

29 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Report by Mr [] on OAS Conference

1. A meeting was held in Mr. [] office on 25 March at 1430 to receive Mr. [] report on the OAS Conference. Present were: Mr. [] Department of State; Mr. [] Department of State; Mr. [] ; [] ; [] .

2. Mr. [] first discussed the behind-the-scenes efforts to persuade various countries which were on the fence to support the American anti-Communist resolution. An all-out effort was required of the U.S. delegation to obtain the 17 favorable votes that were cast.

A. Uruguay. This country, formerly a staunch supporter of the U.S., is growing antagonistic because of our friendly attitude toward Peron and tariffs on Uruguayan wool. The Uruguayan vote was obtained by informally pointing out to the Chief of their delegation that the support which they could now expect from the U.S. in case of aggression by Argentina, is to a great extent pendent on Uruguay's anti-Communist position.

B. [] Vote was obtained by promise of a new credit for [] during the next fiscal year.

C. [] Vote was tied to the U.S. position at a conference to be held in [] for consideration of the border dispute between []

3. Three delegations appeared to be closely controlled and under definite instructions. These were Guatemala, Mexico, and Argentina. Mexico and Argentina, while definitely opposed to the anti-Communist resolution, because of their devotion to the principle of non-intervention and their fear that the resolution might be the opening wedge to intervention, found it expedient to abstain.

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
C.S.L. / H.R.G. ON 3 JULY 95

4. Mr. [] was emphatic in stating that the cornerstone of the OAS is devotion to the principle of nonintervention, and that the leader of this principle is Mexico. — Although the U. S. delegation emphasized the distinction between international versus national communism, many of the Latin American countries are more afraid of the possibility of American intervention than they are of what they consider the vague threat of international communism. This is in spite of the American record of the past 20 years. That is why Mr. [] is so concerned about the possible disastrous effects on our Latin American relations if PBSUCCESS is planned on the United States government. All the delegations except the Mexican reacted to the Guatemalan "white paper" as if it were "the bunk". This attitude may mainly be attributed to the U. S. policy of non-intervention since the early 1930s.

5. The Secretary's decision not to pinpoint Guatemala assisted in pushing through the resolution. Even though it may have been with tongue in cheek, it was necessary opening to state that the resolution was not directed against any one country. Mr. [] is consequently very doubtful of the possibility of multi-lateral action against Guatemala. As a first step an air tight legal case must be constructed, built on intelligence much firmer than that which we now possess. The right emotional state must also be created. The best possible lawyer's brief must be prepared. Prior to the calling of a meeting of representatives of OAS to discuss multi-lateral action, there should be bi-lateral talking with all the doubtful countries and no meeting should be held unless a 2/3s favorable vote is lined up before the meeting.

6. Mr. [] commented on the reaction of the Latin American delegations to Toriello's main speech. Secretary Dulles was the only one who did not applaud. From the Latin American side Toriello received the greatest applause and ovation of the Conference.

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
C-5 H/10/5 ON 03 JUL 55

~~TOP SECRET~~

7. [] asked Mr. [] if he had changed his thinking since the Conference on the possible methods to get rid of the ARBENZ government. Mr. [] repeated that in his opinion the elimination of 30 of those in high positions of the government would bring about its collapse. He then qualified this statement by saying that perhaps that even a smaller number, say 20, would be sufficient.

[]
Chief, []

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN APPROVED
FOR RELEASE, AS SANITIZED, BY
SSE/HRK ON 03 JUL 85

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL