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#2118

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
MISSION FOR GERMANY
United States Forces
European Theater

7 September 1945

TO: Lt. Williams, WAC
Deputy Chief, SCI, CIB, USFET

FROM: Major T. F. Purner
Deputy Chief, OSS, G-2, Germany

SUBJECT: FLECHNER

1. Lt. Colonel Rothschild on 7 August submitted to Counter-Sabotage Section, Operations Group, G-2, CIB, USFET, a letter of five questions which were embodied in Colonel Berding's interrogation brief of 9 August to Captain Tim.

2. Attached are two copies of Major King's report in reply, dated 27 August 1945.

3. Kindly transmit this report to the Counter-Sabotage Section, Operations Group, of CIB.

95

Incls.
2 cys of report.

1 Copy sent to War Room - WW.

Distribution:

3 - Lt. Williams
1 - Files

2

Approved for Release
Date 20 May 98

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#13820

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER
SCI/CIB, G-2 DIVISION
APO 757

6 September 1945

TO : Chief, CIB, G-2, USFET

SUBJECT : Operations and Agents of Leitstelle II Sued-Ost fuer Frontaufklaerung.

Attached for your information and files is a report on the above subject prepared by Lt. Pierre HAAS, formerly French Liaison Officer with SCI MUNICH. The report has only recently been translated and made available for dissemination.

Evelyn M. Williams
1st Lt., WAC, for

ANDREW H. BERDING
Lt. Colonel, AC
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - CHIEF, CIB, G-2, USFET
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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
INTELLIGENCE CENTER
Interrogation Section

27 August 1945

SUBJECT: Direct Interrogation of Oberstl FECHNER, AIC 1414

TO : Chief Prisoner Division, SCI Munich

1. FECHNER was interrogated in accordance with brief, USFET, [illegible] Form [illegible], [illegible] dated 9 August 1945.

2. The following answers were elicited:

a. Full details of attempts to sabotage British shipping. Study [illegible] at the beginning of the war: negative. [illegible] in a position of sufficient importance in Abwehr at that time.

b. List of all undertakings known to FECHNER in or concerning selected countries:

GREECE Name of undertaking: [illegible]

Date : During 1940

Objective : Sabotage of important installations

Controlling agency : Gruppe II, Ast WIEN

Directed by : Abwehr II, through Maj PUTZ, Ast WIEN

From where : Gruppe II, Ast WIEN

Remarks : To be executed by Sonderfuehrer SCHWIEGER and Gefr NIKOLITS, both Ast WIEN. Both agents were arrested by the Greek police before being able to execute their mission. They were later released through intervention of SEITZ, Attache at the German legation in ATHENS. They were then expelled from GREECE.

Name of undertaking: KIND

Date : April 1945

Objective : Reactivation of R-Net in Greece

Controlling agency : Abt D, Oberleutnant [illegible]

Directed by : Oberleutnant [illegible]

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Remarks : Undertaking sabotaged by FECHNER, Group never left GERMANY.

North AFRICA

Name of undertaking: ?

Date : (?) Probably 1942

Objective : Disruption of railroad running from ALEXANDRIA towards DERNA

Controlling agency : Abwehr II

Directed by : Hptm SCHIFFBAUER, Sdfr SCHEUERMANN

From where : Gruppe II, Ast ATHENS

Remarks : Executed by a group of men from BRANDENBURG Regt, commanded by a Lt. Whole group was captured before executing their mission.

ITALY, EGYPT, SOUTH AFRICA, AFGHANISTAN: Negative

INDIA : Name of undertaking: BAJADERE

Remarks : Activated at "Regenwurmlager", MISERITZ under command of Rittmeister HARBICH. Never committed.

HARBIG?

PERSIA: Negative

TURKEY: Name of undertaking: ARIADNE

Date : 1942 - 1943

Objective : Sabotage and Subversion in the Caucasian Oil Region with a base of operations in TURKEY.

Controlling agency : Abwehr II

Directed by : II Bearbeiter, ISTANBUL

From where : ISTANBUL

Remarks : About 12 men under Sonderführer KUEGLER took part in this operation.

[illegible] negative

Name of undertaking

Date 1944

Objective Sabo

Controlling agency

Directed by

From where

Remarks

SOUTH AMERICA, [illegible], HOLLAND [illegible]

All countries mentioned, except GREECE, were
sphere of activities. His statements as to
operations in the countries indicated can be

c. Names and cover names of all
with data as to their use and controlling

Only a small number of agents
FECHNER, since as head of Wirtschaftstrans
later of Leitstelle II Sudost, SIPO, he had
with agents whatsoever. All information
of his subordinate officers. The following
FECHNER:

[illegible] alias STEVENSON.
[illegible] agent of Levante [illegible]
[illegible] by the II Berater [illegible]
[illegible] II [illegible]
[illegible] was a relative of

[illegible] supported by 1st [illegible] ex-
[illegible] Abwehr II and later [illegible]

[illegible], Heinrich: alias WALTER. Former National [illegible] mended his ways at an dearly date and joined the [illegible] resistance movement. Was used as a double agent by these [illegible] also employed by CANARIS and later by SCHELLENBERG. [illegible] controlled directly by Abwehr II and I.

[illegible]ABERT: alias BERKY. Was trained at the "Deutsche [illegible]", STUTTGART. Was sent to the WIEN office of [illegible] D. [illegible] I. was sent to HUNGARY for the hiring of agents. [illegible] assigned to FAK 205.

[illegible] : alias MUENZ. A former Czarist Lt. Col. Fanatic and very active, he was used in various operations against the Soviet UNION. Was last controlled by Mil D.

d. This brief has not been received as yet.

e. Entirely negative, even under extended questioning.

/s/ Edmund L. King
EDMUND L. KING
Major Inf.

[illegible]

[illegible] THIRD ARMY
APO [illegible] 403

SUBJECT: Operations and Agents of Le[illegible]
Frontaufklärung

TO : G. D., X-2 Germany

1. The attached report, subject [illegible]
by Mrs. Burrell of the French original [illegible]

[redacted]

25 July 1945

SUBJECT: Operations and Agents of Leitstelle II Süd-Ost für Frontaufklärung.

ZO: [redacted], U.S., E-2 Germany

Introduction

Leitstelle II Süd-Ost, established in August 1944 in Vienna, descended directly from Abwehr II Vienna and from a certain number of other groups that the rapid advance of the Russian Army in Central Europe had very quickly and almost completely destroyed. It was necessary for the German intelligence and sabotage services to resume contact with the newly-occupied countries and to attempt, on the one hand, to establish relations with what remained of the old networks, and, on the other hand, to form new groups for intelligence and sabotage destined to aid the coming German counter-offensive which seems doubted, officially at least, would take place in the near future.

This last point is very important if the true nature of the operations which were attempted between August 1944 and April 1945 and the weakness of the system are to be understood. In fact, despite the turn of military events on all fronts, the official position, according to which victory would surely reward the efforts of the German people, forbade anyone to take measures providing for a German defeat, at least in an organization of this type which was very suspect in the eyes of pure Nazis. The networks of the Leitstelle are not, therefore, technically stay-behind networks despite the fact that the agents were operating behind the Russian lines.

There was, consequently, a psychological handicap at the basis of the activities of the Leitstelle reflecting the contradiction [redacted] the situation within Germany.

In addition there was a more serious difficulty. The Leitstelle represented under a different name the former Abteilung II of the Abwehr and the great majority of its personnel came from that organization which had been dissolved by the Nazis in May 1944 and which the events of July 1944 had discredited in the eyes of the Nazis. If this state of mind is taken into consideration and also the fact that RSHA Amt VI B, Mil Amt B and [redacted] Süd-Ost had a technical and geographic sphere very similar to that of the Leitstelle and also had the confidence of the authorities in power, it will be seen that the position of the Leitstelle was anything but brilliant.

To these difficulties of a general order must be added those brought about by the relations of the Leitstelle vis-à-vis the Army and the Nazi Party. In reality, the title of the Leitstelle is: "Leitstelle II Süd-Ost für Frontaufklärung". [redacted] 102

SCHWENDI. (This information was furnished by Major GABELER.) The RSHA, however, did not give up the idea of absorbing the remaining elements of the old Abwehr which were still outside its authority and in the end the Frontaufklärung was absorbed into RSHA Mil Amt F which thus became the sole authority with the right to issue orders of a technical nature (Fachliche Befehlsgewalt). The OKW retained only a vague disciplinary power. Nevertheless, the conflict between the Army and the Party remained unsettled and was not resolved except by an order of KALTENBRUNNER toward the end of February 1945.

