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PROBABLE TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY
ASSISTANCE

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

on 24 January 1962. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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PROBABLE TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable trends over the next few years in Soviet military assistance to other Bloc nations (excluding Communist China) and to non-Bloc countries.¹

CONCLUSIONS

1. Soviet military assistance to Bloc and non-Bloc countries has not been significantly limited by availability of arms and equipment in the Soviet stockpile, and will not be so limited in the future. Such a limitation would only be felt if the Soviets should decide to include in the assistance programs substantial numbers of their newest weapons, and we do not think that they will consider it necessary or desirable to do so. (*Paras. 6-13, 26*)

2. We believe that the Soviets will continue to provide military assistance to other Bloc countries substantially according to the pattern they have already established for these programs. This pattern involves providing the Satellites with generous amounts of conventional arms and equipment, but it excludes nuclear weapons as well as medium and long-range missiles and bombers. While the modernization of Satellite armed forces proceeds a little behind that of the Soviet

military, some advanced weapons are provided to these countries—thus, surface-to-air missiles are now appearing in the Satellites, and we expect that MIG-21 fighters soon will. It is clear, however, that Soviet aid programs are primarily designed to equip the Satellite forces for a subordinate role in any major war, and to contribute to the defense—especially the air defense—of the USSR itself. (*Paras. 7-13*)

3. Since 1955 the Soviets have negotiated military assistance agreements totaling over \$2 billion with a dozen non-Bloc countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Moscow views this program as an integral part of its general campaign to expand its influence in the underdeveloped areas and, despite a number of disappointments, almost certainly believes it has been an effective instrument for this purpose. The USSR's criteria for extending arms aid are broad and flexible (recipients include countries whose domestic policies are strongly anti-Communist), and, though apparently unwilling to furnish its most advanced weapons, it has shown an increasing

¹This estimate deals essentially with assistance to established regimes and governments. It does not attempt to cover Soviet bloc support of subversive and dissident movements in which the supply of arms may play a role, possibly by re-export from recipients of overt Soviet aid.

readiness to export selected items of modern equipment (jet medium bombers have been shipped to Indonesia and Egypt). Indeed, the major restraint imposed on the program appears to be some reluctance among non-Bloc countries to accept such aid. (*Paras. 14-23*)

4. As opportunities emerge, the USSR will increase and extend its military assistance to non-Bloc countries. Some recipients are likely to receive increasing amounts of advanced equipment, such as

short-range tactical guided missiles, but not nuclear weapons. Increasing emphasis may be given to the training of non-Bloc military personnel, both within the Bloc and in the recipient states, using facilities there developed by the Soviets. Disputes with recipient countries might curtail the program in some areas, but Moscow's commitments are now so deep and so broad that it would be difficult for it to break existing agreements or even to refuse new ones, without risking serious political losses. (*Paras. 24-27*)

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

5. Since the end of World War II the USSR has furnished extensive military assistance to the countries of the Bloc; since mid-1955 it has extended such assistance on a considerable scale to a selected but growing group of non-Bloc nations. An examination of these programs throws some light on their pattern, the motives behind them, and the criteria by which they are operated. While such an examination does not provide the basis for a detailed estimate of future Soviet programs, it does establish some broad limits within which these programs are likely to fall.

6. One conclusion which emerges from this examination is that the availability of military equipment is, in nearly all cases, not a limiting factor in Soviet aid arrangements. The USSR has a very large armaments industry, which is supplemented by the modest-sized arms production capacity of the Satellites. The Soviets traditionally create large inventories of those military items which they put into production. More important, the continuing modernization of all the arms of the Soviet defense establishment regularly makes available large quantities of weapons which, while obsolescent by major-power standards, remain useful for many recipients of Soviet as-

sistance programs. Modern weapons are also supplied, and, given a sufficiently attractive political opportunity, the USSR is also sometimes willing to export small quantities of advanced weapons, such as the MIG-21 jet fighter.

II. ASSISTANCE TO BLOC NATIONS²

7. Since the USSR wished to preserve the forms of national sovereignty in the areas which it dominated at the end of World War II, it had to provide these countries with the appurtenances of statehood, including a national military establishment. Thus the Soviets, unless they were to provide for a substantial defense industry in each of the Satellites, were from the start committed to furnishing extensive and continuing military assistance to these countries. In fact, their programs have gone beyond the creation of merely token military forces, and it is clear that the Soviets intend the Satellites to provide for their own internal security and to make some contribution to the total military posture of the Bloc.

