VI. E. CONDUCT OFFENSIVE (STRATEGIC) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN
FURTHERANCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVES

Counterintelligence operations have been discussed in the defensive
context under Objective B (Safeguarding National Security Information) and
Objective C (Thwarting Soviet Active Measures). These are major roles of
counterintelligence and crucial to the attainment of both objectives. The
highest payoff, in the form of knowledge of certain enemy agents within the
government, comes from recruitments-in-place and induced defections.

While the HOIS constitute a formidable threat against which one must
defend, they also are targets susceptible to exploitation in furtherance of US
national security policies. And, again, assets within the enemy camp are of
extraordinary importance to the conduct of this category of
counterintelligence operations.

1. Prioritization of Effort

The recruitment and secure handling of penetration agents in the
KGB, GRU, Soviet Bloc, PRC, and Cuban intelligence and security services have
been accorded highest priority in the national counterintelligence program.
Additionally, capitalizing on advances in the state-of-the-art, the mounting
and exploitation of technical penetration operations against the Soviet,
Chinese, Soviet Bloc, Cuban, Indo-Chinese, and North Korean intelligence and
security services are receiving comparable emphasis. These priorities will
pertain for the foreseeable future.
2. **Strategic Operations**

The general purpose of offensive operations is to exploit, confuse, and discredit the intelligence services of foreign powers, particularly Soviets and their close associates in Eastern Europe and Cuba, by the application of counterintelligence and covert action techniques. Degradation of the capabilities of the KGB and cooperating services facilitates the accomplishments of US foreign policy. This is achieved by exposing hostile and deceptive activities of the several HOIS to foreign governments and publics; by assisting foreign governments in discovering specific hostile intelligence activity and neutralizing that activity through arrests and expulsions; by the provision of tailored information through controlled channels.

These are extraordinarily challenging operations. For conceptualization, planning, and execution, the premium is on individuals with imagination, with an offensive mindset, and with the ability to think strategically and long range.

The counterintelligence community, with the CIA bearing the principal responsibility, will give priority attention to increasing the scope and effectiveness of offensive operations.
The first-ever, overall review of double agent operations worldwide was scheduled for 1985 but deferred by reason of higher priority.

The review recently conducted by DoD of military department's operations was for the limited purpose of assessing intelligence gain against intelligence
loss from the provision of feed material. Given the weight of counterintelligence effort devoted to these operations and their potential to advance US strategic interests, there appears to be little justification for further delay of the overall review. Specifically:

- The ancillary purposes of the review will be to identify HOIS essential intelligence requirements, assess the operational security of US HUMINT operations, and address the feasibility of greater use of personnel from non-military components of the government as well as agent operations.

- This joint analytical program will be evaluated by the counterintelligence community at the end of one year to determine whether it should be implemented on a continuing basis.

4. Improving the Defector Program

Aside from being valuable sources of information, hostile intelligence officers who defect cause significant disruption of their parent
services. Thus, when recruitments-in-place cannot be achieved, inducement of
defection is a viable alternative. The decision of a potential defector is
significantly influenced by what he knows—or can be convinced to
accept—about the post-defection environment and his opportunities for a
satisfying lifestyle.

The National Defector Program has been reevaluated in light of
certain problems surfaced by the Yurchenko case, and improvements in the
system for handling defectors have been implemented. The handling,
debriefing, and resettlement of defectors has been centralized under one
senior officer within the CIA, and support services such as medical,
psychiatric, and security have been better integrated within the entire
process. The debriefing and resettlement processes will be more effectively
interrelated and should provide adequately for the physical and psychological
care and feeding needs of defectors. The Interagency Defector Committee
system, which concentrates on the provision of debriefing requirements and
dissemination of information obtained from the defector, required no change.

(NOTE: Any statement of actions which need to be taken to
improve the defector program should be based on the NSC decision
on the recommendations of the in-depth PFIAB study on the defector
program.)
Counterintelligence elements contribute to the primary goal of forestalling terrorist violence in a secondary—albeit significant—way. The primary task of the counterintelligence division of the FBI (whose parent agency has lead responsibility for counterterrorism in the United States) is to

The dissemination of the information collected, combined with defensive surveys and awareness training, constitutes the CI contribution to the hardening of US targets.

Since there is no prospect for any abatement of State-supported terrorism, counterintelligence components must continue to pursue these activities with vigor.