

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
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26 OCT 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence  
THROUGH : Deputy Director (Intelligence)  
SUBJECT : OCI Reporting on Communist Influence and  
Activities in Cuban Revolution

This Office has printed numerous articles that pointed up the interest, influence and activities of the Cuban Communist party in Fidel Castro's revolutionary movement and in the government established by Castro on 1 January 1959. The articles appeared in the Current Intelligence Bulletin, the Current Intelligence Review, and notes prepared for delivery to the National Security Council.

The publication, its date, and the pertinent data concerning the Communist subversion are listed in the attached compilation.

/s/

HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON  
Assistant Director  
Current Intelligence

Enclosure: a/s

CD/WE:MBBrown/jb/x4281 (25 Oct 60)

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[REDACTED]

OCI Reporting on Communist Influence  
and Activities in the Cuban Revolution

The following excerpts were taken from the Daily Bulletin and Weekly Review published between 8 April 1958 and 13 October 1960. (pages 1 to 52) The excerpts from NSC briefing notes are from briefings prepared from 24 September 1958 to 29 September 1960 (pages 52 to 66).

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 April 1958

"The outlawed Cuban Communist party has offered Castro unsolicited support for a general strike....several of Castro's followers—including his brother, who is known to have traveled behind the iron curtain—have been suspected of Communist sympathies."

[REDACTED]

7 July 1958

"Raul Castro's Communist-infiltrated forces often operate without direct orders from his brother Fidel...."

[REDACTED]

14 July 1958

"Officers of the US Naval Base at Guantanamo expect the 29 American servicemen still held by the Cuban rebels to be released beginning today....An American consul negotiating with the rebels believes they could successfully elude any force sent in to rescue the Americans, and one of the rebel officers warned him they would fight any American rescue force and would publicly request Soviet arms to do so...The American consular officers dealing with Raul Castro have been unable definitely to

[REDACTED]

identify any member of his group as a Communist, but nevertheless believe that some of the leadership may be."

[REDACTED]

2 January 1959

"The outlawed Popular Socialist (Communist) party (PSP) may now increase its efforts to ally itself with the rebel cause in an attempt to gain political advantages or recognition under a new government...On 2 January the Communist chief announced support of the rebel movement and called for a "united front"...Communist sympathizers are believed to have penetrated the rebel movement on a low level, and the anti-American sentiments held by some rebels--particularly within the group commanded by Eaul Castro--could well be exploited to the Communists' advantage."

[REDACTED]

3 January 1959

"The leadership of Cuba's strong labor movement is at stake....The Communists, who have maintained an underground labor organization, can be expected to make a strong bid for control of organized labor."

[REDACTED]

8 January 1959

"The Cuban Communist party (PSP) has succeeded in obtaining a minority voice in the organized labor movement and is represented on an employee committee which is attempting to take over the management of the Cuban Electric Company, a subsidiary of a US firm. The PSP is acting openly to create an impression of legality. However, the Urrutia government has not recognized the party."

[REDACTED]

9 January 1959

"Meanwhile there are some signs of feeling against the US Government among members of the new regime and a general desire to speed the 'Cubanization' of foreign-owned industries, particularly sugar plantations."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

12 January 1959

"Fidel Castro and other leaders of the politically dominant 26 of July Movement have declared that the Popular Socialist (Communist) party (PSP) will now be permitted to operate as a legal party 'since freedom of political action is guaranteed by the constitution.... On 10 January, the Communists in Havana held their first public rally since Batista outlawed their party in 1953. The Communist daily newspaper Hoy has resumed publication, and the party has opened offices in Havana and Santiago."

[REDACTED]

20 February 1959

"Meetings planned in Cuba for later this month among leaders of several Latin American Communist parties may concern Communist efforts to control the several 'liberation' movements being formed with Cuban government encouragement to oust 'dictators' in the Caribbean area."

[REDACTED]

14 March 1959

"Disillusionment with the Castro regime seems to be spreading.... Castro's... preoccupation with certain projects such as social and agrarian reform is delaying economic recovery. He has alienated certain commercial, professional, and political groups, including some of his former supporters, but his popularity with the lower classes is apparently undiminished. Certain moves by the new government, such as lowering rents and cutting utility rates, have been designed to appeal to the lower classes without regard to the effect on the economic structure."

[REDACTED]

20 March 1959

Former Costa Rican President Jose Figueres, during his current trip to Cuba, will probably try to dissuade Castro from actions that would increase Communist capabilities in the area, and seek Castro's

( )

[REDACTED]

help for his own plans for ousting the regimes in Nicaragua and Dominican Republic. He and his ally, Venezuelan President Betancourt are deeply concerned over Castro's demagoguery and his predilection for supporting pro-Communist groups of revolutionaries in his crusade against dictatorships." [REDACTED]

27 March 1959

"Former Costa Rican President Figueres failed in his visit to Cuba to convince Fidel Castro that Castro's movement is supporting irresponsible Communist groups in its campaign against Caribbean dictatorships." [REDACTED]

1 April 1959

"The extent of Communist influence in Cuba was impressed on former Costa Rican President Figueres during his visit there last week. Figueres now definitely regards Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro as an opponent of the leftist non-Communist Latin American revolutionary movement represented by himself and Venezuelan President Betancourt. He expects serious political deterioration in Cuba, after which 'anything can happen,' including Communist domination." "Figueres and his close associate, Gonzalo Facion, returned convinced that the Communists are influential, not only in the Cuban Army and in organized labor, but also in circles close to Prime Minister Fidel Castro....He strongly suspects that there is a nucleus of dedicated Communists in Cuba trying to create a 'Hungary in reverse' requiring US armed intervention....Figueres' observations were apparently confined to the Havana area....In Oriente Province, where the Communists appear to exert their greatest influence....Communists are prominent among the teachers being recruited for the violently anti-US political-indoctrination schools which the government is establishing to teach the illiterate rural masses. The schools are expected to be extended to the rest of the island." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

10 April 1959

"In private conversation with Cuban businessmen on 4 April, Pazos (president of the Cuban National Bank) reportedly expressed pessimism concerning Cuba's future under the Castro regime. Several other observers of Cuban developments have recently voiced similar pessimism. Serafino Romualdi, AFL-CIO representative to the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (OAIT), reported on 8 April that OAIT has concluded that the Castro government is opening its doors to Communism in Cuba." [REDACTED]

14 April 1959

"Opposition to the Castro regime, still largely unorganized, is increasing as Castro continues to reveal authoritarian tendencies. Catholic Church leaders are deeply disturbed over the Communist gains and are said to be planning the establishment of a political party to influence political events....A number of Cubans, most of them disillusioned former supporters of Fidel Castro,...are alarmed at the regime's anti-US orientation and the influence of the Communists on the government...After his return from his Cuban visit last month, former Costa Rican President Figueres, who has always been slow to pin the Communist label on anyone without adequate proof, told US Ambassador Willauer that he was tending more and more to believe that Castro may, in fact, be a Communist himself. While there is no proof that he is a member of the Communist party, it is clear that the Communists have made significant gains since Castro came to power last January and that Communists or pro-Communists are among his aides." [REDACTED]

18 April 1959

"The Communist threat in the Caribbean area is considered alarming by a group of Latin American and US liberals meeting in Costa Rica with former President Jose Figueres. The group...is particularly

[REDACTED]

concerned over Communist penetration of the Cuban Government." Figueres and Betancourt (President of Venezuela) are justified in their fear that Communist-controlled Nicaraguan and Dominican revolutionary groups, which have been sympathetically received and encouraged by Cuban officials, will spread Communism throughout the area.."

23 April 1959

"Raul Castro, the irresponsible Communist-influenced brother of the prime minister, strongly attacked the United States as one of 'the enemies of the Cuban revolution' in a speech on 20 April."

1 May 1959

"Sweeping changes are reported being made in the military high command as well as among lower ranking officers. Raul Castro, commander in chief of the armed forces, apparently initiated the changes prior to his hurried trip to meet Fidel Castro in Houston on 28 April. They may be designed to eliminate officers he considers to be rightists and unsympathetic to him.... Communists, who have gained a foothold in Cuban organized labor under the Castro regime, will undoubtedly play a prominent role in the 1 May celebrations. The pro-Communist army major 'Che' Guevara has announced plans for an 'armed workers militia' to parade on 1 May, but the head of the Cuban Confederation of Workers has stated that such a militia has not yet been organized."

21 May 1959

"A man with a long record of Communist associations has been named executive director of the agrarian reform machinery established by cabinet decree on 17 May. Land reform is the key to the country's economic and social development, and penetration of its administration would provide the Communists with the means of building up considerable political strength in the rural areas....The Communists have

[REDACTED]

already shown considerable activity in some rural areas, particularly in Oriente Province where they have staffed 'revolutionary schools' designed to instill revolutionary fervor in the masses. They have also been involved in the formation of an armed civilian militia in Oriente."

[REDACTED]

11 July 1959

"Cuba is interested in purchasing a light-arms factory from Czechoslovakia, according to a reliable source of the American Embassy in Havana. A Czech official already in Cuba discussing tractor sales has indicated that a Czech expert on arms sales is expected in Havana on 13 July."

[REDACTED]

11 July 1959

"The Chinese Communists have established a branch of their official news agency in Havana and are reportedly planning to publish a Chinese-language newspaper. A Chinese Communist 'journalist' delegation is currently making a substantial propaganda effort in Cuba, following earlier visits to Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay. This activity reflects the sharply increased Chinese Communist effort in Latin America especially apparent since Latin American Communists met with top Chinese officials in Peiping earlier this year."

[REDACTED]

The Chinese apparently view Cuba--where Communists have made considerable gains under Castro--as a particularly favorable center for developing a propaganda network in the area."

[REDACTED]

18 July 1959

"Fidel Castro's successful 17 July maneuver of forcing the resignation of President Manuel Urrutia by dramatically threatening his own resignation as prime minister has increased the opportunities for further Communist gains in Cuba. Communists quickly joined in the emotional public expressions of support for Castro and against

[REDACTED]

Urrutia..../Castro/sharply attacked Urrutia for criticizing Communists and said his differences with the former president were '95% ideological.'...Raul Castro, who has facilitated Communist penetration of the armed forces, reportedly told Urrutia on 11 July that he would make certain government appointments regardless of the President's contrary wishes. [REDACTED]

18 August 1959

"Khrushchev has been invited to visit Havana. The invitation was extended [REDACTED] by the pro-Fidel Castro Cuban newspaper Diario Libre. The visit to "revolutionary Cuba would be an extension of his US trip." [REDACTED]

19 August 1959

"The chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries [REDACTED] requested a one-month visa for the chief of its Latin American Department to visit Cuba [REDACTED]. The request followed a Cuban newspapers' invitation to Khrushchev to visit Havana. Bloc propaganda over the last several months has paid increasing attention to Cuban developments. [REDACTED]

1 September 1959

"There is a widening rift between the AFL/CIO-backed Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers and its affiliate, the Cuban Confederation of Workers. The result is likely to be an increase in anti-US sentiment in Cuban organized labor, where Communists have made gains by promoting 'unity' with adherents of the 26 of July Movement....In the 15 of 33 constituent federations of the CTC which have recently held elections, Communists or suspected Communists were elected, under 26 of July cover, to the executive committees of five federations, including Cuba's second, third, and fourth largest. Communist gains were also significant in earlier local union elections." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4 September 1959

"...The removal of Batista holdovers, most of them technicians and mechanics, has further aggravated the already chaotic conditions in the armed forces, which have been a focal point of Communist penetration and efforts at subversion by anti-government plotters." [REDACTED]