At that time the very existence of the Leitstelle was in doubt. The efforts of SKORZENY to obtain complete control of sabotage operations seemed about to succeed and Amt VI E, through AUNER, chief of Referat Roumania Amt VI E, notified PIFF, chief of Referat Roumania of the Leitstelle, that henceforth Amt VI E had complete control of operations for Roumania and that PIFF was not to initiate any action without first referring it to AUNER. To corroborate this new authority AUNER forbade the execution of Operation GILL which was already to leave for Roumania. Finally, at the end of April, to ratify this power an order arrived at Partisan in the Tyrol (the evacuation center of the Leitstelle) to turn over without delay to Major LOOS, deputy chief of Mil Amt D, all documents concerning the operations and agents of the Leitstelle which had not been previously destroyed. This order was not carried out.

When Germany surrendered the Leitstelle had practically ceased to exist. This was true not only for the staff and the services of the Leitstelle but also for the networks of agents.

During the nine months of its existence the Leitstelle had two functions. First, it was charged with maintaining contact with the old networks in the Balkans formerly under Gruppe II of Abwehrstelle Vienna and the Abwehrstelle of the Balkan countries such as Bucharest and Belgrade. Second, the Leitstelle was to build up by means of special operations (Unternehmen) networks capable of sending intelligence, of preparing an atmosphere favorable to the counter-attack of the Wehrmacht and also of assuring the success of that counter-offensive when it took place. To achieve success in these special enterprises the Leitstelle was either to recruit the necessary personnel directly or to address its requests to the Frontaufklärungkommandos and Frontaufklärungtruppe which were subordinate to it although tactically responsible to Army Groups and Armies to which the FAKs and FATs were attached. In addition, there were under the Leitstelle certain missions of a defensive nature such as the "Sentinelle", the purpose of which was to warn of any act of sabotage which could stop traffic on the [illegible].

In addition the Leitstelle received the [illegible] concerning "action dump" operations of the FAKs and FATs which were under the jurisdiction of the Leitstelle or organized by groups which were working in territories related to the [illegible] of the Leitstelle before the German defeat in [illegible] rope. For example, Gruppe II of Ast Bucharest, [illegible] ZIGMAR and SCHAMIS, or Unternehmen [illegible] which [illegible] sabotstelle [illegible]. These sabotage, dump and [illegible] Slovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria and [illegible] in case of [illegible]

not been used up to the moment of the German capitulation. The documents were recovered with the capture of the Leitstelle personnel at Portisau on 3 June 1945.

Work within the Leitstelle was divided among a certain number of referats which each had a geographic area of its own with technically the same mission. All the work of the three referats was supervised by Hauptmann ZIEGLER, chief of operations, who was directly under Oberstleutnant FECHNER.

Operations and Agents of Referat FA1

This Referat was directed by Leutnant TÜMMLER assisted by Leutnant Hans BAUER (Low at Third U.S. Army IC). The jurisdiction of the Referat included Bulgaria and Macedonia, the latter at that time taken over by Bulgaria. At the beginning, to carry out its missions, the Referat had FAK 205 which was later moved to Slovakia.

The mission of the Referat was first, to maintain contact with the network established by Unternehmen TRITON, and second, to organise Unternehmen BÄR which was to supplement TRITON.

1. TRITON

Originally this operation, directed by Oberstleutnant FECHNER, had counter-sabotage as its only mission, namely, protecting the shipments of chrome across Bulgaria. Its headquarters were at the Wirtschaftstelle Sofia. TRITON was directly under the Kriegsorganisation Bulgaria

During the summer of 1943 an order arrived from OKW Abwehr II stating that, under cover of the Wirtschaftstelle, a number of sabotage, arms and food dumps should be established in Bulgaria and Macedonia and that small groups of agents should be set up to maintain contact in case of a German retreat. The agents were also to work for the return of the Germans. For the success of this operation Bulgaria was divided into five regions and an officer or an NCO was made responsible for each region. The results were not very encouraging. Only one radio agent established and maintained contact after the German retreat. In fact, the officers responsible, who were careless and pressed for time, reported agents who did not exist to Berlin. These charts of imaginary networks of Unternehmen TRITON were recovered among the documents of the Leitstelle and sent to the SHAEF Counter Intelligence War Room in London.

The only well-organised region was No.IV, Macedonia under Leutnant TÜMMLER. The network of agents in this region was centred in the towns of Skopie and Kacanik. Its chief was a certain DJORGEWITSCH (phonetic) alias MILAN, a silversmith in the Mohammedan quarter of Skopie. Most of his agents were Mohammedans. The radio operator for the network was KARAMANOFF (phonetic) alias KAMIL. He had received his training with the Nachrichten Regiment 506 near Vienna during the fall of 1943 and was recruited by TÜMMLER. He had maintained radio contact until October 19[illegible] without sending any messages because the German troops were still occupying Bulgaria. He transmitted messages from November 1944 to April 1945 when the German controls ceased its monitoring.

group directed by MILAN and in addition to report on all important events of a political, economic and social nature. Between October 1944 and April 1945 he sent about twenty messages. He transmitted on an average of twice a week. In the radio documents of the Leitstelle found in the mountains near Partisan after the arrest of PROHNER, ZIEGLER, PIFF, NOWAK and BAUER, KAMIL's radio plan was found but, for some unknown reason, without the call signs. According to this plan, KAMIL was in contact with WALD, the auxiliary centrale of WERA, and later with VIERS, the evacuation centrale of WERA, located at Obing in Bavaria.

At the end of February the Leitstelle thought that KAMIL was controlled by the Russians and, in fact, he had transmitted the signal arranged for in case he operated under enemy control: "Grüss an den Chef". From later messages, however, it was discovered that there had been a misunderstanding. KAMIL was only signaling that the Russian counter-espionage services made his job very difficult. KAMIL was the only serious agent of the TRITON group according to Hauptmann ZIEGLER who thinks it would be possible to re-establish contact with him by courier if not by radio.

GEORGEWITSCH (phonetic) alias MILAN: 1m64; heavy; round face; very devout Mohammedan; Albanian nationality; speaks Greek, Turkish and Albanian.

KARAMANOFF (phonetic) alias KAMIL: 1m72; 27 years old; thin; brown hair; Mohammedan; merchant in Skopie; strongly anti-communist.

2. BAR

The inefficiency of the German networks in Bulgaria necessitated the preparation of another operation by the Leitstelle which would permit the employment of the good elements of the existing network and also correct theerrors of the preceding operation. This was the reason for the creation of Unternehmen BAR. Leutnant BAUER, at that time chief of Referat PA1, organised this operation during the autumn of 1944.

Ten agents were recruited from volunteers of the anti-communist Bulgarian movement in Vienna which was known as the Organisation Legionär. These agents were all students who came from the Bulgarian middle class. As usual the radio training of the agents was undertaken by Nachrichten Regiment 506. Two of the agents MEDELKOFF and DRAGANOFF were trained at a villa in Mödling near Vienna and the others at Hinterbrühl near Mödling. Instruction was mainly concerned with radio. All the students were members of a political group. German was the language employed as all the students spoke it. It was arranged, however, that certain ones would use the Bulgarian cyrillic alphabet.

There were two instructors, one a radio [illegible] tor from WERA, Wachtmeister Franz HOHN and the other a Bul[illegible] HILMERRAHM (phonetic) who was more particularly in [illegible] military training. The training lasted longer for certain [illegible] than [illegible] originally provided for. Hinterbrühl [illegible] threatened by the Russian advance in April and the [illegible]

transmitted to a chalet near Kirchberg in the Tyrol (in the Kitzbühl area). Because of these delays four agents were not able to leave and were sent back to the Organisation Legionär at Duellersheim near Vienna in April 1945. They were Boris DINOLOF alias [illegible], Theodor DINOLOF alias TEDDY, Dimiter NOTEFF alias HERZ and [illegible] GRAINOFF alias STUBS.

The agents were distributed according to the five Bulgarian zones as they had been defined at the time of Operation TRITON.

Raum I (Zone I). This zone was bounded on the north by the Danube, on the south by the Balkans, on the west by the railroad line Sofia-Pirot, and on the east by a line going north and south passing approximately through Rasgrad.

