


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Prospects for Leftist Revolutionary Groups in South America

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum




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
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PROSPECTS FOR LEFTIST
REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS
IN SOUTH AMERICA

Information available as of 22 May 1966 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum, approved for publication on 30 June 1966 by the Acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

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SCOPE NOTE

This Memorandum surveys the nature and seriousness of revolutionary activity in 10 South American countries. Suriname, Guyana, and French Guiana are not included, because they are usually considered by the US Intelligence Community as part of the Caribbean region.


The survey is broken down as follows:

- Countries where revolutionary groups are currently active, namely Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador, listed in order of the seriousness of the problem.
- Countries where no revolutionary groups are now active but where existing radical groups may have the potential to turn (or return) to violence within the next few years, namely Argentina and Uruguay.
- Countries where no insurgent groups are active and existing radical groups appear unlikely to develop into true revolutionary organizations, namely Bolivia, Venezuela, Brazil, and Paraguay.

In all, 21 extremist groups with revolutionary intentions are described, ranging from the formidable, several-thousand-strong Sendero Luminoso of Peru to the remnants of the Brazilian revolutionary groups of the late 1960s. All are leftist groups. Nowhere in South America are rightwing groups trying to seize power, although (as briefly described in this Memorandum) in several countries rightwing extremists employ terrorist tactics for counterrevolutionary purposes.

In addition, this Memorandum:

- Addresses the effects of the political and economic environment on prospects for these insurgent groups.
 - Describes the nature and sources of external support upon which many of these groups depend.
 - Examines recent efforts to foster both national and multinational cooperation among these groups.
 - Estimates the impact on US interests of likely developments among these groups during the next few years.
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KEY JUDGMENTS

The level of leftist-inspired politically motivated violent activity varies enormously in South America, from Chile, where such activity is endemic and incessant, to Paraguay, where there is virtually no leftist political violence. In four countries, the extremist groups are strong, active, and determined enough to be called revolutionary organizations—even among these countries, however, the violence varies considerably [REDACTED]

A country not currently suffering from insurgency or harboring a group likely to develop into a revolutionary organization is not necessarily safe from rebellion. Bolivia falls into this category, for example, yet history tells us not to expect much political stability there. Also, Paraguay has been politically quiet for decades, but it has been the calm of repression rather than contentment. Moreover, porous borders between several South American countries enable insurgents and arms to move freely across national boundaries and create the danger of a spillover of revolutionary violence [REDACTED]

Nevertheless, recent and current trends in revolutionary activities in the various South American countries appear to offer the best clues as to their likely stability in the future, as well as to the prospects that US interests in these countries may come under violent attack. [REDACTED]

Status of Revolutionary Violence by Country

Leftist revolutionary groups are active in four of the 10 South American countries:

- In *Chile*, the Communist Party and its affiliated terrorist group, the Manuel Rodriguez Partiotic Front (FPMR), along with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), are taking advantage of the increasing isolation of the internationally discredited Pinochet regime and the continuing fragmentation of the domestic opposition to raise the level of revolutionary violence.
- In *Peru*, the formidable Sendero Luminoso (SL) has expanded its urban terrorist operations—including assassinations of security force personnel—while continuing its insurgency in the rural highlands. The much smaller Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA) continues its own urban terrorist operations, often directed against foreign, especially US, targets.

[REDACTED]

— In *Colombia*, as anticipated, the 1984 truce between the Betancur government and most of the leftist guerrillas has gradually unraveled, with only the largest group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), continuing to observe the cease-fire even nominally. The Cuban- and Libyan-supported 19th of April Movement (M-19) and other, smaller groups have renounced the cease-fire and resumed insurgent activities—as we expect the FARC to do before another year passes. At Havana's urging, cooperation among Colombian insurgent groups has been growing. Revolutionaries from Ecuador and possibly Peru have joined with elements of M-19 to form the America Battalion, a small international guerrilla force operating (without much success) in Colombia near the Ecuadorean border.

— In *Ecuador*, Alfaro Vive, Carajol (AVC), which surfaced as an urban extremist group, has—under the tutelage and with the assistance of Colombia's M-19—expanded its operations to rural areas and undertaken operations of increasing intrepidity, complexity, and violence. In recent months, though, after a number of severe operational setbacks, it has been rather quiet. [REDACTED]

In *Argentina and Uruguay*, the remnants of former insurgent groups such as the Montoneros and the Tupamaros have been taking advantage of the more tolerant atmosphere of civilian rule to rebuild and reorganize, while their members debate whether to integrate into the legal political process or to prepare to resume armed action in the future. In the other four countries of South America—*Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Paraguay*—no revolutionary groups are active, and no existing radical groups appear likely to evolve into significant revolutionary threats during the next few years. On the other hand, some of these countries are used by foreign revolutionary groups and their supporters as safehavens, staging areas, conference sites, and smuggling channels. Sites in Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia, for example, have been used by Chilean insurgents and their Cuban sponsors, sometimes in collaboration with local radicals. [REDACTED]

Factors Contributing to Revolutionary Violence

The success of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua heartened and inspired would-be revolutionaries all around South America. In addition to this demonstration effect, we see four other factors as particularly aiding the spread of leftist revolutionary violence in South America:

- Increasing political latitude.
- Growing economic disarray.

[REDACTED]

- Expanding support from external patrons.

- Improving cooperation among insurgent groups [REDACTED]

In Peru and Ecuador, the increase in revolutionary violence has coincided with the ostensibly countervailing current of democratization. This demonstrates that, while democracy may immunize a society against revolution in the long run, in the short run a liberalized atmosphere may make it easier for radical groups to organize, recruit, propagandize, and raise funds [REDACTED]

In most South American countries, adverse economic conditions have led to declining living standards and government spending cutbacks for both social and security programs. The pool of deprived and disaffected citizens from which insurgents are recruited is being enlarged, while the ability of the affected governments to cope with extremism is being degraded [REDACTED]

The Marxist-Leninist revolutionary leaders of the 1960s and 1970s tended to guard their independence jealously. They rarely cooperated with other leftist groups, and in many cases they rejected support from Cuba and the Soviet Bloc rather than accept the strictures that came with it. The leftist revolutionaries of today, however, tend to be linked rather closely to the Soviets and their Cuban and Nicaraguan allies—or, in some cases, with the Libyans—whose external training and material support have become vital to their survival and growth [REDACTED]

Their patrons, however, are demanding in return not only that these groups improve their effectiveness and make real progress, but also that they cooperate with one another in working toward their mutual goals. The America Battalion is one result. Apart from these efforts to promote leftist solidarity, in Colombia some guerrillas (notably from the FARC) have begun working with narcotics traffickers in order to draw upon their financial resources and smuggling networks [REDACTED]

Sources of External Support

Foreign help of one sort or another has been received by revolutionaries in every South American country except Paraguay, where there have not been any revolutionaries since Stroessner took power:

- *Cuba* has been the principal source of aid for South American revolutionaries. Although Havana currently appears to be giving more priority to the support of revolution in Central America, in the past, Cuba is known to have backed revolutionary groups and fostered wider cooperation among radical leftists in every South American country save Paraguay and Peru. With the

[REDACTED]

exception of Chile and perhaps Colombia, however, Cuba appears to be holding support for active insurgencies in abeyance while concentrating on political gains through diplomatic and commercial initiatives.

- The *Soviet Union* has maintained a relatively low profile, except in Chile, providing political and moral backing but scant material aid. We suspect, though, that the Soviets may channel much of their aid through the Cubans. The Soviets openly advocate the overthrow of the Pinochet regime and make little effort to hide their support of the leftist opposition in Chile.
- *Nicaragua* has provided training, safehaven, and political support to insurgents from Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and possibly Peru. Sympathizers from most South American countries reportedly have participated with the Sandinista forces fighting against the Contras.
- *Libya* has supplied arms, training, and funds to Colombian, Chilean, Ecuadorean, and possibly Peruvian revolutionary groups.
- Elements of the PLO provided training to personnel from various South American insurgent groups before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon drove the Palestinian forces from their bases there. [REDACTED]

Outlook

Insurgents More Capable. Since the 1960s there have been substantial changes in the nature of insurgent movements in South America. The skill levels of leftist revolutionaries are often much higher now, as a consequence of the training and guidance they have received. The quality of their weapons and equipment has also improved, since in many cases they are supplied by patrons and no longer need to be scrounged or captured. Some of the leftist revolutionaries of today have also begun using more lethal and less discriminatory weapons, such as car bombs and rockets. All in all, they are more formidable adversaries than their counterparts of 15 to 20 years ago. [REDACTED]

Security Forces Better, Too. At the same time, however, the capabilities of the counterinsurgency forces in many South American countries have also improved, in some cases even more than those of the guerrillas. The counterinsurgency forces of today typically employ sophisticated modern tools such as electronic surveillance equipment and computer data bases and they are often equipped with advanced

[REDACTED]

weapons, transport, and communications equipment. In most countries they have been more than a match for their domestic opponents [REDACTED]