15 September 1959

"Raul Castro in a strongly anti-US speech on 11 September endorsed the calling of a Latin American people's congress. This may be the congress planned in Moscow at a special conference of delegates of the 18 Latin American Communist parties attending the 21st congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union last February. Identification with the Castro revolution rather than with a local Communist party would make the congress more attractive than otherwise to certain non-Communists and provide opportunities for Communist penetration of future hemispheric activities....Such a congress appears to be part of the Communist plan of action in this hemisphere...Meanwhile, Ernesto Guevara, a pro-Communist leader of the Castro revolution, told a TV audience on 14 September that the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay made Cuba a target for nuclear attacks. An intensified campaign against US military bases and missions was another important tactic in the action program adopted in Moscow." [REDACTED]

17 September 1959

"A cabinet minister has told a usually reliable source that Fidel Castro is planning important changes in key government positions. There have been numerous reports that some moderates may be forced out of the government and the pro-Communist Ernesto Guevara will have an influential industrial planning role....The retention of trained officials... determined to keep the Cuban economy from collapsing would serve as a counterbalance to the apparently increasing power of Raul Castro, Guevara, and other extreme leftists." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1 October 1959

"...Castro's...high praise of 'Che' Guevara, whom he placed in charge of industrial planning, may reflect awareness of the distrust which many responsible Cubans feel for Guevara, who is generally regarded as pro-Communist.... In [a TV speech of 28 Sept./Castro emphasized his great reliance on 'true revolutionaries', naming among others 'Che' Guevara..."] [REDACTED]

20 October 1959

"Current changes in Fidel Castro's government indicate that the extremists are expanding their control at the expense of moderate officials. Raul Castro heads a powerful new ministry of the armed forces; one of his closest associates, characterized by the American Embassy as an extreme leftist, has been assigned to head the key labor ministry....Kartinez [new labor minister] may facilitate expected Communist attempts to dominate the CTC national conference in November, when top officers will be elected. Raul Castro...commander of all Cuban armed forces since...February...has converted the military into a political instrument, dismissing almost all army and air force members who had served before the revolution." [REDACTED]

24 October 1959

"In a TV speech on 22-23 October....the Cuban premier said he did not believe accusations made against Communist regimes since they were the same charges leveled against the revolution he leads; he said he did not care if his movement was labeled Communists.... Charging the US with attempts to keep Cuba defenseless against its enemies by blocking purchases of military equipment such as British jet aircraft, Castro said that the workers and peasants now are Cuba's main force and that they must be armed. Earlier this year Cuban Communists proposed that a people's armed militia be organized, and extremist government officials now controlling labor and agrarian reform may respond to Castro's declaration by creating such a militia with help from Raul Castro, the leftist minister of the revolutionary armed forces." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

26 October 1959

"Fidel Castro's vitriolic attacks on opinions which diverge in any way from his own, his recently increased rabble-rousing, and the appointment of known leftists to high offices all indicate a real threat of extremist control over the Cuban leader. A qualified American observer feels there is almost no hope that Castro can now be influenced to moderate the course of his regime or to recognize the danger of Communism."

[REDACTED]

4 November 1959

"On 3 November Revolucion, the official daily of Fidel Castro's '26th of July Movement,' advocated that Soviet Deputy Premier Kikoyan, who will inaugurate the Soviet exhibition in Mexico on 22 November, be invited to visit Cuba as a prelude to the resumption of relations and to expanded trade between Cuba and the USSR....The Castro government may [also] be planning to ill open trade relations with East Germany...A Soviet cultural official made an unpublicized visit to Havana in October, and the USSR has ordered 500,000 tons of Cuban sugar during 1959, the largest amount since 1955... 'Che' Guevara, a pro-Communist who reportedly exercises great influence over Castro in matters of foreign policy, was reliably quoted in March, 1959 as being determined to restore diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union."

[REDACTED]

11 November 1959

"While the 26th of July Movement claims sweeping victories, Communists are believed to have gained substantial representation among the 3,000 delegates elected by local unions...to attend the national congress... of the dominant and politically powerful Cuban Labor Confederation. Raul Castro and his confident, Labor Minister Martinez Sanchez, are expected to remove from power Confederation leaders who are opposed to growing Communist influence in labor and in the government."

[REDACTED]

14 November 1959

"Fidel Castro evidently plans to subordinate the Cuban Government as well as the entire Cuban economy to the control of the leftist-led National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA). He is alleged to have said in a closed meeting of INRA officials that his government could

[REDACTED]

obtain all the money necessary for its plans and that no private investment would be needed since the state would own everything." [REDACTED]

16 November 1959

"At least one of the several Cuban military purchasing missions now in Europe is believed to be in Prague. The Cubans are in search of a number of types of arms and aircraft, reportedly including Soviet MIGS....The extremist, anti-US leaders now dominating the Cuban Government appear anxious to promote trade with the Soviet bloc as a means of shifting the pattern of Cuba's international trade away from dependence on the US market." [REDACTED]

28 November 1959

"The shake-up in high government posts on 26 November is a further step in the leftist trend that has been evident for the past three months. 'Che' Guevara, named to head the National Bank, will now be in a position to implement his conviction that Cuban independence must be achieved by shifting trade patterns away from reliance on the United States. The new minister of public works, Camani Cienfuegos, is probably a Communist... remaining moderates in the government, convinced that Cuba is rapidly heading for economic collapse and Communist takeover, will almost certainly be replaced....Ambassador Bonsal sees /the government shake-up/ as stressing Fidel Castro's commitment to extreme leftist policies and his growing receptivity to guidance by Communist-oriented elements." [REDACTED]

12 December 1959

"The Soviet press is devoting increased attention to Cuba, and Izvestia recently characterized the Castro regime not as the usual Latin American revolution but a 'national liberation movement'--Soviet terminology usually reserved for Afro-Asian anticolonialist movements. This portrayal implies that Moscow has put the stamp of approval on the Cuban revolution within the context of Marxist-Leninist dogma." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

13 January 1960

"Recent developments indicate increasing Cuban contacts with Communist China, and we believe that the Castro government will probably recognize Peiping sometime this year." [REDACTED]

20 January 1960

"In an effort to focus increased attention on the opening of the Soviet exposition in Havana on 30 January, Moscow plans to send Deputy Premier Mikoyan to the inauguration ceremony and is arranging a number of performances by prominent Soviet artists. The American ambassador in Mexico reports close liaison there between the Cuban and Soviet embassies, with renewal of diplomatic relations a possible early objective." [REDACTED]

6 February 1960

"Fidel Castro will probably accept Mikoyan's public invitation to visit Moscow "in the near future." Resumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR seems almost certain. Mikoyan's delegation /to the Soviet exposition/ is heavily weighted with trade specialists and Cuba is expected to respond favorably to any new Soviet economic overtures." [REDACTED]

11 February 1960

"The Castro government will probably expand its economic relations with other Sino-Soviet bloc countries in addition to the substantial trade contracts with the USSR which will evidently follow Mikoyan's visit. The Mexican ambassador to Czechoslovakia claims to have information that three Cubans arrived in Prague on 7 February to buy munitions--one of several such missions reported in Prague during the past six months. An East German trade delegation is in Havana to negotiate a barter agreement with Cuba, and Poland and Communist China recently bought sizeable quantities of sugar from the Castro government." [REDACTED]

15 February 1960

"An agreement for a long-term Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar and the extension of the USSR's

[REDACTED]

usual \$100,000,000 economic development credit indicate a shift from Moscow's attitude of aloofness of the past year to active support of the Castro regime. These agreements and Kikoyan's statement indicating a willingness to supply military material to Cuba "if requested" [REDACTED]

17 February 1960

"The American Embassy in Havana believes that the most serious results of Kikoyan's visit to Cuba are the expressed intention of the Soviet and Castro governments to collaborate actively in the UN and the offer of technical assistance by the USSR. Embassy officials state that the Cuban government has taken a long step toward putting itself definitely in the Soviet camp, that there is little possibility that the United States will reach a satisfactory relationship with the present regime, and that 'time is working against us' as Castro's control over Cuban public opinion tightens." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

that Castro is also making overtures toward diplomatic relations with Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria." [REDACTED]

23 March 1960

"Cuban Foreign Minister Roa on 21 March strongly objected to Ambassador Bensal's expressed regret that the Castro government had chosen a position outside the free-world community. Roa...implied that he does not believe the Communist bloc represents slavery." [REDACTED]

30 March 1960

"Communists or pro-Communists from fifteen Latin American countries attended the closing ceremonies of the 'Week of Solidarity with the struggles of the Latin American Peoples' in Havana on 26 March...Cuba is rapidly becoming a base for Communist activities in the rest of Latin America." [REDACTED]

6 April 1960

"Delegates from the Sino-Soviet bloc and from Latin American nations are now in Havana for the Fourth National Congress of the Youth Section of the Cuban Communist party... The congress has been given TV time and other

[REDACTED]

facilities by the Castro regime.... Preparations are being made for an ostensibly non-Communist Latin American Youth Congress which is to be held in Cuba, reportedly next July...it is expected that it will be manipulated by Communists...The Communist youth activities in Cuba are only one indication of the extent to which the Castro regime is lending itself to furtherance of world Communist objectives in Latin America."

[REDACTED]

7 April 1960

"...Cheddi Jagan /of British Guiana/ ... conferred at length on 4 April with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a high-level Cuban Communist who is influential in the Castro regime..."

[REDACTED]

8 April 1960

"The Communists are making a determined effort to take complete control of the Cuban Labor Confederation before the massive labor rally planned for May Day. Their move is gaining momentum with support from the minister of labor, who has Fidel Castro's endorsement."

[REDACTED]

9 April 1960

"The Castro regime is evidently preparing to accept its first ambassador from a Sino-Soviet bloc country...Vladimir Pavlicek who, as /Czech/ minister to Mexico, arranged for the shipment of Czech arms to the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954."

[REDACTED]

18 April 1960

"Fidel Castro seems determined to make the May Day rally in Havana a demonstration of strong support for his regime not only by the Cuban masses but also by public sentiment throughout the hemisphere and by the Sino-Soviet bloc...The Cuban Government reportedly is paying transportation and lodging costs for 18 Chinese Communists who will participate in the May Day rally along with 73 Soviet visitors and other bloc delegations..."

[REDACTED]

20 April 1960

".../Education Minister/ Hart...is believed to be dominated by his wife, Kaydee Santamaria,

[REDACTED]  
and other pro-Communists influential in Cuban foreign affairs." [REDACTED]

22 April 1960

"...Castro in recent months has endorsed the support given the Communists by his brother Raul and Raul's protege, pro-Communist Labor Minister Martinez Sanchez."  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

23 April 1960

"Exchange visits between Cuban and Communist bloc delegates for May Day celebrations and the hiring of Czech technicians by the Cuban Government highlight Castro's rapidly growing involvement with Communist countries. The Brazilian ambassador in Cuba says he does not know whether the Cuban leader retains 'sufficient autonomy and freedom of action public to define himself clearly regarding Communism.'...An observer close to Castro thinks the Cuban leader may not be free to oppose the trend /toward growing involvement with Communist countries/ even if he wishes// [REDACTED] numerous Czech technicians and economic representatives have arrived in Cuba in April ..."

9 May 1960

"The 7 May announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Castro regime and the Soviet Union formalizes increasingly close economic and political ties since Mikoyan's visit to Cuba last February..." [REDACTED]

18 May 1960

"Castro's former minister of finance is reported to have commented privately on 16 May that the Cuban Government is 'under heavy pressure' to recognize Communist China immediately...Many regime officials are

[REDACTED]

sympathetic to the Chinese Communists. Cuban Armed Forces Inspector General William Galvez Rodriguez recently had two audiences with Mao Tse-tung..." [REDACTED]

21 May 1960

"The Castro Government on 18 May ordered that each refinery in Cuba for the rest of this year must purchase approximately 300,000 tons of Soviet crude oil, now arriving under the Cuban Soviet trade agreement." [REDACTED]

23 May 1960

[REDACTED] the Soviet bloc may be prepared to supply Cuba with at least token deliveries of arms... Since Mikoyan's visit to Cuba last February, bloc activity in Cuba has increased sharply... [REDACTED] ten Soviet technicians are en route to Cuba, probably to begin preliminary planning for projects under the \$100,000,000 Soviet line of credit.

