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DIST: 20 APRIL 1984
COUNTRY: VIETNAM
SUBJ: VIETNAM'S ASSESSMENT OF U.S. POLICY IN THE REGION
AND CONTINUING HOPE FOR U.S. AID
DOI: 1973-AUGUST 1984
SOURCE: [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO AN APRIL 1983 CONFIDENTIAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARTICLE, THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) SPECIALISTS NOTED THAT U.S.

RELATIONS WITH THE SRV WERE SOLELY BASED ON THE U.S. SEARCH FOR SERVICEMEN MISSING-IN-ACTION. THE ARTICLE ALSO STATED THAT THE U.S. WAS PLAYING THE CHINA CARD AGAINST THE SOVIETS, NOT AGAINST THE SRV. FROM THE MID-1970'S TO 1983, VARIOUS POLITBURO MEMBERS AND RANKING CADRE MAINTAINED HOPES FOR U.S. ECONOMIC AID. IN MID 1983, SEVERAL SRV AGENCIES CALCULATED THAT THE COUNTRY NEEDED U.S. \$350 MILLION TO GET ON THE ROAD TO RECOVERY.

TEXT: 1. ABOUT APRIL 1983 THE "BULLETIN ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS" (TAP CHI THONG TIN QUAN HE QUOC TE) OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA) OF SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SRV) PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "DISCUSSIONS ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, CHINA AND JAPAN." THE ARTICLE WAS EDITED BY A GROUP OF MFA SPECIALISTS AND WAS DISTRIBUTED ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS TO A NUMBER OF HIGH-RANKING CADRE. IT PRESENTED THREE ASSESSMENTS: THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD JAPAN; THE POSSIBILITY OF A MILITARY

BLOC COMPOSED OF THE U.S., CHINA AND JAPAN; AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SRV.

2. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDED THAT THE U.S. TOOK ADVANTAGE OF CHINESE IMPERIALIST AND EXPANSIONIST AMBITIONS TO SUBVERT THE BUILDUP OF SOCIALISM IN VIETNAM, LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA AND TO FORM A STRATEGIC ALLIANCE (LIEN MINH CHIEN LUOC). ON THE KAMPUCHEA QUESTIONS, ALTHOUGH THE U.S. DID NOT WANT TO DISPLEASE CHINA, THE U.S. DID NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED FOR FEAR OF NEGATIVE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND IDEOLOGICAL EFFECTS, AND BECAUSE OF OLD WOUNDS RECEIVED IN THE VIETNAM WAR. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE U.S. DID NOT WANT CHINA TO GAIN GREAT INFLUENCE OVER THE INDOCHINESE STATES. ALTHOUGH RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND VIETNAM WERE POOR, THE U.S. HAD NOT CUT OFF THE COMMUNICATION LINKS OR "THE BRIDGE OF RELATIONS" WITH VIETNAM. THE ARTICLE EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. REMAINED COMMITTED TO THE SEARCH FOR SOLDIERS MISSING IN ACTION (MIA). ALSO, THE U.S. DID NOT WANT THE SRV TO BECOME SO WEAK ECONOMICALLY AND MILITARILY THAT VIETNAM WOULD FALL APART; THE U.S. WANTED VIETNAM TO BE STRONG ENOUGH TO STOP THE CHINESE MENACE AGAINST AMERICAN ALLIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, BUT NOT SO STRONG AS TO BE A MENACE TO THOSE ALLIES. THE ARTICLE NOTED THAT THE SEARCH FOR U.S. MIA'S WAS THE FIRST PRIORITY OF U.S. POLICY IN THE SRV AT PRESENT AND IT WAS A POLICY EXPECTED TO BE CONTINUED. THE ARTICLE MAINTAINED THAT ONE OF THE REASONS FOR THE U.S. CONTINUED HARDLINE POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM WAS U.S. RESENTMENT FOR BEING DEFEATED IN THE VIETNAM WAR.

3. THE ARTICLE SAID THAT U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS WERE INFLUENCED BY A U.S. DESIRE TO PLAY THE CHINESE CARD AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION RATHER THAN BY ANY POLICY CONCERNING VIETNAM. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDED THAT A MILITARY COALITION AMONG THE U.S., CHINA AND JAPAN WAS UNLIKELY BECAUSE EACH COUNTRY HAD ITS OWN INTERESTS, AND OWED LOYALTY TO ITS OTHER ALLIES.

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4. IN JULY 1983, DURING A SEMINAR CONDUCTED BY SENIOR RESEARCHER VIET (PHUONG) FOR THE LEADING CADRE OF THE CENTRAL INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (CIEM) ON THE SUBJECT OF MUTUAL EFFECT BETWEEN FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE ECONOMY, PHUONG SAID THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT LOST INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE WERE SIGNS THAT THE U.S. WAS STRIVING FOR MORE INFLUENCE IN THE REGION.

