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13 January 1954

FN 28

C/R 34

CONTACT REPORT

Persons Present: ()
Place: ()
Date: 9 and 10 January 1954
Reason for Contact: Discussion of Matters Pertaining to PBSUCCESS

I. SUBJECTS DISCUSSED

A. () briefed () on operational, zone of responsibility, financial and support matters as follows:

1. a. General - () was told that in his conversations with Rufus to keep the following in mind:

(1) The conduct of operations from this point forward will be based on unconventional warfare program. This program consists of a tying together of () legs. At the same time keeping them ~~them~~ ^{them} compartmented.

(2) () and () legs are being carried out independently of () but each has the sole responsibility of servicing () These ties are being made at headquarters level. ()'s assignment, once the new concept has been successfully established, would be in the field of () only.

(3) Insure that Rufus knows that his operational plan may be studied carefully in order to preserve full implementation of his slant as well as to fully utilize this planning to date. His plan, as submitted, will be built around, added to, and unfeasible portions, if any, discarded or might be completely discarded. The sole purpose of the final operational plan being to conduct the operation ~~1/1/54~~ by unconventional warfare means. This term allows flexibility to the greatest degree. () was warned that in the () field he must make Rufus acquainted with the general framework around which headquarters was basing its thinking and planning so that headquarters planning would coincide with Rufus' so that the reasoning behind our request to him would be apparent and the final operational plan ~~1/1/54~~ would be compatible with his intra-organizational coordination and planning.

(4) Each item of the basic framework would be subject to change as () information and pertinent information on Rufus' assets or Rufus' former plans is made available to headquarters and ~~then further study~~ might show some items to be superfluous and some might be more easily accomplished by hitherto unrecognized or unconsidered assets; however, as stated above, () was to insure that all concerned realized what the basic planning would be built around.

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b. [] was informed that at present we are considering many key points with which Rufus will be concerned in the target country. One was Coban garrison; two was Zacapa; three was Jutiapa; four was Mazatenango garrison or field; five was Quezaltenango garrison or field; six was Quiche garrison or field; seven Guatemala City and central zone and garrisons and fields and major commo points; eight was San Jose; nine was Puerto Barrios garrison, port and field.

[] was informed that having studied slightly into the geographical and active opposition and as yet being uninformed as to the exact assets available in Rufus' organization, it was highly possible that Mazatenango, Quezaltenango and Quiche might have only folding blocks thrown between them and Rufus' operations to forestall our entry into the action during the movement into target areas and operations against targets near the border. [] informed [] that a pouch had been sent to [] marked eyes only as requested by [] previously concerning Rufus' latest operation plans never before studied by headquarters. The pouch has not ~~yet been received~~ reached [] as of this date, 18 13 January, but a preliminary discussion of the contents of the pouch led [] to believe that the strongest approach to operational plans should be based around past planning and preparation. It was ~~not~~ decided between [] and [] that on arrival of Rufus' plans, headquarters would study for feasibility and convert the plan into an unconventional warfare operational plan sufficient so that upon Rufus' arrival for conference with [] on possibly 25 January, an operational plan could be discussed with [] At that time acceptance of such phase could be ironed out and the firm operational planning to proceed from that point.

c. The operations against each separate target would be compartmented except at Rufus' staff level. To maintain this compartmentation, separate staging areas for each operation would be obtained. In each case the staging area should be [] of the target when feasible. The selection and obtaining of these sights in [] would be a priority job for [] through Rufus during the remainder of January. It was initially thought that the [] would arrange for ~~the~~ cites within its jurisdiction at [] request. [] brought up the fact that some 150 men ~~are~~ are not located within ~~the~~ housing areas [] It was agreed that this situation would continue insofar as [] is concerned with emergency staging cites designed to receive the

men just short of jump-off time. Storage of pre-invasion weapons and equipment would be made in the vicinity of these emergency staging cites. Operational preparations would be made in the present housing area [] was told to be examining the problems being encountered along these lines. He was told of cites to be located should be isolated farm areas. He may find such farms impossible to obtain in the interests of security and to obtain black isolated bases on the border in place of those. Those observations should be clarified prior to the meeting approximately 27 January and we would discuss the action concerning same at that time.