27 May 1960

"Eighty Russians arrived in Cuba on 22 May to join the Soviet Trade Commission established during Mikoyan's visit in February, according to information considered reliable by the US service attaches in Havana. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Castro regime is granting visas to numerous Soviet bloc personnel without apparent regard to their status or activities... Cuban-Polish diplomatic relations will probably be announced shortly." [REDACTED]

An unverified report that 70 to 80 young Cubans have been sent to the USSR for Jet training has added to speculation that the Soviet bloc may soon provide Castro with jet planes..." [REDACTED]

30 May 1960

"The Peiping opera company which has been touring Latin America will spend most of June in Havana. The Cuban Government is emphasizing cultural ties with Communist China and may soon proceed with the long-foreseen establishment of diplomatic relations. A group of students arrived in Peiping from Cuba on 25 May, the latest of numerous Cuban visitors there, and Cuba seems to be a key target of Peiping's stepped-up propaganda activities in Latin America." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4 June 1960

"...Honduras may break relations with Cuba because the Cuban ambassador there has been particularly provocative in his support of radical, Communist-inspired opposition groups... Cuban President Dorticos' 'good will' trip in South America...is demonstrating that the best organized support in Latin America for the Castro regime is Communist." [REDACTED]

4 June 1960

"Soviet Premier Khrushchev has accepted an invitation to visit Cuba, according to TASS....The announcement following Khrushchev's recent personal endorsement of Fidel Castro and his glowing praise for the aims and methods of the Cuban revolution, suggests that... Moscow is more willing than it was during Mikoyan's winter visit to Havana to exploit the Cuban Government's hostility to the US and Havana's readiness to strengthen ties with the Communist bloc." [REDACTED]

13 June 1960

"In another move promoting close bloc-Cuban economic relations, Czechoslovakia has extended to the Castro government a \$20,000,000 credit for industrial development. A technical assistance agreement and a five-year trade pact also were concluded on 10 June. [REDACTED] The Czech foreign trade official responsible for negotiating military deliveries to non-bloc countries was in Havana at that time. [REDACTED] The Soviet diplomat who organized and ran the atomic spying in Canada from 1942 to 1945 reportedly will be named Moscow's ambassador to Havana. [REDACTED] Bloc economic credits to Cuba now total \$120,000,000."

18 June 1960

"Fidel Castro has told a usually reliable source that he is confident of obtaining transportation for Cuba's entire POL requirements...and thus is prepared for early seizure of the US and British-owned refineries which have refused to process Soviet crude oil....The 60,000 barrels per day of POL required for Cuba's internal needs would almost certainly be replaced by the USSR, which is already shipping smaller amounts under the Cuban-Soviet trade agreements." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

20 June 1960

"The resignation of two under-secretaries in the Cuban Foreign Ministry, announced on 17 June, is probably the precursor of a general shake up of top officials in the ministry...One of the newly appointed under secretaries is regarded as a Communist; ...Both may have been selected by Raul Castro, suggesting that he and the Communists are likely to extend their influence over foreign policy." [REDACTED]

27 June 1960

"The Castro regime continues its efforts to secure industrial goods and technical assistance through the conclusion of trade and aid agreements with the Sino-Soviet bloc." [REDACTED]

1 July 1960

"The Argentine ambassador in Havana reports that Fidel Castro told him that Raul Castro is to sign a 'military pact' with Czechoslovakia during his current visit to Prague, according to...an influential official of the Argentine Foreign Ministry.

8 July 1960

"Repeated Soviet assurances of both economic and political support to Cuba have strengthened Castro's hand in his anti-US policies.... The cutback in Cuba sugar exports to the United States may present new opportunities for bloc exploitation. The bloc's general low level of sugar consumption enables it to absorb whatever purchases are considered politically expedient." [REDACTED]

12 July 1960

"Communists continue to expand role in Castro regime. The Castro regime is believed to be considering the appointment of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez as minister of finance... Rodriguez, a leading member of the Communists' Popular Socialist party and editor of the party daily, has long been among Castro's close advisers. The heavy workload of Fidel Castro and his chief aides, "Che" Guevara, Antonio Munoz Jimenez, and Raul Castro--all three of them indistinguishable from Communists--may dictate the sharing of administrative responsibilities with Rodriguez..." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] of Czech technicians  
at Cuba's chief military garrison in  
Havana." [REDACTED]

15 July 1960

"Khrushchev's qualified rocket threat on 9 July, and pledge of general support on 12 July, in defense of Cuba is designed to inflate the Cuban situation into a major international question." [REDACTED]

16 July 1960

"....On 11 July the leaders of a Cuban workers' delegation in China stated that 'the Cuban revolution has drawn on the experience of the Chinese revolution.'" [REDACTED]

25 July 1960

"[In] the trade pact concluded on 23 July Peiping has promised to buy at world prices up to 500,000 tons of Cuban sugar annually over the next five years--well over twice the amount of sugar normally imported from non-bloc countries by China. The trade agreement is to be followed later this year by an economic aid agreement under which Peiping is to provide industrial equipment and presumably technical assistance to Cuba." [REDACTED]

25 July 1960

"The long-planned Latin American Youth Congress, which opens on 26 July, will be a major effort to propagandize the Castro--and Communist goal of 'liberating Latin America from US imperialism.' Because the congress is likely to be completely Communist dominated, youth groups in Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and other countries have boycotted it, but delegates are expected from most Latin American countries and from the Sino-Soviet bloc." [REDACTED]

27 July 1960

"The Argentine ambassador in Cuba, Julio Amodeo, told Ambassador Bonsal that he fears Fidel Castro is a 'doomed man' and that the situation in Cuba is 'hastening to a tragic outcome in which Castro will be the victim.' Amodeo who has been the Latin American

[REDACTED]

ambassador closest to Castro and whom Ambassador Bonsal regards as a reliable and sympathetic ally of the US, received this impression during a 23 July conversation with Castro in the course of which 'Che' Guevara unexpectedly appeared. Amado feels Castro was unable to speak to him because of the presence first of acting Foreign Minister Olivares, a pro-Communist, and later of Guevara. He concludes that Castro has become the virtual prisoner of the pro-Communist clique headed by Guevara."

[REDACTED]

5 August 1960

"....Raul Castro told the delegates /to the Latin American Youth Congress in Havana/ on 4 August that Cuba does 'have something for which to thank imperialism. Without Batista, imposed by imperialism, we would probably still be playing with representative democracy.' [REDACTED]"

16 August 1960

"The eighth national congress of the Popular Social (Communist) party of Cuba opens on 16 August with the attendance of relatively high party officials from France, Italy, and most countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The congress, the first since 1952,...is likely to be a demonstration of international Communist solidarity with the Castro regime in its 'struggle against American imperialism.' The foreign Communist delegations undoubtedly will use this opportunity to strengthen the Communist position in Cuba with the aim of using that country as a base for further penetration in Latin America. [REDACTED]"

[REDACTED]

18 August 1960

"The Salvadoran ambassador in Havana has received reports from a contact in the Cuban National Bank that the Castro regime is sending large amounts of money to various other Latin American countries to carry on Cuba's campaign against the OAS, and perhaps to bribe delegates to the OAS foreign ministers' meeting..." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

19 August 1960

"Following the breakdown on 5 August of trade negotiations between Cuba and the Federal Republic, Bonn believes that the Castro regime may extend diplomatic recognition to East Germany." [REDACTED]

23 August 1960

"Communists and other pro-Castro elements in a number of Latin American countries are likely to attempt demonstrations this week designed to influence the OAS foreign ministers' meeting. Such demonstrations [are] encouraged and probably largely financed by the Castro regime." [REDACTED]

29 August 1960

"The US Army Attaché in Havana has received a press photograph...which clearly shows Czech semiautomatic rifles in the hands of Cuban militia....There is no indication of the amount of Czech material which has been delivered." [REDACTED]

1 September 1960

"North Korea has received its first diplomatic recognition outside the bloc with the 29 August agreement to exchange ambassadors with Cuba 'as soon as possible!'. Cuba has little to gain economically from North Korea, but establishment of relations at this time is consistent with the increasingly close ties between Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc..." [REDACTED]

3 September 1960

"In the most vindictive attack on the United States of his career, Fidel Castro defiantly announced on 2 September Cuba's intention to establish diplomatic relations with the Peiping regime....Castro in effect withdrew his country from the inter-American system and from the Western alliance.

9 September 1960

"A Soviet merchant ship...arrived in Cuba on 8 September with Moscow's first major arms delivery to the Castro regime." [REDACTED]

6 October 1960

~~On 2 October,~~ the National Bank of Cuba purchased in New York the equivalent of nearly \$4,500,000 in pounds sterling and ordered its deposit in London to the account of the Czech State Bank. This transaction was probably a payment for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Bloc allies." [REDACTED]

12 October 1960

"Peruvian President Prado has stated that he is ready to break diplomatic relations with Cuba on the grounds that Cuba is supporting Peruvian Communists."

[REDACTED]

19 October 1960

"Fidel Castro told [REDACTED] last month that he believed capitalism is on its way out...He expressed confidence that the Sino-Soviet bloc would win today's ideological struggle and said it was therefore necessary for him to align Cuba with the Communist countries...He became enthusiastic when referring to the operations of the Cuban Petroleum Institute under the guidance of Soviet technicians."

[REDACTED]

A Cuban deputy foreign minister told the West German ambassador in Havana on 17 October that Cuba intends to extend diplomatic recognition to the East German regime...Cuba has already recognized all other countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc except Albania, Rumania, and Outer Mongolia."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

10 April 1958

"Although individual members of the movement have been suspected of being Communist sympathizers, Castro has recently refused apparently unsolicited offers of help from the outlawed Cuban Communist party, which at present is estimated to number 8,000 to 12,000 members. The Communists, however, have jumped on the rebel bandwagon to voice "solidarity" with the Cuban people in their fight against the dictatorship."

[REDACTED]

10 July 1958

"Raul's forces, which may be Communist infiltrated, are isolated from effective contact with the "26th of July" movement headquarters in the Sierra Maestra, and his civilian supporters have been intimidated by army bombings and terroristic attacks."

[REDACTED]

2 October 1958

"The Cuban Government has long charged that opposition groups, particularly the "26th of July" movement, are Communist dominated....Although a few alleged Communist sympathizers have positions of importance, particularly within the group commanded by Raul Castro, and others are to be found on lower levels, there is no evidence to support the charge against the Castro movement. The youth and political immaturity of many '26th of July' members, as well as the existence of some anti-Americanism, especially within Raul's command, leaves the movement open to Communist penetration."

[REDACTED]

8 January 1959

"The Communists have strongly supported the rebel movement in recent public statements, but their frequent efforts during the two-year revolution to obtain acceptance in a united rebel front were repeatedly rebuffed. Nevertheless, they are believed to have infiltrated some rebel units on a low level and may exploit the anti-US sentiments of some rebel leaders. Since Batista's ouster...the Cuban Communist party (PSP) has worked openly to

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

to create an impression of legality. It has succeeded in obtaining a minority voice in the organized labor movement and has opened two overt offices in Havana." [REDACTED]

15 January 1959  
(II)

"The Cuban Communists, whose party was outlawed by Batista in 1953, have been making rapid gains since his fall and have been exerting a special effort to influence the labor movement.... Fidel Castro...has declared that the PSP now will be permitted legal status... 'Che' Guevara...went further than his chief and said he would not oppose Communist participation in the government.... The PSP surfaced immediately after Batista's Fall and succeeded in naming five representatives to a 22-man 'national labor committee' which intends to re-organize the politically important labor movement complete." [REDACTED]

26 February 1959

"Cuban Communists, after five years of illegal, underground existence during the Batista regime, now are staging a series of overt demonstrations and meetings concerned with both internal and foreign matters. The first important public meeting, a three-day session of the national committee of the Popular Socialist (Communist) party (PSP) that began on 26 January, dealt with the domestic situation and emphasized issues that would identify the party with the program and policies of the provisional Cuban Government." [REDACTED]

19 March 1959  
(II)

"Fidel Castro's campaign against dictatorships places him in the same camp with such liberal leaders as Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt and former Costa Rican President José Figueres, but his predilection for revolutionary methods and his recent tendency to deal

[REDACTED]

with Communist-influenced exile groups have prevented concerted efforts by these leaders.... Castro has authorized Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, the controversial leftist Argentine revolutionary, who worked closely with Castro during the revolution, to deal with such groups.... Castro's apparent support for the Communist-influenced Dominican Patriotic Union has met with opposition from Betancourt and Figueres."

