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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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DIST 19 DECEMBER 1966

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM/CHINA/NORTH KOREA

DOI: OCTOBER 1966

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] COMMENTS ON THE VIETNAM
SITUATION AND RELATIONS WITH VARIOUS FOREIGN
COUNTRIES.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)
3

ACQ: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1. SUMMARY. [REDACTED]

DE

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

GAULLE'S EFFORTS IN THE VIETNAM SITUATION WERE AIMED TOWARDS
A COALITION GOVERNMENT AND [REDACTED] THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

4/21/98



1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ [REDACTED]
(classification) (dissem controls)

GOING TO CAPITALIZE ON FRENCH-AMERICAN RIVALRY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE PEKING-MOSCOW DISPUTE DID NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE VIETNAM WAR. CHINA WAS PESSING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT NOT TO APPEASE THE "REVISIONISTS." [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] NORTH VIETNAM NEEDED MATERIALS AND NOT VOLUNTEERS, THE ACCEPTANCE OF WHOM WOULD BRING MANY PROBLEMS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ALTHOUGH NORTH KOREA HAD SENT SOME EXPERTS TO VIETNAM, KOREA COULD NOT HELP NORTH VIETNAM VERY MUCH BECAUSE IT HAD DIFFICULT PROBLEMS OF ITS OWN. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INDONESIA COULD NOT EFFECTIVELY ARRANGE ANYTHING CONCRETE IF IT MEDIATED IN THE VIETNAM QUESTION AND [REDACTED] IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR DIRECT TALKS TO BE HELD WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAM NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

• C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(classification) (dissem controls)

3. EFFORTS OF DE GAULLE. [REDACTED] THE
MOTIVES FOR FRENCH MOVES IN THE VIETNAM QUESTION WERE NOT
ENTIPELY CLEAR BUT [REDACTED] DE GAULLE
LIKE EVERY FRENCHMAN KNEW THE VIETNAMESE MENTALITY VERY
WELL THROUGH HISTOPICAL EXPERIENCE AND THIS MIGHT BE THE
REASON DE GAULLE WAS TRYING TO GIVE THE VIETNAMESE THE
OPPORTUNITY TO SETTLE THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. [REDACTED]
DE GAULLE PROBABLY HAD IN MIND A KIND OF COALITION GOVERN-
MENT WHICH WOULD IN THE END SUBMERGE INTO THE UNIFICATION
OF VIETNAM. THIS WOULD NOT BE IN FAVOR OF THE SOCIALIST
SYSTEM BUT IT WOULD NEUTRALIZE VIETNAM. FURTHERMORE, [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] DE GAULLE WAS WAITING FOR
THE RIGHT OPPORTUNITY TO INTERFEPE IN BRINGING ABOUT A
SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAM WAR BECAUSE IF HE ACTED TOO SOON,
THE FRENCH FEAPED THEY MIGHT LOSE THEIR ASSETS AND INVEST-
MENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND IF HE ACTED TOO LATE HE WOULD
LOSE NOPTH VIETNAM'S "SYMPATHY." [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] THE NOPTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT DISCOURAGE
DE GAULLE'S IDEAS AND EFFORTS BUT WOULD ON THE CONTRARY
MAKE AS MUCH USE AS POSSIBLE OF THE DIFFERENCES OF

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

• ~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

VIEWPOINT AND PIVALRY BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES.

4. THE PEKING-MOSCOW DISPUTE. [REDACTED] AS

TO WHETHER THE PEKING-MOSCOW DISPUTE INFLUENCED THE VIETNAM

WAR. [REDACTED] THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS

DID NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE VIETNAM WAR. [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

THERE WAS SOME RELUCTANCE IN THE SOVIET BLOC TO ASSIST THE

NORTH VIETNAMESE WAR EFFORT WHOLEHEARTEDLY. THE NORTH

VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT SEVEPAL TIMES HAD STATED THAT THE

WAR AND ITS EFFECTS WERE NOT A PURELY VIETNAMESE AFFAIR BUT

WAS A COMMON CAUSE FOR ALL SOCIALIST STATES. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE VIENAM WAR WAS A TEST CASE AS TO WHETHER

WORLD COMMUNISM WOULD SUCCEED OR NOT. PEOPLE WERE ALWAYS

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

TALKING ABOUT "INTERNATIONAL DUTY" AND "INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE

FOR THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT" BUT THESE WORDS WERE THEOPETICAL

AND WERE NOT ALWAYS PUT INTO PRACTICE.