²The nature of the bilateral arrangements for this assistance (whether grants or credits or both) is not known.

8. In shaping these forces, the USSR has used its military aid largely to strengthen the defensive capability, and particularly the air defenses, of the Bloc and thereby of its own territory as well. However, it has supplied these countries with sufficient arms and equipment to enable them to conduct offensive operations of limited scale. Ground force equipment has included artillery, armor, short-range tactical missiles, and transport vehicles; naval assistance has included all types of naval craft from destroyers and submarines down to service craft; and air defense equipment has included combat aircraft and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles.³ The Soviets have not seen fit, however, to provide the Bloc countries with their most advanced weapons and equipment. Nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems (such as heavy or medium bombers, medium or long-range missiles) have been entirely withheld. In general, the USSR has not provided any of the Bloc countries with significant reserve stocks of conventional arms. This pattern suggests a Soviet intention to keep a firm hand on the major instruments of modern warfare, and to limit the possibility that individual Satellites could at some stage embark on independent "adventures," or use such weapons to assert their own autonomy against the Soviet Union.

9. All the European Satellites except Albania now produce Soviet-type infantry weapons and ammunition. In addition, Czechoslovakia and Poland produce some artillery and T-54 tanks, and have produced a substantial number of early model MIG fighter aircraft. Despite these capabilities, all the European Satellites continue to depend heavily on the Soviet Union to sustain inventories of military equipment, and they depend almost entirely on Moscow for naval vessels and armaments, and for newer model aircraft, air weapons, and electronic equipment.

10. Like those of the European Satellites, the North Korean armed forces are a Soviet creation; there is no indication of any significant Chinese military assistance to North Korea. Over a period of years, the Soviets have sup-

plied the Koreans with a range of items similar to that provided to the European Satellites, including modern artillery and aircraft and a number of naval vessels. The North Korean Air Force has twice as many aircraft as South Korea and has a fair-to-good capability for ground attack, air defense, and interdiction. Without outside assistance, however, the North Korean armed forces are presently capable only of maintaining internal security and of conducting limited defensive and offensive operations.

11. On the other hand, in North Vietnam, because of its isolation from the USSR and the close ties formed with the Chinese Communists during the revolution against the French, the armed forces have been predominantly influenced and aided by Peiping. Partly because of this, partly because of topographic factors and the type of warfare conducted, and to some extent because of the inhibitions imposed by the Geneva Accords, the range of armament in the North Vietnamese armed forces is much more limited than that of other Bloc countries, and does not include heavy armor or artillery. North Vietnam has no combat aircraft at present, but it has the nucleus of an air force in a small number of pilots who have been trained in other Bloc countries. It has no major naval vessels, but since 1960 it has received from the USSR three modern submarine-chasers and 12 motor torpedo boats.

12. Moscow has varied the amounts and the quality of its military aid in accordance with the circumstances. Thus, the political schism in Soviet relations with Albania has resulted in a severance of military aid to that country. In Hungary, Soviet military aid for some time after the 1956 uprising was proportionately less than for some of the other Satellites. In East Germany, certain restraints have been apparent, probably because of the presence of Soviet forces in strength and possibly because of Soviet uncertainty over the reliability of the East Germans. Thus, East German forces were formed later than those of the other Satellites and have been relatively restricted in size; until recently, moreover, the GDR was

³ See Table I for Soviet-supplied stocks currently in inventory in the Satellites.

the only East European Satellite (except Albania) which had not received the IL-28 light bomber. In the Far East, as noted above, the nature of Soviet military aid to North Korea has differed greatly from that extended to North Vietnam.

General Prospects

13. We believe that the Soviets will continue to supply the other Bloc countries with sufficient weapons and equipment to ensure that a reasonable level of combat capability is maintained. The policy of modernizing these forces with newer weapons and equipment will almost certainly continue. However, the Soviets will continue to reserve for their own armed forces the main strategic striking capability of the Bloc. Thus, they will not provide the other Bloc countries with an independent nuclear capability. We believe that the Soviets will be prepared in the next few years to supply some of the Bloc countries with limited quantities of advanced weapons, but we doubt that in the next few years they will provide them with the TU-16 medium bomber or longer range surface-to-surface missiles, except perhaps in token quantities for prestige purposes. The course of the Sino-Soviet dispute may in time affect the nature of the Soviet military programs in North Korea and North Vietnam.