Leutnant Boris HEDELKOFF alias HORMANN was parachuted into this zone in the mountains of Murgasch 50 kms northeast of Sofia at the end of October 1944. HEDELKOFF had left Bulgaria after the arrival of the Russians and had crossed the German lines after having organised a group of anti-communist partisans of about sixty members. The group was located near Murgasch in the region where HEDELKOFF was later dropped. He had not been given radio training. He was parachuted at the same time as arms, clothing, food and money for his group. He had been given from 10 to 15 French gold pieces of 20 francs denomination and from 80,000 to 100,000 levas. Kommando KLARA, a special aviation unit, was responsible for the operation as it was for all the agents of the Leitstelle.

Until December 1944 HEDELKOFF had no means of communication. After his brother, Doitschin HEDELKOFF, and DRAGANOFF, both W/T operators, were dropped HEDELKOFF sent an average of two messages a week, a total of from twenty-five to thirty messages in all. He was to report on all outstanding political, economic and social events of importance. He had received definite orders not to undertake any sabotage or active resistance without precise orders from the German military authorities. He never received such orders. He was to develop an anti-communist movement organisation in Bulgaria and was to report on the progress of this movement. The Leitstelle had promised to assist HEDELKOFF as much as possible during hostilities but nothing had been planned in case of a German defeat. Hauptmann ZIEGLER believes, however, that HEDELKOFF is still active and that his anti-communist group probably has a membership of several thousands.

Raum II (Zone II). This zone is in central Bulgaria, bounded on the North by the Balkans, on the south by the Rhodepes Mountains, on the west by the old Bulgarian-Yugoslavian frontier, and on the east by an extension of a line going north and south through Rasgrad.

Two agents with the aliases NERO and DIO were parachuted in this zone 60 kms south east of Widin in northern Bulgaria at the beginning of December 1944. They had two W/T transmitting and receiving sets, one a battery set and the other for electric current. Each agent had been given 30 gold pieces (French twenty francs pieces), 100,000 levas and 50 American dollars; one [illegible] pistols, and two or three grenades for

The feed was destined for Boris HEDELKOFF alias HOHMANN, brother of HERO whose real name was Deitschin HEDELKOFF. The latter received his radio training at Mödling and proved to be an excellent W/T operator. HERO's mission was to contact his brother and place himself under his orders. He was to transmitt in Bulgarian. Together with DIO, he was to send meteorological reports.

DIO, whose real name was DRAGANOFF, was recruited by Boris HEDELKOFF, as was HERO, and received his training with HERO. DIO had the same mission and was parachuted at the same time as the latter.

The radio documents concerning DIO and HERO were recovered among the papers of the Leitstelle.

Raum III (Zone III). This zone is in the Black Sea area, bounded on the north by the Bulgarian frontier, on the south by the Turkish frontier, on the west by a line going north and south through Rasgrad, and on the east by the Black Sea.

Three agents, two of whom were W/T operators, were dropped together between Sliven and Burgas in this zone at the beginning of March 1945. One was GUGUTSCHKOFF (phonetic) alias HELLO who had been given a transmitter-receiver set which worked on a battery, twenty gold pieces (French 20 frans pieces), 100,000 levas, a machine gun, two pistols and two or three grenades. GUGUTSCHKOFF had as his mission to make contact with the Organisation Legionär through Mitko (?) MANDAROFF alias MURZIN, one of the leading members of the Bulgarian anti-communist movements and who had been established in his position at the time of Operation TRIPEN. MURZIN had been an inspector in the Bulgarian secret police and undoubtedly has been in hiding since the Russian occupation. At the [illegible] the beginning of April, after he was parachuted, GUGUTSCHKOFF made contact with the centrale WIESE at Obing but he had not sent a report before the dissolution of the centrale at Obing. Hauptmann ZIMMER believes that GUGUTSCHKOFF can still be contacted although nothing had been arranged for in case of a German defeat.

The second of thethree agents was Diamo KRASTCHEFF alias NUMMI and the third agent was DOITSCHKINOFF alias [illegible]. Both these agents were parachuted with GUGUTSCHKOFF and had the same training, equipment and mission as he.

The radio plan for GUGUTSCHKOFF and KRASTCHEFF was found among the Leitstelle radio documents in the mountains near Portisen. In addition GUGUTSCHKOFF is mentioned in the radio plan of the station established at the beginning of May 1945 on the Lempeen-Joch near Portisen and which was supposed to maintain contact with certain agents.

Raum IV (Macedonia) and Raum V (Mediterranean area) were not provided with agents. The four agents, mentioned above, who were trained for Zone IV did not finish their training until later and were sent back to the Bulgarian Organisation Legionär.

Descriptions

Agent I

Agent Boris HEDELKOFF alias HOHMANN: [illegible] chin; black hair; small black moustache; [illegible]

known in Bulgarian military circles and among members of the Organisation Legionär. Speaks only Bulgarian.

Raum II
Boitschin NEDELKOFF alias NERO: 1m76; 30 years old; thin; brown hair; engineer by profession; speaks German and Bulgarian; formerly 1st Lt. in the reserves of the Bulgarian Army; worked for two years in Vienna for a German firm.

BRAGANOFF alias DIO: 1m75; 24 years old; thin; dark blond hair; speaks German and Bulgarian; son of one of the chiefs of police at Sofia; father executed by the Russians; was a student in Sofia.

Raum III
GUGUTSCHKOFF (phonetic) alias BELLO: 1m78; 23 years old; thin; brown hair; speaks German and Bulgarian; lives at Burgas.
Mitko (?) MANDAROFF alias MUEZZIN: to be contacted by GUGUTSCHKOFF; ca. 1m75; 42-45 years old; heavy; brown hair; grey blue eyes; round face; always clean-shaven; dresses in European clothes; very calm.

Biano KRATSCHEFF alias NURMI: 1m75; 24 years old; thin; black hair; speaks German and Bulgarian; student.

DOITSCHKINOFF alias DOBRE: 1m76; 24 years old; thin; black hair; black moustache; speaks German and Bulgarian; cousin of Boris NEDELKOFF

The information on FA1 was obtained from BAUER and ZIEGLER. TÜMMLER, whose interrogation will be more exhaustive, has not yet been arrested as far as we know. All the documents mentioned above have been sent to SHAEF CI War Room, London.

Operations and Agents of Referat FA2

This Referat was under the orders of Leutnant BRÜGGEBOS. Under his jurisdiction were Yugoslavia and Greece and to carry out the missions Frontaufklärungkommando 201 and Frontaufklärungtruppe 215, 214, 221, 223 and 219 were to be employed. As BRÜGGEBOS is still at liberty, as far as we know, our knowledge of the operations of this referat is fragmentary.

This referat was organised into four unternehmen.

1. ALGOL

In January 1945 FAK 201 sent one of the Bulgarian nationalist leaders CAFER DEVA with a group of twenty Albanians to the Leitstelle at Vienna. This group asked moral support by means of propaganda for the Albanian nationalists. It was arranged that anti-communist tracts, translated into Albanian, would be dropped in Albania but it was not planned to send any agents. ZIEGLER is unable to say whether this operation took place or not and none of the other members of the Leitstelle at present in our hands is able to give any information on the operation.

2. POLLUX

This operation was designed to establish a net- [illegible] The [illegible] of POLLUX depended

Note: The operation except to arrange the parachuting with Commando KLARA. At the end of December 1944, a number of agents were dropped, but by error they jumped 150 kms from the agreed point which was in the region northeast of Salonika. The agents were arrested by the British.

3. VUK

This operation was concerned with organising a group of Serb nationalists under the Serbian Minister LJOTIC. Its purpose was to combat communism. Practically, FAK 201 was responsible for the operation with the assistance of the Leitstelle. LJOTIC was killed accidentally in February 1945.

VUK I. A group of twenty Serbs was to stay behind the lines after the German retreat with a Serb radio operator to maintain contact. No message was transmitted or, at least was not received.

VUK II. Thirty Serb partisans of LJOTIC were trained at a camp in Kaiserwald near Graz. The names of two members of the group are known: Oberleutnant LENNAC, a Serb, and Leutnant VUERSCH, a German. VUERSCH was parachuted in January 1945 in the mountains of the region around Konlje with a W/T transmitter. The fate of the group is not known.

VUK III. At the same time as VUK II, thirty other Serbs were in training at Kaiserwald. They were to be parachuted later but the operation never took place and they returned to the Serb Legion near Trieste.

Leutnant BRÜGGEBOS is evidently the only member of the Leitstelle who would be in a position to furnish information on these operations.