Current trends point toward the following developments during the next few years:

- Revolutionary violence will gradually escalate in Chile while continuing at a moderate level in Peru and Colombia and at a lower level in Ecuador. Revolutionary violence may resume in Argentina or Uruguay or even in other countries, such as Bolivia, where political institutions are particularly weak.
- Soviet, Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Libyan support for South American leftist revolutionaries is unlikely to diminish and may grow in particular cases, if the insurgents appear to be making progress.
- While leadership rivalries and ideological disagreements will continue to constrain in-country collaboration among revolutionary groups, insurgent cooperation across state boundaries is likely to grow somewhat along the lines established by Colombia's M-19, Ecuador's AVC, and Peru's MRTA.
- Collaboration between insurgent groups and narcotics trafficking organizations is likely to increase in Colombia and possibly Peru. [REDACTED]

Rightists Intimidated. Rightwing elements in countries beset or threatened by leftist revolutionaries are likely to continue to respond sporadically with terrorist attacks against identifiable leftist targets, although such death squad activities will probably be more limited than in the past. In general, rightwing government elements will be less likely than in the past to respond to leftwing extremism by wholesale abrogation of civil rights—a consequence of the development of international human rights organizations skilled at exposing and publicizing such repression. [REDACTED]

No Successful Revolutions Likely. Despite the expected extent of insurgent activity, no leftist revolutionary movement is likely to come to power in South America during the next few years. Relative to the regimes they are trying to supplant, currently active revolutionary organizations are weak—and in some cases declining. The evolving democratic political processes in most South American countries will continue to attract widespread public support, while insurgent groups generally will not. In addition, many of the radical elements within the

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Roman Catholic Church in South America are likely to abandon the more extreme forms of liberation theology as civilian rule becomes institutionalized. Finally, cooperation against leftist revolutionary violence has been improving among South American governments. Thus it will become increasingly difficult for insurgents to prey upon one country from sanctuaries in neighboring countries [REDACTED]

Implications for the United States. Increased activity on the part of urban terrorist groups such as Peru's Tupac Amaru would result in more frequent attacks against foreign, especially US targets, which tend to be concentrated in urban areas. The attacks would probably consist mainly of bombings, armed attacks (shootings), and kidnappings for ransom. Spectacular events of duration, such as the seizure of a government or diplomatic installation and the taking of important hostages, cannot be ruled out, since they generate more publicity than any other type of terrorist act. Such operations appear less likely, however, in the wake of the M-19 occupation of the Colombian Palace of Justice, which ended in catastrophe for both sides [REDACTED]

Terrorist attacks directed specifically against US Government officials have been rare in South America during the past few years. Good security practices by US officials have undoubtedly played a part in frustrating some would-be attackers, but we suspect the main reason has been a lack of motivation—the extremists have been rebelling against their own governments, not the US Government. It is likely, moreover, that foreign patrons, such as Cuba and the USSR, have counseled against attacking targets such as embassies and diplomats.

Nevertheless, US policies or actions that have helped to thwart the aspirations of revolutionary groups, such as providing counterinsurgency (or counternarcotics) advice and assistance to a particular government, have in the past elicited a terrorist response from the affected groups or their sympathizers, and have set a pattern likely to be replicated in the future. In other words, US efforts to limit or reduce leftist revolutionary activities over the long run are likely to stimulate anti-US terrorist attacks in the short run [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



DISCUSSION

1. Leftist revolutionary violence in South America has increased significantly since 1979 when the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua began to stimulate revolutionaries elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean. At that time, only Colombia and Venezuela were experiencing active insurgencies—conflicts in which armed leftist opponents of the regime were regularly engaging the security forces or attacking personnel or property. The Venezuelan insurgency was on the verge of extinction, and the Colombian insurgency was not particularly menacing. Since then, however, the insurgency in Colombia has expanded considerably, while new insurgent forces have emerged in Peru, Chile, and Ecuador. Violence against foreign personnel and property has increased dramatically.

2. Terrorist attacks against US targets in South America have increased in frequency since 1979, although they constitute only a small proportion of all instances of revolutionary violence. There were 73 anti-US terrorist incidents in 1985 compared with only 18 incidents in 1980. Most of the anti-US terrorist incidents since 1980 occurred in Colombia, Chile, and Peru, including all but five of those in 1985. Uruguay and Paraguay are the only South American countries where no attacks against US targets were recorded last year.

Current Levels of Leftist Revolutionary Violence

3. In Chile, the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) and its affiliated terrorist group, the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), along with the Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MIR), are exploiting the polarized domestic atmosphere and using increased foreign assistance to raise the level of revolutionary violence. None of these groups, however, currently appears capable of directly challenging the much stronger security forces; thus they have generally limited their armed attacks to bombing soft targets such as electrical towers, railroad lines, and government installations. The FPMR is, nevertheless, developing an effective terrorist capability in Chile. According to generally reliable sources, the FPMR is receiving strong material and moral support from the USSR and its allies. The level of this support is greater than that received by leftist insurgents anywhere else in South America.

4. We see a growing threat to the US presence in Chile. Terrorists attacked US-affiliated entities about 50 times in 1984-85, compared with only once in 1982. [redacted] reported last year that, as an outgrowth of promised Libyan financial aid, 25 members of the MIR entered Chile late in 1985 with plans to attack the US Embassy or a US official. The group reportedly abandoned the plan at year end because leaders believed it had been compromised. In the future, though, the MIR might resume such plotting. The MIR is currently in a rebuilding phase. If it succeeds, we believe the threat it presents will increase significantly.

5. In Peru, security forces are stretched thin as they face two active revolutionary movements, Sendero Luminoso (SL) with 4,000 to 5,000 members and the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA) with an estimated 150 to 300 members. Beginning in 1983 the government declared states of emergency in several highland departments to facilitate counterinsurgent operations against the SL. In 1984 the security forces mounted an ambitious anti-SL campaign but failed to destroy the SL's rural base or to prevent SL terrorist attacks in urban areas—especially Lima. The security situation has deteriorated since Garcia took office in July 1985. Urban terrorist attacks intensified in early 1986. President Garcia declared a state of emergency in the capital in February, but to little avail. SL assassinated several military officers, policemen, and public officials, including a rural governor. At the same time, SL appeared to be expanding its rural insurgency from Ayacucho into Puno as well.

6. Long the region's most insular group, SL has finally established some foreign links, even though we believe it still declines assistance from abroad in the form of arms or training and does not collaborate in any formal way with any other South American insurgent organization. In March 1984 SL publicly joined a fledgling Maoist organization, the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM), whose current mailing address is in London and includes groups from Western Europe, the Near East and Asia, the Caribbean, and the United States. We have no evidence that either the RIM or any of its members receive support from any foreign government—its propaganda's stri-

[REDACTED]

dent assaults on governments of virtually every political stripe hardly invite such assistance. Neither of the two other South American members of RIM, both Colombian groups, seems to be involved in the Colombian insurgency [REDACTED]

7. We are not optimistic that the Garcia government will develop an effective and comprehensive response to Peru's revolutionary violence. Nevertheless, we judge that neither SL nor the much smaller MRTA has any prospects of taking power in the next few years. The government would find it difficult to cope with a more unified revolutionary challenge. There is little evidence, however, that the two groups coordinate their activities, although important anniversaries and events in Lima have often prompted them to conduct nearly simultaneous terrorist actions there [REDACTED]

8. Both groups have attacked US targets. For the most part, these attacks have involved bombs thrown at US diplomatic, commercial, and cultural facilities in Lima, including the US Embassy and Consulate. The threat to the US presence in Peru has escalated since the virulently anti-US MRTA lifted its five-month moratorium on the use of terrorist tactics last November. Last December, for example, MRTA sprayed the US Embassy with machinegun fire [REDACTED]

9. In Colombia, truces reached in 1984 between the Betancur government and most of the Colombian guerrilla groups¹ failed to prevent a deterioration in the overall security situation. Insurgent groups are divided over whether to continue to observe the cease-fire with the government. The FARC favors maintaining the truce, but most of the other, smaller groups oppose it. What little remains of the peace process may not last another year. M-19, the guerrilla group Betancur had tried hardest to court, renounced the truce in June 1985. Since then it has spearheaded the formation of the National Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CNG), a loose alliance of Colombian insurgents opposed to the truce. The alliance's international wing, the America Battalion, with an estimated 250 guerrillas including members of the Ecuadorean Alvaro Vive, Carajol (AVC) and the Peruvian group Tupac Amaru,

¹ The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—tied to the orthodox Colombian Communist Party, the 19th of April Movement (M-19), the Quintin Lame Group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) (see [REDACTED])

recently launched an offensive against government forces in southwest Colombia. While M-19 boasts of "final victory" by 1987 can be discounted as the bravado of an organization known for its dramatic media announcements, the antitruce guerrillas are clearly determined to persist in their aggressive course. Their determination has been demonstrated by M-19's seizure of the Palace of Justice in Bogota in November 1985—the resulting shootout with Colombian security forces left more than 100 dead, including 12 Supreme Court Justices—as well as the America Battalion's rural operations. On the other hand, if M-19 continues to sustain losses of leaders and combat personnel at the rate evident during the past year, its days as an effective insurgent group are numbered [REDACTED]