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5. SINCE 1973, LE DUC (THO) HAS BEEN AMONG THE POLITBURO MEMBERS WHO LOOKED HOPEFULLY TOWARDS THE U.S. TO HELP REBUILD THE SRV ECONOMY. IN THE MID 1970'S THO OFTEN VISITED THE SRV AIR FORCE UNITS AND ENCOURAGED PILOTS TO TAKE A LESS HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE U.S. IN THE EVENT THAT U.S. AID WOULD BE "POURED" INTO THE SRV SOME DAY. A LONG SPEECH BY THO WAS RECORDED ON TAPE AND OFTEN PLAYED TO AIR FORCE CADRE. THO TALKED ABOUT THE SRV VICTORY, ITS SUCCESS AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE OF 1972, AND ABOUT FUTURE U.S. AID, OR WAR DAMAGE INDEMNITY. IN ALL CASES THO USED DEFERENTIAL TERMS, AND NOT THE INSULTING TERMS USED IN THE SRV MEDIA, TO SPEAK OF THE U.S.A. FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER

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NGUYEN DUY (TRINH) REGULARLY WARNED
HIS FAMILY AGAINST BEING INFLUENCED BY THE
SRV PROPAGANDA AND TAKING A HOSTILE VIEW AGAINST THE U.S.
TRINH SUBTLY SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE SRV MEDIA SPOKE OF
THE MANY ILLS OF THE U.S., THESE ILLS WERE LESS THAN IN
THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. TRINH SAID THE U.S. WAS A
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7. WISHES FOR AMERICAN AID AND EVEN FOR AMERICAN INTERVENTION TO SAVE THE SRV ECONOMY AMONG THE MIDDLE-LEVEL CADRE, INCLUDING THOSE CLOSE TO THE TOP LEADERSHIP AND THOSE TRAINED IN THE SOVIET UNION, WERE WIDESPREAD AND OPENLY EXPRESSED. FOR EXAMPLE, ABOUT TWO-THIRDS OF THE 300 MANAGERIAL TRAINEES IN THE SOVIET UNION FROM OCTOBER 1981 TO JULY 1982 HAD THIS VIEW. LUONG TRUONG (SINH), THEN GROUP CHIEF AND CHAIRMAN OF THE TRAINEES' PARTY CHAPTERS UNIT AND NOW A DEPARTMENT CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION COUNCIL (HOI DUNG TRONG TAI KINH TE TRUNG UONG), SAID, "NOW ONLY THE U.S. CAN SAVE VIETNAM." TRANH XUAN (DIEU) (FEMALE) OF THE EDITORS' STAFF OF TAP CHI CONG SAN (COMMUNIST REVIEW) SAID, "AT PRESENT ONLY COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. CAN BE EFFECTIVE. COOPERATION WITH ANYONE ELSE CANNOT BE EFFECTIVE." THE SOVIETS SEEMED AWARE OF THE SRV SENTIMENTS. YEVGEN'Y PAVLOVIC (IGLAZUNOV), CHIEF OF THE VIETNAM DEPARTMENT OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY, AND SOVIET ADVISORS OF THE SRV 921ST AIR FORCE REGIMENT SOMETIMES ASKED THEIR VIETNAMESE FRIENDS HALF-JOKINGLY, "WHEN WILL VIETNAM CONSIDER THE SOVIET UNION ITS ENEMY AS VIETNAM DID THE U.S. BEFORE AND DOES CHINA NOW?" GLAZUNOV OFTEN EXPRESSED HIS FEAR THAT SRV COULD BECOME ANOTHER POLAND BECAUSE OF ITS DISASTROUS ECONOMIC SITUATION.

ACQ: [REDACTED] (EARLY APRIL 1984).
DISSEM: [REDACTED]

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WELL-ORGANIZED AND WELL-MANAGED COUNTRY. IN COMMENTING ON THO'S TAPE, TRINH SAID THAT HE AND THE OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS LOOKED FORWARD TO A WAR DAMAGE INDEMNITY OF U.S. \$80 MILLION WITH JOY AND EAGERNESS. HE COMMENTED THAT THE INDEMNITY WOULD HAVE BEEN OF CONSIDERABLE HELP IN REBUILDING THE SRV ECONOMY.

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[REDACTED] HEADQUARTERS

COMMENT: TRINH WAS DROPPED FROM THE POLITBURO AT THE FIFTH PARTY CONGRESS IN MARCH 1982.)

6. IN JULY OR AUGUST 1983, DURING A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES, VIET PHUONG MENTIONED THAT BASED ON INTER-AGENCY COMPUTATIONS, THE SRV NEEDED U.S. \$350 MILLION. THESE FUNDS, IF WELL-MANAGED, WOULD GIVE THE SRV ECONOMY A GOOD BOOST TOWARDS ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND IT WOULD BE ENOUGH TO PAY FOR THE SAME AMOUNTS OF FUEL, FERTILIZERS, SYNTHETIC FIBERS AND BUILDING MATERIALS THAT THE SRV IMPORTED IN 1982.

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