- d. The [] training now being laid on to commence 11 January is to produce, as discussed, four staff men, ten organizers, ten shock troop leaders, four sabotage experts and two assassination specialists. As discussed, the four staff men will be returned to Rufus to assist in his planning. The ten organizers and ten shock troop leaders would be retained and as two-man teams provide the trained specialist leaders and/or viewpoint for each specific target. These leader organizer teams may: (1) Send the organizer to the target to conduct organization while the shock troop specialists remain at the safe cite collecting personnel, training and preparing them for action, or (2) the organizer might enter the target area only long enough to instruct the selected leader who is already within the target complex. He will instruct them in organizing for partisan warfare and for setting up future actions of supplying those partisans that are organized and to conduct special courier supply operations as necessary. The shock troop specialists for that particular target might only instruct already positioned leaders or possibly lead a shock tropp action from the outside or act as adviser to already selected leaders for shock troop action from the outside. This man might be released to training and leading reserve units if we determine such personnel are available. The actual employment of these organizers and shock troop leaders can only be determined after Rufus' evaluation of his assets and capabilities are ~~thoroughly~~ thoroughly studied and assessed. Since it is necessary in order for Rufus' preparations to get the fullest attention to have an operational plan in his hands by 1 March at the latest, [] was told that it was a priority necessity to turn in the biographical data on Rufus' assets & Rufus' operational plans immediately.
- e. Sabotage experts produced from the training are in turn conducting a 3-weeks' course at 4 appropriate safe areas [] for approximately 16 selected team leaders. Where it is possible, those 16 team leaders will have recruited from within the target area and each will be responsible for a target near his natural habitat. When possible, an excuse for 3 weeks absence from the target area may be formulated for him, and a sabotage leader will be reinstated immediately to recruit and train this team and

commence his operations again where evaluation and assessment of our present assets near each sabotage target have been compiled and [] requests have produced sufficient information from which specific targets have been selected, it may be considered more feasible to use the trained expert as an instructor to persons on the spot in certain instances as well as melding back into his natural habitat and lying dormant until time to start. This flexibility and planning must be maintained until a final operational plan is forthcoming approximately 1 March, however positive sabotage target planning should be in [] hands from this headquarters 15 February so that Rufus [] it accordingly. It is tentatively the trend of planning that the sabotage program will be in three stages. Stage one is passive sabotage which will be that produced through the effectiveness of psychological warfare efforts. This will not be a directed sabotage program nor will Rufus' [] personnel be responsible for any portion of it. Stage two is an active stage which in any case will not be activated earlier than two to three days prior to the movement to the target of the special units (tactical radio operator, shock troops, etc.). It is entirely possible that a study may show the feasibility of holding this second stage to occur merely hours short of H-Hour or even possibly to occur simultaneously with Stage three. Stage three will be D-Day H-Hour over sabotage using demolitions and arson and other overt means to coincide with the opening of overt [] action aimed at cutting communication lines, complete demolition of the main radio stations and blocking reinforcement by the active opposition. As stated above, designation of these targets should be forthcoming by the middle of February and recruiting should commence accordingly. Again after a study of the evaluation of the existing assets it will be decided whether assets exist within the vicinity of the target or whether training specialists will return and recruit a team to conduct the mission or whether training specialists instructing existing assets and provide for equipping them. The mission is to be initiated in concurrence with the attack or whether it is only set up to be used if needed during the attack and consolidation. This planning will come as a portion of the final operational plan due approximately 1 March.

- f. The assassination specialists would be utilized to return to Rufus' [] teams for instructional purposes. These K teams should be compartmented now and EET's on their targets to be compiled for them and their operational plans fitted into the over-all plan.
- g. The Commo trainees will be turning out both the resident operators (located near the target but compartmented from the activities at the target) and tactical operators (located at the staging cite