[REDACTED]

26 March 1959  
(II)

"President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela and former Costa Rican President José Figueres have grave misgivings concerning the methods and objectives of the latest leader of the crusade against dictators, Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Both are alarmed at Castro's demagoguery and his tendency to support pro-Communist Nicaraguan and Dominican revolutionaries. [REDACTED]

2 April 1959

"Communists in Cuba continue to operate with little restraint and have succeeded in making inroads in the organized labor movement, the armed forces, and probably the press.... The Argentine-born rebel leader Ernesto 'Che' Guerara, placed in charge of the Cabana fortress in Havana, has permitted Communist activities within his command.... The creation of a new section of the General Staff, known as G-6 or 'direction of culture,' has provided another opening for Communist penetration in the armed forces. Headed by the pro-Communist brother of the army chief of staff, G-6 is reportedly engaged in rewriting textbooks for military personnel. In Santiago, a group of citizens found it advisable to disband their anti-Communist civic committee, since anti-Communists are being equated with counter-revolutionaries--who are considered close to being traitors in Cuba today." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

30 April 1959  
(III)

"Charges that Raul /Castro/ is pro-Communist rest partly on his associations. In January of this year, he married Vilma Espin, a fellow rebel who has been reported to be pro-Communist. He has worked closely with the pro-Communist guerrilla leader 'Che' Guevara in the activities of revolutionary exiles in Cuba. He went to Vienna in March 1953 to attend a "Conference for the Defense of the Rights of Youth"...and may have traveled to bloc countries afterwards.... Whatever Raul's precise relations with the Communists, his actions have certainly facilitated Communist gains in Cuba. In the army, he has permitted Communist influence to spread.... Bitterly anti-American, he has made frequent statements blaming the United States for Cuba's economic, political, and social problems." [REDACTED]

7 May 1959  
(II)

"Cuban Communists have been making a special drive for control of organized labor and are evidently meeting with some success by working at the local level and behind the scenes.... Among the moves advocated by Communists is the formation of a worker's militia. This project has been endorsed by a number of top labor leaders and by Major Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, an important Castro adviser whose actions frequently encouraged and facilitated Communist activities.... Though not proven to be a Communist, Guevara publicly maintains that by their aid in the revolution--which, in fact, was minimal--Communists earned the right to participate in the government Communist activity has been pronounced in his army command...." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

28 May 1959  
(II)

"Moderates in the Cuban cabinet evidently oppose parts of Prime Minister Fidel Castro's drastic and complicated new agrarian reform law. The version unofficially published on 19 May has confiscatory aspects likely to impede Cuban economic recovery. It also gives sweeping powers to the National Agrarian Reform Institute, the organization charged with enforcing the law and at present under the executive direction of a pro-Communist--Antonio Munoz Jimenez, an intellectual with a long record of Communist associations and wide-spread influence in the Cuban revolutionary government. Munoz and other pro-Communists are believed to have drafted the law in such a way as to give them carte blanche to extend their influence in agricultural areas--as has already happened with pro-Communists in some of the labor unions, parts of the revolutionary army, and possibly in public education."

25 June 1959  
(II)

"Ernesto 'Che' Guevara--a high-ranking pro-Communist military subordinate of Cuban Prime Minister Castro--reportedly plans to go to China after his current visit to the UAR, and Peiping may discuss with him the possibility of diplomatic relations."

16 July 1959  
(I)

"Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro is encountering increasing unrest as public attention is drawn to Communist penetration of his government."

23 July 1959

"Peiping appears to be making Cuba a center for its propaganda activities in the area. It has already established a press office in Havana and it plans to have the local Communist press print a Chinese language newspaper. The Chinese will probably also exploit the new Latin American Press Agency, which is penetrated by Communists and has editorial

[REDACTED]

offices in the same building as NCHAS Havana bureau...The delegation of Chinese "journalists"...have exploited all opportunities to hint at the desirability of Cuban adoption of Chinese Communist land reform techniques...."

[REDACTED]

3 September 1959  
(II)

"Prensa Latina--Latin Press--a Latin American news agency formally launched on 9 June in Havana...is believed to be substantially financed by the Castro regime, and its staff is composed largely of persons with an anti-US bias, some of them suspected Communists....The staff comprises suspected Communists and others, including Director Massetti, who held prominent offices in former Argentine Dictator Peron's Agencia Latina, a "news agency" that was in fact a strongly anti-US propaganda machine. Angel Borlenghi, a crypto-Communist who was Peron's interior minister, is reported to be an agency consultant in Havana."

[REDACTED]

24 September 1959  
(II)

"Raul Castro and Guevara continue their efforts to arouse anti-US feeling and to sponsor activities which promote Soviet strategy. Raul recently spoke in support of convening a Latin American "people's congress"--a project for which considerable groundwork was laid during discussions by Communists and other Latin American leftists in Santiago de Chile in August....Latin American delegates to the Soviet 21st party congress in Moscow early this year resolved to hold a "people's congress" ostensibly dedicated to some popular cause which could be used to attract the sponsorship of popular leaders like Fidel Castro. The sponsors would be drawn into association with the Communists, who would remain in the background guiding the congress in an "anti-imperialist," anti-US direction. An

[REDACTED]  
intensified campaign against US military bases and missions was another important tactic in the action program adopted in Moscow. Whether by coincidence or design, Ernesto Guevara has picked up this theme. In one of his frequent speeches since his return from an extended tour of neutralist countries in the Middle East and Asia, he declared that the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay makes Cuba a target for nuclear attacks and argued that Cuba should pursue a neutralist foreign policy." [REDACTED]

22 October 1959  
(1)

"Strong opposition has evidently been aroused among some of Fidel's trusted officials by his support of leftists and pro-Communists in the Cuban Government. Huber Katos, one of Castro's top lieutenants during the fight against Batista, resigned as governor of Camaguey Province this week because of his conviction that extremists led by Raul Castro and 'Che' Guevara are now firmly in control of the Castro regime.... There have been reports of dissatisfaction over Communist influence by other provincial officials, but none has taken a public stand." [REDACTED]

29 October 1959  
(1)

"Fidel Castro apparently does not recognize the danger of Communism for Cuba and is not likely to be influenced to moderate his course.... Leaders of the extremist forces are Raul Castro and 'Che' Guevara, both obsessively anti-American and suspected of Communist sympathies. Raul was recently named minister of all army, navy, air, and police forces, which will enable him to control them even more closely for political purposes than he has done thus far. Guevara is director of industrial regulation and development and considered actually to run the Castro regime's most powerful and unrestricted agency, the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA). Both Raul and Guevara are believed to exert

[REDACTED]

dominating influence in determining high Cuban policy in all domestic and foreign matters and to nullify the influence of moderate officials who hitherto have managed to temper some of the revolution's more drastic aspects." [REDACTED]

5 November 1959  
II

"Cuba may be planning to resume diplomatic relations with the USSR and open trade relations with East Germany. On 3 November the semiofficial daily Revolucion urged that Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan...be invited to visit Cuba as the first step toward renewed relations and further trade with the USSR. Ambassador Bonsal in Havana has reported that East German economic officials are expected in Cuba soon, and he considers it quite likely that some rapprochement may be contemplated." [REDACTED]

12 November 1959  
II

"The Communists are likely to increase their influence in the large and politically powerful Cuban Workers' Confederation (CTC) during its national congress from 18 to 21 November. Although the revolutionary 26th of July Movement claims sweeping victories, Communists are believed to have gained substantial representation among the 3000 delegates elected to the congress by local unions on 8 November. Their efforts to infiltrate the CTC will be facilitated by the actions of extremists who now virtually control the Cuban Government.... Raul Castro, considered leader of the extremists in the government, is reliably reported to have ordered the expulsion of five non-Communists from the CTC directorate, probably during the congress. They evidently refused to agree automatically with government actions they disapproved. The new labor minister, Augusto Martinez Sanchez, who is closely

[REDACTED]

identified with Raul, has already suggested that he will not give non-Communists the tacit government support which, early in the Castro regime, enables 26th of July labor leaders to resist Cuban Communist party (PSP) efforts to dominate the CTC. The labor minister's influence and the PSP strategy of discrediting individual anti-Communist leaders while not challenging labor officials who do not openly oppose Communist efforts will give the PSP minority in the labor movement a disproportionate behind-the-scenes voice in the election of national CTC leaders during the congress." [REDACTED]

25 November 1959  
(1)

"The results of the stormy congress of the dominant Cuban Workers' Confederation (CTC) which ended on 23 November may be only a surface setback for Fidel Castro and are, at the least, a partial victory for the influential Communist minority in the CTC. The delegates rejected a "unity" slate for the top officials of the CTC executive committee which had been endorsed by Castro and contained three Communists, but chose a group with at least three labor leaders likely to collaborate with Communists. David Salvador, an opportunist who has worked with Communists in the past, remains as Castro's hand-picked secretary general. Of the five strongly anti-Communist members on the CTC directorate which has served provisionally since Batista's defeat, only two were re-elected. Raul Castro reportedly had ordered the expulsion of all five." [REDACTED]

3 December 1959  
(1)

"The shake-up in high Cuban Government posts on 26 November demonstrates Fidel Castro's apparently complete commitment to extremism in his efforts to remake

[REDACTED]

Cuba....Ambassador Bonsal believes this trend is accompanied by a growing receptivity to guidance by Communist-oriented elements. The pro-Communist Ernesto "Che" Guevara, new head of the National Bank, now is in a position to determine the allocation of the foreign exchange, on which Cuba's economy is based because of its large sugar sales. ... The prime minister relies heavily for advice on Guevara, whose economic knowledge is basically weak and colored by his concept of the Cuban revolution as a class struggle in which the government must "change the economic panorama" of the country and its social system. The new minister of public works--also a powerful post--is Captain Osmani Cienfuegos, who is probably a Communist .... The few remaining moderate officials ...now are virtually without influence and almost certain to be replaced soon. They are convinced that Cuba is rapidly headed for economic collapse and a Communist takeover." [REDACTED]

10 December 1950  
III

"In attempting to build an authoritarian political machine based on mass support, Castro is turning more and more to Communist oriented advisers, and Communists are benefitting from the demagogic tirades against the rich and against the United States that Castro uses to mobilize his mass following.... The Popular Socialist (Communist) party (PSP) of Cuba, which has some 17,000 members including its youth section, has made steady gains since Castro came to power last January. The party has benefited directly from the actions of such highly placed sympathizers as armed forces chief Raul Castro, economic and foreign policy adviser "Che" Guevara, and agrarian reform chief Antonio Nunez Jimenez, all of whom have been instrumental in securing important government positions for known Communists.

[REDACTED]

The armed forces and the agrarian reform machinery have been penetrated by Communists whose potential for infiltrating the economic organizations of the state was greatly enhanced by the appointment on 26 November of "Che" Guevara to head the National Bank. Cesari Cienfuegos, named minister of public works the same day, is the first probable Communist to secure a post in the cabinet. Reliable sources reported recently that a top PSP official was being considered as minister of finance.

