

CUBA

Cuba's President Dorticos will probably use his current official trip to Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, and Mexico primarily to stimulate support for the Castro regime among the people, ignoring criticism or advice from government leaders. The Brazilian and Argentine ambassadors in Havana are reported to have expressed this view and to have said that although their

governments--like most of those in Latin America--have reached the end of their patience with Castro, public opinion in their countries would not support an alignment with the US to isolate him and bring him down.

These ambassadors have previously been sympathetic both to the aims of the Cuban revolution and to Castro, but see his present policies as leading only

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to chaos and Communism. They doubt that Castro will take the necessary action to save the situation--a demonstration of his intention not to let the Communists dominate his government.


Jose Miro Cardona, designated ambassador to Washington in early May, still has not been granted an interview with Castro or been given any information on the regime's plans for future relations with the US, according to a usually reliable source. This report supports suspicions that Miro's appointment was only a gesture and that Cuban policies toward the US will continue to be hostile and will reflect sudden and expedient decisions by Castro's ruling clique.

On 23 May the American Embassy was informed by the Cuban Government that it intends to build facilities at the entrance to the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay to control the entrance and exit of persons and vehicles. The measure, ordered by Che Guevara of the state bank, is designed "to capture" the dollars--some \$7,200,000 each year--earned by Cubans on the base. Each of the 3,500 Cuban employees will be given documentation by the regime. This action will permit tight controls for political purposes and may be a preparation for a future attempt to influence personnel policies on the base.

The effect of Castro's bloc ties are becoming more apparent. Refineries in Cuba have been told that during the rest of this year each must purchase approximately 300,000 tons of the Soviet crude oil already arriving under the Cuban-Soviet trade agreement. This affects primarily Esso, Texaco, and Shell, which process about 95 percent of Cuba's refined petroleum products and have used Venezuelan crude almost exclusively.

The newly appointed Czech ambassador to Havana, Vladimir Pavlicek, has had many years' experience in Latin America.

 *SB ok*
 Frantisek Mares, who heads the technical directorate of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Trade and negotiated arms deals with the UAR and Indonesia involving aircraft, was issued Cuban visas for himself and several other Czech trade officials. The Soviet bloc may be prepared to supply Cuba with at least token deliveries of arms, possibly including the jet aircraft particularly desired by Castro.

Establishment of Cuban-Polish diplomatic relations will soon be announced.  *SB ok*

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