Among the radio documents of the Leitstelle were found the radio plans of four agents all operating in Yugoslavia, of whom three were under Oberleutnant BRÜGGEBBOS: (the names given to the agents are those of their posts) KALMAN, who transmitted in Serb and who was in the region of Kopacuik. KALMAN had two W/T sets. BRÜGGEBBOS is described on KALMAN's radio plan as the führende offizier; ALGOL I, the radio plan dated 3 March 1945 states that the agent was to be parachuted 23 March 1945 and the station, theoretically, was to be in the region of Skopje. The messages were to be translated into German. The führende offizier was BRÜGGEBBOS; BLAGO, the radio plan dated 31 January 1945 and the language used was Serb. The region of operation was Kopacuik. This agent was to send tactical and meteorological information. BRÜGGEBBOS was again führende offizier; DUJAN, the station was to operate in the region of Belgrade. The agent had two W/T sets. The name of BRÜGGEBBOS is not mentioned.

4. KINO

This operation was to attempt to sabotage on a large scale the Allied gasoline dumps in the Middle East. It is rather difficult to ascertain in what way the Leitstelle was connected with this operation which never took place. The only Leitstelle officer concerned with KINO was Leutnant BRÜGGEBOS.

Operations and Agents of Referat FA3

This Referat was under the orders of Leutnant Alfred PIFF, whose jurisidiction extended to Roumania and Hungary. For the execution of his operations PIFF employed FAK 206 and FATs 201, 204, 213, 202 and 250.

The Referat organised the following special operations:

1. URANUS I

This undertaking was begun before the Leitstelle existed and was completely carried out by FAK 205. The only part the Leitstelle played in the operation was to receive the documents pertaining to it. These documents have been recovered and sent to the War Room. The operation was concerned with the establishment of sabotage, arms and food depots in Hungary.

2. URANUS II

This operation was concerned with building an anti-communist resistance movement in Hungary. All preparations for URANUS II were made by FAK 206, the Leitstelle merely supervising. Agents were recruited and trained but never placed.

3. REGULUS

About the 20 September 1944 PIFF was ordered to organise an operation for Roumania which was to be known by the code name REGULUS. The purpose of the operation was to infiltrate agents into Roumania who were to an atmosphere favorable to the German counter-offensive, to reform the anti-communist nationalist groups and to send political, economic, social and military information. They were strictly forbidden to commit any acts of sabotage, a prerogative of SKORZENY's.

In order to obtain the necessary personnel for this unternehmen, PIFF, on orders from Oberstleutnant FECHNER, was to get in touch with Horia SIMA, chief of the Roumanian Iron Guard at that time at the Hotel Imperial, Vienna. SIMA had 360 Iron Guard members at his disposition. These men had recently been liberated from Buchenwald where they had been interned for two years because of the conflict between SIMA and ANTONESCU. The latter had been backed by the Germans. SIMA agreed to put some of his men at the disposition of PIFF, although expressing surprise that so many people were asking aid of him. In fact, SKORZENY, a short time before, had made a similar request and had recruited 150 men.

A group of fifteen men was put at the disposal of the Leitstelle and PIFF turned them over to Oberstleutnant HOTZEL of Nachrichten Regiment 506 for training as radiooperators. They began their training on 26 September 1944 at Kreitenfurt near Vienna. At the beginning of October when it became evident that the agents would be ready to leave on their missions by the end of November, PIFF again got in touch with SIMA in order to obtain supplementary personnel who were to be formed into groups and parachuted separately, each group with two W/T operators and a certain number of agents. PIFF obtained thirty-seven agents from SIMA. They were trained by Lehrregiment Kurfürst at

[illegible] near Berlin. The instruction was particularly [illegible] with special preparation for their missions and with [illegible] handling of explosives. As all these agents were already [illegible] specialists in political subversion, that part of the training [illegible] omitted.

In the middle of November 1944 all the agents were brought to Breitenfurt. There were fifty-one agents in all, of whom fourteen were W/T operators. Three potential radio operators had been eliminated during the training course. PIRP then got in touch with Kommando KLARA (Gruppe I of Luftgeschwader 200) which was located at the Wiener-Neustadt airport. Kommando KLARA was responsible for parachuting agents.

When everything had been arranged with the Kommando PIRP returned to Breitenfurt with SIMA and organised the agents into seven groups. Each group was made up of two W/T operators with a transmitting-receiving set of battery type No. 109/3. Each agent was given five gold pieces and 300,000 leis. The members of Groups III, VI, and VII received in addition 5000 roubles as they were to be parachuted into a region of Roumania where roubles were used as currency. In addition, they received items which could be used in exchange for food, such as lighters and flints, and saccharine. Each agent had a 45 pistol and each group had two Walther PPK 32s with silencers. Each agent had a Beretta machine gun and each radio operator a wrist watch. They also had enough explosive to destroy their equipment if the need arose.

GROUP I

This group was made up of six agents. The head of the group, VERCA, was also one of the radio operators. The other W/T operator was Nicolae BALANESCU; another agent of the group was CODILA. The name of the radio station was STUHA. They were to work south of Banat and were to be parachuted 50kms southeast of Lugoj. They were dropped during the night 9-10 December 1944 and by error landed 50 kms to the east of the town. Their radio was damaged in the landing but they succeeded a few days later in making contact with another group PRINZ EUGEN which transmitted their messages to the centrale at Vienna. At the landing two members of the group were separated from the others and were taken intthe village of Maria. Some shots were exchanged with the Roumanian police but they succeeded in escaping and rejoined the rest of the group. They then went toward the valley of the river Timis where they were supposed to have been parachuted. BALANESCU took the transmitter to Timisoara (Temesvar) to be repaired by an electrician . BALANESCU was arrested by the Roumanian police probably for a reason that had nothing to do with the fact that he was a W/T operator. He managed to escape two days later. The receiver was repaired and the station PRINZ EUGEN continued to maintain contact with the centrale.

As Group II (MALSKI) and Group III (MARIAN) [illegible] trouble with their radios the Leitstelle decided to [illegible] new sets and radio plans to the three groups. The [illegible] took place 11 March 1945 but the aircraft did not find [illegible] agreed on for the parachuting and crashed on its return [illegible] Wiener-Neustadt. The operation was repeated successfully [illegible] March. Three transmitters were dropped: STUHA [illegible]

[illegible] STUNA III and MARZAN III made almost immediate [illegible] the centrale but MALSKI was never heard. At the be- [illegible] STUNA announced that it would [illegible] the tra- [illegible] the set of the latter having been damaged at the [illegible] parachuting. From then on STUNA sent messages almost [illegible] the location of the station was never changed. The [illegible] place in Roumania and the messages were mainly con- [illegible] information about the anti-communist movement in the [illegible]. According to STUNA, the movement was made up of about three thousand active members with at least one representative [illegible] a village. STUNA also sent some military information although [illegible] trained for that. This station was included in the list of agents which the Leitstelle was to contact from its centrale located on the Lampsen Joch at a height of 2600 meters.

DESCRIPTIONS

Afilon VERCA: 32 years old; 1m68; thin; round face; brown hair; nervous, very active and intelligent; moustache. Comes from the Banat.

Nicolae BALANESCU: 35 years old; 1m70; thin; round face; dark hair; calm; moustache. School teacher; comes from Timisoara (Temesvar).

CODILA: 35 years old; 1m70; big; round face; dark blond hair; calm; athletic type. Come from the Banat.

GROUP II

This group was made up of eight agents. The head of the group, GLIGOR, was also one of the radio operators. The second W/T operator was Alfred POPESCU. The code name of the radio station was MALSKI. The group was parachuted during the night 12-13 December 1944, and, as arranged, landed 40kms to the east of Arad. They never transmitted directly but first through PRINZ EUGEN and later through STUNA.

DESCRIPTIONS

Cantenir GLIGOR: 38 years old; 1m80; thin; long face; moustache; nervous. Comes from the north of the Banat.

Alfred POPESCU: 25 years old; 1m72; medium build; round face; light blond hair; phlegmatic. Student; comes from Bucharest.

GROUP III

This group was made up of eight agents. The chief of the group, GRIMALSCHI, was also one of the radio operators. The head W/T operator was MARUSCA. The following agents were also members of the group: NEAGU, ACHIMESCU and Aurel CHIRIS. The code name of the station was MARZAN. The group was parachuted during the night 12-13 December 1944 50kms south southeast of Kolossvar. They sent their first message three or four days later. They made contact with the centrale about five times a week except when they moved their station which occurred about three times. They sent the same type of report as STUNA but never any military information. They operated in Central Transylvania. One day they announced that two of their members, one of whom was NEAGU, had disappeared and two or three days later their

1

[illegible] above, no message was received from them. [illegible] signal was intercepted once by the centrale. [illegible] station included in those that the Leitstelle [illegible] from the new centrale set up in the mountains [illegible]

DESCRIPTIONS

Pavel GHEMARESCU: 32 years old; 1m72; thin; oval face; blond hair; leader type; calm. Law student at Cluj; comes from the Moldau.

