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National Intelligence Bulletin

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April 2, 1976

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UK-RHODESIA

London's latest move for a resumption of Rhodesian negotiations faces formidable obstacles.

[REDACTED] The package contains elements the British hope will be attractive to both sides in the dispute, including:

- A requirement for expeditious negotiations on the shape of a new Rhodesian government.
- A transition period leading to majority rule of no more than one or two years, which could include the presence of British monitors.
- Provisions protecting the financial position of civil servants who stay on after independence.
- Economic assistance for non-Africans should they decide later to leave Rhodesia or be forced out.

[REDACTED]

The African presidents, who have been backing the Rhodesian nationalists, probably will at least privately go along with a new British initiative that might avert a Rhodesian liberation war that would have serious risks for the neighboring states. It would be very difficult, however, for the four presidents to mold the quarreling Rhodesian nationalists into a cohesive negotiating team for dealing with Smith, even if they decided to exert maximum pressure.

[REDACTED] In response, the four presidents may insist that the proposed transition period be reduced to one year before they attempt to get the Rhodesian nationalists to accept the British negotiating package.

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[REDACTED] Vorster, however, could measurably increase the pressure on Smith by saying publicly that further South African support for the Salisbury regime is contingent on prompt resumption of negotiations. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However anxious Vorster may be to head off a liberation war in Rhodesia that might lead to Soviet or Cuban intervention, it is doubtful that he is prepared to coerce Smith openly toward an early surrender of white rule in Rhodesia.

[REDACTED]

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Text not applicable

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