

COURIER

~~SECRET PBSUCCESS RIBAT~~

29 Wash

LINCOLN

Chief of Station, Guatemala

INFO: Chief, WHD; ()

Operational

JUN 15 1954

Operational Report ()

1. Enclosed are five contact reports from () covering recent meetings with ()

2. The subject matter of paragraph 4, enclosure 1, is also discussed in paragraph 16, enclosure 4, and it appears that the arrest of () was not as serious security-wise as we originally feared.

3. The highlights of enclosure 2 were cabled to LINCOLN, information DIR. The matter of () paragraph 14, this enclosure, was previously reported with the request that appropriate security action be taken.

4. Enclosure 3 is a detailed reply to () Both () and () were convinced (when the report was written) that a suspension of () activities was essential in order to assure the existence of an effective underground organization in the critical days preceeding D-Day. They have since concentrated on re-grouping and other organizational work in connection with the underground teams () Within the limits of "need-to-know" we have indicated to () that PBSUCCESS state of readiness has not been seriously retarded by recent compromises and that they should be prepared to activate the underground teams at a moments notice.

5. The subject matter of paragraph 4, enclosure 4, was reported to LINCOLN, () and DIR (GUAT 821) and we are awaiting identifying data before attempting to establish contact with these elements that appear to have been cut off by the () compromise. The identifier mentioned in paragraph 17, enclosure 4, is retained in station files.

6. Paragraph 2, enclosure 5, refers to tentative contact plans for picking up the individual mentioned therein (not to be implemented until his bona fides are confirmed by () Much of the data in this and above enclosures (e. g., paragraphs 6, 7) cover matters outside station jurisdiction. We presume that these miscellaneous comments will have meaning to LINCOLN and () and that any action required will be handled by responsible personnel. Paragraphs 15-18 contain interesting PI data reflecting reactions to current events and are submitted in compliance with ()

Attachments: 5 reports
15 June 1954/()
Distribution:

2-Lino w/att ()
2-Wash w/att; ()
1-files w/att

~~SECRET PBSUCCESS RIBAT~~

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY CSF/HRK ON 11 JUL 95

10 June 1954

SUBJECT: Meeting Between () and ()

1. A meeting occurred between () and () on Wednesday night, 9 June.

2. ()'s meeting with (), scheduled for Wednesday night, failed to materialize. It is not believed that () has been arrested - and () is attempting another meeting with () for tonight.

3. () met with several señoras del mercado. They are determined to carry on, and are full of courage. () reports that this group is perhaps the most courageous and willing-to-fight group of any. These señoras are planning on sending out some delegations to the departments to tell the people not to lose hope, etc. () also expects to utilize them as messengers to the underground if this can be worked out in any way. They are almost the only group left entire in ()'s organization since the recent wave of arrests.

4. ()

() had had a meeting with her Tuesday night, at which time she reported that apparently the police had taken the pressure off the CEUA headquarters, since the crejas were no longer evident in the vicinity. Her arrest can possibly be due to information extracted from other prisoners - the lawyer retained by the () reports that () is being subjected to considerable torture at the hands of the police. This is probably true in the case of the other arrests also.

5. () suggests that inasmuch as all packages sent through the mail are inspected at the post office, and hence another method would have to be utilized in

Encl 1

delivering a package to such persons as ()
() It is much better to use something with a real
shock value, such as the empty shell of a grenade or
large machine gun or rifle clip, with shells, rather
than an alarm clock or other such harmless article.
Also, rather than to () and men of this
ilk, who know they haven't anything to gain at the hands
of the opposition and are confirmed gobiernistas -

() and his fellows, who are fence-sitters, opportunists,
and cowardly at heart, should be the recipients of such
"presents". If we cannot obtain any grenade shells,
() has a few (two or three) clips which he can use -
however, the grenade shells would be much more effective.

6. Concerning the details of () meetings -
before concluding one meeting, arrangements are made for
the next meeting - time, place. The meetings are held
at night, and contacts established in the darker sections
of the city. Because of the present situation - ()
in hiding, and unable to come out during the daytime,
emergency or unscheduled meetings cannot be included
with any degree of certainty in these plans.

