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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTINE

# Intelligence Information Cable

Mandatory Review  
96-41  
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COUNTRY INDONESIA

TDCS -314/04529-64

DATE OF INFO. 10 OCTOBER 1964

DISTR. 24 OCTOBER 1964

**SUBJECT**

PRO-COMMUNIST ARMY OFFICER'S VIEW THAT WAR WITH BRITAIN WAS INEVITABLE AND THAT INDONESIA WAS STRENGTHENING ITS ARMED FORCES, INCLUDING THE ACQUISITION OF NEW SOVIET MISSILES

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [REDACTED] (19 OCTOBER 1964)

REF IN 99273

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: [REDACTED] FIELD REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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1. SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO A PRO-COMMUNIST ARMY OFFICER, THE INDONESIAN ARMY FEELS THAT AN ARMED CONFLICT WITH THE BRITISH OVER MALAYSIA IS INEVITABLE. THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES ARE THEREFORE PREPARING TO DEFEND INDONESIAN TERRITORY AGAINST BRITISH ATTACKS AND FOR PURPOSES OF RETALIATION OR DETERRENCE ARE PLANNING TO INSTALL SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE BASES IN INDONESIAN TERRITORY.

2. ON 10 OCTOBER 1964, LT. COLONEL ZAIN HAMID WHO WAS FORMERLY THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF KODAM 2 AND WHO IS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE SECURITY III OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS STAFF IN

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STALLER TOLD THE SOURCE THE FOLLOWING:

A. FROM 28 AUGUST TO 19 SEPTEMBER 1964 WHEN BRITISH NAVAL FORCES SAILED PROVOCATIVELY THROUGH THE SUNDA AND LOMBOK STRAITS, OTHER BRITISH WARSHIPS WERE LYING OFF INDONESIA PREPARED TO LAND TROOPS ON SUMATRA IF THE INDONESIA ARMED FORCES ATTACKED THOSE BRITISH AND AUSTRALIAN WARSHIPS MANEUVERING IN INDONESIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS.

B. THE INDONESIA GENERAL STAFF NOW BELIEVES THAT AN ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN INDONESIA AND BRITAIN IS INEVITABLE ON BRITAIN'S INITIATIVE. INDONESIA IS THEREFORE PREPARING TO DEFEND HER TERRITORY AND ALSO TO DEVELOP A CAPABILITY TO RETALIATE AGAINST BRITISH AGGRESSION AND TO POSSIBLY DETER IT.

C. TO RETALIATE IF NEED BE AGAINST BRITAIN AND HER SEATO ALLIES AND TO POSSIBLY DETER BRITISH AGGRESSION, INDONESIA HAS ORDERED FROM THE USSR BALLASTIC MISSILES. THE MISSILES AND THE SOVIET TECHNICIANS WHO WILL CONSTRUCT THE MISSILE SITES ARE NOW BEING AWAITED IN INDONESIA. IT IS HOPED THAT THE MISSILE BASES, WHICH WILL BE DEPLOYED STRATEGICALLY THROUGHOUT INDONESIA, WILL BE OPERATIONALLY BY THE END OF 1964. THE MISSILES, WHICH AS FAR AS IS KNOWN TO INDONESIANS NOW, WILL BE OF THE SAME TYPE AS THOSE WHICH WERE ONCE INSTALLED IN CUBA. THEY WILL BE AIMED TO COVER ANY POINT IN SOUTH EAST ASIA. THE ROCKETS HAVE BEEN SAID TO HAVE A GREAT ENOUGH RANGE TO REACH AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN.

D. THE INDONESIA GENERAL STAFF ASSUMES THAT BRITAIN WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY LANDING THEIR ARMY ON INDONESIAN SOIL BECAUSE OF

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THE SUPERIOR NAVAL STRENGTH. INDONESIA IS THEREFORE PREPARING TO MEET SUCH AN INVASION BY STRENGTHENING ITS LAND FORCES. BRITAIN CAN NO LONGER DEPEND ON ASSISTANCE FROM THE PRRI, DI-TII AS STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO NEUTRALIZE THESE ELEMENTS. ONLY RECENTLY 49 PRRI INDONESIANS FROM MALAYA WERE CAPTURED TRYING TO LAND IN EAST SUMATRA. 20 OF THESE WERE ARMED WITH STEN GUNS.

E. AN INSPECTION OF THE EASTERN COAST OF SUMATRA CONDUCTED IN EARLY OCTOBER BY LT. COLONEL ZAIN SHOWED THAT THE MILITARY THE HANSIP (CIVILIAN DEFENCE CORPS) AND THE GENERAL POPULACE ARE RAPIDLY REACHING A FULL STATE OF MILITARY READINESS AND SHOULD BE TOTALLY PREPARED TO DEFEND THE AREA BY JANUARY 1965.

F. FIVE HANSIP BATTALIONS, AND ONLY ONE ARMY COMPANY REMAIN IN THE CITY OF MEDAN. TWO BATTALIONS OF PASUKAN GERAK TJEPAT (PGT-MOBILE ARMY SHOCK TROOPS) REMAIN DEPLOYED IN THE VICINITY OF MEDAN FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE POLONIA AIRFIELD. THE REST OF THE TROOPS NORMALLY STATIONED IN MEDAN, ALL MILITARY DOCUMENTS AND ALL VITAL WAR MATERIAL WERE RECENTLY MOVED OUT OF MEDAN AND DEPLOYED INLAND. PLANS HAVE BEEN DRAWN UP FOR DEFENDING NORTH SUMATRA IN DEPTH WITH EMPHASIS PLACED ON GUERRILLA WARFARE. IT IS ASSUMED THAT MEDAN COULD NOT BE DEFENDED. LT. COLONEL MALIKI HAS BEEN APPOINTED COMMANDER OF THE GUERRILLAS WHO WOULD SURROUND MEDAN AND CONDUCT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE CITY. LT. COLONEL JUSUF HAS BEEN APPOINTED COMMANDER OF GUERRILLAS IN THE REGIONS OF SEMALUNGAN, TANAH KARO AND LANGKAT.

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2. THE ARMY AND OTHER SECURITY FORCES WILL SUPPORT THE  
CUBAN RELATIONS FROM INLAND COMMAND POSITIONS.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF  
PACFLT (ALSO SENT DJAKARTA SURABAYA KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE  
HONOLULU MANILA MELBOURNE LONDON).

END OF MESSAGE

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