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until just prior to the operation) who will be the communication link during overt operations on D-Day, and additional cases where the target commander is merely part of the target garrison, the tactical radio operator will be positioned with the protective unit and ~~message~~ ^{parade} with the ~~partisan~~ ^{parade} unit will be at each hour. Individual cases where the target will be attacked by shock troops from the outside. In combined situations a tactical radio operator will travel with the shock troops. The rest of the radio operators will not enter into the phases, but will provide intelligence before and after the operation, using proper clandestine procedures, we will effect the contact with the leader of the underground and serve as a message center between the underground leader and Rufus. When the D-Day operations commence, transmission of radio traffic will go through the tactical radio operators. During the entire proceedings, [] will be getting field messages directly from both tactical and resident radio operators. [] will stand as the message during the whole operation. The first and best two radio operators will be sent to Rufus to establish direct commo link between [] and Rufus. All incoming intelligence will be forwarded to Rufus immediately. All Rufus' instructions will be passed to target leaders by way of [] This will in no way affect the speed of transmission nor will Rufus' control of the situation be lessened by the fact that the equipment and signal plan are at [] Until the D-Day trigger is pulled, headquarters will be utilizing this control to end direction to all operations. During the overt action stage, headquarters can only act as a disseminator of messages and will be set up to handle the heavy traffic quickly. It is now estimated that 5 hours round trip traffic can be expected. Rufus to headquarters to Rufus and Rufus to headquarters target commander and vice versa. Allowing for decoding, answering, and recoding. Rufus should personally conduct the principal city target country operations physically at the scene of action. It is realized the principal value that can be gained from instantaneous radio communication from Rufus to his individual units; however, there is little that Rufus can do with instantaneous communications in this situation and the major job of conducting this principal city operation will occupy his whole time and attention. The 5-hour time lag will keep him well informed as to the events of the country before phone lines are re-established and inter-target consolidation is accomplished. Incidentally, [] questioned [] concerning his facilities at that station and it was unwittingly elicited that they could handle a small team of American radio operators and in this way [] has in mind for bringing up to the chief of the project the possibility of using [] to directly re-transmit

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messages from the individual units straight to Rufus and vice versa once the overt operation is commenced, making [] an info station, as []'s capability of being able to do anything about overt operations would be very limited, and Rufus' need for immediate information from his sub-units is great.

- h. The operational planning will allow for three different stages of planning the first being the one just discussed, the second being to accomplish the consolidation once stage one has been completed successfully. The third stage will be planned to insure that guerrilla warfare can be conducted by such units whose stage one was not completed successfully. This guerrilla warfare would be carried on until such time as consolidated areas could come in touch with the units conducting guerrilla warfare. The tactical radio operator can be used with the isolated unit to direct area re-supply and direct recontact with units which have successfully completed stage one. This stage of the planning requires more thorough study.

2. Finance-

- a. The \$19,090 pouched to you in care of [] is to be dispensed at the rate of and within the limitation that we discussed ~~SECRET~~ at our last meeting. This breakdown will be accounted for as follows:

(1) []

Item	Minimum	Maximum
Food, 35 men & 15 guards	\$ 1,500	\$ 2,500
Pay, gd. force, 15 men	300	500
Medical supplies	100	100
Clothing	500	750
POL	100	250
Land rent	300	500
[] office, 2 men & rent	200	500
Transportation facilities	200	500
	<u>\$ 3,200</u>	<u>\$ 5,600</u>
Emergency fund		840
TOTAL		<u>\$ 6,440</u>

(2) For holding 220 men (Incl. selection SAB. experts)		11,000
Emergency fund		1,650
TOTAL		<u>\$12,650</u>

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- b. As per our discussion the accountability for January expenditures will be your responsibility. In view of the fact that your negotiations [] are unfirm at this time, you will be responsible for the ~~actual disbursement of funds for~~ [] camp until such time as you are directed to turn over the accountability and responsibility to []
- c. In addition, specialists for running the Commo training camp will be pouched to, dispensed by and accounted for by the Commo men at the training camp.
- d. As discussed, the other phases of project expenditures ^{Concurrence} ~~may make~~ (?) [] and [] will be the responsibility of those officers in charge of their phase and will be of no concern to you.
- e. Your February finances will be delivered at our February meeting and accounting of January expenditures, insofar as possible, made at that time.

