both to avoid criticism from radical Arab states and to avoid the restrictions that the United States has placed on deployment of weapons sold to Jordan.

Iraq opposes a Western military presence in the region because it aims at a leadership role in the Gulf, the Arab world, and the Nonaligned Movement. Riyadh, Amman, and Baghdad all charge that the Camp David Accords cannot produce a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement; all three countries criticize Egypt for not pushing Israel hard enough on West Bank and Gaza autonomy.

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even Iraq might cooperate with Egypt and Sudan if Soviet and radical activities threatened their national interests directly. Such actions might include a major buildup of Soviet military forces to crush a rebellion in South Yemen or Ethiopia or to threaten or coerce states close to South Yemen or Ethiopia; a seizure of power by pro-Soviet groups in Djibouti or North Yemen that threatened radical control of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb and perhaps of the southern Red Sea; or an ouster of Nimeiri and a turn to the left in Sudan.

Such developments could drive home to Riyadh, Amman, and Baghdad their increasing stake in Red Sea security and overshadow—at least for a time—longstanding Arab rivalries. A dramatic change in the present regional balance of forces could lead Egypt and Saudi Arabia to recall that they overcame earlier antagonisms during the period between the war with Israel in 1973 and the Camp David Accords in 1978. Iraq has moved far enough from its dogmatically radical stance of the 1960s and early 1970s that cooperation with Saudi Arabia and even with Egypt against a common military threat seems plausible. Baghdad has displayed its pragmatism by refraining from criticizing growing Omani military ties with the United States because Oman has supported Iraq on several issues during the Iran-Iraq war.

A small-scale regional precedent for cooperation among political rivals is the Gulf Cooperation Council. In that case, the threat of the Iran-Iraq war and a series of Soviet advances in the region brought together countries that differed as widely on foreign policy as Oman and Kuwait and lessened—even if it did not remove—the concern of the smaller Gulf countries about potential Saudi dominance.