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DIST 29 DECEMBER 1966

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 23 DECEMBER 1966

SUBJECT STATEMENTS BY NORTH VIETNAMESE [REDACTED] THAT CONTINUED AMERICAN BOMBING AND AMERICAN REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE VIET CONG ARE CHIEF OBSTACLES TO NEGOTIATIONS

- ~~BATOR~~
- ~~BOWDLER~~
- ~~BUDGET~~
- ~~DAVIS~~
- ~~GINSBURGH~~
- ~~HAMILTON~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~JORDEN~~
- ~~KE NY S~~
- ~~KEMER~~
- ~~MOYERS~~
- ~~TAYLOR~~
- ~~WRIGHT~~

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

ACQ [REDACTED]

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1. (SUMMARY. [REDACTED] NEGOTIATIONS ON THE VIETNAM WAR ARE IMPOSSIBLE WHILE THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM CONTINUES. [REDACTED] THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CANNOT OFFER CESSATION OF INFILTRATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM IN EXCHANGE FOR CESSATION OF BOMBING AS THAT WOULD STIFLE THEIR ENTIRE EFFORT. [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] ANOTHER OBSTACLE TO NEGOTIATIONS IS UNITED STATES FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE VIET CONG (VC) AS DIRECT PARTNERS IN BARGAINING. [REDACTED] NORTH VIETNAM WOULD BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE IF "THE INDISPENSABLE CONDITIONS" WERE MET, AND

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1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

(classification) (dissem controls)

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1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

• S-E-C-R-E-T
(classification)

(dissem controls)

THAT WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS IS A CONDITION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE, RATHER THAN A CONDITION FOR OPENING TALKS. THE ATTITUDE OF THE VC ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS, [REDACTED] IS NOT CLEAR, AS THEY DO NOT ALWAYS AGREE WITH HANOI. [REDACTED] NORTH VIETNAM EXPECTS EVENTUAL AMERICAN INVASION BUT [REDACTED] THIS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY DRAW CHINA INTO THE WAR. [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] NOT YET [REDACTED] ANY DIRECTIVES FROM HANOI ON AMERICAN UNITED NATIONS DELEGATE ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG'S REQUEST TO U THANT TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE AND THIS MIGHT INDICATE A LESSENING OF SKEPTICISM IN HANOI ABOUT UNITED STATES INTENTIONS.)

2. [REDACTED] CONCERNING NORTH

VIETNAM'S REFUSAL TO RESPOND TO UNITED STATES PEACE OVERTURES, [REDACTED] IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATE WHILE THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM CONTINUES. [REDACTED] NORTH VIETNAMESE DO NOT AGREE THAT ANY CESSATION OF AMERICAN BOMBING SHOULD BE MET BY AN EQUIVALENT EFFORT ON THEIR PART. THEY CONSIDER THE BOMBINGS AS BEING WITHOUT ANY GENUINE EQUIVALENT ON THEIR SIDE. IN THEIR VIEW THE SUGGESTION THAT THEY SHOULD CEASE TO INFILTRATE SOUTH VIETNAM IN EXCHANGE FOR A CESSATION OF THE BOMBING WOULD MEAN THAT THEY WOULD BE STIFLING THEIR ENTIRE EFFORT, WHILE THE AMERICANS WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THEIR LAND WAR INTACT.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

3. [REDACTED] THE CHIEF OBSTACLE TO NEGOTIATIONS, IF THE BOMBINGS

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

ARE STOPPED, IS UNITED STATES FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE VC AS
A DIRECT PARTNER IN THE BARGAINING.

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DEMAND FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS AS
ONE OF THEIR BASIC FOUR POINTS IS NOT MEANT TO BE A CONDITION FOR THE
OPENING OF PEACE TALKS, BUT A CONDITION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE.
A STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN INTENT TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES AFTER AN
ACCORD ON PEACE TERMS WOULD SUFFICE. THE MODALITIES OF THE WITHDRAWAL
CAN BE WORKED OUT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

