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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

[REDACTED]

16 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

FROM: Robert C. Ames  
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia

SUBJECT: SCC Meeting of 15 July 1980 - "Security Framework"

1. Action Requested: None; the following is for your information. (U)
2. Background: This was the thirteenth in a series of SCC meetings held on the Security Framework for the Persian Gulf Indian Ocean. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Brzezinski and DoD's papers on "Regional Exercises and Deployments" and "Forward Basing" were the major items of discussion.
3. Exercises and Deployments: Much of the discussion was a rehash of the discussions held by the Framework Working Group on 7 July (attached). State continued to have problems with frequency and profile while DoD asserted that it needed to have exercises to ensure combat readiness. There would have to be trade-offs for both political and budgetary reasons. It was agreed that the RDJTF battalion exercise, planned for Egypt should be moved from December to October-November. This is the probable time frame for a Soviet step up in Afghanistan and the exercise would send the right message. We would hold a MAU exercise in Kenya later after breaking the ice with the exercise in Egypt. In order to sweeten things for the Egyptians, we should move out on the Ras Banyas development program - Sadat is most interested in this. On MAU presence in the Indian Ocean, it was decided to seek Presidential approval to have a 70% maximum sustained presence, rather than 100%. Lack of exercise areas makes 100% presence impractical.
4. Basing: The DoD paper asks us to approve a basing concept assessed as the minimum required to defend the regional worst case: a Soviet thrust into Khuzestan. State objected that perhaps we should hold off action until we did a more complete appraisal of the threat. Our new access agreements give us a good starting point and going to the next phase requires more thought.

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DoD believed that the "stop and appraise" approach would end up in a "stop." We had momentum and had to keep moving. State said that our facilities agreements should not drive policy. For example, our oil policy should not be hampered by pressing for facilities. Brzezinski asked that DoD flesh out its paper, translating it into military and budgetary recommendations. State would then review this paper for political/diplomatic problems. After this exercise we will determine if we need a threat assessment. We are not meeting to second guess a Presidential decision on presence Brzezinski said.


5. Other Items:

a. Saudi Arabia: The first military/security Joint Commission meeting will be held in early fall. Dave McGiffert is working on this. We have to convince the Saudis that facilities/overbuilding is in their interest. The Saudis will want something in return and we must convince them that that "something" is our protection. The F-15 issue will not be raised again until after the election so that will not be a problem. (Comment: We should coordinate our Fahd briefing to support the commission's work. Are we to be represented at the meeting?)

b. CIA Reactions Paper: Secretary Brown said that while he agreed completely with our Pacific, Arab and Third World sections and our European section is "logical," his meetings with five European leaders over the past two months, at which he discussed drawdowns, caused no adverse reactions. Brown was not sure whether the Europeans were just afraid to say something or believed the drawdown was just election politics, but they didn't blink an eye when he brought up the subject. Brown noted that perhaps the moment of truth will come when they get the bill. In the meantime, Brown suggested that CIA might take another look at European reaction.

*Robert C. Ames*  
Robert C. Ames

Attachment:  
MEMO FOR RECORD



14 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Framework Working Group

1. On 7 July 1980 the Framework Working Group held a meeting in the Situation Room chaired by Bill Odom. The purpose of the meeting was to review DoD's third cut on the military exercise paper. While it was agreed that the schedule was quite clear, how these exercises fit into the deployment level approved by the President was not. DoD was asked to come up with a matrix showing exercise/deployment presence through the end of the year. This would help in two ways. First it would indicate whether the mix (naval surface/TACAIR/ground) was appropriate and, secondly, it would give State lead time to secure the appropriate clearances.

2. On the paper itself, State believed that the battalion deployment scheduled for December coupled with the MAU exercise in October would overload the circuit in Egypt. State thought semi-annual exercises should be sufficient. Most agreed with this point. DoD stated that if it had to make a choice, it would prefer the battalion deployment.

3. Concerning Saudi Arabia, State said that we should not tie the TACAIR exercise there with exercises in either Oman or Egypt. If these exercises gave the appearance of a Saudi-Omani-Egyptian front, the Saudis would balk. These exercises should be spread out in the beginning or we'll turn everyone off before we get started. All agreed on this point.

4. Odom pointed out to all present that we made a guarantee to the President of a certain degree of presence in the region. The mix is negotiable but the degree is not. We have to come up with a force and exercise mixture that meets the minimum presence guaranteed to the President.

5. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

6. Somalia is an alternative, but this is very "iffy" at this stage. The Ambassador is returning to Somalia with a brief to continue the facilities negotiations, but we should not count on Somalia.

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