In contrast to Communist policy in Guatemala during the Arbenz regime, when an attempt was made rapidly to build a mass party, the PSP in Cuba appears to be concentrating on quality rather than quantity. The slow recruitment and emphasis on indoctrination suggest considerable care in the selection of new members, particularly in view of the extremely favorable conditions for the party's growth." [REDACTED]

23 December 1959  
II

"The Cuban Medical Association, whose strong Havana branch defeated a revolutionary slate of officers in elections on 1 December, elected a protege of pro-Communist "Che" Guevara as president on 20 December, reportedly after heavy pressure from the government." [REDACTED]

30 December 1959  
II

"Fidel Castro's drastic reform program, his stimulation of class antagonisms by bitter attacks on the wealthy, the growing strength of Communists and pro-Communists in the government, and his increasingly authoritarian methods have resulted in a definite narrowing of the base of his regime." [REDACTED]

30 December 1959  
III

"During his recent visit to Mexico, Mikoyan is reported to have approved a deal whereby the USSR is to provide Cuba with from \$5,000,000 to \$6,000,000 worth of agricultural implements, to be delivered on credit by a Mexican company, and to have promised that Soviet technicians would service the equipment...."

[REDACTED]

Cuba has accepted Moscow's offer to present its exhibition in any Latin American country following its stay in Mexico City. The exhibit is now scheduled to open in Havana about February.

Satellite missions have visited or are planning to visit Cuba to try to capitalize on anti-Western sentiment and establish trade relations. Czechoslovakia has already established a permanent trade representative in Havana." [REDACTED]

21 January 1960

"The National Agrarian Reform institute is already seizing significant acreages of sugar land, with this year's sugar harvest barely under way. Its executive director, suspected Communist Antonio Ruzex Jimenez, declared on 12 January that... 'in a few days all large sugar plantations will also come under INRA's control'.... The American ambassador in Mexico reports close liaison there between the Soviet and Cuban embassies ...." [REDACTED]

28 January 1960

"According to 'Che' Guevara, pro-Communist president of Cuba's National Bank, foreign banks will no longer be permitted to rediscunt with the National Bank their crop loans to either American - or Cuban-owned sugar companies.... It could be a step toward nationalization of the entire banking system, one of Castro's early stated objectives.... The government, in a strong curb on private business, has also issued regulations putting control of all changes of employment under the Labor Ministry.... In another move toward closer relations with Communist and neutral countries, the Castro-subsidized press service, Prensa Latina, concluded news exchange agreements on 20 January in Havana with representatives from the USSR, UAR, Communist China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, East Germany, Indonesia, and Japan.... there is already suspicion in other countries of Communist influence in PL's personnel and output." [REDACTED]

4 February 1960

[REDACTED]

"Kikoyan's presence in Havana...will give impetus to increased Cuban-Soviet relations in several fields....In recent months there have been numerous as-yet-unconfirmed reports that the USSR and other Soviet bloc countries have offered Castro large barter deals, some involving Cuban minerals as well as sugar, and credits for equipment badly needed for Castro's reform program....Inside Cuba the numerous militias formed among labor, student and other groups--on Castro's exhortation but at the original suggestion of the Cuban Communist party--have been more tightly organized under the control of Minister of the Armed Forces Raul Castro and of Che Guevara, who remains head of instruction for the armed forces. Raul Castro also exercises increasingly decisive authority over Cuban economic life through Minister of Labor Martinez, who controls employment and is empowered to intervene in business management almost at will." [REDACTED]

11 February 1960

"....Cuban Commerce Minister Cepero cited these bloc sugar purchases as of great value in helping Cuba sell its unusually large carry-over from the 1959 crop....Cepero specifically welcomed increased Soviet-Cuban trade....The Castro government is also encouraging closer relations with other bloc countries....In Havana, an untested source in a position to observe, reports that Prensa Latina, the Castro-subsidized Latin American news agency, now has a radio transmitter equipped to send messages in code to the Czech news service in Prague..." [REDACTED]

18 February 1960

"In the nearly 14 months since Castro's seizure of power in Cuba, Moscow's attitude has changed from cautious approval of the new government to optimism regarding the opportunities the situation presents for the advancement of Soviet interests in Latin America....The highly organized Cuban Popular Socialist (Communist) party (PSP)--17,000 members--has enjoyed considerable success in following the directives laid down by

[REDACTED]

bloc leaders during the 21st party congress in Moscow in early 1959....The PSP has openly identified itself with the principal goals of Castro's program. Party members pose as strong supporters of the revolution. Taking advantage of the government's benevolent attitude toward the party, the Cuban Communists have succeeded in obtaining considerable influence in the government, particularly in the military and economic sectors, and in the labor movement....The USSR intends to take advantage of Cuba's economic weaknesses; its dependence on the sale of sugar, its lack of investment capital,, and its low foreign exchange balance....The Cuban Government's increasing leftist orientation....[is] probably considered...susceptible to Soviet exploitation."

[REDACTED]

25 February 1960

"Fidel Castro's regime has lost prestige in other Latin American capitals because of authoritarian methods, susceptibility to Communist influence, and its unorthodox behavior in hemisphere affairs....Although few officials consider Fidel Castro a Communist, many are convinced that close aides such as Che Guevara and Raul Castro are promoting Communist objectives and that the premier himself is in danger of becoming a captive of the Communists."

[REDACTED]

17 March 1960

"Cuba is becoming the center of Communist activity in Latin America. A hemisphere peace Conference under the auspices of the Communist-front World Peace Council is being planned for Havana in May or June, and the Communist hand is also evident in the 'Friends of Cuba' societies being formed in most Latin American countries. Communist bloc propaganda continues its active support of Castro, and Cuba's economic, labor, and cultural contacts with the bloc are increasing.

24 March 1960

"The Castro regime is tightening its control over communications media and extending its radical socio-economic programs....Over 80 radio and television

[REDACTED]

stations have been formed into the 'Independent Front of Free Transmitters' (FIEL)...Many of the announcers are pro-Communists and the output often follows the Communist line....According to Peiping's New China News Agency, which has been timely and accurate on recent internal Cuban developments, the 'peoples' stores,' organized by the regime's Agrarian Reform Institute...are being extended to the cities....Recent defections... coincide with increasingly outspoken attacks on Communism by Cuban groups alarmed at recent Communist gains....The 'Week of Solidarity with the Struggles of the Latin American People,' declared by the Communist-infiltrated Cuban Labor Confederation... was warmly endorsed by the Cuban Communist Party..." [REDACTED]

31 March 1960

"Castro's Cuba is increasing hospitable to Latin American Communist activity." [REDACTED]

7 April 1960

"The Castro regime is moving to tighten its control over Cuban universities and to squelch the recent manifestations of anti-Communist sentiment among politically active student groups. At the same time, the regime has provided television facilities and helped in other ways the national congress of the youth section of the Cuban Communist party which opened in Havana on 4 April....Arrangements are probably being made at the congress to manipulate a preparatory meeting...for the Latin American Youth Congress which Castro is promoting in Havana in July." [REDACTED]

21 April 1960

The Cuban Communist party is taking a leading part in preparations for the May Day rally and is using them in an effort to resolve in its favor the bitter internal rivalries with non-Communist factions in the powerful Cuban Labor Confederation. The Cuban Government is reportedly paying transportation and lodging costs for 18 Chinese Communists who are to participate in the May Day rally. Leaders of the

[REDACTED]

Cuban Communist party have privately expressed great satisfaction with their accomplishments since the advent of Castro and with the considerable influence they have over high Cuban officials, according to a usually reliable source. One top Communist is reported to have privately stated that 'Castro can do more to further our aims than we could possibly do...we keep in the background and there is no need to do otherwise....If we controlled the Cuban Government, we could not make the rapid progress we are making. Here we are doing things that cannot even be done in the peoples' democracies.'" [REDACTED]

28 April 1960

"....The three-man Chinese Communist delegation that arrived in Havana on 22 April was the first of many foreign delegations, including other representatives from the Soviet bloc, to come for the May Day events in Cuba. Greeting the Chinese at the airport, Cuban pro-Communist labor leader Soto said, "you have had revolutionary experiences from which we must learn, especially regarding questions of labor.'" [REDACTED]

5 May 1960

"The Castro regime, which continues to strengthen its ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc, is becoming further isolated from other Latin American governments....Cuba has maintained close contacts with dissatisfied elements in Venezuela's government coalition and with Communists there, and it may be giving them financial aid and guidance....Karta Frayde--a charter member of the 26th of July movement and close confidante of Castro--told the press during her recent visit to East Germany that she favored closer relations between both countries. Peiping radio continues its extensive reporting on events in Cuba, and the secretary general of the Cuban Communist party, Eals Roca, was received by Mao Tse-tung while in Peiping for May Day celebrations." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

12 May 1960

"The Castro government is moving to implement promptly the establishment of relations with the USSR announced on 7 May. [REDACTED]

the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City 'to furnish visas to all Soviet diplomatic personnel who may request them, especially to diplomatic couriers.'....Faure Chaumont /To be Cuban ambassador to Moscow/ is believed to have allowed the Communists to use his now practically defunct Revolutionary Directorate as a front, and in 1959 he was sent by Castro to Communist China, Czechoslovakia, and other countries 'to make friends for the Cuban Revolution.'

[REDACTED] there will be an announcement on 17 May of establishment of diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia....On 7 May a Cuban radio station said that a Czech mission had arrived in Havana to conclude a trade agreement. On the same day a staff member of the Cuban Communist party newspaper reportedly said that relations with Communist China would be established in due course." [REDACTED]

19 May 1960

"The Castro regime completed on 17 May the first year of its agrarian reform program, which has already transformed most of the Cuban economy. Meanwhile, there are new indications of closer relations with Communist China. Major William Galvez Rodriguez, inspector general of the Cuban Armed Forces, reached Peiping in early May on an extended good-will tour of neutralist and bloc countries. He had at least two audiences with Mao Tze-Tung and, according to the New China News Agency, said on 12 May that the Cuban people desired to intensify their 'intimate relationship' with the Chinese people and to unite with them in opposition to the 'imperialists of the US.' On 16 May, Castro's former minister of finance is reported to have said that the Cuban Government is 'under heavy pressure' to recognize Communist China immediately and that he felt the move was imminent". [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

26 May 1960

"The Brazilian and Argentine ambassadors in Havana have previously been sympathetic both with the aims of the Cuban Revolution and to Castro, but see his present policies as leading only to chaos and communism.... The effect of Castro's bloc ties are becoming more apparent. Refineries in Cuba have been told that during the rest of this year each must purchase approximately 300,000 tons of the Soviet crude oil already arriving under the Cuban-Soviet trade agreement. This affects primarily Esso, Texaco, and Shell, which process about 95% of Cuba's refined petroleum products. The newly appointed Czech ambassador to Havana has had many years' experience in Latin America. As minister to Mexico in 1954, he arranged the clandestine shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia to the Arbenz regime in Guatemala. [REDACTED] Frantisek Kares, who heads the technical directorate of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Trade and negotiated arms deals with the UAR and Indonesia, was issued Cuban visas for himself and several other Czech ~~trade~~ officials.... Establishment of Cuban-Polish diplomat relations will soon be announced."

