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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director/Intelligence

SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Theses on the Seven-Year Soviet Economic Plan (1959-65)

1. This memorandum is for information only and contains a preliminary appraisal of the "Theses" on the Seven-Year (1959-65) Soviet Economic Plan presented by N. S. Khrushchev to a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow on 12 November. This paper is based on the Moscow radio broadcast of 14 November to its domestic audience.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. Formulation of this plan was ordered in the fall of 1957 to supplant the overly ambitious Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-60). Publication of the "Theses" at this time is purportedly to allow study by the entire Soviet Communist Party membership of the content prior to a discussion by its elected representatives at a Party Congress in January 1959. While some changes will occur, the broad outlines and most of the detail probably will be approved by the Party Congress, and a subsequent but still unscheduled session of the Supreme Soviet will enact the plan into Soviet law.

Themes

3. Khrushchev's themes are that great progress is being made in catching up with the leading countries in the West and that the achievements of Soviet industry are of great benefit to the Soviet populace. The main task of the "new period which the USSR is entering, the period of large-scale building of Communist society," is as follows: "creation of the material-technical basis of communism, the further strengthening of the economic and defense might

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SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Theses on the Seven-Year Soviet Economic Plan (1959-65)

of the USSR, and simultaneously the fuller satisfaction of the growing material and spiritual requirements of the Soviet people."

4. On science the report states: "Soviet scientists are successfully advancing along the road toward utilizing atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The production of intercontinental ballistic missiles has been successfully organized. With the launching of the first Soviet artificial earth satellite a new era in the history of mankind has been taken. Preparations are being made for a flight to celestial bodies. A series of high-speed electronic computers has been created."

5. Khrushchev expresses confidence that by 1970, five years beyond the end of the Seven-Year Plan, "...and possibly even earlier, the Soviet Union will gain first place in the world both as regards the absolute output and the output of goods per capita, which will insure for the population the highest living standards in the world. That will be the world historic victory of socialism in its peaceful competition with capitalism."

6. There is a sharp contrast between the glowing claims of Khrushchev and the hard figures presented in the "Theses." The Seven-Year Plan contemplates annual rates of growth of 8.7 percent for industry and 7.9 percent for agriculture. The industrial rate falls within the range previously forecast as feasible by ORR, but the projected agricultural growth rate is greater than considered feasible with present agricultural programs. While twice the US growth rate, the 8.7 percent is less than the rate achieved by the USSR during the Fifth Five-Year Plan or even in the years 1956 through 1958. Such a growth rate would not permit the USSR to catch up with the US in per capita industrial output by 1970, as Khrushchev claims.

7. Khrushchev's claim that by 1970 the USSR will exceed the US, as well as all other countries, in per capita industrial output is predicated upon inaccurate assumptions. He is using the same assumptions which have appeared recently in Soviet journals: i.e. that in the base period, 1958, Soviet industrial production will be 50 percent of that in the US and that US industrial production will grow at about two percent per year, the rate for the period 1953-57.

SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Theses on the Seven-Year Soviet Economic Plan (1959-65)

He also assumes that Soviet industrial growth for 1959-70 will proceed at the rates projected in the proposed Seven-Year Plan. In fact Soviet industrial production will probably not be more than 40 percent of the US output in 1958. Furthermore, a longer and perhaps more representative period for the US, e.g. 1948-56, would give a rate of about four percent. Using this rate and accepting the Soviet schedule for its own industry Soviet industrial production could be as high as 60 percent of the US by 1970.

8. In contrast to the claims of catching up with the US in 1970 in per capita output, a strong note of realism underlies the industrial goals for 1965. For the most part the industrial goals confirm that Soviet industry is scheduled to grow at a rate below that achieved in previous seven years. Even if the regime hopes that the presently announced goals are overfulfilled, as they were in the past three years, it does not appear that such overfulfillment could result in a rate of growth as high as the 11 percent a year of the 1950-55 period. Nevertheless, this program schedules an impressive economic achievement and by 1965 the output of many basic raw material and industrial products will be approaching and in some cases will exceed that of the US. Thus, production achievement in 1965 will provide the basis for a powerful propaganda campaign.