7. Before her arrest, () reported to
() that the people arriving at the CEUA headquarters
from the departments reported a great deal of discouragement
among the opposition, and the belief that these
recent arrests and government charges have meant the
destruction of the anti-Communist movement - at least
in so far as it means any effective movement to liberate
the country from its present rulers.

()

11 June 1954

SUBJECT: Meeting Between () and ()

1. A meeting occurred between () and () on Thursday night, 10 June.

2. ()'s house was entered and searched by the police yesterday. ()'s house was also searched, as well as various other persons.

3. The police released (). She reports that she offered no resistance to their questioning, but answered "si" to everything. An attempt is being made to obtain a more detailed account of her questions and answers.

4. () was arrested yesterday - possibly as a result of the () arrest, or of other arrests and confessions. () assisted in setting up the underground in Puerto Barrios, Quezaltenango, and Quiché.

5. The () (fmu), believed connected with some part of the movement, was arrested yesterday also.

6. Because of the () arrest, BLANCA is now in semi-hiding.

7. BLANCA reports that many people are here in the capital looking for ANABELLA. They carry messages, and not finding him do not know what to do - they search the city for some one to deliver the messages to - the three groups of messages turned in this morning are samples of the type material these people are carrying. Also, a big demand seems to be for money from ANABELLA's activists in the provinces to carry on the work they have been assigned - otherwise it is in danger of lapsing. The note concerning the arms shipment to Honduras comes from a Communist on the ANABELLA payroll - and he is crying for his money. We do ~~know~~ not know how much money is involved in any of these cases.

Encl 2

8. () (of the ANARELA system presumably) has sent an urgent cry to the city that he is desperately in need of money.

9. () (fnu) and a secretary of one of the anti-Communist filiales in Tiquisate have fled to the capital (name of secretary unknown) - they report many arrests in Tiquisate area and the people disheartened. These two are being sought by the police and are now in hiding here in the city.

10. Reports indicate there was a "matanza" in Amatitlán yesterday. The gobernador, jefe de policía, and the sub-jefe were reportedly killed, as well as others unnamed.

11. Alfonso Bauer Paiz yesterday stated that a coup by the military is expected this week.

12. Current rumors, with considerable strength, in the streets are that Eliego Monzón has fled Guatemala, presumably to Honduras.

13. DeLeón (name and rank unknown - but is on the) said that there is a great states of "nervios y descontrol" in the army.

14. The market women report that from other sources come continued reports that María Cruz (widow of Oscar Luna, and believed to be cook in Castillo Armas home in Honduras) is a government spy. They report that there seems to be little doubt about this. Her amante (name unreported) is a member of the Policía Judicial. Her father received messages every day from her. Her father is employed by a Sr. Serra or Sierra (fnu) who is reportedly a relative of Arbenz. Again - it is considered extremely curious that María Cruz went to Honduras without advising anyone and apparently on her own money - and had no trouble crossing the frontier.

()

11 June 1954

SUBJECT: Review of () Underground Situation

References: Dispatch, 24 May 1954, and Memo 3629

1. () and (), after discussion and review of the whole general situation, believe that it is best that no action be taken at the present time with regard to reference matter, which may compromise our position, or which will indicate to the government that the backbone of the opposition has not been broken. It seems best to let the government's anti-"anti-Communist" activities gradually lessen before we undertake any more propaganda activities from within the country. More propaganda from within the country at this time will only serve to betray to the government that there is still a network or partial network of the opposition elements functioning, and the government will redouble its efforts at breaking this up. Tortures will be increased or renewed and many names will be given under these tortures that will only lead to more arrests, more disclosures, and more arrests - which could have the effect of breaking up whatever remains presently of the organization.
2. A halting of our propaganda activities now may also serve to lessen or halt the tortures on the prisoners already taken and now being taken by the government. () men, was arrested yesterday, and can disclose the underground system in Quezaltenango, Quiché, and Puerto Barrios.
3. Paragraph 3 of 24 May dispatch contains sentence "strict compliance with this rule (the teams should engage in no activities before word is given) is imperative to conserve our forces for the critical phase". If the underground system is expected to play a part at a more critical phase of the operation, it is considered necessary that for the present at least, no activities other than maintaining lines of communication and contact be undertaken.
4. At present there is no propaganda which we can put out which will counteract or soften the government's blows - such propaganda as "the government's actions have not

Encl. 3

destroyed the opposition", etc., or "here lives a Communist", or the issuance at this time of the mimeographed news sheet, give little encouragement to a people facing arrest and torture, and who have been fed much propaganda through the years and particularly in the past few months. Their greatest wish and only hope at present is to see some kind of armed action. They are afraid and want nothing more to do with propaganda - they want action, or they will render no more assistance until that time.