[REDACTED]

2 June 1960

"Communists are playing a more extensive and active role in the revolutionary processes now remaking the economic and political life of Cuba than they ever did in Guatemala or any other Latin American country. In the 18 months since Castro came to power, they have benefited from the fact that his methods and aims have generally paralleled theirs, at least in the short run, and from the active assistance of the pre-Communists or crypto-Communists who are Castro's closest and most trusted aides. Castro himself has strongly implied, and other high-ranking officials have flatly asserted, that, to be anti-Communist is to be 'counter-revolutionary,' and this statement has been a guide in the purges that have periodically swept all areas of the government. Communists or pro-Communists now hold

[REDACTED]

positions of ultimate authority in the armed forces, the important National Agrarian Reform Institute, the National Bank, the Ministry of Public Works, various propaganda media, and organized labor. They also appear to exercise considerable influence in the formulation of foreign policy. In addition, Communists have succeeded in occupying a considerable number of lower and medium-level posts throughout the bureaucracy. The Popular Socialist (Communist) party (PSP).../is/ the only organized party active in Cuba today....Its real gains come from penetration of key position through the principal areas of government. Communist activity in the armed forces has followed two general directions: (1) political and social indoctrination of the common soldiers, most of them poorly educated; and of certain officer groups; and (2) active penetration at all levels by PSP militants and Communist-front members. Castro's three closest aides, all of them pro-Communists, have had an active part in facilitating Communist success in the military....The army is the most heavily infiltrated of the three services... Communists are playing a major role in the formulation and execution of policy by the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA), the instrument through which the regime is rapidly consolidating its control of the nation's agriculture, industry, and trade. Most provisions of the agrarian reform law as well as the measures implementing the law closely follow the PSP program.... The Communists are also active in other areas of civil government...The judicial system is coming under steady Communist encroachment....In the Ministry of Education, the Communists have won strategic positions from which they are apparently able to appoint additional Communists to positions vacated by purged career employees. In Havana University, Communists are increasingly influential as the regime tightens its control over the teaching staff and student groups. Under the

[REDACTED]

presidency of Che Guevara, the National Bank has become a 'camp of Communists,' in the words of an embassy informant. Welfare institutions are also a Communist target. The Ministry of Public Works, with a large reservoir of patronage, is headed by a probable Communist. The PSP now controls an influential segment of Cuban news media....Communists also exert significant influence on many non-Communist news media. Revolucion, the regime's daily press organ, is directed by pro-Communist Carlos Franqui and has several Communists on its staff. Its propaganda is indistinguishable from the Communist line. The director and at least five of the chief editors /of the Castro-subsidized Prensa Latina/ are Communists or Communist sympathizers. Since last January, PL has made exchange agreements with news agencies of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Communist China. The powerful Cuban Workers' Confederation (CTC), which has become the labor arm of the Castro regime, is a major target for PSP control and is the organization in which the Communists have been most open in their efforts to win dominance. The Communists, who controlled the confederation prior to 1947, had a nucleus of trained and experienced leaders when Castro took over...and, despite temporary setbacks, have steadily regained influence in the organization....A labor minister unsympathetic to Communists was replaced in October by Haul Castro protege Major Augusto Martinez Sanchez, who is enthusiastically supported by the Communists....Castro's foreign policy...has been ardently supported by the PSP.... Although nominally 'neutralist,' Cuban policy has meant steadily closer relations with the Sino Soviet bloc....There has been some Communist penetration of the foreign service, even at the ambassadorial level....

[REDACTED]

Early this year a secret section was reportedly created in the Foreign Ministry for the purpose of placing agent-informers in certain Cuban embassies. Members of the new section are reported to be Communist indoctrinated, and one of their primary jobs is said to be the surveillance of regular foreign service personnel....Communists have also been active in the Cuban-sponsored subversive activities against...governments of the Caribbean area.

The Latin American Youth Congress, scheduled for July in Havana,...appears certain to be dominated by the Communists. The forthcoming youth congress, the meeting last March of representatives of various Latin American 'peace' committees, the meetings of international labor representatives in Cuba, and other gatherings of Communist-front groups are all illustrative of the extent to which the world Communist movement can now use Cuba as a base for activity in other parts of the hemisphere. [REDACTED]

2 June 1960

Soviet trade specialists and technicians have begun to arrive in Cuba in sizeable numbers. On 22 May, 80 are believed to have joined the trade commission established in Havana during Mikoyan's visit. Venezuelan newspapers have reported that Russians and Czechs recently passing through that country en route to Cuba are documented as mechanics, technicians, and experts on airports, hydrology, meteorology, and other specialities.

[REDACTED] the Cuban Government is granting visas freely to bloc nationals....The expected establishment of relations between Cuba and Communist China may come in June...Some 30 Cubans are reliably reported to be attending a six-month training course in China, and at least three other students, labor, and official Cuban delegations have visited there in recent weeks. [REDACTED]

9 June 1960

[REDACTED]

"Khrushchev's acceptance of an invitation to visit Cuba is the latest evidence of Soviet intentions to exploit fully Castro's open hostility to the US and evident desire for closer relations with the bloc....Reports that Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai has also accepted an invitation to visit Cuba persist in Havana, where the Peiping Opera Company continues to be feted by Castro officials. The troupe is the guest of the Castro government for its month-long-tour....The Czech foreign commerce minister arrived in Havana on 6 June with an official delegation to conclude commercial, payment, technical, and credit agreements negotiated between the Cuban and Czech governments over the past few weeks."

[REDACTED]

16 June 1960

"Czechoslovakia on 10 June signed several agreements designed to further bloc economic interests in Cuba....In a television interview on 10 June, Castro praised Czech equipment and hailed bloc economic agreements as facilitating an industrialization program under which machinery was already being purchased and installed in '70 factories'....Sergey Kudrayavtsev...[reportedly] will be named ambassador to Havana has been identified as the intelligence officer who organized and ran the Soviet atomic spy ring in Canada from 1942 to 1945.... There have been further examples this month of the increasingly close relationship between the Castro regime and the Communist bloc. A group of Bulgarians... arrived in Havana...supposedly to discuss trade. Soviet technicians continue to be received warmly by the Cuban government [and] Castro has expressed gratification over the attentiveness shown to the Cuban commercial mission now in Moscow.

[REDACTED]

Communist strength within the Cuban government is growing. Known Communists, including at least two from other Latin American countries, have been appointed to key positions by Castro....Arrangements are probably under way for shipment of Soviet petroleum and products in larger quantities than present levels.

[REDACTED]

23 June 1960

"The resignation of two under secretaries in the Cuban Foreign Ministry, announced on 17 June, appears to be the precursor of a general shakeup that is likely to end in increased Communist influence over Cuba's foreign policy....One of the newly appointed under secretaries-- Hector Rodriguez Llompart--is believed to be a Communist...Both may have been selected by Raul Castro, who has played a key role in Communist inroads in the military organized labor, and other areas ....A Cuban economic mission headed by agrarian reform director Nunez Jimenez has reached a series of agreements in Moscow giving substance to the Soviet-Cuban trade and aid agreements concluded last February."

[REDACTED]

30 June 1960

"Raul Castro arrived in Prague on 26 June...likely to seek military equipment. According to unconfirmed reports, Raul Castro is also to visit Moscow to negotiate a 'nonaggression' pact....Surveys of Cuban resources are being conducted by some of the bloc technicians in Cuba in preparation for proposed projects....

[REDACTED]

the Cuban Foreign Ministry authorized visas for a Chinese Communist commercial mission. /At Havana University/ faculty members are being purged by Communist-dominated student groups, and Communist 'goon' squads almost control the university....The seizure on 29 June of the \$21,000,000 Texaco refinery may presage

[REDACTED]

seizure of the other two major refineries, both foreign owned, which have also refused to process Soviet crude oil."

[REDACTED]

7 July 1960

"Raul Castro told the Czech press that it no longer would be a disaster for Cuba if the United States stops buying Cuban sugar, since now 'we have the help of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.'....pre-Communist Carlos Olivares...appointed under secretary /of the Foreign Ministry/ has been assuming an increasing share of responsibility in the ministry. Olivares, a member of Raul Castro's clique, has been a leading organizer for the Castro sponsored Latin American Youth Congress..."

[REDACTED]

14 July 1960

"The immediate response among Castro followers to Khrushchev's declaration of support for the Castro regime on 9 July was fast and enthusiastic....The trends in Cuba continue toward tighter dictatorship and enhanced Communist influence....The Castro regime is believed to be considering the appointment of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a high Communist leader and director of the party's daily, as minister of finance... Rodriguez has long been among Castro's closest advisers."

[REDACTED]

21 July 1960

"The Castro regime and the Communists continue to tighten their grip on Cuba. The Castro-sponsored Latin American Youth Congress, scheduled to open on 26 July, was first discussed at the Communist-front World Youth Festival in Vienna last summer. Cubans have for months been traveling throughout Latin America, where, with the help of local Communists, they have stimulated the organization of delegations to the congress."

[REDACTED]

28 July 1960

"Prominent Cubans are continuing to resign their positions, and further defections

[REDACTED]

are likely. Dr Perez Cisneros, alternate Cuban representative to the OAS Council, resigned over the pro-Soviet trend of the Cuban government.... West Germany continues to delay concluding a trade agreement with Cuba, and Bonn officials have recently expressed concern that the Castro regime, annoyed at these hesitations, may grant diplomatic recognition to East German."

[REDACTED]

5 August 1960

"There are indications that Fidel Castro's authority in the government may have been significantly reduced in recent weeks and that the pro-Communist clique headed by the ambitious and hard-driving Che Guevara may have gained correspondingly in power. Guevara, whose administrative abilities contrast sharply with Castro's own disorganized methods of governing, has become the virtual tsar of Cuba's state directed economy and exerts considerable influence in other areas of government.... President Dorticos, a former Communist who has never recanted, has shown himself to be a stronger personality than his figurehead status would imply, and he would become an even more influential figure if Fidel Castro should temporarily or permanently leave power. The Argentine and Brazilian ambassadors in Havana—who have shown themselves unusually astute observers—are becoming convinced that Castro has become, in fact, a prisoner."

[REDACTED]

11 August 1960

"There is new evidence of preparations for the delivery of bloc arms to Cuba.... Additional gatherings of Communists and Communist-front groups are scheduled, now that the youth congress is over."

[REDACTED]

18 August 1960

"In accordance with the 8 May announcement of the resumption of diplomatic relations,

[REDACTED]

Soviet Embassy personnel--many of whom have been drawn from embassies in Mexico City and Montevideo--are beginning to reach Cuba. Ambassador Kudrayavtsev arrived on 17 August.

On 14 August President Dorticos, an increasingly authoritative spokesman for the regime, told a television audience that 'there can be no social progress based on vague and romantic theories and the theory of representative democracy...he attacked private enterprise as the root of Cuba's economic ills.

The eighth national congress of Cuba's Popular Socialist (Communist) party opened on 16 August in Havana....The gathering provided an opportunity for international Communist liaison and the further exploitation of Cuba as a base for operations in Latin America....the USSR may be represented by Ambassador Kudryavtsev. Communist China, East German, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Poland sent members of party central committees, and North Korea also sent delegates. Most Latin American Communist parties probably are represented..." [REDACTED]

25 August 1960

"In the report to the eighth national congress of the Communist PSP on the PSP program, it was emphasized that much remains to be done, including the 'intervention' of remaining US property, ouster of the United States from the Guantanamo Naval Base, and completion of the remodeling of the government on the Communist pattern. Fidel Castro's remarks in a 23 August speech...probably forecast Cuba's position of support for the Soviet Union on all issues at the UN General Assembly session, including support for the admission of Communist China. [REDACTED]

1 September 1960

"The /Castro/ government announced on 29 August that Cuba and North Korea...had

[REDACTED]

...agreed to establish diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level 'as soon as possible'...If Cuba grants diplomatic recognition to the North Korean regime, it will be the first non-bloc country to do so....A photograph...of a militia review before Fidel Castro on 21 August established that Czech semi automatic 7.26-mm rifles...have been delivered to Cuba. These are the first bloc arms to be positively identified in Cuba. These weapons presumably arrived on board a Soviet merchant ship which arrived in Cuba on 6 July. [REDACTED]

8 September 1960

"Fidel Castro in effect withdrew Cuba from the inter-American system in a 2 September speech that featured the announcement of his entention to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China. Cuba, with a Chinese community of about 30,000,--the largest in Latin America--will be a particularly valuable base for the Chinese Communists in promoting their influence in Latin America." [REDACTED]

15 September 1960

"The Soviet ship Ilya Mechnikov arrived at Havana with a 4,000 ton cargo on 8 September, the first major bloc arms shipment to the Castro regime." [REDACTED]

29 September 1960

"Fidel Castro's address before the UN General Assembly on 26 September showed the degree to which Cuba has become committed to Soviet foreign policy objectives ....Meanwhile there is an increasing volume of travel to the Sine-Soviet bloc by Cuban students, labor unionists, artists, and others. The Cuban Communists continue to strengthen their position....Communists are organizing 'united fronts' at the local level...probably intended to become the bases for provincial, the national, political machines. In addition, the

[REDACTED]

Communists now have virtually taken-over the powerful Cuban Workers' Confederation. Communists are probably also active in indoctrination programs directed at various segments of the population." [REDACTED]

6 October 1960

On 3 October, the National Bank of Cuba purchased in New York the equivalent of nearly \$4,500,000 in pounds sterling and ordered its deposit in London to the account of the Czech State Bank. This transaction was probably a payment for bloc arms....The expected Bulgarian trade agreement will be the seventh concluded by Cuba this year with bloc countries....Che Guevara is to visit Moscow in early November for the anniversary celebrations of the Soviet revolution, and Carlos Franqui, pro-Communist director of the government's newspaper, ...left on 29 September to study Soviet journalism. Numerous other Cubans now are visiting Moscow, Peiping and satellite capitals." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In addition to these printed articles, there were also briefing notes prepared for the National Security Council briefings. The date and brief highlights of each follow.

