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At first it seemed that there was evidently no cooperation from () and it was thought that he was purposely stalling. Further developments brought out that it was merely that he had not been told what to do and when he was told where the gear was wanted, it went immediately. In fact, 5 tons were across the border and almost on the () finca by the next afternoon. No unusual troubles or difficulties were encountered - just the normal run. () said he would fly 5 tons of equipment any day we let them know we wanted them to (Plan 5).

On Plan 6 - () . The boat purchase price is \$15,000 and if we do not burn it, we can re-sell it. He was going to La Ceiba to look at it.

They are waiting for a recon man to return. The man is at the mouth of the river at Pto. Barrios. It is proposed to unload the equipment off the coast into small boats.

In discussions of the groups, relative sizes, etc. it was pointed out that some groups may be more than we can possibly arm. If we drop at night, the parachutes won't be seen but the arms might be messed up by dropping. () has set aside 8 cases of ammo, 900 rifles which will fill up the available parachutes. As long as () is packaging and there is a reserve supply, () is all right as a re-supply base.

Out of 11 groups, 8 have access to radio; 5 have ^{all radio} ~~off~~ of these 8 if Plan 2 used.

The 200 men who recently came out of Guatemala did not do so under CALLIGERIS orders. () sent them out. Over 100 are now () Upped by one platoon the shock troops to Jutiapa. As of today men are going to the farms. These men are being grouped in 5-man groups and are to be taught to work as a team. CALLIGERIS thought that if these last named groups could be back in and starting to work 5-6 days before the actual day, it would really confuse the issue. Men are to be sent back to their own area.

Word has been sent in to knock off the recruiting and stop sending people out.

Shock troops can be organized and in position to go; we are capable of putting people in there, capable of handling emergency within 4 days. Coban is the only area where they feel concerned at all. There is an organizer to go in there, too. The organizer is not known to () he knows none of them). There is an organizer for Quezaltenango - in fact, for each of the target areas.

Sab leaders will be briefed during this coming week. There are people moving with suitcases. None of the volunteers have been turned back with arms yet.

() questioned () about the methods of communication in () and this was explained to him. Messages (cable) are passed in sterile form only without references although an indication is made to the reference through a reference to the text.

Under the deception plan RUFJS will set it up so that he will obviously be in Panama on D -4. He will go to the () Embassy of Panama and arrange a visa for D -6 and on D -5 he will depart () for Panama. He will, in addition, arrange for a tour through other countries. On D -4 () advance post leaves () . All members of the staff apparently will break up.

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However, RUFUS will go back with his staff by black flight and will meet with the others at a safehouse. The only ones out in on this plan were () and RUFUS. The American operators will be at the safehouse where this meeting will take place.

Status of the () signal plan was questioned. () passed them to the ROs 2/3 days ago. RUFUS knows these are his communications with the Group. () government has not been told that RUFUS wants a radio and should be. Whether or not this would be identified with RUFUS or would be an official radio was discussed. () said it would be laid on through (). It was also questioned as to RUFUS's explanation for the radio.

There has been no word on the ROs yet. Two radios have gone in, one is in Quezaltenango. The two which were sent to the Embassy are still there.

() made the statement that in 13 days the U.S. could paralyze Guatemala economically.

With regard to the leaflet drop - the Guatemalan government said that they did not know who it was but that it must have been a well-equipped plane with radar since Guatemala did not even get their fighter planes off the ground. () and () were very excited about the leaflet drop. () likes () but he thinks it isn't punching back quickly enough.

() was discussed and the possibility of using him, the 180 Cessna, etc. / During this discussion a cable from () was received re this subject and read to those present. () will lend his maintenance man and private strip across the way for the Cessna.

() was interested in the reliability of ground signals in operation. They are not very reliable.

() is now in () willing to pilot a P-38 or anything we want him to do. () vetoed his use.

() was asked if he had heard anything of Calderon Guardia's negotiations with Perez Jimenez in Venezuela.

General discussion of RUFUS' assets, aptitude and potentiality followed. It was agreed that the men would do as they are directed but would not be able to carry out too complex a plan.

() requested that Messrs. () prepare a rough draft of suggested or contemplated activities for the next 10 days and turn them in before leaving today. This would be the period through 12 June.

Mr. () was checked on the status of the terror broadcast and said it would be ready in 3 days if notice were given. It can last from 20 minutes to 2 hours as desired.

Meeting adjourned at 1610.

pm
2 June 1954