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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

17 December 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

FROM: Robert C. Ames  
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting of 16 December 1980 - Security Framework

1. Action Requested.

2. Background. The meeting, chaired by Dr. Brzezinski, was the 19th SCC meeting on the Security Framework for the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Brzezinski noted that this would be the last SCC on Security Framework held by this administration and would be devoted to identifying and tying up loose ends and reviewing a Presidential Directive. (S)

3. Discussion. Dr. Brzezinski went around the table asking each principal to identify short term issues that would require papers or actions prior to 20 January.

- a. Treasury (Secretary Miller). Referred to the Treasury paper in response to the Brzezinski memo. Treasury strongly urged that we integrate our economic and military programs in LDC's better than we have done to date. It was also emphasized that we take a more imaginative and coordinated approach to Saudi Arabia.
- b. Energy (Secretary Duncan). Energy supported Treasury's comments and expressed concern that we are again slipping into nonchalance in energy matters. Energy was concerned about the drift into stalemate in the Iran-Iraq war and the cumulative negative effect this was having on the

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
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oil market. At this point Brzezinski suggested a mini-SCC on Iran/Iraq for 17 December to discuss whether we should be taking any initiatives.

c. State (Undersecretary Newsom). State had three points to make.

- (1) There should be more funds allocated to military construction in FY 82 for Kenya and Somalia to make our new relationships credible.
- (2) We must get Congress to go along with a non-formal agreement with Egypt over the facility in Ras Banas.

(S)(C)

(3) 


d. Defense (Claytor and Komer). Defense had two issues for short term consideration.

(1) A Presidential Letter to Sadat requesting NPW transit of the Suez Canal (DoD has a draft).

(2) Once again raised the need for security assistance funding in the key states of Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt. Defense believes this funding should be a budget add-on in the range of one billion dollars. Brzezinski asked Secretary Miller to support this as his support would be critical with the President. Miller said he was not familiar enough with the issues to give outright support. Komer and Newsom would meet with him immediately after the SCC to brief him. (S)

4. Brzezinski then distributed the Presidential Directive. He said he would like comments by COB 17 December. He hoped there would not be too many changes. This particular Presidential Directive codifies what the Security Framework has been doing. Brzezinski said that the Presidential Directive should be considered an historic document that, in time, could be viewed as a major achievement similar to Truman's decision on Greece and Turkey. There was some debate on the art form, but Brzezinski wanted to keep the Presidential Directive even if we later supplemented it with a summary of the Framework process. The only change suggested at the meeting, and approved, was the addition of actions the President took - AWACS to Saudia, ships to Hormuz, etc - in the wake of area developments. (S)

Attachment:  
PD/NSC

  
Robert C. Ames

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Presidential Directive PD/NSC

*Commitment by  
1980 Framework*

TO:           The Vice President  
              The Secretary of State  
              The Secretary of The Treasury  
              The Secretary of Defense  
              The Secretary of Commerce  
              The Secretary of Energy  
              The Director, Office of Management and Budget  
              The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
              The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:       Persian Gulf Security Framework (U)

In my State of the Union Address to the Congress in January 1980 I called special attention to our interests in the Southwest Asia and Persian Gulf region. Furthermore, in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I made it a point of public record that:

"An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled

by the use of any means necessary, including military force." (U)

*Indicate action taken - Jan - Sep - 1980, 1981, etc.*  
It is U.S. strategy to meet this commitment and to defend our vital interests in the region as a whole by:

- building up our own capabilities to project force into the region;
- assisting countries in the region to deter internal and external threats to stability;
- diminishing radical influences in the region by working for progress toward a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement;
- improving access to facilities in the region while remaining sensitive to the special historical experience of the

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region and not placing in jeopardy our wider diplomatic and political relationships or the internal stability of the countries concerned by insisting on formal basing arrangements;

- taking a regional approach to securing our economic and political interests rather than basing their defense wholly on any sub-set of countries in the region. (S)

There has been considerable progress in improving our security posture in the region and in shaping an effective security framework. In order to ensure that this trend continues, I direct that the Persian Gulf Security Framework be pursued in terms as follows. (S)

I. The Military Component

The Department of Defense has principal responsibility for initiatives in this area but assisted where appropriate by State. This component will consist of efforts to improve the following areas:

- A. U.S. Forces Capabilities, including forces, lift, facilities access, exercises, and presence in the region.
- B. Local Defense Capabilities, improved through security assistance, advisory programs, and enhancement of local facilities and military capabilities.
- C. Interrelation Between U.S. Force Projection and Local Defense, developed by joint planning, combined exercises, consultations, and any other means for achieving a symbiotic connection between local and U.S. force capabilities.
- D. Force Implications for NATO, assessed for our own force planning and coordinated with our allies in Europe in an effort to get NATO to build up its forces more rapidly,

permitting a shift of U.S. resources to the security of the Persian Gulf. (S)

## II. The Foreign Policy Component

The Department of State has principal responsibility in this area. This component will consist of;

- A. The Peace Process in which progress must be achieved as rapid as feasible.
- B. The Northern Tier, including Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, in which improved security relations are the objective.
- C. The Arabian Peninsula in which we will assist the countries concerned to enhance their internal stability and to the extent feasible and consonant with our other objectives.  
*- Coordinate approach to Saudis -*
- D. The Horn of Africa, where we seek improved ties with Somalia and Djibouti and, where possible, with Ethiopia.
- E. The Allies, in Europe and Asia, from whom we seek diplomatic and military assistance in meeting our mutual security objectives in the Persian Gulf region. (S)

## III. Economic Issues

The Departments of State, Energy, Treasury, and Commerce will share responsibility in this area. Economic subcomponents are:

- A. Oil Policy, to ensure availability of oil at reasonable prices and to reduce Western dependence on Gulf oil.
- B. Western Economic Assistance, in which our goal will be to help address economic problems in the region through multi-lateral and unilateral efforts.
- C. Saudi Financing of Regional Security Needs, in which we seek a more comprehensive, region-wide use of Saudi wealth

to meet regional security needs.

- D. International Monetary Policy as it affects our relations with states in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia. (S)

#### IV. Intelligence Issues

The Director of Central Intelligence has the principal responsibility for developing an effective, regionally integrated intelligence program which is fully supportive of the tasks and objectives in the military, diplomatic, and economic components. [REDACTED]

#### Resources Considerations

Each agency will be responsible for and will identify the programs in its area which are required for implementing this directive. In addition, each agency will propose appropriate priorities for these programs. (C)

The Office of Management and Budget will monitor agency programs in support of this directive, will insure that such programs are identifiable, and will insure that they are receiving an appropriate high priority in all agencies. (C)

#### Coordination

Interagency coordination for the security framework shall continue to be accomplished by the SCC. (C)