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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

27 January 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans, State (INR)  
Colonel B. R. Brown, USA (ACSI)  
Captain H. W. McElwain, USN (ONI)  
Colonel R. M. Lawson, USAF (AFCIN 2B3)  
Colonel K. T. Gould, USA (J-2, The Joint Staff)  
Colonel R. P. Halloran, USAF, Director of  
Operational Services, NSA  
Mr. Randolph V. Zander, Defense (OSO)

SUBJECT: NIE 36-61: PROSPECTS FOR THE ARAB WORLD

1. The attached draft terms of reference are forwarded for review.
2. It is requested that your representatives meet with us at 1000, Tuesday, 7 February in Room 154 Administration Building to discuss these terms.

*Willard C. Matthias*  
WILLARD C. MATTHIAS *du*  
Acting Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

*19 Dec 61*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

27 January 1961

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 36-61: PROSPECTS FOR THE  
ARAB WORLD

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the general trend of events in the Arab World  
over the next few years.

SCOPE

We envisage a paper of moderate length, with emphasis on area-  
wide patterns, problems, and prospects, and how these have changed  
since NIE 30-59, "Main Currents in the Arab World," dated 25 August  
1959. The following outline covers the major topics we think  
should be discussed.

1. The Role of the Radical Nationalists
  - a. Extent to which they will retain the initiative in  
the Arab World.

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- b. Nasser as leader and symbol of the movement. How his problems, objections, and prospects have changed over the last two years in the light of Arab developments, events in Africa, etc.
  - c. Possibility of significant reverses for the Pan-Arab nationalist movement (e.g., a split in the UAR).
  - d. Nature of radical nationalist and Pan-Arab pressures against the remaining conservative governments.
2. The Traditionalist Governments
- a. Their prospects in light of the pressures generated against them by their own nationalists and by other Arab states.
  - b. Their likely domestic and area policies in light of these pressures.
3. Arab Unity -- Chances of practical progress in light of country nationalisms and conflicting interests of leaders. Likely trends in the Cairo-Baghdad rivalry. Its effects on other states.

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4. The Economic Outlook
  - a. Movement toward statism in the economic field.
  - b. General economic prospects -- bright spots, problems (i.e., population in Egypt), the oil industry (borrow from NIE 30-60); likely role of foreign aid from the West and the Bloc.
5. Modernization -- Manner and degree to which the Arab states are moving out of traditional patterns in social life and the effect of this on their economic and political prospects. Role of the military, the intelligentsia, other important groups.
6. Arab Relations with the Outside World
  - a. The Arab standpoint
    - (1) The neutralism of the nationalists. Extent to which it is likely to remain truly neutral. The UAR as leader of Arab neutralism.
    - (2) Pro-West inclinations of the conservatives.
    - (3) The peculiar role of Iraq.

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b. External influences

- (1) Policies and role of the Sino-Soviet Bloc toward the Arab World.
- (2) The West.
- (3) The Neutralists.

7. The Arab-Israeli Question -- The arms race; effects of Israeli nuclear capability as a weapon in the cold war with the Arabs. The question of the Palestine refugees. The question of Soviet countersupport for the Arabs.

8. Annex

Assessment of the military strength and effectiveness of the major Arab states and Israel.

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