

Intelligence Information Cable

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PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

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~~GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

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CITE [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

DIST 14 FEBRUARY 1968

COUNTRY ARAB STATES/ISRAEL/USSR

DOI 5 FEBRUARY 1968

SUBJECT COMMENTS BY SOVIET OFFICIAL ON THE POSSIBLE RENEWAL OF ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES AND SOVIET INTENTIONS

ACQ [REDACTED]

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

See page 5

1. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS

THE FIRST INFORMATION RECEIVED [REDACTED]

REGARDING SOVIET PLANS TO PARTICIPATE IN A LIMITED ARAB

OFFENSIVE AGAINST ISRAEL. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

[REDACTED] THE SOVIETS NOW BELIEVE A RENEWAL OF ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES WILL OCCUR IN LATE SPRING. [REDACTED] HOSTILITIES ARE INEVITABLE SINCE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ARRANGE A VEHICLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE ARABS. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

COMMENT: A SIMILAR REPORT FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BEIRUT WAS RECEIVED IN LATE JANUARY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ACCORDING TO THIS REPORT, [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] EGYPT WAS PREPARING A LIMITED ATTACK AGAINST ISRAELI FORCES IN LATE FEBRUARY TO DRIVE THE ISRAELI FORCES BACK "THREE OR FOUR MILES" FROM THE SUEZ CANAL. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SEE BEIRUT EMBASSY AIRGRAM A-639 DATED 31 JANUARY 1968. ANOTHER REPORT ON THE POSSIBLE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES [REDACTED] RECEIVED IN LATE JANUARY

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(classification)

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

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[REDACTED]

(classification)

(dissem controls)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] STATED THAT THE UAR IS PLANNING TO RESUME HOSTILITIES BECAUSE OF THE EXTREME PESSIMISM OVER THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION OF UN SPECIAL ENVOY GUNNAR JARRING. MINISTER OF WAR FAWZI REPORTEDLY FAVORS AN ATTACK ON 5 JUNE 1968 WHILE PRESIDENT NASIR PREFERS AN EARLIER DATE, LATE MARCH OR EARLY APRIL, IF POSSIBLE. IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF IDENTIFICATION OF THE [REDACTED] INFORMANTS, THE REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO THE UAR LEADERS SHOULD BE TREATED WITH CIRCUMSPECTION.)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

3. [REDACTED] WHEREAS PREVIOUSLY SOVIET ADVISORS [REDACTED] STAYED IN THE BACKGROUND AND [REDACTED] PLAYED A LIMITED ROLE IN SHAPING AND ORGANIZING ARAB ARMIES, THEY ARE NOW ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN REORGANIZING ARAB FORCES AND ENGAGING IN SOME COMMAND FUNCTIONS. [REDACTED] WHEN THE FIGHTING IS RENEWED, THE SOVIETS WILL ACTIVELY AID THE ARABS IN GAINING BACK THE TERRITORY LOST IN THE JUNE 1967 WAR. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

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[REDACTED]

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

[REDACTED] SOVIET ASSISTANCE, HOWEVER, WILL BE LIMITED TO REGAINING ONLY THAT TERRITORY LOST IN THE JUNE WAR. [REDACTED]

COMMENT: THE SAME EMBASSY AIRGRAM CITED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ALSO STATED SOVIET ADVISORS WOULD DIRECT A LIMITED ATTACK AGAINST ISRAEL FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF IMPROVING EGYPT'S BARGAINING POSITION WITH ISRAEL. THE SAME [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE ASSISTING THE UAR IN PLANNING AND TRAINING FOR A RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. [REDACTED]

THE SOVIETS HAVE ADVISED THE UAR THEY WILL SUPPORT AN ATTACK AGAINST ISRAEL TO RECOVER THE TERRITORY LOST DURING THE JUNE WAR IF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS FAIL; BUT THE SOVIETS MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT ISRAEL IS HERE TO STAY AND THAT THEY WILL NOT ACQUIESCE IN OR FACILITATE ISRAEL'S DESTRUCTION. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

4. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.5(c)
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(classification)

(dissem controls)

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] THE "PUEBLO"
INCIDENT [REDACTED] DRAMATICALLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE UNITED
STATES HAS MADE IT CLEAR IT WILL AVOID A COMMITMENT OF ITS
FORCES ELSEWHERE. [REDACTED] THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT
THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERVENE ON ISRAEL'S BEHALF UNLESS
THE PRE-JUNE 1967 BORDERS ARE CROSSED. IN VIEW OF THIS, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE ARABS SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION TO
REGAIN THEIR LOST LANDS. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] A REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN
POWER POSITIONS [REDACTED] MAY RESULT IN A MAJOR ARAB MILITARY
OFFENSIVE AGAINST ISRAEL BY JUNE 1968.)

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSOUTH (PERSONAL)

CINCMEAFSA [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

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