III. ASSISTANCE TO NON-BLOC NATIONS

14. The Soviet Bloc has been involved in an expanding program of military assistance to non-Bloc countries since mid-1955.⁴ By late 1961 a dozen countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America had negotiated agreements to purchase on credit armaments and associated equipment totaling over \$2 billion (at list prices before discount).⁵ To date, the value

⁴ Czechoslovak and Polish participation, under Soviet aegis, is included in this assessment. The Chinese Communist military aid program, which has been of very limited scope, is operated independently of Soviet efforts.

⁵ List prices are frequently discounted (averaging 25 percent on all deals made thus far). Cash down payments are often not required; the terms usually stipulate repayment over five years or more with a two percent annual interest charge.

of deliveries under these commitments has comprised about three-quarters of this total.

Recent Developments

15. The pace of the Bloc military assistance program was stepped up during 1961. Moscow concluded important additional arms agreements with the three principal recipients of such aid (Indonesia, Egypt, and Iraq) and committed itself to supply further quantities of arms to Afghanistan and Cuba. MIG-19 jet fighters were delivered for the first time to Egypt (which had asked for them in 1958), Iraq, Cuba, and Indonesia. Deliveries of Bloc arms were made for the first time to Morocco and Mali, and offers of aid were extended to the Congo, Cambodia, Burma, and Syria (following its split from the UAR), and apparently to the Sudan, the Somali Republic, and India as well.

16. More important, in 1961 the USSR for the first time provided more advanced Soviet arms and weapons systems to non-Bloc countries. Indonesia, Egypt, and Iraq were promised delivery of MIG-21 jet fighters and TU-16 (BADGER) medium jet bombers; some of the TU-16's have already arrived in Indonesia and Egypt. The Soviet-Indonesian arms agreement of January 1961 included provisions for the shipment of a variety of short-range guided missiles to the Indonesian air force (air-to-air, air-to-surface, and surface-to-air), navy (ship-launched surface-to-surface), and army (surface-to-air). Subsequent agreements with Egypt and Iraq also specified delivery of missiles; Egypt is apparently soon scheduled to receive air-to-surface and ship-launched surface-to-surface systems, while Iraq has contracted for at least a surface-to-air system.

17. Military assistance was also an important factor in exploitation of the Communist breakthrough into the Western Hemisphere provided by the Cuban revolution. Soviet arms deliveries in 1960 and 1961 have provided Cuba with ground and air weapons superior to those of any other Latin American country. However, the USSR apparently does not intend to provide Castro with the means to threaten the US militarily, lest the US be provoked to take

preventive action or lest control over major risks pass from Soviet hands. Furthermore, materiel supplied does not include equipment which would permit a major military aggression against other Latin American states, a course of action which could gravely compromise Soviet and Cuban political objectives in that region.

Soviet Motives and Criteria

18. Moscow views its military assistance program as an integral part of its general campaign to expand Soviet influence in non-Bloc areas. Arms shipments are thus intended to serve the same broad political objectives as the Bloc's economic aid program—the displacement of Western influence, the creation of pro-Soviet alignments, and the encouragement of pro-Soviet forces within recipient countries. The USSR can often arrange arms exports in quantity at relatively little cost to itself and can promise quick delivery. Further, the extension of arms aid at discount prices and on favorable credit terms, with “no strings attached,” is well-gearred to appeal to poor but proud, highly nationalistic states which, in some cases, are unable to procure arms from other sources of the type and in the quantity desired. It fits well into Moscow's efforts to convince the underdeveloped states that the USSR is in the vanguard of the “anti-colonialist” struggle and may also serve to buttress Bloc propaganda concerning Soviet military pre-eminence.

19. The Soviets probably hope that the military aid program, including not only materiel deliveries and subsequent maintenance requirements, but also the furnishing of Bloc military technicians and the training of non-Bloc personnel in the USSR, will have particular influence on military elements in the recipient countries. The Soviets probably consider that such influence could establish a useful relationship, especially in those underdeveloped countries where the military is likely to play a substantial role in the orientation of existing governments and in the choice of their successors. For example, the USSR must be well pleased by the fact that in Indonesia the strongly anti-Communist army

is now receiving Bloc equipment, previously accepted only by the navy and air force.