5. Another point to be considered in regard to the underground activities is that communications is a major problem. Dispatch recommended that telegrams or phone calls, in previously arranged open code messages, be sent to the chiefs of the underground. It is necessary to remember that these people are not accustomed to receiving telegrams, nor do they have phones. One telegram, when most needed, is perhaps feasible. But more telegrams, at indiscriminate times, will immediately call attention to, and under the present existing conditions in Guatemala, direct suspicions against, the recipients of said communications.

6. The alternative is to send messengers. This must be done by the land routes in most cases, and in view of the poor and indirect roads, necessitates time - time to get there, and time to get an answer back. The air routes are too carefully checked, and the messengers available cannot use these routes more than once or twice, if at all.

7. We feel that too little advance notice was given for the best organization of this underground system, and particularly is this true (although unavoidable) in view of () resultant enforced hiding. We were given two weeks to set up this organization. Before the two weeks were up, the flap occurred. One part of the directive stated that the persons chosen should not be connected with any overt activities or should retire from same - if such directives had been given a month ago or preferably even more (I understand the plan was in being for some time before it was passed along to me and through me to () such directives could have been carried out more competently and easily. Now, however, with () and most of his assistants either in hiding, arrest, or exile, and arrests continuing in the capital and the departments daily, it is extremely difficult to get a true picture of our set-up and what is available to us and what is now compromised and dangerous, and to be able to judge how we

can best proceed. We don't know who all have been compromised by () papers, and through the resultant arrests, who else have been compromised by confession extracted under torture.

8. The foregoing is not intended to present a picture of hopelessness - but it is intended to explain our picture and our belief in non-activity for the present, as we can only judge from the meager information being gotten to () from the departments. We believe that all our present activities should be concerned with re-trenching, establishing, or re-establishing and safeguarding our communication lines and our contacts, particularly in regard to the underground.

9. Any propaganda designed to cheer the people can best and most safely be delivered from the airplane or over the clandestine radio. In this connection, is it not possible and feasible, that the airplane make a series of trips to the capital and other major centers, dropping extremely forcibly written and presented volantes, promising retribution without fail, to all those persons having a hand in torturing any of the prisoners being taken by the government? These tortures are being applied to the prisoners and by no means gently. It might make things somewhat easier for them, and also help us, because without torture, the prisoners are considerably less likely to talk.

10. One great security hazard at present is that because of the government news blackout, many people, including our selves, do not know who has been arrested. Delegations continually arrive in the capital, carrying messages, papers, etc., - looking for () etc. When they cannot find the persons they usually contact, they begin to search through the city for some one else to whom they can deliver their messages. This is a hazard to all concerned. Perhaps the clandestine radio could make daily announcements of those persons it knows have been arrested or are in exile. This would serve as a warning to persons looking for any one so named on the programs.

11. () both feel that military action should not be delayed any longer than absolutely necessary. The people are crying for a change and will support any such movement. Propaganda-wise, they are mentally prepared

for armed action (or at least they were, before the arrests, and there is nothing to indicate they are any less so now). All comments from the () group indicate many are tired of propaganda and exposing themselves to arrests, etc. - they want action. They are no longer willing to risk their security for what they regard as useless and non-resulting propaganda which gets them nothing except the government's wrath and imprisonment.