3. Scope of Responsibility-

- a. The entire project as discussed has been broken down into [] and [] consists of (1) training and (2) operations. [] has been responsible for training, including directing the conduct of training and insuring that training meets project standards. Your responsibility is in operations as [] case officer, which officer (1) directs the principal agent in all [] matters to see that [] standards are maintained in the fields of (a) recruitment; (b) dispersal of funds; (c) preparation for operations including all contacts made by the principal agent, all commitments made in the project named by the principal agent, and the conduct of all preparations so that [] operations can be carried out as the operational plans direct; (d) conduct of [] operations in accord with project headquarters directives; (e) security in that the principal agent fully understands the necessity of confining the development of the operational plans to his immediate staff.
- b. It is not expected that this direction of the principal agent by [] would be in the form of commands to be followed or else, nor is it expected that complete leeway would be even intimated by [] in dealing with the principal agent. [] has been commended to employ methods of presentation so that the preparation for operations are carried out within the framework given by project headquarters. Latitude would be considered in every case to allow for [] advice and experience to be utilized and for Rufus' advice and experience to be utilized, but such latitude would be checked out through me when practicable and I have instructed [] that he would be directed within the framework

of my directive. [] was informed that every attempt would be made to give his advice complete consideration, and that he is to work within the directives which have been broadened as far as possible for his implementation.

- c. He is instructed to maintain a flow of information to project headquarters through (1) monthly assessment of [] personnel as to their ability, morale, and their state of readiness; (2) bi-weekly assessment of the training program as directed; (3) monthly accounting of expenditures; (4) maintain a close/bibliographical analysis on all recruited personnel and all potential personnel being considered/.
- d. [] was instructed to add his advice on the practicality of the planning and form an indigenous perspective for us in our planning, and from his knowledge of the active opposition advise on the practicality of all matters under consideration by project headquarters.
- e. [] is to maintain compartmentation between training and operations. [] command channel is straight to this office. [] connections with the training camp have been limited to, (1) setting up of the camp and camp procedures, as directed; (2) presentation of [] to project personnel in the necessary spirit; (3) liaison with [] within the limits of our previous discussion; (4) delivery of the bodies and assessments to the training arrangement (all assessments to be known to the training chief by code number only); (5) delivery of the bodies from the training area to the staging area; (6) furnish [] contact and coordination with Rufus to insure that his personnel receive instructions to properly motivate and prepare them to come up to [] standards of training; (7) bi-weekly assessment to this office on training progress and standards; (8) close coordination between [] and [] for the purpose of implementing operational ideas and training; (9) the reception of incoming equipment and training as and disposal of equipment for training as set up in December 23 and 24 [] contact report; (10) It is not anticipated however, in the event [] considers training standards are not sufficient or are above the capability of the personnel, he is to inform [] but to take no steps except directly through me.
- f. [] is to operate independently of the [] except to keep them informed on matters they need to know in order to cover up illegal operations connecting the U.S. Government.
- g. [] is to discuss all problems within the jurisdiction of [] with [] receive his approval before (1) making contact with [] indigenous personnel outside of Rufus' organization, or (2) acquire land within the jurisdiction of [] responsibility.

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h. NOTE: After a discussion with [] on the situation at [], it was decided against placing him within the jurisdiction [] in the manner he is placed under the []. The reason for this being the present utilization of [] mostly as a Commo link with headquarters rather than being acquainted with operations that are going on within the area. Further discussion on this matter will be taken up between the chief of project and Chief of PM.

1. [] is to receive Lincoln approval before recruiting non-Rufus personnel for any witting deal within the project.

2. [] reports, verbal and written, and his cables are to be addressed to Lincoln.

4. Support -

a. [] have the sole function of making [] activities a success.

b. The initial equipment is arriving as discussed in the [] [] 22, 23, 24 December meetings. (NOTE: Black flight arrangement memorandum PM to Chief of Project) [] turned over to [] the requirements of the black flight landing [] as presented [] through [] contact, []. [] gave initial approval to the plan; however, final approval would have to be given by []. That approval was forthcoming on 12 January. If there are no changes in plan, no word will be received []. If for some reason, changes in plan are forthcoming, they will be cabled forward commercially to [] a mailing address drop located in Florida. As of this date, afternoon of 13 January, the commercial cable has not arrived. All planning is being conducted as if the initial arrangements by []. [] do hold true at the point of landing of the black flight. Those arrangements can be found in cable form, Lincoln to headquarters insofar as briefing of the pilot is concerned. In addition to the above, it was brought out by [] that at 7 o'clock on each evening all personnel at the landing field, except military personnel are removed from the vicinity of the landing field. This leaves the operation in control of the chief of the air group army at the field. Rufus' men will be in the control tower conducting the instructions of the plane as it lands in accordance with the pilot briefing cable sent to headquarters. [] will conduct security around the field. Rufus' men will be handling the fork lift equipment that will comprise the unloading of the