[illegible]RESCA; 24 years old; 1m62; thin; oval face; black hair; childish appearance; vivacious. Student; comes from Cluj.

Aurel GHIRA: 28 years old; 1m68; fat; round face; blond hair; full of life. Student; comes from Hatszeland.

[illegible]: no description available.

AGHINESCU: no description available.

GROUP IV

This group was made up of seven agents, the chief of whom was TOMA. GHEORGHEGHI was one of the radio operators. [illegible] does not remember the name of the second operator. The name of the post was GORNIP. They were to be parachuted 40 kms. South of Bilin (?) but an error of 30 kms. was made. At the time of the landing th Roumanian police was on their track but they managed to escape. Their first message was received two or three days after their arrival. Contact was lost but was reestablished through MARZAN. The reason for the break in contact is not known but [illegible] thinks that it was because of a defect in the radio equipment.

DESCRIPTIONS

Nicodim TOMA: 27 years old; 1m78; medium build; light hair; lively and active. Comes from Transylvania.

GHEORGHEGHI: 35 years old; 1m75; medium build; [illegible] dark blond hair; calm. Comes from Transylvania.

GROUP V

This group was made up of six agents, the chief of [illegible] MARMARIN. PASCA, who was killed in landing, was the [illegible] of the radio operators. FLORESCU was another [illegible]. The W/T transmitter was destroyed in landing. The [illegible] of the post was GALO. The group never carried on any [illegible] vity and this information was transmitted through [illegible]

GROUP VI

This group was made up of eight agents. [illegible] the [illegible] operators, was the chief. [illegible] or [illegible] was [illegible]. The code name of the station was [illegible] [illegible] km. north of Bucharest instead of [illegible] [illegible] They started transmitting [illegible] after the landing. They had very difficult [illegible]

like the mountains near Brasov at an altitude of about 1200 meters. They made contact with and employed a group of German prisoners who had escaped from the Russians. Their zone of action was the Sinaia-Brasov region. One of their messages said that their W/T set had been damaged by the cold and it was decided to send them a new battery. Contact with the group was broken. However, and through GROUP VII (LOPA) the Leitstelle learned that in the middle of February 1945 the group NUTRU had had a fight with the Rumanian police but that all the members had escaped.

DESCRIPTIONS (GROUPV)

Ion MANDRESCU: 35 years old; 1m72; medium build; oval face; black hair; calm; type of leader. Comes from Transylvania.

Vasile PASCA: 32 years old; 1m72; medium build; oval face; naive. Dead.

Stelian VLORESCU: 35 years old; 1m73; medium build; long face; black hair; calm; moustache. Comes from Brasov.

DESCRIPTIONS (GROUP VI)

Dimitru MONU: 40 years old; 1m82; well-built; long face; black hair; calm. Comes from Brasov.

SUTU or SUTRA: about 35 years old; 1m70; fat; round face; light blond hair; obliging; calm. Teacher. Comes from Prahova-Tal.

GROUP VII

This group was made up of eight agents, the chief of whom was JOVIN. The radio operators were Nicolas POPESCU and CIUPALA. POLISTIUC and PITIGARU were also members of the group. They landed 90 kms west of Brasov instead of to the south west. The code name of their station was LOPA. They established contact about fifteen days after their arrival and after they had reached the region of the oil wells of Ploesti and the neighborhood of Bucarest where they were supposed to operate. This group quickly established an excellent network which supplied the best political information received by the Leitstelle. CIUPALA at one time sent a message saying that he had been contacted by a British agent, who, because of the close watch kept by the Russians, was unable to accomplish anything and was anxious to employ members of the Iron Guard. PIFF told CIUPALA to refrain from mixing in the affair.

LOPA, having lost its calibration coil, sent a message through one of the stations of Referat Roumania of Amt VI in the Bucharest region. ARNER, chief of the referat, re-transmitted the message to PIFF and received PIFF's response. At the end of February the station broke off after having announced the arrest of POPESCU.

DESCRIPTIONS

Nicolae POPESCU: 26 years old; 1m73; thin; oval face; black hair; nervous; intelligent. Student. Comes from Prahova-Tal.

Vasile JOVIN: 45 years old; 1m73; [illegible] grey hair; very calm; pensive. Comes [illegible] lived in Bucarest.

CIUPALA: 35 years old; 1m73; thin; long [illegible] hair; calm. Worked for the railroads. Comes from [illegible] Tal.

POLISTIUC: 27 years old; 1m70; thin; [illegible] hair; comes from Bukovina.

PITIGARU: Comes from Bukovina.

GROUP VIII

About 15 December 1944 [illegible] Group South to the Wehrmachtkommandostab and to the [illegible] ing attention to the fact that in certain regions of [illegible] were German prisoners who had escaped from the [illegible] in need of assistance. An order was issued to send [illegible] help the prisoners. FÖCHERR ordered PIFF to get in [illegible] with SINA in order to obtain the necessary personnel [illegible] three of his men but no radio operator. PIFF applied [illegible] MANGELSDORFF of Bataillon Regiment 806 who [illegible] German W/T operator, Gefreiter FÖCHERR. PIFF [illegible] two members of the Iron Guard, BORCHSICRANU and [illegible] group was dropped during the night of 17-18 December [illegible] south of the Danat and they began to transmit [illegible] landing. They never found the so-called group of [illegible] On the other hand they succeeded in establishing [illegible] Group STUKA and later with MARIAN. They maintained radio [illegible] until the end. The centrale in the mountains still received the [illegible] nal of PRINZ EUGEN.

DESCRIPTIONS

Klaus FÖCHERR: 19 years old; 1m70; [illegible] face; blond hair; calm and courageous. [illegible] only German. Comes from Berlin. Chief of the [illegible]

BORCHSICRANU: 35 years old; 1m68; fat; round [illegible] blond hair; lively. Comes from the Danat.

Vasile DATRAN: 27 years old; 1m70; long [illegible] black hair; naive. Student. Comes from the [illegible]

Groups IV, V, VI, and VII were [illegible] some place about 21 December 1944. They all landed very [illegible] the pre-arranged spot.

4. SINA

[illegible]

of the operation. At the beginning of March [illegible] ply fifteen to twenty-five men. The men were sent [illegible] for training as radio technicians and at the end of April were ready to leave. They were given twelve or thirteen transmitters, one of which was very powerful. However, they did not leave because Kommando KLARA had no more gasoline for its airplanes and, in addition, Amt VI B in the person of ABSHER forbade the undertaking on the pretext that all radio operations in the Balkans were exclusively the business of Amt VI B.

All radio plans of Operation HERCULES have been recovered and sent to the War Room.

5. SIRIUS

This undertaking was assigned to PAK 205 and later to PAT 217 under Kommando 20(. It was to establish a network of agents in Slovakia. Leutnant SCHOLZ of the Leitstelle was responsible for supervision of SIRIUS and he spent all of his time on it after he was attached to PAT 217 in December 1944.

CONCLUSION

This summary does not attempt to give a complete picture of all of the activities and undertakings of Leitstelle II Süd-Ost but rather it attempts to give as faithful a picture as possible of the achievements of this organization as seen in operation. The information contained in this report is derived principally from the interrogations of Hauptmann SINGLER (concerning Bulgaria), Leutnant PIFF (concerning Operation HERCULES), Leutnant BAUER (concerning Operation VUK), and of Oberstleutnant FECHNER. The documents which were recovered with the aid of SINGLER have been used only slightly because of their purely technical nature.

