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LINCOLN

CONTACT REPORT

C/R No. 33

DATE: 21 February 1954

PLACE: Safe House "A"

PERSONS PRESENT: ( )

COVER USED: Pseudonyms

DISCUSSION: Discussion Topic: ( )

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1. In accordance with instructions which I had received, I went over in detail the memorandum regarding the possible use, or exploitation, of ( ) ( ) attitude was completely negative. Even before I had finished the complete discussion of the points contained in the memorandum, he had attempted to interrupt me with strong objections. The complete list of objections is to be found in attached memorandum typewritten.

2. The most outstanding thing which I gathered from this discussion was ( ) intense dislike of ( ) and any possible collaboration with him on the part of the JUNTA or the GROUP ~~to~~ him appeared as a grave error. He summarized this attitude in stating that even if we discover that it is necessary to place ( ) in a position of use, that is to secure his help in having ( ) as a base of operations, or in some manner to assist us in that country- whatever small part he plays will not be worth the trouble which will be created later on by incorporating him into the movement. He pointed out that, in weighing this, it would be in his opinion, and he was certain that RUFUS would share this opinion, that no use could be made of ( )

3. ~~He~~ then explained several points which had been made in the initial discussion, ~~on my part~~, of the written memorandum which had been given to me. However, ( ) did not give in an inch and appeared to be adamant regarding the matter of doing any business at all with ( )

4. I advised him that, of course, they would be kept in constant knowledge of what was taking place with ( ) and furthermore, the results of the conversations which might ensue.

5. At this time I returned to ( ) and, after conveying the initial reaction of ( ) I was advised that possibly this attitude should be changed slightly to the one that it would be possible to utilize him after his true assets had been obtained and reviewed by RUFUS and ( ) an isolation process would have to take place; that I should advise ( ) definitely that this consideration certainly would be thought of, if his assets did not appear actually to be real. I advised ( ) that I had not brought this matter up because it had not been in the memorandum, although ( ) advised me such information had been contained in the ( ) Task. I, in brief, outlined the information and reaction and objections of ( ) to him and then advised him that I would return with this additional information for ( ) benefit. Also, I advised that I wished to clarify the matter regarding ( ) obtaining an approval of approach to ( ) and as

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to what reaction there had been at the time.

6. Checking again with ( ) a short bit later, I advised him that I had been thinking about this matter while I had been gone and that I was extremely interested in finding out further his reaction on this thing. ( ) said that he principally had absolutely no confidence in ( ) and that RUFUS shared this view also. I then advised ( ) that, actually, if we discovered that no real assets or real uses could be made of ( ) certainly we wished to get him out of the way, either by neutralization, isolation, or, at last risk or cost, elimination. I said we could not allow this man to continue in his present state, in as much as he was actually doing harm to the JUNTA, and that we must find some way to fit him in or take him out of the picture.

7. ( ) again stated his views as to the risks of taking him in and gave to me at this time a list of objections which he had verbally told me earlier in the afternoon. He again counselled extreme caution on any dealings with ( ) stating that, at any time and at any place, ( ) would be willing to betray anyone for his own personal interests. I advised him that the utmost discretion would be used and that immediately after we had obtained from ( ) a list of his assets, we would make these facts known to RUFUS and ( ) for their private investigation or survey of them.

8. I asked ( ) if this whole subject of ( ) had not been approached previously by ( ), and ( ) had advised that it had been and that RUFUS said that if the GROUP dictated that ( ) should be the leader of this, if it meant success for the movement, he, RUFUS, would become a soldier in the ranks to comply. ( ) said if this eventuation should come to pass, he, although he would continue along with the movement, would be the first one to oppose him once he was established as the new leader of Guatemala.

COMMENTS:

DECISIONS:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Signed \_\_\_\_\_

Distribution:

Orig & 1: Addressee  
cc: Subj (1)  
Chrono (1)  
etc. (1)

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( ) is not in favor of any use of ( ) because he can't be trusted. The following points are set forth to prove his arguments:

1. ( ) has disregarded entirely his ( )

2. ( ) denounced Rufus to Trujillo as a spy in Arbenz service. (This was obtained by Arenas. Trujillo showed a copy of ( ) letter stating Rufus was a spy.)

3. Rufus has proof ( ) was author of a leaflet distributed widely in Guat., El Salv. and Hond. which defamed Rufus—claims was for sole purpose of obtaining outside aid for him and not for ( )-Ruf.

4. In Guat. ( ) has lost all strength—major portion—still anti-Communist—is now aligned to Rufus.

5. ( ) is personally ambitious and wants nothing less than presidency. Communist cause completely secondary. Does not, rpt not, have support of the army or people.

6. ( ) sent letter to certain US Senators attacking the "Group" for their aiding Rufus instead of ( ) (Group has copy of this letter.)

7. ( ) tried to get Rufus to sign an agreement guaranteeing that Rufus would give ( ) official backing in a "free" election to be held after a successful revolution. Rufus refused. ( ) was furious.

8. ( ) particular friends see ( ) even less than Rufus military elements.

9. Rufus young army men in exile want no part of ( ), since he would benefit only older, high ranking officers—youngsters would be out in the cold after the big day.

10. ( ) represents conservative elements and if a part of the new govt., would give Commies chance for come-back, since he would have little real desire in a positive program.

11. ( ) has little regard for ( ), even once thru ( ) offered to kick him out of ( )

12. Rufus and ( ) themselves have no, rpt no, personal confidence in and consider ( ) ie.) he has nothing to offer. They can prove it, they say. Anyone talking to ( ) will soon learn same—if he makes ( ) get down to FACTS regarding his assets.