10. The FARC is the only significant insurgent group still formally committed to preserving the truce; yet we believe it is also gaining at the government's expense. Because the FARC is the largest insurgent group in Colombia, it has the capability to intimidate the government security forces and to force the government to tolerate some of its activities in the countryside. The FARC's political front group, the Patriotic Union, engages in legal political activity—the group won minority representation in Congress last March and presented a candidate for the presidency—and carries out armed intimidation and propaganda efforts in rural areas [REDACTED]

11. Including the FARC, the guerrilla groups opposing the government may be able to field as many as 7,500 armed combatants. With their present capabilities and with the FARC barely observing the cease-fire, the Colombian armed forces are strong enough to maintain control over most of the country, although they cannot prevent individual terrorist acts. If the FARC were suddenly to return to open hostilities or to join the other groups in the CNG, the government would be hard pressed to provide urban security, much less maintain control over rural areas. With the victory of the establishment, Liberal Party candidate in the presidential elections in May, the FARC may decide to abandon the cease-fire, thereby finally shattering President Betancur's dream of pacifying Colombia. We have seen reports that the FARC is contemplating joining the other groups in a coalition of guerrilla forces, but we do not find them convincing. In the past, these groups frequently clashed as they vied for control of territory, and there is no persuasive evidence that they have changed their basically competitive approach [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

South American Revolutionary Groups

Countries and Principal Revolutionary Groups	Ideology and Numbers	Foreign Support	Closest Contact	Types of Violent Activities	Comment
Primary Trouble Spots					
Colombia					
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	Affiliated with pro-Soviet Communist Party; 2,500 to 4,000 members.	Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya: training. USSR: political support.		Kidnapings, robberies, attacks on military patrols, occupation of small towns.	Large rural strongholds; formally participates in peace talks with government; some income from drug industry.
19 April Movement (M-19)	Pro-Cuba; 850 to 1,000 members.	Cuba, Libya: funds, arms training. Nicaragua: arms, training.	Close links to Ecuador's AVC; possible contacts with Peru's MRTA, Venezuela's CBR; probable ties to Central American guerrillas.	Attacks on government buildings, kidnapings, robberies, occupation of small towns.	Debilitating leadership struggles since 1983; rebuilding from Palace of Justice incident; probable contacts with drug traffickers; seeks regional role.
Peru					
Sendero Luminoso (SL)	Maolist, fiercely independent; 4,000 to 5,000 members.	None		Brutal attacks on peasants; bombings of powerlines, police stations, military and political targets.	Rural based; leadership reportedly reorganizing.
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)	Marxist-Leninist; 150 to 300 members.	Cuba: training and material aid.	Possible contacts with Colombia's M-19.	Bombings of US business offices; radio station takeovers.	Urban based; appeared 1984; specializes in targeting foreign interests.
Chile					
Communist Party of Chile (PCCCh)	Pro-Soviet Communist party; 30,000 to 50,000 party members.	USSR, Bloc: funds, training, arms, propaganda. Cuba: arms.		Bombings, protests, assassinations.	Main advocate of violence to overthrow government; building toward insurgency.
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)	Marxist, pro-Soviet; 500 to 600 members.	USSR, Cuba: arms, training, funds, propaganda.	Contacts with Argentine Communists, Montoneros.	Bombings of government buildings, electric powerlines, rail transportation; attacks on police.	Affiliated with Communist Party.
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)	Castroist, pro-Cuba; 400 to 500 members.	Cuba, Libya: supplies, arms, training, funds. USSR: propaganda. Nicaragua: political support and training.	Contacts with Argentine ERP, Bolivian Communists.	Bombings, assassinations, attacks on police.	Extensive foreign contacts and political ties; recovery from heavy losses in 1983.

South American Revolutionary Groups (continued)

Countries and Principal Revolutionary Groups	Ideology and Numbers	Foreign Support	Cross-Border Contact	Types of Violent Activities	Comment
Ecuador					
Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC)	Pro-Cuba; 300 to 500 activists	Cuba: training, funds. Nicaragua: arms, funds, safehaven.	Close links to Colombia's M-19.	Media office takeovers, pamphlet bombs, bank robberies, arms raids, kidnappings.	Urban based, fast growing; beginning to press limited government counterinsurgency capabilities.
Other Countries					
Argentina					
Peronist Montonero Movement (Montoneros)	Far leftist, pro-Cuba; 300 to 500 members.	Cuba: some training and funds.	Probable contacts with Chile's MIR and FPMR.	None at present.	Aims at infiltrating political parties, trade unions, human rights groups.
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)	Marxist-Leninist; 200 members.	Cuba: some training and funds.	Contacts with Chile's MIR and FPMR, Uruguay's Tupamaros.	None at present.	Aims at infiltrating political parties, trade unions, human rights groups.
Uruguay					
National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros)	Far left, nationalistic; 300 members.	USSR and Cuba: possible funds		None at present.	Rebuilding domestic political organizations.
Venezuela					
Bandera Roja (GBR)	Pro-Cuba; 25 to 30 members.	Cuba: possible funding.	Reportedly has arranged arms shipments with Colombia's M-19.	Small terrorist actions in past; inactive at present.	Badly hurt by security forces in past; little sign of activity.
New Revolutionary Coordinator (NCR)	Pro-Cuba; 25 to 50 members.	Cuba: training and funds.	Two M-19 members reportedly in group's National Directorate.	None at present.	Little known.
Bolivia					
Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB)	Orthodox Moscow-line Communist party; 900 to 1,000 active members.	USSR: possible funds, training.	Supports Chilean guerrillas with safehouses and arms shipments.	None at present.	Follows directions from Moscow closely.

12. Although not among the more spectacular operations in Colombia, guerrilla actions against US targets have been part of the increased leftist revolutionary violence. In 1985 a number of US citizens, including oil and construction company officials and missionaries, were kidnaped for ransom by various Colombian revolutionary groups. M-19 and other groups also placed bombs at the US Embassy, binational cultural centers, and US businesses in several cities.

13. In Ecuador, the leftist revolutionary elements do not appear to be as strong as those in Chile, Peru, and Colombia, although the AVC developed considerable momentum against the undertrained security forces in 1984-85. AVC operations progressed steadily from a skillful publicity campaign through successful arms raids and bank robberies, to kidnappings, direct challenges to security forces, and initial operations in

[REDACTED]

rural areas. AVC's personnel have been trained, guided, and materially supported by the combat-experienced M-19 of Colombia, given safe refuge in M-19-controlled areas of Colombia, and acted with M-19 personnel in operations in Colombia and Ecuador. There are also reports that at least 17 AVC guerrillas received military and explosives training in Libya.

14. The AVC has suffered some recent reverses, however. The government has mounted a considerable and, lately, successful counterinsurgency effort in which several prominent AVC leaders have been killed or captured. Moreover, unlike its counterparts in Chile, the AVC does not appear to be gaining popular support. President Febres-Cordero appears determined to achieve rapid improvements in the military's counterinsurgency capabilities, although jurisdictional disputes between the police and the military could continue to hinder counterinsurgency operations. The AVC conducted minor bombing attacks against the US Embassy in Quito in 1983 and 1984, but it has not mounted a substantial campaign against US companies, facilities, or personnel in Ecuador.

15. In *Argentina* and *Uruguay*, groups formerly engaged in insurgencies until suppressed by military governments are using the more tolerant atmosphere of civilian rule as an opportunity to reform, recruit, refinance, and debate whether to participate in the political process or to prepare for future armed actions. These groups include the Peronist Montoneros and the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) in Argentina, as well as the Tupamaros (National Liberation Movement) in Uruguay. At a 1984 meeting in Havana, the Montonero and ERP leaders reportedly agreed to cooperate in infiltrating labor unions and political parties in order to nudge these organizations leftward. About a year later, despite its Trotskyite origins, the ERP agreed to join the pro-Soviet Argentine Communist Party in a "Forum for National Liberation" to target propaganda against "imperialism" and multinational companies. According to sources of varying reliability, the Cubans have also been encouraging the Tupamaros to pursue similar political strategies designed to exploit the country's economic woes. The Tupamaros have been calling on the Sanguinetti government to repudiate Uruguay's foreign debt (a favorite Cuban ploy). In neither country, however, do these groups seem anxious yet to take on the security forces. In the case of the Montoneros, this reluctance has been reinforced by the fact that the Argentinian Government, having obtained the extradition of Montonero

founder Mario Firmenich from Brazil in October 1985, intends to try him for terrorism.

16. *Elsewhere in South America*, we believe the potential security problems lie not in the indigenous radical groups—which appear weak or, in Paraguay's case, nonexistent—but in how these countries are being used as staging areas by foreign revolutionary groups:

— In *Bolivia*, there is no viable revolutionary movement. In October 1985, however, the armed forces reportedly turned up evidence that over the previous two years, apparently with the help of local leftists, at least 10 clandestine arms shipments had been made from a base in Bolivia to leftist revolutionaries in Chile.