This summary should, however, be sufficient to establish that the radio networks of the Leitstelle seen as a whole arose from the same necessity. Despite lack of information on the Serbian networks, the same is probably true for them. In fact, among the documents recovered, there is "Technikre Plan KRANICH" which is nothing more than the radio plan for the centrale installed at the beginning of May on the Lempesen-Joch near Partisan. This plan was to include all the radio agents when the Germans thought it was still possible to contact at the moment of the surrender. The plan includes six stations: PRINZ EUGEN, STUKA 3, MALSKY, MARIAN, HELLO and KLAGO, four in Roumania, one in Bulgaria and one in Serbia. It is necessary, however, to eliminate two of the Roumanian stations: MALSKY, in fact, never transmitted and MARIAN never sent a message directly, its call signal having been intercepted only once. HELLO established contact with the centrale but never sent any messages. Concerning KLAGO there is not enough information. It should be noted, moreover, that this plan does not include certain stations, such as KAMIL, which at that period could have been contacted. Judging from the facts as provided by the headquarters of the Leitstelle these networks were more or less in a state of dissolution at the time of the German surrender. Certain individual stations were able to survive but the system as a whole was disorganized. The networks were not set up to carry out by themselves; they were established with the idea that the Wehrmacht would return in strength. This fact is particularly obvious in the case of the choice of the Bulgarian agents, for the most part notorious

[illegible]

present time, in [illegible] which the greater part of the [illegible] as valuable as a peace [illegible] ties to be overcome are large if only [illegible] fact that the transmissions take place in [illegible]

The greatest argument against [illegible] works, except for the [illegible] phones, lies in [illegible] core of the Leitstelle. Oberstleutnant [illegible] and Leutnant BAUER claim that their only [illegible] months was to establish contact with the [illegible] not succeeding, they decided to protect [illegible] such as the radio stations. [illegible] Western Powers and Russia is inevitable and [illegible] the disposition of the Western Allies in the hope that [illegible] be rewarded. It has not been possible to determine to [illegible] this idea of collaboration with the Allied intelligence [illegible] includes also the idea of using these same services [illegible] new operations.

The reactivation of these networks [illegible] German intelligence service presents not only [illegible] supposing that it is possible to reactivate [illegible] very real risks. In fact, the case of the [illegible] separately, that is, without comparing it to [illegible] have been encountered during the last few [illegible] exceedingly difficult to determine real [illegible] man networks in the West, it has been possible to [illegible] precise idea of the German services [illegible]

The German strategy is marked by [illegible] first phase consists in trying to turn the [illegible] others, and at the same time trying to [illegible] German intelligence [illegible] cover of Allied [illegible] purely German [illegible] contents, the collaboration of one or [illegible] of the Leitstelle is necessary and [illegible] their first aim is given them. [illegible] up the idea of employing the [illegible] that their objective is not achieved [illegible] possibility of employing certain [illegible] ing the officers themselves. [illegible] solved; a plan which will not further the [illegible] stelle.

DISTRIBUTION

[illegible] cc --- G.S. Z-2 Germany [illegible]

1 cc --- PIP Case File [illegible]

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER
OSS MISSION FOR GERMANY
X-2 BRANCH
APO 655

9th August 1945

To: Capt. Eric TIDE, Munich

Subject: Directed Interrogation of Oberstlt. FECHNER

1. CIB, USFET has requested that the following questions be put to FECHNER. The questions are quoted as submitted.

a) Full details of attempts to sabotage British shipping in St. George's Bay, Greece at the beginning of the war.

b) List of all undertakings known to FECHNER in or concerning the following countries. The list should include, wherever possible, name of undertaking; date; objective; in what country; directed by whom; from whom; controlling agency.

Greece, North Africa, Italy, Egypt, South Africa, Afghanistan, India, Persia, Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordania, South America, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France.

Statements by FECHNER that such-and-such an officer of Mil D would know more about a certain country are of no interest in the sense that we still want his information.

c) Names and cover names of all Abw. II and Mil D agents, with data as to their use and controlling officers.

d) My previous questions sent by Major EVANS to Third Army, not so far answered.

e) Full particulars, including real name, and activities of BOLIVAR.

2. Please pouch details to this office as soon as completed.

ANDREW R. BURNING
Lt. Colonel, A.C.
Commanding

Distribution:
1 - CO, SCI Munich
1 - Major J.B. OAKES (Attn. Lt. WELLA B)
1 - Ops File

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

AB 012 THIRD Army

AB010

A. AB/OSS INVESTIGATING INTERPRETATION WAR DEPT PARTICULARLY [illegible] DISCUSSED ON PHONE.

B. FECHNER CAN BE RELEASED BUT CIB WANTS TO KNOW HIS [illegible] ADDRESS AND YOUR PROPOSED MEANS OF CONTROL.

C. BUT WE ALSO CAN ARRANGE RELEASE OF GROUP IN PARA ABLE [illegible] IF AUTOMATIC ARREST CATEGORY IF YOU CAN GET HERE BY FRI[illegible] POUCH PERTINENT DETAILS ON EACH.

D. DETAILS SHOULD INCLUDE STATEMENT ON EACH GIVING [illegible] DETAILS, PROPOSED PLAN OF EMPLOYMENT, FUTURE ADDRESS, [illegible] OF CONTROL, DETAILS OF ARREST.

E. USUAL INFORMATION ON OTHER ABLE CASES WOULD SUFFICE.

TYP

~~SECRET~~

RESTRICTED

(G-2/CIS/DPMS)

istry of Justice Officials

#2118

G-2 Opns Branch	8 Aug 1945	1. Forwarded for necessary action by your branch, in accordance with conversation between Maj KRAMER and Capt MOOTHE, 7 August 1945.

2. The files of this branch have been checked and the latest available information is listed below:

	POSITION	DISMISSED ED	LOCATION
rt	Adm Mat	2118	3rd Army Interrogation Center
	Adm Dir	[illegible]	7th Army Interrogation Center
, Wolfgang	Adm Dir	607	3rd Inf Div PW
lf	Adm Mat	1026	36th Div PW
erich	Adm Dir	608	3rd Inf Div PW
, Hermann	Eng Mat	687	3rd Inf Div PW
l	Vice Pres des Nollesgerichtshof	1833	7th Army Interrogation Center
ard	Ofm		3rd Inf Div PW
rl	Adm Mat	1876	Bremen Interrogation Center

Ltr. U4600, file IN CI SI 383.6-33, dat d 21 July 5, subj. as above.

T. J. HAMES
Colonel, General Staff Corps
Chief, GSD

Checked

RESTRICTED

07 1300

07 2050

TO: ABOO, AMZON

FROM: AB012, THIRD A RGY

1. REUR LETTER APPROVING RELEASE [illegible]

INSTRUCTING CONTACT THIRD ARMY.

8. G-2 3RD AGREES RELEASE BUT [illegible]

MAKE WRITTEN USFET ORDER NECESSARY.

10. ADVISE IF YOU CAN GET OR [illegible]

Sci - USFET for action

#2114

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER
OSS MISSION FOR GERMANY
X-2 BRANCH
APO 655

#2118

23 July 1945

CO, SCI Detachment Munich

: Release of Obstlt. FAHRMAR - ref. your memo of 14 June.

. chief X-2/OSS Germany is in agreement with your sug- that Obstlt. FAHRMAR be released and returned to his ortison.

is requested that the recommendation for FAHRMAR's be submitted by the CO SCI Munich to Chief CIB, 3rd

NTION:

- ARMY LONDON
- ARMY WASHINGTON
- Chief CIB, G-2, USFET
- CO, SCI Munich
- Ops. File

SECRET

SECRET

U.S. GROUP CONTROL COUNCIL
(Germany)
APO 742
Office of the Director of Intelligence

IN CI AI 383.6-53

21 July 1945

SUBJECT: Ministry of Justice Officials.

TO : AC of S, G-2, U.S. Forces, European Theater, APO 757.

1. The enclosed list of individuals wanted by the Legal Division, this headquarters, for purposes of interrogation concerning activities of the German Ministry of Justice, is forwarded herewith. Latest information available to the location of these individuals has been noted in pencil opposite each name.

2. This office would appreciate any information as to which of these individuals are under detention, either as Security suspects or as Prisoners of War, where they are located, and whether they may be made available for interrogation by the Legal Division, this headquarters.

For the Director of Intelligence:

H. O. SIXON
Colonel, Cav.
Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch

Incl:
List of
Officials

SECRET

ARK SAFETYA FILM

INCOMING

~~SECRET~~

Doc 1134

14 July 1945

AMLON FOR SHEDS, G-2, 12 AG

WASHCOM, LONDON

A. Please refer to your 438 of 5 June concerning Kurt [illegible]TP and other members of Leitstelle II Sud Ost including Lt. [illegible] PIFF arrested by 1st Army.

B. Also refer to para 15 of annex "A" of USFET weekly [illegible]ligence summary No 47 for period ending 3 July which reports [illegible]t of Lt. Alfred PIFF of Leitstelle II Sud Ost by CIC Corps on [illegible]ne.

C. Please confirm that these two men are not identical [illegible]e of name, rank, area of operation and formation. Have [illegible]y suggestion as to how we should distinguish them in our [illegible]lections to avoid inevitable confusion.