24 September 1958

"The Cuban government continues to charge Communist tie-up with rebels. Documents provided US Ambassador Saity by Batista, however, fail to establish Communist connections. There are some alleged Communist sympathizers on leadership as well as lower levels, but there is no evidence that the rebel movement is Communist-dominated."  
[REDACTED]

29 October 1958

"Rebel '26th of July' movement reportedly contains some Communists and leftists, but they are not dominant influence in the movement. Anti-Americanism of some leaders, however, leaves movement open Communist penetration. Batista making major effort to identify rebels with Communists, but has failed to provide US with his alleged proof. Rebels have refused public Communist offers of help, but some Communists have probably infiltrated lower rebel ranks and a few alleged Communist sympathizers have important positions in the groups commanded by Fidel Castro's brother, Raul. Cubans active in rebel movement in Mexico City include 3 known Communists and the new leader there is a Communist sympathizer, according to the one of our sources."  
[REDACTED]

26 March 1959

"Communists, operating openly and legally, have gained footholds in the organized labor movement, the armed forces, and possibly the press. The government is not now Communist dominated or controlled, however, although the potential for further Communist penetration exists. Castro has indicated he will not allow the Communists to 'steal the revolution' from him. So far, however, there has been no serious attempt to proscribe Communist activities. A vehicle for Communist penetration of the army is a new G-6 Section

[REDACTED]

which is in charge of 'educating' the troops. Marxist teachings are prevalent."

[REDACTED]

22 April 1959

Again emphasized footholds Communists had gained in organized labor, armed forces and press. "Way open for further Communist penetration; Castro has made no serious attempt to proscribe Communist activities. Indoctrination programs in the schools for educating the illiterate rural masses reported to be strongly anti-American; Communists believed participating in committee to rewrite text books."

[REDACTED]

21 May 1959

In a discussion of the new agrarian reform law giving its details was the following statement, "Castro has selected as Executive Director, Antonio Munoz Jimenez, apparently a confidant of pro-Communist military leader Che Guevara. Munoz himself has a long record of Communist associations and may even be a member of the Communist party."

[REDACTED]

9 July 1959

"In Cuba Fidel Castro facing intensifying domestic unrest. Charges of Communist infiltration in armed forces recently aired by resigning air force chief Major Diaz Lanz points up issue of growing concern to many informed Cubans. Anti-Communist officers being purged from air force and probably from other services."

[REDACTED]

16 July 1959

The Director referred to the establishment by the Chinese Communists of a newspaper and a propaganda center in Cuba.

23 July 1959

The Director pointed out that Castro's anti-Urrutia charges and the indications that the ouster of Urrutia amounted to a plus for the Communists. "Castro's action against Urrutia clearly helps Communists. Castro more committed than ever to public position against action to control Communists....Some indications that Urrutia's ouster may increase influence of Raul Castro."

[REDACTED]

22 October 1959

"Raul Castro has consolidated position in government. Now holds powerful new cabinet post as head of all army, navy, and police forces. Raul reorganizing armed forces, which

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

he considers primarily as means to political ends, to bring them under tighter, direct control....One of Raul's close associates named Minister of Labor, replacing moderate who had tried to resist Communist efforts to control union elections." [REDACTED]

29 October 1959

"Trend of past few weeks indicates real threat of extremist control, and there is almost no hope Fidel Castro can be influenced to moderate his course or recognize danger of Communism. Castro relies almost entirely on leftist advisers, and last week said: 'If they want to call us Communists for what we are doing, then I say let them....' Che Guevara, probably the real power in National Agrarian Reform Institute, is in charge of industrial planning and development....The relatively few moderate members of government seem now to be ignored." [REDACTED]

25 November 1959

"Communists have registered important gains this year in penetrating Cuban revolution and other aspects of Cuban life. The Cuban government continues its rapid trend to the left. Communist-influenced National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA) becoming all-powerful. INRA's pro-Communist director said at closed meeting in early October that the Institute is the 'real government of Cuba,' [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] At the meeting Fidel Castro said he would obtain funds necessary for INRA since through it the government will control the entire economy. INRA expropriations and other activities to date do indeed suggest plans to control production and sale of all agricultural commodities, cattle, minerals, petroleum, and other raw materials. Lands taken are organized as state-owned cooperatives, and not given to peasants as promised by Castro. As head of INRA's industrial section pro-Communist Che Guevara has almost unlimited powers in formulating foreign and domestic economic policy." [REDACTED]

December 1959

"The 28 November government shakeup is latest move by regime in its rapid trend to the left. Shakeup brings pro-Communist Che Guevara even more to the fore as new head of National Bank. Guevara has no economic background and has concept of Cuban revolution as a class struggle that will change economic structure and social system. New minister of public works, Osmani Cienfuegos, is probably a Communist. Communist-influenced National Agrarian Reform Institute becoming all-powerful."

14 January 1960

"The Communist-infiltrated Cuban Workers' Confederation announced on 11 January that it would invite Latin American labor organizations to meet in Havana in February to discuss plans for a congress at which a new 'independent' Latin American labor federation would be formed. Such a federation was discussed by Latin American Communists attending the 21st Party Congress in Moscow as long ago as last February and was proposed by the Cuban federation in November 1959 when it withdrew from the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers, which is affiliated with ICFTU, free union. Meanwhile, recent developments indicate increasing Cuban contacts with Communist China, and we think Castro will probably recognize Peiping sometime this year. It is reported that 20 Chinese industrial and agricultural technicians--apparently by Defense Minister Raul Castro--would arrive in Cuba during January. Soviet exposition brought from Mexico City to open in Havana about 1 February. USSR plans a simultaneous strong propaganda effort featuring films, concerts, and visits by leading Soviet cultural representatives."

21 January 1960

"Moscow is moving to extract the maximum propaganda and political benefit from its exhibition in Havana, opening 30 January. As in Mexico, Mikoyan is scheduled to open it. Mikoyan will also no doubt be prepared to discuss resumption of diplomatic relations. Cuban and Soviet embassies in

[REDACTED]

Mexico City are maintaining close contact... As the USSR's economic advance-man, Mikoyan will also press for expanding economic contacts..." [REDACTED]

18 February 1960

"Mikoyan's visit marks definite espousal of Castro regime by Soviet Union. USSR has shifted from cautious attitude to one of active support. Close economic ties established with signing of trade agreement and Soviet extension of \$100,000,000 economic aid credit. Both governments have expressed intention of collaborating actively in UN. Diplomatic relations also expected to be resumed soon. No mention of arms in official communique and thus far no evidence arms deal has been made. But at official reception Mikoyan, in answer to question, expressed Soviet readiness to provide military aircraft if requested.... Rapidity of government's moves toward close ties with USSR and intensification of controls over business, finance, labor, and freedom of expression have aroused some opposition among middle and upper classes and among students." [REDACTED]

10 March 1960

"US Embassy in Havana sees no hope that US will ever be able to establish a satisfactory relationship with any Cuban government dominated by Fidel Castro and his associates....Castro and Guevara continue to condemn foreign and private investment. They will dominate the newly-formed Central Planning Board, which will supervise and control every phase of Cuba's economy, particularly industry. Castro regime... will turn to USSR and European countries for technical advice and supplies.

17 March 1960

"Cuba becoming a center for Latin American Communist activities. Hemispheric "peace" conference planned for Havana in May or June. Representatives of seven LA affiliates of World Peace Council met in Havana last week to prepare for conference.... Conference would implement one of plans developed by representatives of LA Communist parties at clandestine sessions in Moscow at time of 21st CPSU Congress in early 1959. At Moscow meetings, Communists agreed to strengthen 'peace'

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

movement, launch propaganda attacks on US missions and bases, and call a continental peace conference by mid-1960.... Popular Socialist party (Communist) of Cuba...giving open support to 'week of solidarity with the struggles of the LA peoples' 20-27 March, called by Communist-infiltrated Cuban Labor Confederation. 'Casa de las Americas' in Cuba, run by pro-Communist wife of education minister, is promoting 'friends of Cuba' societies in most other LA countries. Societies are, in effect, Communist fronts. Active in propaganda, 'cultural' affairs. Sino-Soviet bloc continues active support for Castro. Sino-Soviet propaganda repeating Castro's anti-US charges. Representatives of Polish foreign trade organization reported by US Embassy Warsaw to be departing soon for Cuba to discuss supplying foundry and rolling mill installations and other capital goods. East Germans and Czechs already active commercially in Cuba....

[REDACTED]

24 March 1960

"We believe that Fidel Castro and his government are not now demonstrably under the domination or control of the international Communist movement....Yet, we believe that the Cuban regime is in practice following the line set for Latin American Communist parties at the time of the 21st Party Congress in Moscow in February 1959 and that it will continue to pursue policies advantageous to the Communists and to accept Communist assistance and advice in carrying them out....The more /Castro/ becomes embroiled with the US, the more he will look

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

to the Bloc for support, including provision of military equipment, although both the Bloc and the Cubans would probably seek to avoid any accusation that Cuba was being made into a Soviet base. Should the Castro regime be threatened, the USSR would probably do what it could to support the regime. However, the USSR would not hesitate to write off the Castro regime before involving itself in a direct military confrontation with the US over Cuba, or at least, during the present state of Soviet policy, in a major diplomatic crisis with the US." [REDACTED]

1 April 1960

"Trend continues toward Cuba's becoming base for Communist activity in rest of Latin America. Communists or pro-Communists from at least 15 of the other 19 Latin American countries were in Havana last week for 'Week of Solidarity With Struggles of Latin American People....' Manifesto published 26 March, last day of 'Solidarity Week,' vowed an 'anti-imperialist and anti feudal revolution in all Latin America.' Cuban labor leader announced that Cuban groups will leave on 1 May for other Latin American countries, 'to give them help and to request aid for the Cuban revolution....' Increased liaison among Latin American Communists now taking place in Cuba and the hemispheric 'peace' conference planned for May or June in Havana were also parts of program developed at the Moscow meeting. East German newspaperman says Cuban and GDR will exchange permanent trade missions in next two months, after which it will be easy for GDR to open 'ambassadorial' office in Havana for Latin America similar to one it has in Europe." [REDACTED]

7 April 1960

"The Castro regime continues to further world Communist objectives in Latin America. Soviet, Chinese, Czech, and other Bloc delegates, as well as Communists from various Latin American countries are now in Havana for the Fourth National Congress of the Youth Section of the Cuban Communist party.

