

~~SECRET~~
CONTROLLED DISSEM

U.S. Powell

NIE 89-65 ADVCON
16 December 1965

RECEIVED
N.S.C.
DEC 17 10 26 AM '65

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 95-133
Document # 1100

1102

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

VENEZUELA

- Introduction
- The Present Situation
- The Outlook

NOTE: This is an advance copy of the conclusions of this estimate as approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The complete text will be circulated within five days of this issuance.

Central Intelligence Agency

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
10 NOV 1997

~~SECRET~~
CONTROLLED DISSEM

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and the NSA.

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

on 16 December 1965. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

~~CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE IS OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WHEN USED SEPARATELY~~

~~GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
60178~~

WARNING

~~This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

16 December 1965

SUBJECT: NIE 89-65: VENEZUELA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the situation in Venezuela and the prospects under the Leoni administration (until general elections in 1968).

CONCLUSIONS

A. Venezuela will probably continue to experience political stability and a favorable rate of economic growth over the next few years. However, it will still face deep-seated social problems. Most economic and social reform programs will be pushed vigorously through 1966. Thereafter budgetary restraints are likely to lead to some loss of momentum. This slowdown will almost certainly become a major issue in the December 1968 elections.

B. The government and security forces have dealt reasonably effectively with the leftist insurgency; the capabilities of the guerrillas and terrorists will probably decline further. The insurgents are not likely to pose a major threat to the government during the period of this estimate.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

C. Some misgivings regarding the Leoni administration still persist among the military, but the military establishment is generally disposed to support the constitutional government. We believe that there is little chance of a successful military coup within the period of this estimate.

D. Leoni's governing coalition will probably hold together at least until the near approach of the elections scheduled for December 1968. The contest is then likely to be between two center-left parties, AD and COPEI, each claiming to be the more effective means of achieving social reform. If, in anticipation of this contest, Leoni should initiate a more radical reform program, he might thereby antagonize the military and increase the chances of a military coup.

E. The administration will make some attempts to increase Venezuelan influence in Latin American affairs, while holding to the Betancourt Doctrine of denying recognition to governments which come to power by overthrowing constitutionally-elected ones. Manifestations of economic nationalism -- and in particular resentment over US restrictions on the importation of Venezuelan oil -- will probably produce frictions in relations with the US.