(435 is OSS OUT 647)

OSS 2890

[illegible]NT

[illegible]EO

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING

180217

091450

100815

TO: CROWN

FROM: WAR OSS LONDON

REF YOUR AMLON 060 RE FERID.

A. REFS TO FERID WILL BE FOUND IN YOUR REPORTS ON [illegible] KOCH SUGAR POINT 1490 AND ROOKS SLANT 100. NAME [illegible] [illegible] FERID AS WELL AS FECHNER MAY BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH [illegible] POINT RAISED IN OUR VAR 5684 RE KOCH REPORTS.

B. GOTHARD GARBER NOW AT CAMP 020 STATES THAT [illegible] WITH KRO 201 TILL AUTUMN 44 WHEN HE MOVED TO MIL ABT [illegible] LOG REFERAT SUDOST AND THAT HE HAD EXEPTIONALLY GOOD [illegible] IN GREECE.

C. FURTHER TRACES IF ANY WILL FOLLOW SOONEST.

D. SUGGEST THAT FERID SHOULD JOIN KISSENBURG AND FECHNER GROUP AT MILE FOR ITAM UNIT 4 FOR FULL [illegible] INVIEW OF HIS PAST ABT ROMAN 2 ACTIVITIES IN BALKANS [illegible] RECENT POSITION AS HEAD OF REFERAT SUDOST. KISSENBURG [illegible] FECHNER GROUP AND FERID OUGHT BETWEEN THEM TO [illegible] ACCOUNT OF ABT ROMAN 2 SUDOST ACTIVITIES.

Fechner is at 7th Army. Evidently in South Germany he and 26th Army

SAINT

EXEC

SECRET

SCI TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
MUNICH

15 June 45

: Kurt FUCHSER, Oberstleutnant, z.V.,
Commanding Officer Leitstelle II, Sud-Ost.

: CO, X-2 Germany.

INTERROGATION REPORT "TIP" CASE

DATA

1. Born June 5, 1896 at LEITMERITZ, Bohemia. Married - ta nee Grimm - no children. Wife is a doctor of me- d lives at PERTISAU, Austria. Nationality - Austrian. - Roman Catholic. Description: Hgt: about 6 ft; Wgt: lbs; big head, long, pointed face; long nose, wide blue eyes, dark blond, spare hair; erect, military speaks in a slow, precise, professorial fashion; - German, French, Polish and Czech; is in a delicate health - gall stones, two wounds in the stomach, one lung.

2. He is a professional soldier. In the last war he th the Austro-Hungarian Army, attaining the rank rleutnant. After the Armistice he attended the Uni- f Vienna. By 1938 he was an Oberstleutnant and di- the Army Institute of Science at Vienna. The an- f Austria with Germany brought him degradation and dismissal from the service; the reasons given: he er of the anti-Nazi "Wehrbund" and "Impurity of blood" grandfather was a Jew. When Germany invaded Poland he was called back into the Army — as a private. nt he received assistance from an old friend of t (later General) v. LANGSDORF, Chef Abwehr II, he signed and taken into the Abwehr. By 1941 he rose k of Major.

3. In April 1944 General LANGSDORF was at the Russian Abwehr II was headed by Oberst Baron PERTIAS, a very nd of the family. Baron PERTIAS commissioned FUCHSER e the Leitstelle II Sud-Ost with headquarters in According to the directive the headquarters should in BELGRADE, where the headquarters of Heeresgruppe F ed, but in deference to FUCHSER's delicate health rsonal wish to remain at home, Vienna was chosen.

SECRET

When the Russians approached Vienna [illegible] to PERTISAU, where it was [illegible] overrun the territory.

4. The Leitstelle II Sud-Ost [illegible] the command of Oberst Baron [illegible], [illegible] leutnant FUCHSER was the [illegible] elements were combined to create [illegible]

a. Abwehr clerical staff.
b. Abwehr administrative [illegible]
c. Radio central [illegible]
d. The [illegible] supply unit attached [illegible]

The name "Leitstelle II [illegible]
"Leitstelle" — it was [illegible]
"II" — it was under the [illegible]
"Sud-Ost" — it was [illegible] Kleinrauf [illegible] attached [illegible] Sud-Ost.

5. This Leitstelle was created for [illegible] reasons:

a. To bring all the Tactical [illegible] Army Group F under one [illegible]
b. To keep records for [illegible] (FAKs and FATs)
c. To equip and supply these [illegible]
d. To collect [illegible] reports [illegible] FAKs and FATs.
e. To give account of the [illegible] FATs to Abwehr II in [illegible]
f. To assist the Army Group [illegible] by creating and [illegible] network (Spiritual [illegible] Force).

6. These FAKs and FATs, through [illegible] Leitstelle, were not commanded by the [illegible] their orders from the [illegible] attached, where they also received [illegible]

7. Following are the FAKs [illegible] Leitstelle II Sud-Ost and serving [illegible]

a. FAK 301 in Bregenz [illegible]
The FAK CO - [illegible]
The FAKs attached [illegible]

SECRET

[illegible] in Slovakia.
[illegible] FAK CC - Maj BRUNDT
[illegible] FAT attached to it: 217 (Originally with FAK 201)

[illegible] CC in Southern Balkans.
[illegible] FAK CC - Hptm REINHARDT.
[illegible] FATs attached to it: 201, 204, 213, 250.

[illegible] the known Special Operations organization Leitstelle II Sud-Ost:

[illegible] - in Albania under Bruggeboes
LAUER - in Bulgaria under Ziegler and Bauer
[illegible]GULUS - in Roumania under Piff
SIRIUS - in Slovakia under FAK 205
[illegible] - in Hungary under Piff
[illegible] - in Serbia under Bruggeboes.

[illegible]. Station [illegible] was the service radio station of the [illegible]. When the German troops retreated WEHA was divi[illegible] parts; one [illegible] to PERTISAU, and another to OBING. [illegible] station was at the disposal of the Leitstelle. [illegible] ordered the PERTISAU radio station to become absolutely [illegible] of any other central, so that it would be possible [illegible] hand in all records and equipment of the whole Leit[illegible] the Americans when they finally entered the territory. [illegible] the equipment of this station was smashed to avoid [illegible] remaining active to the very last moment. The [illegible] was done to another station (name [illegible] one [illegible]) by the [illegible]. The [illegible] for this new station was to observe [illegible] of the approach of either the Americans or the SS. The frequencies, codes, and maps indicating specific [illegible] of arms, weapons and money depots were saved and handed [illegible] Third Army.

10. The Leitstelle could in times of great need call for [illegible] (through channels) on the 200th Liaison Squadron [illegible] Luftwaffe. But during the last year of war when their [illegible] the most urgent, the Luftwaffe could not give the [illegible] because of the gas shortage. Shortly be[illegible] Americans took possession of the PERTISAU Area a [illegible] was sent to recover the radio and depot records [illegible] of the Leitstelle, but fog prevented the plane [illegible] in the mountainous area.

11. The headquarters of the Leitstelle was divided [illegible] main parts:

Referat 1 - covering Roumania, Hungary, Slovakia;
Referat 2 - covering Bulgaria, and Macedonia;
Referat 3 - covering Serbia and Croatia.

SECRET

SECRET

Referat 1 was under Lt. PIFF, 2 under Lt TURNLER, 3 under [illegible] Oblt BRUGGEBOES.
These referats kept in touch (by radio) with the FAKs and [illegible] FATs working in the territories assigned to them and [illegible] reports on the Front Aufklarung Units.

12. The personnel of the Leitstelle was almost [illegible] composed of either anti-Nazis or just plain army men [illegible] ferent to any politics. To be sure exceptions occurred [illegible] they were people who were planted in the Leitstelle by [illegible] Nazis as a sort of informers ("Spitzel", stool pigeons). [illegible] PIFF was considered to have been one of the such [illegible] formers. He had two men loyal to him whom he used as [illegible] for his contacts with Stubfu BEWESCH of the Jagdverband Sud-Ost and with Ustuf W BEB of Amt VIe.

13. Subject claims that the putsch of 20 July was the work of Abwehr II, which he thinks is a proof of the [illegible] anti-Nazi feeling prevading this organization. And the [illegible] members were almost all Army Abwehr men to whom the [illegible] appealed. Among those who lost their lives as the [illegible] the putsch are the following:

Oberst Baron FREYTAG, of the OKW Abwehr II,
Oberst MARCONA, of the Leitstelle Sud-Ost,
Oberst ARNSTER, staff member of Leitstelle [illegible]
Oberst HANSEN, of the Mil Amt.