— In *Brazil*, the military establishment closely monitors the activities of the Revolutionary Movement of 8 October (MR-8) and the Revolutionary Communist Party of Brazil (PCBR). Even if the two groups have decided to pool their meager resources, as military leaders reportedly believe, they do not pose much of a threat. A potentially more serious problem is that Brazil shares a permeable border with four countries where there are active or latent insurgencies. Reports from various sources over the past two years indicate that revolutionaries from Peru, Colombia, and other countries have established safe-havens in Brazil. In October 1984, representatives from revolutionary groups in six South American countries and from the Government of Nicaragua reportedly met in Porto Alegre, Brazil, to discuss establishment of a multinational revolutionary "Coordinator" targeted against the Pinochet regime. We have no information indicating that this initiative advanced beyond that stage; considering the lack of a common border with Chile, it is highly unlikely that Brazil would be used as a base of operations against the Pinochet regime.

— In *Venezuela*, two small clandestine subversive organizations, *Bandera Roja* (Red Flag) and the obscure *New Revolutionary Coordinator* (NCR), receive some limited Cuban support and are of concern to Venezuelan security officials. Although *Bandera Roja* has disbanded its urban unit and its rural unit has not been active, the group has not renounced armed struggle and some members reportedly cooperate with Colombia's M-19.

[REDACTED]

— In Paraguay, leftist revolutionary groups have had no success, and the Paraguayan Communist Party (PCP) is in disarray. [REDACTED]

Factors Contributing to Revolutionary Violence

17. Much of the insurgency in South America is occurring in the face of the presumably countervailing current of democratization. Logic suggests that the replacement of military dictatorships by popularly elected governments, which—however flawed—provide more legitimate outlets for political grievances than their predecessors, would undercut popular support for the insurgencies. Over time this conclusion may prove correct, but in the interim the elected governments must cope with sagging economies that compel them to adopt unpopular economic policies. Moreover, the skill of leftist groups in exploiting an open political climate, the demonstration effect of the Sandinista revolution, and the beginnings of effective collaboration among some of the groups are complicating and threatening the democratization process. [REDACTED]

Increased Political Latitude

16. Political liberalization has given South American revolutionaries new opportunities to attract recruits, raise funds, propagandize, and build front groups. Throughout most of South America, it is no longer inherently dangerous to belong to an orthodox, pro-Soviet Communist party. From 1968-78 such parties were legal only in Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela; at present they are outlawed only in Chile and Paraguay. Moreover, in addition to the universities and labor unions that have often been vehicles for leftist or revolutionary agitation, revolutionaries have reached out to human rights organizations and other middle-class groups. [REDACTED]

19. Radical Christian activists, particularly Roman Catholic adherents of liberation theology, are also encouraging collaboration throughout Latin America between Christians and Marxists. These activists, along with numerous national and international human rights organizations created in the past decade, have been prominent among public critics of the—admittedly sometimes objectionable—behavior of security forces toward leftist activists and their sympathizers. [REDACTED]

Serious Economic Disarray

20. In many South American countries, economic conditions have deteriorated in recent years, contrib-

uting to a climate conducive to insurgencies. Population pressures, high unemployment and underemployment rates, heavy external debt burdens, and other economic problems have caused some governments to cut funding for social programs and security forces alike. In countries where a lack of economic opportunity has contributed to the growth of the illicit narcotics industry, such as Peru and Colombia, some insurgents have joined forces with traffickers for mutual benefit. [REDACTED]

21. The standard of living in the region has actually dropped since 1979. This has led some persons to cooperate with insurgents out of sheer economic need. For example, one Colombian group attracted recruits by paying them monthly salaries one-third higher than the minimum wage. According to a captured member, the AVC has promised half the proceeds from bank robberies to those willing to join and participate in such acts for the organization. Even members of the security forces are not immune to such inducements. The AVC has been able to recruit prison guards to facilitate jailbreaks of captured members. M-19 has bought the services of some retired Colombian officers and enlisted men. [REDACTED]

Expanded External Support

22. The Soviets, Cubans, Libyans, or Nicaraguans have contributed some form of aid to revolutionaries in every South American country except Paraguay. The level of effort appears to be greatest in those countries with active insurgencies, except for Peru, and to be little more than a token in nature in countries where insurgency is inactive. (see table). [REDACTED]

The Soviet Role

23. A direct Soviet tie can be documented only in Chile. The USSR hardly troubles to conceal its hostility toward Pinochet in the apparent belief that it risks incurring very little international disapproval:

- Soviet-controlled propaganda broadcasts beamed to South America by Chilean exiles openly call for violence against the Pinochet regime.
- Moscow finances and provides guidance to the PCCh, which closely follows the Soviet line.
- Luis Corvalán, head of the PCCh, lives in the Soviet Union and is totally responsive to Soviet direction. In 1980, probably at Moscow's instruction, he announced resumption of the armed

[REDACTED]

struggle in Chile; he repeated this announcement during his trip to Scandinavia in May 1985.

- The Soviets and their East European allies have reportedly provided arms, training, and financial support to the FPMR.
- According to a generally reliable source, 120 Chilean exiles recently completed urban warfare training in Algeria, East Germany, Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union and are being returned to Chile. Some of them reportedly have participated in the recent violence [REDACTED].

24. Elsewhere Soviet support is not well documented. Beyond moral encouragement, there are some scattered indications of covert financial assistance to certain groups. It seems likely that the Soviets channel much of their aid through the Cubans, so as to conceal their own role [REDACTED].

The Cuban Role

25. For more than two decades, Cuba has been the principal external source of support for South American leftist revolutionaries. In June 1983, Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez publicly acknowledged Havana's commitment when he stated that one of his government's basic aims is to foster socialist revolution throughout Latin America. Moreover, in a January 1984 interview with a US Congressman, Fidel Castro emphasized that Cuba considers all of South America part of the revolutionary process and predicted specifically that Chile, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil would eventually all have revolutions [REDACTED].

26. Since the Sandinista revolution, however, we believe Cuban support for South American revolutionaries has been limited by two factors:

- The more immediate priority given by Havana to Central America, except for Chile and possibly Colombia.
- The perception in Havana and Moscow of opportunities to make political gains in South America through diplomatic and commercial initiatives [REDACTED].

27. Chile is the one South American country where Cuban policy now appears to focus on supporting the armed overthrow of the government. Castro has stated publicly and privately that he attaches special impor-

— tance to undermining the Pinochet regime, both because of its strident anti-Communism and because it toppled the Cuban-backed Allende government. In addition, we believe Havana calculates that the regime has become an international pariah—meaning the Cubans risk minimal political costs for promoting its downfall. Castro judges that domestic conditions render Chile ripe for revolution. In that context, Manuel Pineiro, the head of the Cuban Communist Party's Americas Department, admitted to US officials in February 1985 that Cuba was currently supporting insurgents in Chile as well as in El Salvador and Guatemala. Other sources of varying reliability indicate that during the past year this support has included infiltrating numerous Cuban-trained terrorists into the country, prodding the MIR to resume armed action, stepping up the shipment of arms and financial assistance, facilitating the movement of Chilean revolutionaries training outside the region, and providing more frequent tactical guidance to several Chilean far left groups [REDACTED].

28. In Colombia, the Cubans have maintained longstanding connections with both the National Liberation Army (ELN) and M-19. Encouraged by the Sandinista victory in 1979 and embittered by Colombian competition that caused Havana to lose its bid for a UN Security Council seat in 1980, Cuba provided training, arms, advice, and safehaven to M-19 in the early 1980s, according to reliable sources. In 1981, however, a large M-19 force that had been trained and organized in Cuba attempted to land on the Colombian coast and was annihilated by Colombian armed forces. The embarrassment led Castro to curtail arms shipments, although he allowed other forms of aid to M-19 to continue—even after M-19 agreed to a truce with the government in 1984. In February 1985, months before M-19 denounced the truce, Pineiro admitted to US officials that M-19 personnel were still returning to Colombia after training in Cuba. Pineiro claimed that this did not constitute a Cuban effort to subvert the Colombian Government [REDACTED].

29. Elsewhere in South America, Havana has been maintaining a more circumspect approach, in which limited support for potential or actual opponents of the ruling party is coupled with an outwardly cordial effort to court the regime. For example:

- In Ecuador, according to a generally reliable source, Cuba provided guerrilla training to a small number of members of the radical Ecuadorean Socialist Revolutionary Party in 1983 and

[REDACTED]

1984 in the expectation, thus far unfulfilled, that the party would initiate armed actions in late 1984. In addition, captured AVC documents point to Cuban commitments to provide training additional to that furnished by M-19. At the same time, Havana has sought to preserve the upgrading of diplomatic relations accomplished under leftist President Hurtado in early 1984; the US Embassy reports that on his visit to Havana in April 1985 conservative President Febres-Cordero was impressed with Castro's disclaimer of involvement in Ecuador and his pledge that he would counsel Ecuadorean leftists toward moderation.