20. Because of political considerations, Moscow has been less rigid in its handling of military aid programs with non-Bloc countries than with its own Satellites. Although it may once have held high hopes for short-run political gains from these non-Bloc programs, Moscow appears to have accepted disappointment of these hopes and no longer counts on immediate successes. Qasim's suppression of the burgeoning Communist movement in Iraq, for example, did not deter the USSR from implementing existing arms agreements or signing new ones. The cooling of Soviet-Egyptian relations in 1958 was probably responsible for some reduction and delay in Soviet assistance, but the program was never suspended. Bitter propaganda exchanges between Moscow and Cairo in the spring of 1961 did not prevent the subsequent signing of a major new arms deal. Other elements of friction between the USSR and recipient countries, such as requests for equipment Moscow is reluctant to provide, have sometimes caused negotiating difficulties but have not prevented the establishment or continuation of military aid programs.

21. Unlike the Chinese Communists, who prefer to stress aid to militant revolutionaries, the Soviets appear to be willing to extend arms aid to any government which offers some promise of being useful to long-run Soviet objectives. Soviet programs have been instrumental in fostering local rivalries through arms races (as in Africa and the Middle East), and in encouraging regional hostilities (as in Indonesia). The USSR has not been deterred by the prospect of irritating the Chinese Communists (e.g., in India). The character of a regime and its attitude toward communism do not seem to have much bearing on Moscow's attitude, as can be seen in Soviet arms shipments to Yemen and offers to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Nor does the apparent inability of some recipients, such as the Indonesians, to use or maintain sophisticated equipment prevent shipments of such materiel. Restraints on the USSR's military assistance program are thus of a generalized

political nature—such as its disinclination to create situations which might directly involve its own forces in hostilities—or are those imposed by such factors as a reluctance to export its most modern weapons.

22. The principal factor limiting Soviet arms exports is, in fact, the reluctance of prospective recipients to accept such aid. Some states regard acceptance of Soviet military assistance as fundamentally incompatible with their pro-Western orientation. Among those pursuing a neutralist policy, some, such as India, Burma, and Ethiopia, have thus far preferred to refuse such aid because of suspicions concerning Bloc motives or unwillingness to compromise their neutrality. In still other cases, such as Saudi Arabia, professions of interest in Soviet offers are designed primarily to elicit greater Western help. Thus, while the list of recipients of Bloc arms continues to grow, we do not foresee any radical expansion in the near future.

Soviet Evaluation of Results

23. The USSR probably judges its arms aid, not as a separate program, but in terms of its contribution to the totality of Soviet foreign policy. In this context, Soviet leaders probably estimate that the program has helped to extend Soviet influence, and in some areas to sustain, if not create, pro-Bloc political sentiments. While Moscow cannot claim any recent political gains as a result of its programs in Egypt and Iraq, it has maintained its presence in these countries without suffering any noticeable loss of prestige. Despite some setbacks—most notably in the Congo—the Soviet leaders probably count their expanded program in Africa as a successful one and are probably optimistic about its potential. They almost certainly consider that, in Indonesia, Sukarno is moving toward a still closer alignment with Bloc policies and attribute such a development largely to the close association of their arms aid program with Djakarta's desire to acquire West New Guinea. The Soviets must also view with pleasure the effectiveness of their program in aggravating problems in various areas of the world where Western in-

terests are directly involved, as in Indonesia and Cuba.

Prospects

24. Trends observable during the past year—most notably the further expansion of arms aid offers, the conclusion of additional agreements with major recipients, and the shipment of more modern and powerful weapons—can be expected to continue. Certain key countries, such as India and Morocco, which have hitherto resisted large Soviet offers, will probably be pressed anew with attractive proposals. Shipments to rebel movements in Africa—hitherto largely confined to Algeria—may receive greater emphasis, and may be open or masked as suits Soviet purposes. Depending on the solution of logistics problems and the political opportunities open to them, the Soviets may, for example, supply revolutionaries in Cameroons, the Congo, or Angola. Offers to Latin American countries—so far limited to Cuba and Ecuador—would be quickly extended to any likely new candidates.

25. A facet of the military assistance program which may receive increasing attention over the next few years is the training of non-Bloc military personnel within the Bloc. Opportunities for the training of a greater number of such personnel for longer periods of time will probably grow apace with the expansion of programs in the more backward, newly emergent countries of Africa. Soviet establishment and staffing of military schools and training facilities within the recipient countries may also receive greater emphasis. Chances of influencing non-Bloc armed forces are greater in states where such forces have no prior traditions of their own and where existing facilities are negligible or nonexistent.