4. THERE ARE THREE DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW
ABOUT THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: (A) PEKING IS TOTALLY OPPOSED TO THEM.
IT SUITS THE CHINESE TO HAVE THE WAR CONTINUE, INVOLVING THE UNITED
STATES WHILE CHINA IS UNTOUCHED; (B) HANOI WOULD BE READY TO NEGOTIATE IF WHAT
IT CONSIDERS TO BE THE INDISPENSABLE CONDITIONS ARE MET; (C) WHAT THE VC
WANT IS NOT CLEAR. THEY ARE FIGHTING MEN AND DO NOT ALWAYS SEE EYE-TO-EYE
WITH HANOI. NORTH VIETNAMESE ABILITY TO CONTROL THE VC
LIMITED, AND THEY MUST BE REPRESENTED IN ANY PEACE
NEGOTIATIONS.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

5. AS TO WHETHER THE ESCALATION OF THE WAR
MEANS AMERICAN INVASION OF NORTH VIETNAM, NORTH VIETNAM
BELIEVES AN AMERICAN INVASION MUST BE ANTICIPATED SOONER OR LATER AND
IS PREPARING FOR IT. THIS INVASION WOULD NOT NECESSARILY
DRAW CHINA INTO THE CONFLICT, ALTHOUGH "OBVIOUSLY AN

1.5(e)
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(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.5(e)
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1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

AMERICAN INVASION OF NORTH VIETNAM WOULD INCREASE THE THREAT TO CHINA, AND THE ENTRY OF CHINESE 'VOLUNTEERS' WOULD BE INCREASED.

HOPE CAN PREVENT THIS. HOPE IS FOR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, EVEN FROM FRIENDS." FOR SOME SORT OF NEUTRALIZATION OF NORTH VIETNAM, BUT DO NOT BELIEVE IN THE 'DOMINO THEORY', THAT CHINA WOULD ATTEMPT TO TAKE OVER ALL OF ASIA IF THE VIETNAM WAR ENDS WITH THE AMERICANS' LEAVING. DID NOT BRING UP THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

6. AS TO THE TIMING OF REUNIFICATION, ALTHOUGH NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM INTENDED TO BE REUNITED, IT WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE IMMEDIATELY--"NOT BEFORE THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 1968."

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

7. HANOI'S REACTION TO UNITED NATIONS DELEGATE ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG'S REQUEST TO UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT ON 19 DECEMBER TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE, HANOI HAD NOT YET TAKEN ANY OFFICIAL POSITION AND THEREFORE NOT ANY DIRECTIVES YET. THIS MIGHT INDICATE LESS SKEPTICISM IN HANOI ABOUT UNITED STATES INTENTIONS THAN THERE HAD BEEN LAST YEAR WHEN UNITED STATES AMBASSADORS WERE DISPATCHED ON "PEACE MISSIONS" TO VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE GOLDBERG OVERTURE CAME AT THE SAME TIME AS THE ARRIVAL OF UNITED STATES REINFORCEMENTS AND THE CONTINUED BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, WHICH MADE IT DIFFICULT TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

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(classification) (dissem controls)

[REDACTED] THE REITERATION OF THE AMERICAN "14 POINTS"
CONTINUES TO PUT CONDITIONS THAT ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO HANOI.

8. [REDACTED] AS TO NORTH VIETNAM'S ABILITY TO
RESIST A LENGTHY WAR, [REDACTED] "WE ARE USED TO WAR. WE HAVE HAD A
QUARTER CENTURY OF IT NOW, AND WE ARE HARDENED. IT WILL TAKE A MILLION
AMERICAN SOLDIERS TO APPROACH ANYTHING LIKE A REAL VICTORY, AND EVEN
THOUGH SUCH A FORCE MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN A RELATIVELY EFFECTIVE
MILITARY OCCUPATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM, RESISTANCE WOULD GO ON
INDEFINITELY." [REDACTED] THE WAR WAS ESSENTIALLY AN AMERICAN WAR,
AS THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE CANNOT BE COUNTED ON FOR EFFECTIVE FIGHTING.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

9. [REDACTED]
NO PERMANENT VC OFFICE WILL BE OPENED IN PARIS, AS THE FRENCH
GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN NO INDICATION IT WOULD WELCOME SUCH A
REPRESENTATION. [REDACTED] THERE ARE NO
AUTHENTIC VC REPRESENTATIVES NOW IN PARIS.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

10. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

11. [REDACTED] DISSEM. STATE CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

• ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ [REDACTED]
(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)