- In Peru, Cuba's flirtation with insurgency is reflected in Castro's January 1984 statement to a US Congressman that Peru's "problems" could be solved only "by revolutionary movements" and in Radio Havana's encouragement to the MRTA. Nonetheless, in December 1985 the Garcia government agreed to upgrade diplomatic relations to the ambassadorial level.
- In Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Venezuela the Cubans are encouraging radical leftists—partly through financial backing—to rebuild their strength, yet are also pursuing diplomatic gains. To some degree they are counting on short memories. Despite considerable past Cuban aid for Brazilian revolutionary groups, for example, the Brazilian Foreign Minister has expressed to US officials his confidence that Castro would not interfere in Brazilian affairs and thus recommended that Brazil reestablish diplomatic relations.
- In Bolivia, under President Siles, the Cubans established full diplomatic relations and gained significant influence with some members of his administration. Since President Paz Estenssoro replaced Siles, bilateral relations have cooled, and Cuban influence in the government has been almost completely erased [REDACTED]

The Libyan Role

30. In 1979 the Soviets and Cubans reportedly began pressing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) guerrilla groups to take a more active role in Latin America. During the early 1980s Brazilians, Bolivians, and Chileans were among South Americans reliably reported to have been trained in PLO camps, mainly in Lebanon. After the Israeli invasion of

Lebanon in 1982, the PLO largely lost its capability to provide such training to non-Palestinians. Since then, the Libyans have in effect filled the vacuum.

31. The Libyan Government has been involved in a wide-ranging program to train, arm, and fund subversive and terrorist organizations throughout Latin America. Qadhafi once said that he wanted to establish a beachhead for insurgency in Latin America. He may have been deliberately trying to supplant Cuba as the primary sponsor of Latin American and Caribbean revolutionary movements [REDACTED]

32. The Caribbean is clearly Libya's priority target, but well-documented activities are also under way in Central and South America. Libyan support to Nicaragua, itself active in supporting rebel groups in other countries, complements Tripoli's broader efforts to destabilize the region. Within South America, the Libyans have promised and in some cases have supplied financial aid and arms to groups in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and possibly Peru. Colombian insurgents, notably members of M-19, have been trained in Libya in military and terrorist tactics. At least 17 members of Ecuador's AVC guerrilla organization reportedly have received training in Libya in the use of automatic weapons, explosives, and military and terrorist tactics. Tripoli has provided training and funding to the Chilean MIR to help upgrade its terrorist capabilities. Libya has attempted to expand its influence in Venezuela through its People's Bureau in Venezuela, but with little success, due to effective countermeasures by Caracas [REDACTED]

The Nicaroguan Role

33. The Nicaraguans have supplied training, and in some cases arms and financial assistance, to the MIR in Chile; M-19, FARC, and ELN in Colombia; and AVC in Ecuador [REDACTED]

34. The affinity between South American revolutionaries and the Sandinistas has been expressed in a number of ways. Since 1977, revolutionaries from every South American country except Paraguay have aided the Sandinistas politically or militarily. Leftwing insurgent groups have staged violent attacks in support of the Sandinistas in several countries. In countries without active insurgencies, such as Brazil and Venezuela, pro-Sandinista elements have held demonstrations. Some South American revolutionaries have demonstrated their solidarity in person by participating with the Sandinista forces fighting against the Contras.

[REDACTED]

35. As a direct result of increased external support, some South American leftist revolutionary groups have become more competent and capable. Training acquired in terrorist camps in Central America, the Eastern Bloc, and the Middle East and combat experience gained since the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua have left insurgents more prepared to deal with their countries' military and security forces. In addition, revolutionary groups have acquired more lethal weaponry and advanced communications equipment. Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, when many revolutionary leaders jealously guarded their independence and chose not to be closely aligned with Moscow, Marxist revolutionaries now tend to be linked to the Soviets or their Cuban and Nicaraguan allies, whose training and material support help sustain them [REDACTED].

The Question of Regional Cooperation

36. In no South American country is cooperation among insurgent groups as close as it is now in El Salvador or used to be in Nicaragua. So far, there is no South American equivalent to the three Sandinista "Tendencies" united in a single Directorate nor to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) that includes five Salvadoran guerrilla groups. The nearest equivalent appears to be CNG, the coalition of antitruce insurgents in Colombia led by M-19 [REDACTED].

37. In Ecuador, other extreme leftist parties are reliably reported to be resisting cooperation with the AVC. The Maoist Sendero Luminoso in Peru has not even publicly recognized the revolutionary credentials of Tupac Amaru. Elsewhere in South America, small bands of revolutionaries proclaim their unceasing struggle against "imperialism" and occasionally commit terrorist acts in that cause, but because of personal jealousies or the memories of old quarrels they do not cooperate effectively with other revolutionaries in the same country; each group marches and countermarches to its own drums [REDACTED].

38. The concept of a transnational "Bolivarian army" has long been advocated by South American guerrillas. According to various unconfirmed reports, the multinational America Battalion that was formed in Colombia under the leadership of M-19—numbering at least 250 armed personnel in March 1986—may have included Ecuadoreans, Peruvians, Venezuelans, Panamanians, and even North Americans. More reliable sources, however, can confirm participation only by members of Ecuador's AVC and Peru's Tupac Amaru, in addition to M-19. During the past several

Intelligence Gaps on Sources of External Support

There are major unanswered questions about the network of external support to South American insurgent groups [REDACTED].

- *The mechanism by which the Soviet Union provides support to leftist revolutionary groups.* Is Soviet support direct but covert, or is it channeled through other countries such as Cuba and Nicaragua?
- *The Soviet-Cuban division of labor.* Do Havana and Moscow agree on which South American governments are most vulnerable to revolution? Are Moscow and Havana less concerned with unification of guerrilla groups in countries in South America than in Central America? Are there countries in South America where the Soviets and Cubans are working at cross purposes? To what extent are Libyan and Nicaraguan aid programs coordinated with either the Soviets or Cubans?
- *Relationship of transnational collaboration to external support.* Is M-19 or Havana the ultimate author of M-19's relationship with AVC? How do Moscow or Havana facilitate contacts between South American insurgents and their counterparts in Central America?
- *The Peruvian exception.* To what extent does the Soviet arms supply relationship with Peru inhibit Soviet and Cuban support for leftwing insurgents in Peru? Are the issues of accepting foreign support and establishing regional ties subjects of debate within Sendero Luminoso? Are there SL factions that may break with the mainline organization and establish foreign links? How does SL participation in the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement affect its activities in Peru?

[REDACTED]

months this small guerrilla force has clashed frequently with the Colombian Army in and around the city of Cali in mountainous southwestern Colombia. The guerrillas reportedly have well-organized columns armed with assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and a few recoilless rifles. The Colombian military, which is determined to eradicate the America Battalion, has reported inflicting heavy casualties on elements of the battalion it has been able to draw into combat but has not yet been able to dislodge the main force of the guerrillas from their mountain

[REDACTED]

stronghold. Most of the Ecuadorean and Peruvian guerrillas—a minority of the battalion—have reportedly been killed or captured [REDACTED]

39. The America Battalion aside, the connections established by M-19 with the AVC appear closer than in any previous case of transnational cooperation in Latin America. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] M-19 leaders have publicly claimed to have contacts with revolutionaries in Peru and, according to a source whose reporting has sometimes been substantiated, privately claimed similar contacts with the Chilean MIR. Elsewhere in South America, revolutionary organizations based outside Chile occasionally are reported to be providing support to either the FPMR or the MIR. [REDACTED]

Outlook

40. Over the next few years, economic and political conditions in South America appear to favor the continuation of insurgencies in Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador. There also is some chance of the revival of at least a low level of armed revolutionary violence in Argentina or Uruguay as well as in countries where currently there are no active insurgencies, such as Bolivia [REDACTED]

41. Throughout South America the combination of government-imposed austerity and persistent inflation is driving lower- and even middle-class families into poverty, thereby contributing to the pool of potential recruits for the violent left. Because of their economic problems, some governments may be forced to cut back military spending; consequently there may be further reductions in the size, capabilities, and morale of their forces [REDACTED]

42. Collaboration between South American insurgent groups and narcotics traffickers may spread. The FARC and M-19, the two largest Colombian insurgent groups have already been implicated with the drug trafficking, and other South American groups may succumb to the temptation. The Ecuadorean AVC, for example, might come to emulate the drug trafficking practices of M-19, its principal mentor. The reported ad hoc arrangements between Sendero Luminoso and drug traffickers in Peru could also assume a more permanent form. Elsewhere in South America, a few of the inactive insurgent groups—possibly in Venezue-

la and Brazil—may see narcotics money as the financial key to their revitalization. We believe that increased cooperation between insurgents and drug traffickers would considerably complicate the problems faced by the security forces, which have had enough trouble trying to cope with the heretofore separate challenges posed by the insurgents and the drug traffickers [REDACTED]