9. Despite promises in the proposed plan that the output per capita of textile, clothing, footwear and some food products will reach or even surpass Western levels by 1965, the output of consumer goods as a whole will remain far below Western levels and will grow more slowly (7.5 percent annually) than it did during the past seven years (9.7 percent). The prospects in agriculture, which supplies the raw materials from which processed foods and many important consumer goods are made, partly account for this slow down.

DISCUSSION

Investment

10. State investment is scheduled for an annual average growth rate of eight percent as compared with 10 percent in the past seven years. The eight percent rate is consistent with the somewhat slower overall growth of the economy. State investment for the period is to total between 1.94 and 1.97 trillion rubles,

SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Theses on the Seven-Year Soviet Economic Plan (1959-65)

a sum which may well be as Khrushchev says, "almost equal to the volume of investment in the national economy for all the years... of the Soviet government." In addition the collective farms and other non-centrally planned sources will add significantly to this total.

11. The distribution of investment funds among the several parts of the economy does not vary greatly from recent annual plan patterns but the share allocated to industry has increased by two percent to 56 percent of the total.

12. Within industry, fuels and raw materials continue to receive emphasis, reflecting the realistic approach which has characterized Soviet investment planning since the raw material stringencies which appeared in 1956. Rates of growth of the output of equipment for the production of power and basic industrial raw materials, such as chemical and rolling mill equipment, are scheduled to increase substantially. The output of transportation and metal working equipment is to grow at significantly lower rates than attained in the previous seven-year period. In total the output of machinery and metal-working equipment industries is to grow at an annual rate of about 10 percent as compared with over 15 percent claimed during the previous seven years.

13. Despite the slight slow-down in growth of the economy, the investment allocations confirm the continued high priority for the expansion of the housing and agriculture programs. In Stalin's time the prospect of a similar decline would have brought about an immediate curtailment in these consumer-oriented programs in order to keep industrial growth rates from slipping.

Labor

14. The proposed plan calls for an increase of about 11.5 million in the number of workers and employees in the Soviet economy bringing the total in 1965 to over 66 million. During the past seven years the number of workers and employees increased by 13.9 million. Population growth is expected to contribute only about 60 percent of the increase in contrast to the 70 percent it contributed during the earlier period. Although educational reforms may increase the participation of school age youths in the labor force, the net effect of this addition is not expected to be great. It appears very likely, therefore, that about 3,000,000 to

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SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Theses on the Seven-Year Soviet Economic Plan (1959-65)

4,000,000 workers will shift from agriculture to the non-agricultural sector of the economy. The regime may also find it expedient, considering its need for labor, to reduce further the size of the armed forces.

15. According to the "Theses", the "world's shortest working day and the shortest working week" will be found in the USSR by 1965. Underground workers in mines and those in harmful occupations are to be on a 30-35 hour work week by then. Substantial progress is claimed to have been made toward the announced goal of the 20th Party Congress that all workers and employees be on a 41 hour week by 1960, and it appears likely that this goal will be achieved.

16. The proposed plan calls for a 45-50 percent increase in labor productivity, implying an annual rate of increase of 5½-6 percent. This rate of increase is well below the 7.8 percent average obtained during the preceding seven years, but approximates the rates of the last three years.

Steel

17. The pig iron and crude steel targets are ambitious although probably feasible. Achievement of the crude steel goal in 1965 of 86 to 91 million tons will require the solution of problems which have harassed the industry for the last several years--an inadequate supply of iron ore, the insufficient production of metallurgical equipment, and unduly long periods for mine and plant construction.

18. The scheduled rate of growth of Soviet crude steel output is slower than that achieved during the last seven years. However, the required average annual increment to output is scheduled to 4.5 to 5.1 million tons of crude steel compared with the 3.4 million tons achieved annually over the last seven years. During the period 1952-58 the US steel industry added about 33 million metric tons capacity which may be compared with the Soviet goal of 31 to 37 million tons in the next seven years. Capacity of the US industry on 1 January 1958 was 127.5 million metric tons.