5. [REDACTED] COMMUNIST CHINA ALWAYS

PRESSED NOPTH VIETNAM NOT TO MAKE ANY APPEASEMENT WITH THE

"REVISIONISTS" AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DID NOT LIKE THIS KIND

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

OF PRESSURE. [REDACTED] THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SURELY KNEW

WHAT TO DO AND COULD HANDLE MATTERS THEMSELVES AND DID NOT

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

• C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [REDACTED]
 (classification) (dissem controls)

WANT TO BE DICTATED TO BY ANYBODY ELSE. HOWEVER, CHINA ALWAYS COOPERATED FULLY WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE WAR MATERIALS PROBLEM AND ASSISTED AS MUCH AS THEY COULD AFFORD. ALSO, [REDACTED] THERE WERE NO SUCH BARRIERS TO TRANSPORTATION OF SOVIET AID ACROSS CHINA AS THE SOVIETS CLAIMED IN THEIR PRESS. NO OBSTACLES WERE PUT IN THE WAY BY THE CHINESE IN THE TRANSPORT OF SOVIET WEAPONS. BEFORE, THERE WERE SOME IRREGULARITIES BUT THEY HAD BEEN TAKEN CARE OF AND PRESENTLY TRANSPORTATION OF MATERIALS WERE BEING "SAFEGUARDED BY THE VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES." HOWEVER, PAUL TRANSPORTATION WAS DIFFICULT AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD THEREFORE ASKED COUNTRIES SENDING AID TO MOVE THE MATERIALS BY SHIP WHENEVER POSSIBLE AND "NOT TO BE FRIGHTENED EVEN BY THE SEVENTH FLEET." [REDACTED] NORTH VIETNAM WAS RECEIVING ONLY ONE-TENTH OF THE AMOUNT OF AID BEING GIVEN TO THE SOUTH VIETNAM GOVERNMENT BY THE UNITED STATES. NORTH VIETNAM BADLY NEEDED MATERIALS. THEREFORE, IT HAD ASKED EAST EUROPEAN BLOC COUNTRIES WHY THEY WERE KEEPING THEIR EQUIPMENT ONLY FOR THEMSELVES AND STOCK-PILING IT INSTEAD OF TRYING IT OUT ON A LARGE SCALE IN

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [REDACTED]

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ [REDACTED]
 (classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(e)
 3.4(b)(1)

VIETNAM THE WAY THE AMERICANS DO.

6. WITH REGARD TO BLOC COUNTRIES' VOLUNTEERS, THERE WERE OBSTACLES TO ACCEPTING THEM. THERE WERE THE QUESTIONS OF WHO WOULD COMMAND JOINT/COMBINED OPERATIONS, WHETHER VOLUNTEERS WERE COMPLETELY PREPARED TO DEFEND THE SOCIALIST WORLD ON VIETNAMESE GROUND, AND WHETHER THEY COULD BE TRUSTED TO DEFEND SPECIAL SECTORS ASSIGNED TO THEM. THE MAIN PROBLEM CONCERNED THE CHARACTER AND MENTALITY OF THE VOLUNTEER GROUPS CONSISTING OF DIFFERENT RACES AND IN GENERAL THE EUROPEAN FEELING OF SUPERIORITY OVER ASIANS. [REDACTED] AT PRESENT NORTH VIETNAM DID NOT NEED VOLUNTEERS BUT ONLY NEEDED MATERIALS. ONLY THE EUROPEAN BLOC COUNTRIES WERE ABLE TO GIVE IT BECAUSE ASIAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES HAD ONLY SMALL CAPABILITIES WHICH IT WOULD BE UNFAIR TO EXPECT THEM TO SHARE MORE THAN NECESSARY.