[REDACTED]

This week-long congress, which opened on Monday, has been accorded TV time and other facilities by the regime. A preparatory meeting of the Communist-front Latin American Youth Congress is scheduled for Havana on 25 April; arrangements for this are probably being made at the current Communist gathering. The Youth Congress is only one of several such Latin American Communist efforts centered in Cuba. A Latin American 'Peace' Conference is planned for May or June in Cuba. Plans, but no date, have also been announced for a 'great Latin American congress to create the apparatus to fight the common enemy, imperialism.' A conference of 'democratic political and intellectual leaders' of Latin America is planned for 30 April in Cuba, and this as well as the hemisphere labor meetings which are expected is almost certain to be Communist-dominated. Meanwhile, the trend continues toward closer economic and 'cultural' ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc. The trade and payments agreement signed with Poland on 31 March was supplemented by an agreement for technical cooperation, scientific assistance, and credit for the purchase of industrial equipment.

[REDACTED] Cuba is also negotiating with Hungary for delivery of 15 or 20 million dollars worth of machinery. [REDACTED] The first shipment of Russian crude oil is en route to Cuba, where it is to be processed in government-operated refineries. Reportedly, some 70 Cubans 'from all walks of life' will leave on 20 April for a tour of the USSR, and in return some 70 Russians will visit Cuba. Also, a good source reports that a top Cuban Communist will shortly go to Moscow to 'feel out' Soviet leaders on their willingness to make a military commitment to Cuba.

Domestically, the Castro regime is tightening its political controls....In line with Castro's equating 'anti-Communism' with 'counterrevolution', the government-dominated leaders of the principal university student organizations have formed special courts to try students guilty of 'counterrevolutionary crimes.'

[REDACTED]

14 April 1960

[REDACTED]

"Cuba preparing establish diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia, first with any Sing-Soviet bloc country since 1952.

Foreign Minister Eca advised [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of imminent Czech request for agreement for Vladimír Pavlíček as ambassador to Cuba.... [REDACTED]

Communists stepping up efforts to win complete control Cuba's powerful labor confederation. Labor minister Martínez Sánchez, close associate of Raul Castro, is putting government's weight on side of Communists in bitter sub-surface maneuvering in labor confederation." [REDACTED]

28 April 1960

"Top Cuban Communists in Peiping for May Day—including Blas Roca, Secretary-General of party. Three Soviet tankers and ten cargo ships have or shortly will arrive in Cuban ports, implementing February Cuban-USSR trade deal." [REDACTED]

20 May 1960

"On 16 May Rufe Lopez Fresquet, Castro's former finance minister, told a fairly reliable source that Castro government 'under heavy pressure' to recognize Communist China and that he believes the move is imminent. Cuban Armed Forces Inspector General said in Peiping on 12 May that 'Cuban people desire to intensify their intimate relation with the Chinese people and to unite with them in opposition to US imperialists....' Cuban archbishop's circumspect pastoral letter of 17 May stating that Communism already within the gates of Cuba and that Catholics must not cooperate with Communism may also have effect in Latin America." [REDACTED]

8 June 1960

"In agreeing to visit Cuba Khrushchev is exploiting the Cuban government's hostility to the US and its desire to strengthen Cuban ties with Communist bloc. Khrushchev invited on 3 June by Agrarian Reform Institute Director Nunez Jimenez who heads commercial mission to USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland.... Soviet trade specialists and technicians beginning to arrive in Cuba in sizable numbers, in addition to Czechs,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Bulgarians, East Germans, and Poles on similar missions. Working sessions of eight Cuban-Soviet committees on industrialization 'and other matters' began 2 June in Moscow. [REDACTED]

Cubans grant visas indiscriminately.

[REDACTED] Cuban embassy in Mexico City furnish visas to all Soviet diplomatic personnel who may request them, especially couriers. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bloc may now be prepared to begin supplying Castro with arms aid, probably through Czechoslovakia. Head of Technical Directorate of Czech Ministry of Foreign Trade, which handles Czech export of military equipment to non-bloc countries, on 12 May was issued visa to visit Cuba. [REDACTED]

Castro regime may recognize Peiping at any time and one of few remaining moderate Cuban radio stations broadcast reports that Chou En-lai has also accepted invitation to visit Cuba. (No confirmation of this.) One of our Latin American sources says 30 Cubans now in China for 6-month training course on military strategy and agrarian reform." [REDACTED]

22 June 1960

"Fidel Castro's rapid concentration of Cuba's political and economic sources of control in the hands of a radical and authoritarian clique has been marked by deep and increasing Communist influence. He has flaunted his willingness to deal with both Cuban Communists and the Sino-Soviet bloc, evidently because he regards them as helpful and reliable allies in achieving his objectives. Communists are deeply involved in the remodeling of Cuba. Cuba has become a base for Communism in Latin America. The Outlook is for Castro's increased dependence on Communists. If this trend continues, the Communists will gain de facto control of the regime and

[REDACTED]

are near this point now....

The regime's moves in agriculture, commerce, industry, education, armed forces, information media, and labor demonstrate a determination rapidly to reorganise all Cuba into tightly knit groups under close government direction and control. Communists have been particularly active in these efforts ....

Cuba's political and economic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc, at first apparently motivated by defiance of the US, have fast become the basis of Castro's foreign relations. Relations with USSR and Czechoslovakia were announced in May and with Poland in June. Recognition of other bloc countries including Communist China and possibly East Germany is likely. Cuba will probably support seating of the Peiping government in the UN in the fall....Agreements for trade, technical assistance, and \$120 million worth of credits have been signed since the first of the year with the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany and are in prospect with Bulgaria and others. No firm evidence that military agreements were concluded during the Czech negotiations, but possibility remains that the bloc has agreed to provide some military equipment. Agreements will all probably be rapidly implemented, as Soviet agreement already is....Sergey Kudryavtsev, Soviet minister-counselor in Paris, has said he will be ambassador to Havana, according to excellent sources....According to TAAS, agrarian reform director Kunex Jimenez said in Moscow on 17 June that Castro will accept Mikoyan's February invitation to visit Moscow at an unspecified date." [REDACTED]

7 July 1960

"Cuban reaction to US sugar law has been quick and violent as expected. Cuban Labor Confederation, Castro's Communist-controlled labor arm, has called for a mass rally protesting 'aggression of imperialist and pro-Nazi government of US....' Raul Castro's 15-man party arrived in Prague on 26 June.

[REDACTED]

Mexican ambassador in Prague has report  
Czechs have agreed to provide Cuba with small  
arms, artillery, and jet aircraft of unknown  
type. Rumors in Havana say Raul is also  
going to visit Moscow to negotiate some  
form of pact with USSR..." [REDACTED]

15 July 1960

"Khrushchev's ambiguous threat of 9 July to  
employ rockets in support of Cuba is big  
step forward in Soviet attempts to exploit  
Cuban situation and inflate it into a major  
international question just as the Cubans  
are preparing to present complaint against  
the US in the United Nations..."

In a letter to Castro, Khrushchev  
limited himself to expressions of "indignation"  
at US actions and 'sympathy' for the Cuban  
people, and in his 12 July press conference  
he went no further than to pledge 'support'  
to Cuba in the event of US aggression. The  
Soviet government may also use repeated  
charges of US intervention in Cuba to  
justify conclusion of an arms agreement be-  
tween Castro and the Bloc....Enthusiastic  
response of Castro officials and Cuban  
Communists to Khrushchev's public support  
was reflected in speeches to 10 July mass  
rally in Havana. 'Che' Guevara told crowds:  
'Cuba today is a glorious island defended  
by the rockets of the greatest military  
power in history....We are practically the  
arbiters of world peace....'"

15 July 1960

"Internally, trends continue toward tighter  
dictatorship and enhanced Communist in-  
fluence....Pro-Castro lawyers, some in  
militia uniform, seized offices Havana Bar  
Association and on 8 July named new governing  
board....Ambassador Bonsal comments: 'This  
is another important step in establishing  
monolithic support of government by pro-  
fessional institutions.' Cuban press  
announced 6 July that all provincial officers  
of powerful Communist-controlled Cuban  
Workers' Confederation have been replaced  
by 'men who truly respond to the revolu-  
tionary moment in which the country now  
lives.' Communist leader Carlos Rafael  
Rodriguez may be named minister of finance..."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

20 July 1960

"Castro regime and Communists continue to tighten grip on Cuba. Communist-dominated Latin American Youth Congress to open 28 July in Cuba. Delegations en route from most Sino-Soviet bloc countries, even North Vietnam, and from Afro-Asian countries, including FLN.... In what press called a 'simple but emotional' ceremony on 14 July, Communist daily Hoy was given printing plant vacated by Revolucion, Castro's official newspaper, which was moved to larger quarters. Regime's links with Communists have aroused protests. Church leaders now moving away from earlier vacillation on Castro. Director of very popular weekly magazine Bohemia, with wide circulation among other Latin American countries, defected 18 July saying he was not permitted to publish anti-Communist article and denouncing Castro for making Cuba a Soviet satellite.... Sino-Soviet bloc continues support. 14-man Chinese Communist mission, headed by deputy minister foreign commerce, arrived Havana 15 July. New Chinese sugar purchase, reportedly as high as 500,000 tons, is likely. Havana-Peiping diplomatic relations probably being discussed.... Armed forces chief Raul Castro arrived Moscow from Prague 17 July. May be concluding arms deal probably discussed in detail in Prague...."

[REDACTED]

24 July 1960

"Communist bloc approaches to Cuba continue. Trade pact concluded with Communist China on 23 July represents strong Chinese effort to win diplomatic recognition from Cuba and demonstrates Peiping's willingness to back anti-US movements with considerable material support. Recognition appears imminent.... Economic aid agreement expected later this year, under which Peiping to provide industrial equipment and presumably technical assistance to Cuba. Raul Castro visit to Moscow resulted last week in communique which promised continuing Soviet support to Cuba.... Delegations are arriving in Havana for 26 July opening of Communist-dominated Latin American Youth Congress."

[REDACTED]

1 August 1960

[REDACTED]

"Communist-dominated Latin American Youth Congress began sessions in Havana 29 July... Delegates...present from most Sino-Soviet bloc countries....Prominent Communists and pro-Communists from other Latin American countries frequently visit Cuba; some live there....Soviet, Czech technicians continue to arrive in Cuba. At least 140 Russians and 25 Czechs have arrived since February, but some have apparently remained only a short time...."

[REDACTED]

12 August 1960

"Serious church-state conflict may be shaping up after 7 August pastoral letter sharply attacking Communist influence in government...Issue likely to have strong impact Cuban public as well hemisphere opinion, particularly if continued outbreaks force archbishop to carry out threat to close all churches, charging government inability to guarantee freedom of worship."

[REDACTED]

29 September 1960

"Castro regime has become virtually a member of Soviet bloc. First major bloc arms shipment arrived 8 September. Included ten tanks, 100 anti-aircraft guns, machine guns, large quantities of ammo and electronic equipment. More probably en route. A number of Cubans have been undergoing training in Czechoslovakia for some months, possibly for jet aircraft. [REDACTED] almost weekly departure Cuban delegations for Sino-Soviet bloc visits. Include students, labor unionists, a medical mission, and high Communist officials.... [REDACTED] Trends toward tighter dictatorship and increased Communist control continue. Last independent TV-radio networks seized 12 September. Last vestiges of an independent judiciary fast disappearing under pressure government campaign to 'revolutionize' judicial branch... 'United front' groups being formed in municipalities in an evident Communist effort to build Communist-dominated political machine at grass roots. Implementing August Communist party congress call for fusion of all revolutionary groups into single revolutionary

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

movement 'under leadership of Fidel Castro'. 'United fronts' evidently contain representatives of Communist party and of Communist-infiltrated '23 of July Movement' and students' Revolutionary Directorate. Local 'fronts' will probably become basis for provincial, then national political machine. Communists have now virtually completed capture of powerful Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC), which takes leading role in organizing Castro's mass rallies.... Workers on Havana's waterfront grumbling at Communist seizure of unions and over their own declining income." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]