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equipment for the plane. Taxi instructions will be given to the pilot, a 4,000 gallon refueling truck will come to a standby position just opposite the plane and will stand off unless called by the plane. Emergency refueling has been arranged and, if called for the truck will be handled and ~~the~~ the hose handled by Rufus' men. [] will be in the background to help conduct the indigenous side of the operation, although he will not appear except under emergency. Upon the approach of our plane all other planes in the area will be directed away from the air field and only an emergency landing might be conducted during the time of the off-loading of our plane. [] army trucks will be standing by until the plane arrives at a taxi stop. All unloading personnel will be Rufus' men under the direction of the Rufus labor pusher. Trucks are to be off-loaded and will immediately proceed to the training area with the MM gear which is the [] gear for the training camp. The trucks contacting the [] gear are to proceed to a central unloading spot which will be under the continual supervision of [] until such time as the training sites for [] activities have been made available.

- c. (1) A break-down of equipment per target for placing at the safe cite areas for that target is being considered. The sum total of initial equipment would be placed on hand for delivery to present underground assets is as discussed in the arms and equipment assay [] memorandum. This is designed to make all men self-sufficient during the short-term active operational period as to weapons, equipment, medical and survival rations, to operate with full sufficiency and self-sufficiency for a ten-day period. [] brought up the possibility that the men would not be willing to exist on evil tasting survival rations, and it was directed that such would be the case if there were plentiful supply, but [] brought up instances in which the emergency rations had been used successfully and it was agreed that training should be slanted so that the men would understand the necessity for ~~if~~ living off the rations for a short period. [] felt that under those conditions the men could be mentally conditioned to depend upon the rations rather than along logistical supply lines []. The method of getting the materiel into the safe cite was discussed in that [] is selecting and will forward for consideration air fields along with their security hazards from which black flights could bring the materiel for a safe cite to the field nearest that safe cite. A further [] study of this plan will be presented to the chief of project with suggestions by Chief of PM having seen the set up at []. The method of getting equipment and materiel into the target area to presently existing underground forces, the time of movement of the equipment to the target area is yet to be firmed up, except that it is contemplated movement into the

staging areas will be by black flight to the nearest fields. Movement into the underground will be determined by the target area situation and will satisfy the individual case.

[] It is contemplated by [] that continuous black trips by courier transports utilizing [] surplus personnel as couriers and utilizing subsequent stashing and caching would permit a build-up at the target [] area for the assets which are in position. The 50-pound self-sufficiency kit designed for the occasion would enable shock troop and outside specialists, including radio operators and incoming sabotage teams to be self-sufficient transport and existing for the ten-day maximum expected period. More research will be forthcoming along this line of thought. The necessary scheduled report to chief of project will outline in detail the pre-arranged staffing that has been done on this subject.

(2) Support requirements during the second phase of overt [] operations, in other words a consolidation phase, will be limited to possible replacement of key instruments and items necessarily destroyed by sabotage and to extra consolidation requirements including operational funds and propaganda material and [] special Commo gear will be required. Support requirements for the third phase of the overt [] operations will have been arranged, gathered and packaged and ear-marked for an emergency black flight so that if any of the units find it necessary to go into this third phase, resupply can be arranged through their tactical radio. This third phase operational plan will of necessity be limited to a short number of weeks due to the topography of the target country and the nature of the expected consolidation of those units successful in the first stage. Proposed, detailed report for the preparation for this third stage support requirement will be forthcoming to the project chief on the Chief PM next report.

