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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

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15 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment (1)

FROM: Robert C. Ames  
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting of 14 April 1980 - "Security Framework"

1. Action Requested: None; the following is for your information. (U)

2. Background: This was the eighth in a series of SCC meetings on the Security Framework for the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean. Dr. Brzezinski announced at the outset that the meeting would last until 1130, vice 1200, that the Defense paper on basing would not be discussed (it was not ready) and that base access in Somalia and Pakistan would be the items covered. He also noted that the last fifteen minutes would be devoted to a rump session on intelligence items. [REDACTED]

3. Somalia: The key question is that in view of Somalia's continued deep involvement in the Ogaden, should we reconsider our request for military facilities? Brzezinski outlined three options: 1) Proceed as we are, recognizing that we may get dragged into the Ogaden squabble; 2) Slow down or drag out the negotiation process to see how things evolve in the Ogaden; 3) Terminate the negotiations. No one wanted the third option. Option two was supported by State. DoD and JCS wanted a modified option one: we should drag things out, but not back off altogether because of the Ogaden. Secretary Brown pointed out, in defense of this point, that 1) we cannot get along with just Oman and Kenya, 2) we do not want to be perceived as having another loss in the area à la Pakistan, and 3) Sadat stressed the need for supporting Siad, who is being wooed away from supporting Egypt by Saudia and Iraq. The DoD point was accepted with the understanding that we would stick to our Ogaden conditions and proceed on negotiations, FMS and ESF in a deliberate manner. [REDACTED]

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4. Pakistan: Dr. Brzezinski opened this segment by stating that he believed that Pakistan was important to our strategic needs in the area. Egypt and Saudia want us to support Pakistan. Pakistan is important vis-a-vis the Afghan insurgency. A stable Pakistan is healthy for the region. Henry Owen then outlined the Pak's key concern - debt rescheduling - per his paper. He said this question boiled down to two issues: could we waive the "imminent default" clause and where would the money come from. We will have a better indication of the latter when the FY81 budget goes forward in three weeks, but it will be difficult to come up with something positive for the Pakistanis right now. It was mentioned that the Pakistanis are currently reviewing their policy options and it would be a good time to come up with something that might cause them to turn our way. Perhaps we can say the following - we will be prepared to discuss with you an effort to undertake debt rescheduling in early May, before the Pak Debt Consortium convenes in June. In this kind of statement we make no promises, but three weeks (the budget will have gone forward) and the Paks could well be in imminent default. This option will be reviewed for the PRC on Pakistan. On arms, we will not give the Paks a list of recommendations, but rather a list of items we are prepared to sell. This will assume the Paks can come up with their own financing. The list will show our assessment of the levels of immediacy of types of weapons required to defend the northwest.

5. Other Pakistani items, including a response to Zia's letter to the President, will be discussed at the PRC meeting on Pakistan to be held on 21 April, vice 18 April as originally scheduled.

6. NIO/NESA Comments: In spite of Dr. Brzezinski's comments on the importance of Pakistan to our policy in the region, I did not get the impression that anyone was prepared to take strong positions to ensure that Pakistan does not seek an accommodation with the Soviets. The [redacted] required to sustain debt rescheduling will either have to be found in the budget or Congress must be presented with the vital nature of the problem and grant an increase. We are pussy-footing around the Pak issue while other friends in the region, who are also debating the extent of US resolve, are waiting to see how we handle Pakistan. Can we really be [redacted] while potentially losing [redacted] for want of [redacted] It seems we not only have some priorities wrong, but are subsidizing regional instability. I realize that a "good" budget and an election year go hand in hand, but we cannot survive as a nation in this rapidly changing world if every four years we forget about long term policy for a year. Pakistan is a very important case in point.

*Robert C. Ames*

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