12. Both () feel that because we have never been given even an approximate date for any military action we have been handicapped in preparing propaganda or in giving advice on propaganda suggested. The propaganda must be time so as not to get the people too aroused until the proper moment, or should not ask the people for too much risk and exposure unless the military is ready to follow up. Also, knowing approximately when any military action is going to occur to back up the propaganda, we are enabled to know what propaganda would be most effective, and when it should be used. We have engaged in certain propaganda work which, in view of the non-appearance of military action, seems foolish and ill-timed, and serving only to bring down government repressive measures. It seems to () that the timing of the "32" campaign was wrong, inasmuch as it occurred in April (25 April was the deadline given us - and with no follow up until almost a month later) and apparently no military action of any kind was contemplated for anytime thereabouts. The "32" campaign merely disclosed to the government that a vast network of opposition existed throughout the country, and aroused the people (in conjunction with other inflammatory propaganda including the clandestine radio, airplane, etc.) - without ever arriving at the only logical climax - military action. These propaganda campaigns should have been scheduled for very shortly before the outbreak of the military campaign. The people's spirits would have been at their highest point, and the government would still be too bewildered by the barrage of different types of propaganda and the vastness of the propaganda, to even begin to effectively take steps to counteract it.

()

12 June 1954

SUBJECT: Meeting Between () and ()

1. A meeting occurred between () and () on Friday night, 11 June.

2. () and () of the Municipalidad of Guatemala City have been arrested. Reportedly, some 60 more persons have also been arrested along with these two.

3. () received a report that the entire municipal council of either Juliapa, Zacapa, or Cullapa has also been arrested.

4. () met with (), who has acted as spokesman for the group of persons here in the capital looking for ANABELA. () is from Zacapa. His father, (), also from the Zona Zacapa, is presently a prisoner here in the capital.

5. () states that the group he represents in Zacapa was given instructions by PANCHO (or in name of PANCHO) while () was in Honduras, and () was told that ANABELA here in Guatemala would provide them with all that they needed:

- a) a pick-up or Panel
- b) three or four houses
- c) a place for the arms
- d) comida, etc., for the men

() estimates that this would represent some \$3,200.00 - pick-up - \$1,400.00; houses - \$150.00 - \$200.00; food, etc. for the men - \$600.00.

- e) guardians or watchmen for the houses ~~the~~ and the arms site - probably another \$100.00
- f) () expenses - \$150.00

Other compromises mentioned by (), as spokesman for the group:

- g) ANABELLA has been giving money to the families of some 8 or 10 of the men who are in Honduras
- h) () family - \$125.00
- i) () of the zona in the (), and who has a number of people in his care - \$500.00
- j) Communist contact - his name is on the paper turned in with reference to arms shipment to Honduras. He states that in the upper part of this paper is also the clave (key) to the code used by the Communists for those parts - \$200.00
- k) a Guardia Judicial, apellido () (fmu), who passes information to the group - \$75.00.

6. The Communist of paragraph 5, j, states that the PGT sent to Honduras in the mentioned arms shipment, 32 ametralladoras and a number of fusiles.

7. Several lawyers have been arrested (names unknown).

8. () has been arrested.

9. A group of persons at the frontier (presumably the Salvador-Guatemala frontier) asked () to relay word to () in Salvador that "capas de hule" and "zapatos de hule" be sent them because of the heavy rains.

10. () is reporting the following information, he has no contact with the group now - () talked with a group of persons in Salvador on his way back to Guatemala from Honduras, which persons are either now in the capital or due to arrive very shortly. They stated they were to make contact with "El Compadre" who was to instruct them and to hide certain people here in the capital.

11. ()'s house was "cateada" (searched) by Villagran (fmu) and 10 other police, for 3 and a half hours the other day. They searched everything - book by book, and took away ()'s camaras, projector, radio, typewriter, his personal business accountings, photographs. They found nothing compromising.

12. (

) reports that no pilot has fled with any plane. Each pilot has a "shadow" or spy, and everyone is carefully controlled.

13. The underground chief and contact has been arranged for Zacapa. () does not have this name as yet. He will obtain it from ()

14. A group of locatarias left on a trip through the departments to try and calm and reassure the people.

15. ()

16. () states that the questions she was asked while in the hand of the police concerned only the papers which the police had seized and her work:

- a) had she seen ANABELA;
- b) who gave her money for the office expenses;
- c) did she know where this money came from;
- d) who gave her orders;
- e) ()
- f) did she have any knowledge of the papers seized in ANABELA's house;
- g) how much was her salary;
- h) what was the motive behind some telegrams sent out to various persons in different Zonas and signed by her;
- i) was she aware of the persons who traveled to the departments;
- j) did she know the "apodos" of the persons who frequented the offices;
- k) did she know how they communicated by code;
- l) did she know the () house and address;
- m) did she know () and was he a member of the Comité (she answered that some time ago he had been on the directive, but that he had retired. Her acquaintanceship with him was through sports and through his sister);

- n) did she know () address (she stated that she believed he lived "() but didn't know the exact address);
- o) they had her identify signatures, letters (letras), and types of machines;
- p) what and to where did she send to Honduras and El Salvador by certified mail.