43. An additional area of concern is the possible revitalization of rightwing terrorist organizations (see inset). Typically, such groups are staffed by active or retired security force personnel and sympathetic civilians. Reportedly, rightwing terrorists are already attacking perceived subversives in Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Argentina. As in Central America, rightwing violence will draw sharp criticism from international human rights organizations and, in our view, will assist leftwing extremists in their recruiting. [REDACTED]

Anti-US Terrorism

44. In recent years, South American insurgent activities have become increasingly urbanized, a trend we believe will continue, as leftist revolutionaries compete with one another and emulate their ideological allies in Central America in trying to stage spectacular incidents. This will lead to an intensification of threats against nonindigenous targets, including US interests, which tend to be concentrated in urban areas. As in the past, US personnel and facilities are likely to be frequent targets of radical leftists seeking to strike at the United States, either for its own sake or because to them it symbolizes capitalism and "imperialism" [REDACTED]

45. The terrorism directed against US interests is likely, in the main, to take the following forms: bombings, kidnappings for ransom, assassination attempts, and—more rarely—attempts to seize buildings and take US hostages. Bombings—perhaps staged as acts of solidarity with revolutionary groups in Central America or elsewhere—will probably continue to consist chiefly of low-risk attacks on US diplomatic and commercial facilities or binational cultural centers, which usually produce few casualties but attract the desired media attention. Kidnapings for the purpose of raising funds have occurred most frequently in Colombia, although not all of the kidnapers have had political motives. A wide variety of both locals and foreigners will continue to be victimized, probably including US citizens, because US companies have

The Persistence of Rightwing Terrorism

Rightwing paramilitary forces have appeared frequently in South and Central America in reaction to the rise of perceived leftist threats. Claiming to be defenders of the status quo, they have attracted considerable voluntary cooperation from the general public and varying degrees of support and participation from the security forces. Many people view them favorably as the bearers of swift and vigorous punishment for agents of disorder. Some governments, hampered by such factors as cumbersome or corrupt judicial systems and judging that they cannot curb subversion and armed violence from the left using strictly legal measures, have welcomed the advent of the anonymous rightwing death squads, with the plausible denial they offer. The rise of energetic human rights organizations concerned with Latin American affairs over the last decade, however, has greatly raised the potential cost, in terms of adverse publicity, for governments that sponsor or permit such rightwing vigilantism. Nevertheless, with the recent expansion of leftist insurgent activity in several South American countries, new stirrings have appeared on the extreme right.

In Chile, members of the security forces have repeatedly been implicated in rightwing terrorism. In 1984 there were accusations from various quarters that the National Information Center (CNI), which is run by military officers, murdered several leftist extremists while they were trying to surrender or after they were in custody. More explicitly, Chilean Anti-Communist Action (ACHA), which has been in existence since the early 1970s and probably has links to Chilean security services, publicly claimed to have killed one leftwing extremist and has threatened several human rights activists with death if they do not cease their antigovernment activities. In addition, according to sources of varying reliability, active duty and retired carabinieri were responsible for the March 1985 killing of three Chilean Communist Party members.

In Colombia, the vigilante group Death to Kidnappers (MAS), formerly active between 1981 and late 1983,

announced its revival in February 1985 and threatened execution of a Colombian businessman, whom it accused of association with M-19. Moreover, the April 1985 murder of a campesino leader, who belonged to a Communist party, appears to have been the work of a rightwing death squad composed, at least in part, of policemen.

In Ecuador, various kind of evidence indicates that in 1985 the police force of Guayaquil may have set up a death squad to deal summarily with both criminals and insurgents. In March, six individuals accused of criminal activities were found murdered. Also in March, wall slogans challenging AVC (Alfaro Lives!) by implying the existence of a mirror image organization (Alfaro Is Dead!) were found in several parts of the city. The methodical, unhurried way in which both activities were carried out implied police connivance. In September 1985, two AVC members captured in Guayaquil were shot by police while being transported between jails.

In Peru, the Rondas Campesinas, rural civilian auxiliaries that have been pressed into service to aid the regular security forces, have sometimes shown indiscriminate brutality against individuals suspected of being SL members or sympathizers.

In Argentina, we believe that a number of small-scale bombings since April 1985 have been the work of rightwing as well as leftwing forces. No rightwing group has been identified, although the most likely candidate would be whatever remains of the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA) founded in 1973 by the then Minister of Social Welfare, and composed of retired military and police officers. Its activities during the "dirty war" against subversion are currently under investigation by Argentine courts.

In Uruguay, small groups of the far right are reportedly monitoring the activities of the small groups of the far left, but so far there has been no violence in recent years from either end of the spectrum.

established a pattern of paying ransom. Neither assassination attempts nor the seizure of public buildings with US hostages have not been commonplace in South America during the past two years, although we believe this has been partly because of improved official US security. We expect the threat of such attacks against US officials to remain moderate:

— In Colombia, we cannot rule out the possibility of another terrorist spectacle by M-19 to recoup lost prestige. High-profile US personnel such as the Ambassador or other senior officials are likely

targets in any future hostage-barricade action. To preclude a government counterattack similar to that staged at the Palace of Justice and create the conditions for guerrilla success, M-19 has publicly announced plans to include important foreigners in a future hostage-barricade situation.

— There is also a high risk of street assassinations in Colombia, where narcotics traffickers as well as guerrillas have threatened to assassinate US personnel. The apparent alliance between some guerrilla groups and drug traffickers compounds

[REDACTED]

the danger to US Government personnel, especially when US antinarcotics or counterinsurgent support to the Colombian Government raises the US profile in Colombia.

- In Peru, we expect a high level of MRTA terrorism that will include attacks against US targets. The SL will also pose a continuing threat to US interests, although it tends to focus its efforts on the Peruvian Government. [REDACTED]

Continued External Support

46. We see little likelihood over the next few years that Cuban and Nicaraguan support for South American insurgents will diminish. Castro's hostility toward Pinochet will not abate, nor will his determination to further revolution in South America. In Colombia, and to a lesser extent in Ecuador, Havana and Moscow hope to reap gains from the ongoing insurgencies. Elsewhere, we expect the Cubans to continue to try to make diplomatic gains while quietly building up their assets in leftist sectors. Libyan support is likely to continue or even increase. [REDACTED]

47. Despite all these problems we see no South American leftist revolutionary group taking power in the next few years. Certain developments are likely to

improve the ability of existing South American regimes to cope with the insurgent threat. Notably:

- Security forces around the continent are becoming more sophisticated and effective, owing to improved training, equipment, and leadership.
- As indications of external support of South American insurgencies and regional insurgent collaboration are recognized throughout the hemisphere, South American security forces will be more likely to collaborate effectively with one another and to accept help from the United States, especially in the form of increased training.
- We believe that the Roman Catholic Church in South America, which has allowed some Church sectors to collaborate with leftist revolutionaries and to sympathize with charges of US complicity with military regimes, will begin to distance itself from liberation theology and insurgent activities as governments return to civilian rule, especially if US policy works toward easing the Latin debt burden.
- Most important, the democratic processes in most countries enjoy widespread public support, while revolutionary alternatives do not. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ANNEX

Revolutionary Movements: Country Profiles by Category

1. This annex divides the 10 countries of South America into three categories according to the status of insurgencies within their borders. We categorize *Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador* as having active insurgencies. We categorize *Argentina and Uruguay* as countries where leftist revolutionary groups have the potential to develop into active insurgencies. We categorize *Brazil, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Bolivia* as countries where there are neither current insurgencies nor any existing groups that might present an insurgent threat during the next few years. It should be noted, however, that the weakness of political institutions in Bolivia, coupled with its economic problems, make that country a place where revolutionary violence can flare up suddenly [REDACTED]

Countries With Active Revolutionary Movements

2. An active revolutionary movement is defined as an armed opposition that regularly engages security forces or attacks state property in such a manner as to threaten the stability of a country's government or economy. Groups at this level exist in Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador [REDACTED]

3. In *Chile*, revolutionary groups building up their strength with significant foreign support continue to call for armed opposition despite widespread popular sentiment in favor of an accelerated transition to civilian rule. During 1984, bombings increased five-fold, and they continued at an even higher rate in 1985. Faced with a large security force under a military dictatorship and constrained by an officially declared state of emergency, the revolutionary groups are forced to operate clandestinely, for the most part. In 1983 the three largest groups publicly formed a loose political alliance, the Democratic Popular Movement (MPD), ostensibly to present peaceful, public opposition to Pinochet. The following groups were members of the MPD, which was outlawed by the government in February 1985:

- The Communist Party of Chile (PCCh)
- The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)
- The Chilean Socialist Party/Almeyda Faction (PSCh/A) [REDACTED]