B. [] brought up the fact that some months ago he had been alerted [] that much Guatemalan money was available if he could procure a certain amount of cash. The subject was brought up with the Chief of WED and [] was told to tell the man to acquire \$400,000 U.S. cash. The man for some six months now has announced that he has the \$400,000 in foreign currency and is requesting of [] that he produce the \$400,000 U.S. cash. This matter has been brought to the attention of headquarters before and Chief of PM feels this man has placed under commitment by this Agency and that a follow-up on this commitment should be made immediately to take him from an embarrassing position. [] informed [] that this money would be forthcoming

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if the commitment is in truth as outlined to []

C. [] inquired as to the report on [] contact with []
 [] on 16 December. [] felt contact between [] and []
 [] could be misconstrued even by [] as [] representing
 U.S. policy. [] instructions to [] to go forward with
 his plans to [] in his proposed operations could be mis-
 construed by [] as U.S. approval. In addition, it was pointed
 out to [] that his mission was PBSUCCESS, that he should stay
 within that mission until so instructed by Chief of PM who would receive
 his direction from project chief and project chief receiving his from
 our headquarters. [] informed [] that he had received
 approval from the Deputy of WHD, that stemmed from occurrences months
 ago during which [] asked [] to feel Rufus out concerning
 future aid to []'s forthcoming operation. Rufus gave his stamp
 of approval on aid to [] in changing the date of his
 move to some time in February, [] sent word to Rufus through
 [] that the February date had been arranged and consequently
 Rufus was employing [] to convey his (Rufus') attitude on the
 affair. [] felt that he was there as a representative of Rufus
 and not as a representative of the United States. When it was pointed
 out by [] that again the target country was that of PBSUCCESS,
 [] pointed out that he had received instructions to talk with
 [] from the Deputy of WHD. [] agreed to remain within the
 [] limits of the target country of operations against the
 target country of PBSUCCESS, but stated and this statement is fully
 agreed upon by the Chief of PM, that his position as to past []
 commitments should be fully cancelled by the persons who laid those
 commitments on or he is placed in the nebulous position of choosing
 which set of instructions he is going to follow. It is felt
 by me that this position should be clarified for [] by the persons
 who gave him past commitments, if containment within the operations
 of PBSUCCESS is truthfully expected to be of []

D. Since [] final approval has not been obtained on the
 pre-arranged black flight, it has been decided that a personal commercial
 cable from [] to the [] mailing address which
 contains a negative attitude on any subject will be warning to []
 that the flight is for some reason cancelled. If [] finds some
 reason for dealy from this end, he will send a commercial cable in
 []'s true name to [] from a pump company concerning
 a pump that [] has ordered. The pump will [] have a number. That
 number will contain the new ETA of the airplane. If the flight is can-
 celled altogether, it will mention that the pump cannot be found, it will
 not refer [] to a number and that there will be no pump forthcoming. If
 the [] date of the arrival of the shipment

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is to be delayed, the number of days of delay will be indicated by headquarters in the commercial cable to [] by indicating that the pump left headquarters so many days ago. The number of days ago indicating the number of days delay in the ETA of the airplane.

E. COMMUNICATIONS

[] warns that if communications are [] not down to very quickest, it is possible Rufus will establish his own communications, which in the opinion of the writer is only natural. The man in the field at the time needs instantaneous communication. I hope that my proposal for communications will be considered in that light and that if immediate communications are not established, Rufus will establish his own by other means. Also in one case where radio Commo would have added to the efficiency of our movements, it was found that the necessary Commo stations were closed for the weekend. It was suggested that headquarters' action would activate a system to eliminate the situation. [] was notified and the three a day contact is now set up for weekends between []

F. [] was alerted to prepare Rufus for a trip to the Miami area approximately 25 January. Rufus will be ready when the details of black flight arrangements have been forwarded to [] Rufus will be alone unless otherwise specified. [] feels that rather than ramrod a meeting for [] and Rufus, a spirit of trust could be incorporated into this meeting by allowing [] and Rufus to spend a day together before meeting with project personnel. This idea meets with the full concurrence of Chief of PM.

II. COMMENTS

[] is a capable, eager, hard-working man. He needs direction from professionals. Such direction must be in the form of intelligent leadership and must shy away from hand-shackling restrictions. This statement is made because of the realization of the inability of non-field personnel to grasp the true problems facing our man on the spot. If we feel that this man cannot work within the confines of a broad directive, we should remove him because whoever occupies the duty that we have assigned to [] must be allowed to use his initiative.

[]

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