17. Contact with the locatarías (señoras del mercado) can be established through:

()
()

The half piece of newspaper photograph should be presented to her to be matched up.

18. The following are workers (obreros) who can be used as contacts with or through the locatarías:

()
[]
()

13 June 1954

SUBJECT: Meeting Between () and ()

1. A meeting occurred between () and () on Saturday night, 12 June.

2. () was given contact instructions to pass along to (). Further talks with () have revealed a misunderstanding concerning his name - it is not () as previously reported, but (). He is () years old, and here in the capital is staying ()

(). He can be contacted at this place between 12:30 and 2:30 P.M., or at the tienda "Lafco", which I understand is a radio servicio in front of the Club Guatemala, which tienda is where he is presently working.

3. () has had two detailed conversations with this man, and says that he knows too many of the right people and too many details for the man not to be what he claims to be, in all probability. () is in charge of the arrangements in the Zacapa zone and wishes to return home as soon as possible in order not to call attention by a too long absence.

4. () states that he had a countersign arranged with ANABKLA, consisting of one half of a 10 of spades playing card. This was arranged through () who had to leave Guatemala as a result of the ANABKLA flap. () was to arrange the matter of the pick-up, maintenance of 300 men, radio technician and instructor, houses.

5. CARTER arranged previously to our contact instructions, a countersign consisting of one half of a 50 centavo note (which has been already given to JORGE). The note contains the number DO 37402. This number is on both halves. () has one half, and the person making the contact is to present the other half.

End. 5

6. Members of the families and some of other families are looking for (brother of Antonio), who has been in charge of repaying money to these families. This is Q30.00 each time to each family.

7 (

8. () coordinador and enganchador for the Zona Los Piedros, La Palmilla, Ceculután (?), etc.. left Guatemala City Saturday because of necessity. () gave him some money. () was in Honduras with PANCHO.

9. () was asked by PANCHO to supply some information on a couple of railroad bridges. This information is the following, and should be sent to Honduras:

Puente ferrocarril, milla 177.2 - barranco profundo, cerro al otro lado. It could be destroyed and its replacement or substitution would be very difficult.

Puente ferrocarril, milla 174.5 - same story.

These bridges are in the Zacapa area.

10. () wants to know about (). if he is in Honduras. () says it is many days since he has heard from him, and that () is important because he controls a whole village in the area.

11. (

12. The chief of the underground group in Zacapa has been chosen. He is () (apparently related to () his father is () mother is ()

13. His assistant is (), bachelor, 34 years old, lives at the right hand side of the His father is ()

14. Arrangements have been (or are in process of being finished) made with a group of universitarios to bring out some volantes among the universitarios touching on the censorship, government arrests, etc., ~~xx~~ with the aim of arousing the students and possibly provoking a flare-up or strike. One of the ditto machines from the office will be used for this purpose. This group is being rounded up through a professor of Derecho Internacional at the university (I believe his name is () ~~xxx~~ fnu) and is some relative - possibly brother - to man where () is presently hiding out).

15. () (gobiernista) in a talk with one of ()'s contacts, stated that he and others would be willing to collaborate with the opposition if they only knew that there was something well organized.

16. () a licenciado and a gobiernista, says that he and others like him in the government, feel that it is a shame that because of a "grupo de intransigencias" the aims of the October Revolution are going to be lost, because it is "cosa sabida" that this government is finished, and all because of the stubbornness of Arbenz and his group and the communist influence.

17. Paragraphs 15 and 16 are indications of how many gobiernistas, now feeling that their side is doomed, are making overtures to the opposition or at least letting remarks drop where they can be over-heard, so they won't lose out completely when a change comes.

18. In the Quiché area, when the opposition airplane passed over the military base, where a couple of machine guns or anti-aircraft pieces were in position, the report is that the soldiers abandoned their arms and instead went about chasing the propaganda that was dropped.

()