4. In our view, the pro-Soviet PCCh (formed in 1922) dominates the MPD and poses the main revolutionary threat to the regime. An advocate of armed struggle since 1980, the party has 30,000 members plus a 20,000-strong youth wing. PCCh members organize political opposition—such as strikes and national protest days—through the MPD. By September 1985 the PCCh Central Committee had reportedly moved to improve the party's organizational capabilities and exert tighter control over those promoting armed action by returning senior exiled leaders to Chile. In April 1985, according to an often substantiated source, the PCCh received a shipment of Soviet-made weapons from Cuba for distribution to regional party units and to the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) [REDACTED]

5. The FPMR, which receives support from both the USSR and Cuba, was formed in late 1983, making it the newest element of the developing revolutionary movement. It often operates independently, but the PCCh has reportedly attempted to assume control by placing trusted members in FPMR leadership positions. The FPMR's actions in 1985 caused at least three blackouts in the capital and bombings in various cities as well as disruption of rail transportation. After it bombed government-owned buildings during the national protest day in March 1985, the FPMR was publicly praised by Radio Havana for its "firm purpose of fighting relentlessly." In September 1985, the Chilean Communist daily published an FPMR manifesto that advocated armed opposition to Pinochet and expressed solidarity with the Governments of Cuba and Nicaragua plus support for the "Salvadoran people and their struggle" [REDACTED]

6. The Cuban-influenced MIR, although repeatedly weakened by security force operations, remains publicly committed to overthrowing the Pinochet regime by force. The MIR, which has a 20-year history of subversive activities, conducted a terrorist campaign from 1981 until late 1983, when security forces killed several militants and leaders, demoralizing the movement. By March of 1984, though, the group reportedly had decided to return to violence as a result of Cuban prodding. According to various reliable sources, the MIR is training revolutionary cadre in Cuba, who are

[REDACTED]

then to be infiltrated back into Chile to wage guerrilla war. [REDACTED]

7. During 1985 the MIR conducted several terrorist actions in conjunction with the FPMR, beefed up its organizational structure, and began to develop an arms smuggling network. To support these efforts, the MIR, like the PCCCh, has reportedly been bringing its exiles home, according to a generally reliable source. In addition, it has launched a recruitment drive, seeking members from among the urban poor, students, and the unemployed. Currently, the MIR probably has about 400 members in Chile. The group is led by Andres Pascal Allende (nephew of the late Salvador Allende), who has lived in Cuba since the late 1970s. [REDACTED]

8. The PSCh/A—the best financed splinter group of the Socialist Party originally formed in 1933—joins the PCCCh and MIR in their political front, the MPD. Named after its principal leader, Clodomiro Almeyda, and numbering between 10,000 and 20,000 members, many still in exile, the PSCh/A formally advocates armed struggle, but, according to an informant, much of the leadership tends to prefer political action while allowing elements within the party to collaborate in PCCCh-sponsored violence. Like the MIR and PCCCh, it is believed to receive support from both the Soviet Union and Cuba. [REDACTED]

9. In Peru, security forces are stretched thin as they now face two active revolutionary movements—the originally rural-based Sendero Luminoso (SL) and the newer, urban-based Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA). While the SL continues to pose the most serious threat to stability, the MRTA may pose a greater threat to US facilities and personnel. The two revolutionary groups operate independently. [REDACTED] International events often prompt terrorist actions in Lima by both groups, but no evidence of coordination between the SL and Tupac Amaru has come to light. [REDACTED]

10. Abimael Guzman began to organize the SL in 1963, drawing its membership mainly from Peru's Indian population. The rigidly Maoist group claims to be the only true Communist Party of Peru. The SL, now with an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 members, maintains strong bases in remote highland areas and has become an urban terrorist threat as well. Led by the improved performance of the government's counterinsurgency forces to change its tactics, in 1984 the revolutionary group expanded from its highlands base in Ayacucho Department in 1984 and began diversifying its operations. For one thing, it escalated its

terrorism in the capital, causing frequent power outages, staging attacks on military and ruling party targets and—beginning in June 1985—detonating crude car bombs. The SL's efforts to disrupt the inaugural ceremonies in late July, however, were prevented by heavy security and arrests of key terrorists. At first, the newly elected President Garcia authorized continued military control over emergency zones in rural SL strongholds, but in December 1985 he lifted the state of emergency in the northern highlands in all but four provinces. In February 1986, however, terrorist assassinations and bombings in Lima caused the Garcia government to declare a state of emergency there. [REDACTED]

11. After emerging in September 1984, the small (several hundred members) but ambitious Tupac Amaru began using car bombs in June 1985, in addition to taking over radio stations, interrupting TV broadcasts, and employing Robin Hood tactics in Lima's slums. The Peruvian press has quoted a Tupac Amaru Central Committee document that defines the group as a working-class, Marxist-Leninist, national liberation organization based on revolutionary internationalism and inspired by the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions to join the "struggle for the construction of world socialism." The group has been publicly applauded by the Moscow-line Peruvian Communist Party. [REDACTED]

12. In a clandestine press conference on 16 August 1985, Tupac Amaru announced a unilateral—and conditional—suspension of armed actions against the new Garcia government. The revolutionary group remained critical of the Garcia administration, however; in late October 1985, its clandestine magazine, *Venceremos*, published an editorial that charged that the government engaged in "state terrorism and a dirty war against the people." In November 1985, Tupac Amaru resumed its terrorist campaign in Lima, and in early 1986, Tupac Amaru publicly announced that it had sent some guerrillas to join the M-19-led America Battalion in southern Colombia. Tupac Amaru has demonstrated a strong ideological affinity with M-19, but it seems unlikely that the two groups will expand their operational links—particularly since MRTA guerrillas in the America Battalion reportedly suffered heavy casualties. Tupac Amaru presents a potentially larger threat than suggested by its current size and activities because it is well disciplined and organized, appeals to students and urban unemployed, and unlike SL appears more open to foreign support. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

13. In Colombia, there are four active insurgent groups:

- The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
- The 19th of April Movement (M-19)
- The National Liberation Army (ELN)
- The Popular Liberation Army (EPL) [REDACTED]

14. Among these four insurgent groups, only the FARC continues to adhere even nominally to the truce signed with the government during the summer of 1984. Guerrilla violence has gradually increased during this truce, and new revolutionary groups continue to emerge. The peace accords broke down in June 1985 when M-19 unilaterally withdrew from the cease-fire agreement, claiming government violations. Smaller revolutionary groups followed suit, and M-19 has since spearheaded a loose alliance composed of groups opposed to any dialogue with the government. Some members of this alliance have carried out joint guerrilla actions, and Colombian police intelligence believes the alliance is planning urban actions. Both the FARC and M-19 appear to have some contact with drug traffickers [REDACTED].

15. Formed in 1966, the FARC is basically the armed wing of the orthodox pro-Soviet Colombian Communist Party. The organization is headed by Pedro Antonio Marin, also known as Manuel Marulanda Velez, who currently advocates reintegration of the group into Colombian society. Of the country's major guerrilla groups, the FARC appears most committed to the truce, but has taken advantage of the cease-fire to strengthen its already formidable combat force. The FARC has grown by at least one-third during the past two years and by conservative estimate now numbers 2,500 to 4,000 fighters; Colombian military intelligence recently estimated its strength at 7,500 armed combatants. Since publicly announcing its desire to participate in national politics, the FARC has formed a legal political party, held peaceful rallies, presented a candidate for the 1986 national election, and won minority representation in both houses of Congress [REDACTED].

16. Even under the truce, however, the FARC has continued to arm and recruit guerrillas, and it has employed armed propaganda to obtain support for its political front, the Patriotic Union. Elements of the FARC still carry out kidnappings, robberies, and extortion, reportedly using a portion of the proceeds to support the group's political activities. The FARC also

derives income from the drug industry, through cultivation of coca in its own fields as well as by extorting protection payments from traffickers. Recent reporting indicates that some elements of FARC may also be involved in cocaine refining and trafficking, although no details are available [REDACTED].

17. M-19, formed in 1970 but inactive until 1979, has suffered debilitating leadership struggles since founder Jaime Bateman's death in 1983. Its strength has been estimated at up to 1,100, but this force has probably been reduced considerably as a consequence of losses suffered in clashes with government forces. Nevertheless, M-19 remains the country's second-largest and most active revolutionary group and the one most influenced by Cuba. In June 1985, after repeated clashes with security forces in several departments, M-19 publicly broke its truce with the government. Although the group suffered casualties in subsequent actions, including the death of a top leader, it had significantly improved its combat capabilities by late last summer. Since then, M-19 has seesawed between success and defeat, initiating armed actions but meeting strong resistance from the Colombian security forces, who consider M-19 a major threat to internal security. Last November, for example, an M-19 force occupied the Palace of Justice and took its occupants hostage but lost 35 of its best fighters to the government troops who stormed the building [REDACTED].

18. M-19 survived this setback to form the National Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CNG), a coalition of antitruce guerrillas. The CNG's primary combat force—a 250-man column known as the America Battalion, which includes some guerrillas from the Ecuadorean AVC, the Peruvian MRTA, and possibly other non-Colombian groups—recently launched an offensive in southwestern Colombia, including an attack on the city of Cali. The military responded in strength, calling in several brigades to dislodge the guerrillas [REDACTED].

