

SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

30 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

FROM: Robert C. Ames  
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting of 29 May 1980 - "Security Framework"

1. Action Requested. None; the following is for your information. (U)
2. Background. This was the eleventh in a series of SCC meetings on the Security Framework for the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean. The two agenda items, amphibious exercises in the region and Saudi financial contributions to regional security, were supplemented by a discussion of the implications of a possible Ethiopian invasion of Somalia on a Somali-US facilities agreement.
3. Amphibious Exercises. The recommendations in the State paper that we have our ambassadors in Egypt and Kenya approach these two governments by 1 June with a request for a joint amphibious exercise was approved. State noted that we should not overburden Egypt with a long list of requests all at one time. DoD assured State that the MAU exercise had top priority and would be handled first and separately. State also noted that Kenya may prefer an inland exercise in an area formerly used by the British. This might lessen the regional impact. DoD noted that the MAU would be having a joint exercise in Spain during the period of 23-30 June. Dr. Brzezinski noted that the President would be visiting Spain during this period and wanted to look into the possibilities of demonstrations or other repercussions of these coincidental events. Lastly, DoD noted that a joint exercise was planned for Tunisia during the 11-12 July time frame. Brzezinski thought this might be used as a partial response to Bourguiba's request to the President for support against Libya.
4. Somalia. The intelligence assessment is that an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia is not imminent, but cannot be discounted. The key questions

are, should we have a MAU exercise before a facilities agreement, i.e. should we stretch agreement talks out but have a MAU exercise as an interim deterrent to the Ethiopians, or should we sign first then have an exercise. State was against any exercise as long as the situation was hot, believing that a US show of force would only make Siad bolder (but not stronger) and prove to Siad how valuable we thought he was and cause him to up the agreement ante. DoD and NSC, in what eventually was the prevailing view, stated that they believed we should go for an agreement soonest (while Siad is nervous) then go with a MAU exercise to show the Ethiopians and their friends we mean business. The Ogaden caveats would be in the agreement. If Siad got in trouble over his Ogaden ventures, that would be his problem. If, however, the Ethiopians marched toward [REDACTED] Ambassador Peterson will be in next week and there will be an SCC to work out this scenario. Aaron asked for an assessment of what the Soviets would likely do in the event [REDACTED] but this was not levied as a requirement. (S)

(b)(1)

5 [REDACTED] The presentation should have two parts: 1) Outline for the Saudis, in aggregate form, what we are doing in the area, and 2) ask what the Saudis are prepared to do in countries we both agree need help. [REDACTED]

DoD believed that Brown should make the above pitch during his meeting with Sultan, but this idea was not accepted. Fahd is the one we should talk to and Brown is not seeing Fahd. Gen. Jones noted that the question of the F-15's will remain an impediment to any meaningful discussion with the Saudis. Brzezinski recognized this and noted that the F-15's would probably be discussed at the President's Friday (30. May) breakfast. [REDACTED]

6. Next Meeting. No date was provided for the next meeting, but two key items will be Somalia and the F-15 package. [REDACTED]

7. Comment. Except for the discussion on Somalia, which was one of the best in this series of SCC's, I found the meeting drifting and lacking focus. I continue to be disturbed at the lack of a coherent approach to the Saudis. Obviously we should be talking principally to Fahd, including the arms issues. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

[REDACTED] The various parts of our policy toward the Saudis - arms, security, petroleum, aid to Pakistan, settlement, etc. - must have a common thread: what are we trying to accomplish in the region and how will this involve our friends. [REDACTED]

*Robert C. Ames*  
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