14. This 20 July affair destroyed almost the whole [illegible] Abwehr and particularly the Leitstelle II Sud-Ost, a newly created weaker member of the Abwehr. HIMMLER and the [illegible] took control of the Abwehr, and the Leitstelle was closely supervised by WANNEK of Amt VIe.

15. In Oct 44 SKORZENY took over the Leitstelle [illegible] Ost. It was his opinion that it has outlived its usefulness and that it should be dissolved. Its place was to be [illegible] by the newly created JAGDVERBAND. Had the war lasted [illegible] longer the Leitstelle would have entirely disappeared.

16. The JAGDVERBAND was made up of strong [illegible] was to be entirely independent of either the Abwehr or [illegible] Army. Whereas the Army issued orders and assigned [illegible] the Kommandos and Truppe of the Leitstelle — [illegible] in the dark as to activity of the JAGDVERBAND. [illegible] of the JAGDVERBAND was divided into 3 departments: [illegible] West, and Ost. Sturmbannführer BEWESCH was the head [illegible] Jagdverband Sud-Ost.

DOCUMENTS RECOVERED BY SCI

17. Records on codes, frequencies and hidden [illegible] established in the Balkan area by the Kommandos and [illegible] of the Leitstelle were kept at the Leitstelle. [illegible] 45 the RSHA in Berlin ordered the Leitstelle [illegible]

by courier to the "super-Nazi" Major LOOS of
Colonel FECHNER disregarded this direct order
s were sent out Hptm ZIEGLER with 19 enlisted men
secs documents some here in the nearby mountains.
care has been taken to prevent Lt PUFF from
hands on them. FECHNER's intention was to surren-
here, again to the Americans. Consequently he sent
(who speaks English) to get in touch with any
Intelligence Agency and inform them about it. But
rived in the area before the Americans. FECHNER was
t as traitor, but was saved when the Americans
I contacted FECHNER who located ZIEGLER and BAUER,
in turn, led to the documents.

SECRET

18. SIX PERSONNEL KNOWN TO THE ARMY

RANK	NAME	DIENSTSTELLE	[illegible]
Hstuf.	GERHARD	REHA	?
Oberst.	HELLFRICH	Abwehr I	[illegible]
Oberst.	DÖHEL	Abwehr I	Rosen
Oberst.	SCHOLZ	Abwehr I	[illegible]
Gen.Maj.	v. LAHOUSEN	Abwehr II, Chef	[illegible]
Major	ABSCHAGEN	Abwehr II	Berlin
Obstlt.	v. TARBUK	Abwehr III, Chef	Prague
Obstlt.	v. DOBRUCKI	Abwehr III	Linz
Obstlt.	v. KLIEMANN	Abwehr III	Wiesbaden
Obstlt.	WOLFF	Abwehr III	?
Obstlt.	WACHERHAGEN	Abwehr III	Steyregg
Obstlt.	KROHMA	Abwehr III	Oberösterreich
Major	In-der-MAUR	Abwehr III	Steyregg
Obsubaf.	WANNEK	Amt VI	Hall, Tirol
Hstuf.	POHLMANN	Amt VI	Kreuzmoser
Hstuf.	PRATSCH	Amt VI	Hall, Tirol
Stubaf.	REKKISKN	Amt VI	Trieste
Ustuf.	WABER	Amt VI	Hall, Tirol
Hstuf.	UDLINGER	Amt VI	Hall, Tirol
Major	Dr. LOOS	Amt Mil D	Reith
Kapitan	LOMMIS	Amt Mil D	Reith
Oblt.	Dr. FERICH	Amt Mil D	Reith
Hptm.	Dr. KISSENBERG	Amt Mil D	Bad Wiesbar
Hptm.	BITTNER	Amt Mil D	Reith
Hptm.	SCHONKICH	Amt Mil D	Reith
Major	SCHÜSSLER	Abwehr III	Vienna
Hptm.	HEIMERS	Abwehr III	Vienna
Hptm.	FURRER	Abwehr III	Steyregg
Major	Prof. KOCH	Pol.Amt (?)	Oster[illegible]
Adm.	BRUCKNER	Amt Ausl. Abw	Berlin
Major	WRAMEL	Abwehr III	[illegible]
Oberst.	BUMPROCH	Amt Mil F	[illegible]
Obstlt.	v.KNESEBECK	Amt Mil F	[illegible]
Obstlt.	v.ESCHEBURG	Amt Mil F	[illegible]
Obstlt.	ARNOLD	Amt Mil F	[illegible]
Major	PARTL	Lehrregt.Erfurt	[illegible]
Major	VERBEK	Lehrregt.Erfurt	[illegible]
Hptm.	Dr. WURBCHE	Lehrregt.Erfurt	[illegible]

SECRET

RANK	NAME	DIENSTSTELLE	LAST [illegible]	HOME
Oberst	WUNSCHE	Chef Kdo Meldegebiet Salzburg	Salzburg	Salzburg
Oberst	WAGNER	Chef Kdo Meldegebiet Ungarn	Lech, Tirol	Stuttgart
Oberst	WIESER	Kdo Meldegebiet Wien	St. Ullrich	Breslau
Obstlt.	WAHL	Kdo Meldegebiet Wien	St. Ullrich	Vienna
Obstlt.	SCHUBERT	Kdo Meldegebiet Wien	St. Ullrich	Essen
Major	PROISSECKER	Kdo Meldegebiet Wien	St. Ullrich	Vienna
Major	SPIGL	Kdo Meldegebiet Wien	St. Ullrich	Vienna
Major	TOMASSOVICH	Kdo Meldegebiet Wien	St. Ullrich	Vienna
Hptm.	Dr.HOCHSTETTER	Kdo Meldegebiet Wien	St. Ullrich	Vienna
Hptm.	BOLEY	Kdo Meldegebiet Wien	St. Ullrich	Vienna
Stubaf.	BENESCH	Jagdverband Sud-Ost	Kremsmunster	?
Ustuf.	BARTUL	Jagdverband Sud-Ost	Kremsmunster	?
Oblt.	KOFS	FAK 213 (?)	Triest	?
Hptm.	WITZEL	FAK 202	Bohemia	?
Sdfu.	RAUPIACH	FAK 202	Bohemia	?
Sdfu.	Dr.KUHBERT	FAK 202	Bohemia	?
Hptm.	HOTTEL	Leitstelle II W	Slovakia	?
Lt.	SCHOLZ	Leitstelle II Sud-Ost	Slovakia	?
Kapitaan	v. WEIKS	Leitstelle II Sud-Ost	Berlin	Vienna
Oblt.	BRUGGEBORS	Leitstelle II Sud-Ost	Pertisau	Zillertal
Lt.	TUMLER	Leitstelle II Sud-Ost	Pertisau	?

19. OFFICERS OF LEITSTELLE II SUD-OST now with IC, 7th Army

NOVAK
ZIEGLER
TUMLER (still at large)
BAUER
PIFF

20. Enlisted Men of LEITSTELLE II Sud-Ost, still believed to be in vicinity of PERTISAU:

Uffz. NEUBAUER
Uffz. SPIEDLER
Fw. BRUGGEMANN
Pvt. LECHNER
Pvt. KERN
Pvt. GAHLER

SECRET

21. OTHER COMMENTS MADE BY THE SUBJECT:

a) SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Dr. HOTTL of VI e has made statements to the effect that he had "some kind of game to play when the Americans finally arrive". It was known that he made some mysterious trips toward the Swiss border.

b) Hptm. WITZEL, native of CRACOW, Poland, cover name "Hptm. KIRN" and member of FAK 202, has been at times parachuted into the Russian held territory to work with the Ukrainian Separatist Movement. He has a good knowledge of the Ukrainians' dissatisfaction with the Soviet.

c) Among Fechner's personal friends is a Herr ARNOLDI, of the Vienna Resistance Movement. Fechner has supplied ARNOLDI with weapons and information. The liaison between the two men was maintained by Lt. NOVAK, member of the Leitstelle II, S-O.

d) Another friend of his is a leader of the Austrian Resistance Movement, Baron Alfred ROTH.

22. C O M M E N T

FECHNER is intelligent, well-informed, and cooperative. Unfortunately his state of health is very delicate. He badly needs immediate and general-hospital-type medical attention.

The territory which he knows well and where he has worked is now in the Third Army Area.

Therefore it was considered advisable to transfer him from the 11th Evac. Hospital at Augsburg to the Third Army Intelligence Center in Freising. He is now in a civilian hospital (under Army control). And he can be interrogated by the people at Freising, as soon as his health permits.

/s/ [illegible]
[illegible]

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