19. While the guerrillas have reportedly suffered heavy losses in the recent fighting, the impact of these losses on the CNG, as well as the rest of M-19, is not yet clear. In spite of these setbacks, it is apparent that M-19 still represents a challenge to the government, at least as a potential leader in future coordinated guerrilla actions. According to sources of varying reliability, M-19 now receives money and training from Libya, arms from the AVC, and various sorts of support from Cuba and Nicaragua. While it has reportedly experienced internal dissent over the possibility of returning to negotiations with the government, Carlos Pizarro

[REDACTED]

Leon-Gomez, its newly elected leader, is a hardline ideologue who is likely to continue aggressive attacks.

20. The National Liberation Army (ELN), formed in 1963 by pro-Castro extremists, has developed strong connections with leftist Roman Catholic Church activists. As with most other South American insurgent groups, the ELN has shifted its focus in recent years from mainly rural to mainly urban areas. Estimates of ELN's strength range from 300 to as many as 800. Although two ELN fronts have signed a truce with the government, other elements have reportedly joined the CNG.

21. In September 1985, the small Maoist Popular Liberation Army (EPL) joined the antitruce CNG established by M-19. The EPL has profited from the truce by filling its coffers with proceeds from robberies and extortions and by conducting a recruitment drive that, we believe, doubled its membership to around 600. Although the group was pro-Chinese in orientation when formed in 1967, it received arms shipments from Nicaragua in 1985, according to an often substantiated source.

22. In Ecuador, the young, middle-class, Cuban-endorsed Alfaro Vive, Carajol (AVC), led by Fausto Basantes Borja ("Tomas") until he was killed by security forces in December 1985, has grown from a mere handful when it surfaced in September 1983 to probably 300 to 500 activists and has developed a semipublic, semiclandestine structure to further its revolutionary aims. The AVC has moved from media office takeovers, pamphlet "bombs," and bank robberies to arms raids, the escape of four top leaders from prison and, in August 1985, a kidnaping.

23. The AVC already has achieved several of the goals outlined in captured documents. Ecuadorean Army Intelligence believes its next objectives include more kidnapings, garnering support from leftist political groups, and increasing rural guerrilla activity. In early May 1985, a midlevel AVC leader reportedly told group members that the organization would soon begin a new phase of terrorist violence, including the assassination of a government official, coupled with an aggressive public relations campaign to gain popular support. The improving government security forces—in consultation with their Peruvian and Colombian counterparts—were able to counter this threat, however. In recent months, government forces have hurt the AVC badly, killing or capturing AVC leaders, raiding safehouses, and breaking up terrorist gatherings.

24. Some AVC members have served with M-19 guerrillas in the America Battalion. Their apparent objectives were to affirm a tactical alliance with M-19 and acquire combat experience. Several have died, however, in clashes with the Colombian military.

Countries With Potential Insurgencies

25. We judge that only two South American countries fall into this category: Argentina and Uruguay.

26. In Argentina, seeking to exploit an atmosphere of economic difficulty and the expanded freedom of action under a civilian regime, two former revolutionary movements—the Peronist Montoneros and the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)—are currently in the midst of an internal debate over whether to resume armed struggle or restrict themselves to participation in the legitimate political process. Those inclined toward pursuing armed struggle may be deterred by the President's determination to be tough on terrorists and by a lack of public support for political violence.

27. Both groups are being supported by Cuba, which has reportedly encouraged them to cooperate in pursuing their goals through nonviolent means under the country's new government. After a meeting in Havana in March 1984, the two groups agreed to cooperate in infiltrating labor unions and political parties to try to induce them to move leftward. About a year later the ERP publicly joined the pro-Soviet Communist Party in founding a "Forum for National Liberation," which aimed at combating "imperialism and its multinational companies."

28. Whether working individually or in tandem, neither the ERP nor the Montoneros appears strong enough to pose any current threat to the regime. The ERP has perhaps 200 members. Its principal leader, Enrique Gorriaran, is in exile in Nicaragua. The Montoneros are believed to number 300 to 500. Mario Firmenich, a primary leader and founder, was recently extradited from Brazil and is in prison in Argentina awaiting trial for terrorism.

29. In Uruguay, the Tupamaros (formally, the Uruguayan National Liberation Movement) have taken advantage of the installation of a civilian government in March 1985 to begin rebuilding their domestic organization. Under the new government's general amnesty program, many Tupamaros were released

[REDACTED]

from prison, while others were allowed to return from exile without fear of prosecution. In addition, the Tupamaros began recruiting new members and even held a convention. Currently, the Tupamaros probably have about 300 members in Uruguay, with many others still in exile. The movement reportedly is divided over whether and when to return to violence, although some Tupamaros who returned from exile have been trying to reconstitute the group's clandestine structure. Meanwhile, Raul Sendic, the top Tupamaro leader, has publicly called for repudiation of Uruguay's foreign debt (probably at Cuban instigation) and issued an antipoverty plan in an effort to appeal to the economically disadvantaged. [REDACTED]

Countries Without Active Revolutionary Movements

30. The remaining countries of South America are not troubled by insurgencies, although in all of them but Paraguay there are small—fewer than 100 members—radical groups or the remnants of such groups. These countries are nevertheless important in the context of South American revolutionary activity because—again, except for Paraguay—they are often used as staging areas and safehavens by foreign revolutionary groups from countries such as Chile, Colombia, and Peru. [REDACTED]

31. In *Bolivia*, leftist political parties—the National Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MNRI), the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), and the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB)—all have connections with leftist groups, including insurgent groups, in other South American countries. MNRI factions have the most extensive connections. Elements of the MNRI, aided by some Argentine Montoneros, served as conduits for Cuban aid to radical leftists in Chile. The Cuban-influenced MIR traditionally has had close ties to the Chilean MIR. A Cuban-influenced splinter group of the PCB that advocates armed struggle as part of the overall revolutionary process is seeking international recognition from other Latin American Communist parties. [REDACTED]

32. The death of Che Guevara in 1967 led to a 15-year lapse in Cuban interest and activity in Bolivia. In 1982, however, Hernan Siles Zuazo of the MNRI was elected President, reportedly with the help of funding from Havana. Siles renewed diplomatic relations between Bolivia and Cuba, although ambassadors were not exchanged. During the Siles administration, the "palace group" of presidential advisers led by Felix Rospigliosi, in conjunction with Interior Ministry officials who distrusted the military, were reliably report-

ed to be developing a core cadre trained in guerrilla warfare tactics in Cuba to protect the MNRI's interests in and out of office. Evidence from a variety of sources indicates that the palace group may have been connected with the logistics base discovered in Bolivia in October 1983 from which Cuban-supplied arms had been smuggled into Chile. Captured documents indicate that at least 10 arms shipments had been made to subversive groups during the preceding two years. Under current President Paz Estenssoro, Bolivia continues to maintain diplomatic ties to Havana, but relations are much cooler. [REDACTED]

33. In *Brazil*, since the return to civilian rule in 1985, there have been rumors that violent leftwing groups will stage a resurgence. The security forces squashed the revolutionaries of the 1960s, but the remnants of two groups, the Revolutionary Movement of 8 October (MR-8) and the Revolutionary Communist Party (PCR), resurfaced in the early 1980s. Closely monitored by the military, however, they appear to pose an insignificant threat, even if they work together. [REDACTED]

34. The military tries to maintain security in the interior, but we doubt it can fully control the country's long and porous border. Brazil borders on two countries with active insurgencies (Colombia and Peru) and another two with potential insurgencies (Argentina and Uruguay). At least four foreign revolutionary groups have utilized parts of Brazil's vast territory to support subversive activities in other countries. Brazil has been used as a safehaven by insurgents from Peru and Colombia. Uruguayan subversives with ties to the Tupamaros reportedly operated an illegal arms smuggling network in Brazil. In October 1984, representatives of several Latin American groups and the Government of Nicaragua reportedly met in Porto Allegre to establish a "revolutionary coordinator" for the movement against Pinochet. [REDACTED]

35. In *Venezuela*, revolutionary groups are tiny and inactive, although some coordinate with and support Colombian insurgent groups. The security forces are effective, and there is no popular support for insurgency. The two clandestine subversive groups that could pose a security threat over the long term—Bandera Roja (Red Flag) and the New Revolutionary Coordinator (NCR)—are both small (perhaps 25 to 50 members each) and poorly led although they appear to be intensifying their organizational efforts. Bandera Roja, the more experienced of the two, is struggling to maintain its military apparatus, having dismantled its urban unit in May 1985. The group, which may receive some Cuban funding, is beset by factionalism,

[REDACTED]

and many members remain in prison. We believe that the Venezuelan security forces will be able to contain any subversive threat from this quarter during the next few years. [REDACTED]

36. *Paraguay.* Revolutionary movements have had no real opportunity to develop under the well-entrenched dictatorship of Gen. Alfredo Stroessner.