

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED

STATE DIA NSA OCR
FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS
STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS [REDACTED] REPORT NO [REDACTED]

COUNTRY: USSR DATE DISTR. 22 September 1986

SUBJ: Corrective Labor Camp at Volzhskiy, RSFSR

DOI: 1972 - 1974

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: The Corrective Labor Colony YaR - 154/12 was located near the Volgograd and served as a strict security type prison for about 3,000 inmates convicted of non-political criminal offenses. The labor camp was guarded by an internal group of military officers and warrant officers as well as an external guard composed of an MVD patrol guard company. The camp had numerous security measures including high walls and electronic surveillance. The guards used specially trained dogs and all prisoners were escorted to various activities.

TEXT: 1. The corrective labor camp (ispravitel'no-trudovaya koloniya) in Volzhskiy, RSFSR, was located about 25 miles Northeast of Volgograd, on the eastern edge of the city not far from the only tram-line in the city, which ran roughly on an East-West line. It was about a 30-minute ride on the tram-line to the vicinity of the camp, which stood out because of its approximately 12-foot walls and numerous sentry towers. The MVD designation for the camp was YaR-154/12. The camp was commanded by an MVD major (name not recalled) who was assisted by a staff of about 25 warrant officers (praporshchiki), who were on extended service and were responsible for the administration and internal security of the camp. The praporshchiki were not armed while performing their duties, not even when escorting camp inmates from the prisoner compound to the adjoining work area. COMMENT: See Enclosure for Source's memory sketch of the labor camp.) Even members of the patrol guard company which manned the sentry towers and was responsible for

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

39

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT
TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

[REDACTED]

the external security of the camp could not carry arms when entering the prisoner compound. The camp was of the strict security type and there were five obstacles or borders (rubezhi) separating the inmates from freedom: the two-meter high wall of the prisoner compound, the light-beam security equipment emplaced at each corner near the sentry towers, an area where dirt was carefully raked every day so as to reveal trespasser's footprints, an external concrete wall about four meters high, and a barbed wire "trapping" obstacle consisting of concentric barbed wire rings set up in a tent-like fashion immediately contiguous with the external wall. The apex of the last-named obstacle was about three meters high. The camp had a capacity of about 4,000 male prisoners, but usually contained between 2,000 and 3,000 inmates.

2. External security at the camp was the responsibility of the MVD patrol guard company v/ch-7461-B, commanded by Captain fnu ((Nemtsev)), an extended service officer who was about 30 years old in 1974. The company was one of three companies commanded by an MVD colonel (name not recalled) whose headquarters was in Volgograd. Each of the four platoons of the company was commanded by a lieutenant who was performing a two-year or less tour of compulsory duty, following which he would be assigned to the MVD reserve. Each of the platoons was organized in the same manner and had the same functions. Each platoon had two or three German shepherd guard dogs which accompanied deputy platoon leaders on their rounds around the perimeter of the camp, performed at least once every two hours to check the perimeter and confirm that the required tower sentry-changes, which occurred every two hours, had been made. The camp was about 300 meters by 100 meters. It took about 1.25 hours to make one tour of the perimeter. Platoon leaders and deputy leaders were armed with 9mm Makarov pistols. Sentries and patrol soldiers were armed with Kalashnikov automatic rifles. There was light-beam detector equipment at each corner of the residential side of the camp, which encompassed the prisoner compound but did not include the work area. The detectors activated a siren when anyone crossed the beam. On the side of the residential area facing the work area there also were installed magnetic detection devices that were said to be capable of incapacitating anyone who crossed their beam, although no instance of this ever happening was ever observed. To prevent tunnelling under the beams of the light-beam and magnetic detection equipment, wires were buried several feet under ground which when disturbed would also activate a siren. At one end of the residential area, considered to be the most vulnerable since it was the quietest area, the area along the wall between the sentry towers was raked carefully every day so as to reveal the footprints of trespassers. The barbed wire obstacle that surrounded the external wall of the camp was interrupted in two places by an electrically-operated barrier. One of these avenues was used for vehicles delivering supplies and prisoners to the residential area and the other was used for delivering work materials to the work area. A truck approaching a barrier was allowed to pass through the barrier, following which

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT
TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

[REDACTED]

the barrier would be lowered and the truck would be examined by a sentry and a guard dog, specially trained to sniff out humans. Only after this inspection was the truck allowed to proceed through the next gate into the residential or work area, respectively.

3. Prisoner barracks were one-story structures, with dormitory-type rooms furnished with two-level bunk beds and providing accommodation for from 40 to 60 inmates per room. Praporshchiki accompanied prisoners for all activities within the prisoner compound. This included movement in groups of 10 or 12 to the club and library, the dining hall, the bath house, and the work area. Prisoners were allowed up to two visitors a month, but there were no facilities for overnight visits with spouses. Prisoners included criminals sentenced to from a few months to up to 20 or more years, and included sentences under Criminal Code articles concerning rape, murder, embezzlement of state property, monetary speculation, and bribery.

4. Able-bodied inmates were required to work six days a week from 0800 to 1600 in the work area, which contained about twenty sheds in which prisoners engaged in the final dressing of tires produced at the Volzhskiy Rubber Plant and brought to the camp by trucks of the plant. Compensation for this work was said to be at the rate of about one ruble per day.

5. In the years 1973-1974, there were no known successful escape attempts at the camp and no attempts of any kind to scale the walls of the camp. There was an instance in 1974 when a supply truck within the work area was commandeered by a group of inmates who then tried to drive the truck through the locked gate of the work area, without success. The inmates involved were fired on by tower sentries and wounded if not killed.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

WARNING NOTICE
 INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED
 FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT
 TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

LAYOUT OF CORRECTIVE LABOR CAMP IN VOLZHSKY (NUMBER POSSIBLY YA B - 15,112)

