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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

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10 June 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : SCC Meeting of 9 June 1980 - "Security Framework"

1. Action Requested: None; the following is for your information. (U)
 2. Background: The meeting was almost entirely confined to the Somali issue. The State Department has requested a PRC on Somalia for Monday, 16 June 1980. Until that time the present policy of seeking access will remain unchanged; State emphasized that it did not suggest we go back on the current access negotiations. In answer to the Chairman's question, do we really need the base at Berbera, the JCS rep pointed out that, given its geographic location, there are many advantages to having a port facility and an airfield there. Although a base at Berbera was not critical to our Indian Ocean action, it nevertheless was essential in view of the policy of base redundancy in the area. It was pointed out that we were not primarily attempting to deny Berbera to the Soviets. Rather, seeking a base access there was a positive contribution to American strategic interests in the western Indian Ocean. [REDACTED]
 3. The Chairman suggested that we were faced with three possibilities: 1) We stretch out the negotiations and increased hostilities do not take place; 2) If a war were to break out and the Ethiopians were to take Berbera, this would be seen in the international community as another demonstration of American unreliability whether we had an agreement or not; and 3) If war breaks out an American presence at Berbera is likely to send a signal to the Soviets even in the absence of an agreement. [REDACTED]
 4. The consensus was that we concentrate on negotiating a satisfactory agreement but that we must be prepared to mount a sufficiently strong deterrent, either with American forces only or in cooperation with the
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Egyptians, to discourage large scale Ethiopian hostilities. We had previously warned the Ethiopians not to cross the border at a time when the Soviets were in Somalia. Surely we are not less committed to this warning now. An Ethiopian/Cuban takeover of Berbera would be a political setback for us; the strategic and political cost to us of a successful Ethiopian campaign would be as high whether we had an agreement with Siad or not.

5. It was agreed that the Eritrean situation and Ethiopian relations with the Sudan would be placed on the forthcoming PRC discussion agenda. Mr. Komer will draw up proposals for circulation on possible Egyptian assistance, after consultation with suitable Egyptian sources. Included in these proposals would be talking points on the role of the Sudan. These proposals were not necessarily required for circulation before the PRC.