1.5(e)
 3.4(b)(1)

7. NORTH KOREAN EFFORTS IN THE VIETNAM WAR. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NORTH KOREA COULD NOT DO MUCH FOR NORTH VIETNAM BECAUSE IT HAD SO MANY DIFFICULTIES AT HOME. HOWEVER, NORTH KOREA ALWAYS CALLED FOR UNITY AMONG THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ON THE VIETNAM WAR. NORTH KOREA WAS FACING THE EXPANSION PROBLEM AND PENETRATION OF JAPANESE CAPITALISM INTO

1.5(e)
 3.4(b)(1)

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
 3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

• C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [REDACTED]
(classification) (dissem controls)

SOUTH KOPEA. SINCE IT WAS FORMERLY A JAPANESE COLONY, NORTH KOPEA FEAPED A POSSIBLE NEW EMERGENCE OF JAPANESE MILITARISM AND THERE WAS A GREAT POSSIBILITY OF INVASION FROM SOUTH KOPEA. THUS, THE NOPTH KOPEAN POSITION WAS DIFFICULT: ON THEIR FRONT DOORSTEP WEPE THE SOUTH KOPEANS SUPPORTED BY THE AMERICANS AND THE JAPANESE, ON THEIR BACK DOORSTEP WEPE THE CHINESE AND THE SOVIETS BOTH PRESSURING TO GET NORTH KOPEA INTO THEIR OWN SPHERE. THE NOPTH KOPEANS TRYING TO EXECUTE AN INDEPENDENT POLICY MADE THE STATEMENT OF 2 AUGUST 1966 STPESSING THAT THERE MUST BE FULL INDEPEN- DENCE AND EQUAL PIGHTS FOR ALL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, LARGE OR SMALL. BECAUSE THE KOPEANS WEPE SEPIOUS ABOUT SENDING MANPOWER, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ALLOWED THEM TO SEND EXPEPTS IN ALL FIELDS TO VIETNAM, INCLUDING THE MILITAPY FIELD, TO MAKE A THOROUGH STUDY OF CONDITIONS IN VIETNAM IN CASE

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

VOLUNTEEPS WEPE SENT LATEP. [REDACTED] NOPTH KOPEA HAD SUPPLIED A FEW WEAPONS SUCH AS LIGHT MACHINE GUNS AND SEMI-AUTOMATIC RIFLES OF NORTH KOPEAN MANUFACTURE AND ALSO ROLLING STOCK, TPACTORS, TEXTILES, AND MEDICINES.

8. NORTH VIETNAM-INDONESIAN RELATIONS. [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [REDACTED]

• C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

PREVIOUS RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WHICH WERE
BASED ON TRADITION AND STRENGTHENED BY SUKARNO AND HO CHI
MINH WERE SPOILED BY THE INDONESIAN COUP D'ETAT BUT THIS WAS
ONLY TEMPORARY. INDONESIA'S ACTING AS MEDIATOR
IN THE VIETNAM QUESTION WOULD NEVER ACHIEVE ANYTHING CONCRETE;
IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE "IMPERIALISTS" TO ARRANGE A DIRECT
TALK WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAM NATIONAL FRONT FOR LIBERATION
WITHOUT CONDUCTING ANY TALKS WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

REGRETTED THE PRESENT INDONESIAN FOREIGN
POLICY BECAUSE IT HARMED THE VIETNAM SITUATION WITH INDONESIA
COMPROMISING WITH THE "IMPERIALISTS" AND ALSO THE CESSATION
OF THE CONFRONTATION POLICY AGAINST MALAYSIA WAS DISADVANTAGEOUS
TO THE VIETNAM WAR.

9. DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCPAC PACFLT APPAC
PACAF

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

C O N F I D E N T I A L