26. While we believe that Moscow will agree to supply more modern weapons to a greater number of countries, such aid will probably for the most part exclude the most modern Soviet conventional weapons and will certainly exclude all nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. Short-range conventionally armed missiles will probably be supplied to the more advanced recipient countries. Deliveries of medium-range bombers will probably be

limited in quantity and restricted to only a few recipients. The Soviet program is a flexible and opportunistic one, however, and it may become increasingly difficult politically for Moscow to resist demands for advanced weaponry from at least those states which have the potential ability to use more sophisticated materiel.

27. We believe that the Soviet military assistance program will remain an important element in the USSR's policies toward non-

Bloc states. Political disputes like that with Egypt or even the failure of a particular program to achieve notable and tangible results might result in the curtailment or even the suspension of aid. But Moscow's commitments are now so deep and so broad, and so intertwined with its general "anti-imperialist" posture, that it would be difficult for the USSR to break existing agreements, or even to refuse new ones, without risking serious political losses.

Table I. ESTIMATED OPERATIONAL INVENTORY OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT HELD BY OTHER BLOC COUNTRIES *

	TANKS & ASSAULT GUNS	ARTILLERY PIECES	ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS
Albania	300	700	-
Bulgaria	1,500	3,500	-
Czechoslovakia	3,000	3,500	100
East Germany	1,600	2,200	1,200
Hungary	800	2,800	-
Poland	2,000	3,300	800
Rumania	1,400	2,600	300
North Korea	800	2,800	200

Combat Naval Ships

	DESTROYER TYPE	SUB- MARINES	PATROL CRAFT	MINE CRAFT
Albania	-	4	14	11
Bulgaria	3	5	24	19
East Germany	4	-	39	-
Poland	2	6	42	-
Rumania	-	-	11	22
North Korea	-	-	25	12
North Vietnam	-	-	15	-

**Combat Aircraft (Fighters and Bombers)
and Surface-to-Air Missile Sites**

	COMBAT AIRCRAFT	SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SITES
Albania	70	2
Bulgaria	285	6
Czechoslovakia	570	5
East Germany	180	5 ^b
Hungary	100	5
Poland	655	5
Rumania	300	5
North Korea	500	-

* The reliability of these figures varies widely.

^b Not including 13 sites under the control of Soviet forces in Germany.

TABLE II (Continued)

	Mid-East		Far East & Asia				Western Hemisphere and Africa				Total		
	Afghan- istan	Egypt	Iraq	Syria	Yemen	India	Indo- nesia	Algeria	Cuba	Ghana		Guinea	Mali
Guided Missiles													
Air-to-surface.....	some	some	some	b 6
Surface-to-air.....	some	e 11-14
Surface-to-surface (ship-launched).....	..	some	d 12	e 11-14+
Air-to-air.....	e 20	d 12+
Bloc Military Technicians (estimated total number present for one month or more during 1961).....													e 20
Military Personnel trained in the Bloc 1955-1961.....	260	450	320	240	30	..	140	..	400	..	30	15	40
	790	1,780	430	740	25	..	3,055	some	250	..	15	80	..

a Includes Czechoslovak and Polish deliveries, but not Communist Chinese. Some of the figures in this table have been rounded.
 b Indicates number of TU-16 aircraft to be equipped with air-to-surface missiles.
 c Indicates number of air defense battalions equipped with surface-to-air missiles.
 d Indicates number of patrol craft to be equipped with surface-to-surface missiles.
 e Indicates number of MIG-21 aircraft to be equipped with air-to-air missiles.

Table III
ESTIMATED VALUE (BEFORE DISCOUNTS) OF
BLOC MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS
WITH NON-BLOC COUNTRIES (1955-1961)

	MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS	SUBTOTALS AS APPROXIMATE PERCENT OF TOTAL
Mid-East:		
Afghanistan	100 — 125	
Egypt	500 — 600	
Iraq	300 — 350	
Syria	250 — 250	
Yemen	30 — 35	
Total	1,180 — 1,360	55
Far East-Asia:		
India	20 — 25	
Indonesia	830 — 850	
Total	850 — 875	40
Western Hemisphere and Africa:		
Algeria	12 — 25	
Cuba	100 — 100	
Ghana	<i>negl.</i> — <i>negl.</i>	
Guinea	2 — 3	
Mali	1 — 2	
Morocco	4 — 4	
Total	119 — 134	5
Total (rounded)	2,100 — 2,400	

NOTE: Values are based on quoted list prices before discounts. For new and for more advanced equipment, the quoted list prices are roughly equivalent to what the cost to provide the item would be in the US; for obsolescent equipment the quoted list prices are from one-half to two-thirds what it would cost to produce the item in the US.

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