

[REDACTED]

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE [REDACTED]

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

[REDACTED]

26 February 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

FROM: Robert C. Ames
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting of 22 February on "Security Framework"

1. Action: None, FYI.

2. This meeting was a follow-up to the 14 February SCC and will, in turn, be followed up by an SCC on 29 February. The Agenda was covered in a rapid, almost cursory, manner, with several items deferred to the 29 February meeting. Before getting into the Agenda, the question of Somalia's activities in the Ogaden arose. With a quick call to Headquarters, the DCI was able to assure the SCC that Siad Barre's panic over Ethiopian intentions was another case of Siad crying wolf.

3. The following were the main points covered in the Agenda:


a. We have to give a little thought to how we keep our dialogue with the Saudis going.


b. It is desirable to have a continuous naval presence in the Indian Ocean, but the size of this presence depends on what the Soviets have and our ability to sustain this presence in the region. We will require porting and material storage facilities commensurate with the size of our presence. We can have a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) and carrier battle group (but this will draw down on other forces) or we can have a carrier there half time and a naval air squadron there the rest. Brown favors the latter but noted that in either case this would cost us an additional [REDACTED] a year.

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c. .On MAU exercises, we may end up with no joint exercise the first time around and have only individual port calls by single boats. The important thing is to get the region used to the presence of MAU's. We'll decide no later than mid-March whether to ask Egypt, Kenya or Oman for a joint exercise.

d. We will proceed on discussions with the British on building up Diego Garcia, but will defer the B-52 deployment question.

e. On the question of the neutralization of Afghanistan, Dr. Brzezinski asked that the following questions be addressed:


°What would real neutralization look like and what would make it "fly"?

°What would be the public relations aspects of this?

°What time frame are we talking about?

°What would be the likely Soviet quid pro quo?

4. The deferred items, plus the question of post-settlement actions in Iran, will be discussed at the 29 February SCC.


Robert C. Ames