Energy

19. The shift from coal to crude oil and natural gas in Soviet energy production was reaffirmed in the plan announcement. Crude oil and gas will constitute more than one half of the primary

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SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Theses on the Seven-Year Soviet Economic Plan (1959-65)

energy supply in 1965--an increase from somewhat less than one-third in 1958. Natural gas resources are ample. The principal problem in meeting the 1965 goal will be in developing sufficient pipeline capacity. The planned goal of 2,300 miles a year of gas lines may be met and in any event the capacity of existing lines can be increased substantially by installing additional compressor stations. Crude oil resources are also ample, as are adequate technological capabilities to develop these resources on a scale sufficient to meet the 1965 goal.

20. The 1965 plan for production of coal, only slightly higher than that originally set for 1960, means an annual growth rate of less than three percent. With coal production currently at about 500 million tons, however, the USSR now has first place in world output. The 1965 goal for electric power production in the USSR, 500-520 billion kilowatt hours, is ambitious but probably feasible. Average annual increases required, 12 percent, are lower than the average of the last seven years, but higher than 1957 or 1958.

Chemicals

21. The tentative plan virtually doubles the share of investment going to chemicals as compared with the past seven-year period. Heavy emphasis is placed upon the production of synthetic materials from gases for both heavy and light industry and artificial fertilizers. Fertilizer is scheduled to approach 37 million metric tons, well above current US levels, and may be expected to have an important impact upon agricultural yields.

22. Fulfillment of the plan, however, will depend in large measure on the success achieved in developing the petrochemical industry. This is an area in which the Soviets have traditionally lagged, and achievement of the target seems improbable unless substantial assistance in the form of petrochemical technology and equipment is procured from the West.

Agriculture

23. The plan for agriculture calls for increases in production which will be difficult or impossible to achieve with present agricultural programs. Assuming average weather conditions and the continuation of the agricultural programs adopted to date, the

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SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Theses on the Seven-Year Soviet Economic Plan (1959-65)

the achievement of most goals appears to be impossible--including those for overall increases in production (7.9 percent per year), livestock products, and grain. Present agricultural programs have already had their major growth-stimulating effects. The major new lands expansion has been completed; much of the realizable gain from the corn program has been achieved; and most of the incentive measures and institutional rearrangements have already had their output-increasing effects. A major exception is the recent sale of agricultural machinery to the collective farms.

24. There is no doubt, however, that the regime can embark on further programs to increase agricultural output. In fact, some features of the "Theses" suggest that the Soviet leaders may have such programs in mind. Khrushchev referred, for example, to the "better utilization of the highly fertile lands in the zone of reliable and stable rainfall." Taken together with the very large planned increase in the output of mineral fertilizers, this statement suggests that new programs may be contemplated for the European USSR.

25. Even if new programs are not adopted, the Soviet consumer will apparently receive discernable improvements in his diet by 1965 with substantial, if below planned, additions to his consumption of high protein foods. The "Theses"--by discussing such innovations as self-financed inter-collective farm canneries--give increased weight to recent indications in the Soviet press that more changes are soon to come in the direction of cooperation between collective farms and of making them more like State farms.

The Consumer

26. In terms of both consumer goods output and prospective increases in real wages, the Soviet citizen will experience a slower rate of improvement through 1965 than occurred in the preceding seven years. The output of light industry (textiles, clothing, and footwear) is to increase at an annual rate of six percent for the next seven years in contrast with an 8.7 percent increase claimed for 1952-58. Despite these increases, the volume, per capita output, and quality of Soviet textile and footwear output for 1965 will remain below those of the US for 1957. Achievement of the 1965 target for cotton fabrics, the major textile, will depend upon increased imports of raw cotton. The production of synthetic fibers and leather will have little impact on the production of light industry products in the next seven years.

-7-

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Theses on the Seven-Year Soviet Economic Plan (1959-65)

27. The production of durable consumer goods, especially household appliances, has risen rapidly from its low base during the postwar period. Although large percentage increases are planned, the output of most such items is currently so low that 1965 production will still be far below that of the US both on an absolute and a per capita basis.

28. The brightest outlook for the consumer lies in housing where urban housing construction is scheduled at double the rate achieved during 1952-58. This goal is aimed at providing a minimum of 100 square feet of living space per person by 1970 which will still be below Western European standards. The total volume of housing to be built in the period 1959-65 is about seven billion square feet, two-thirds of which is to be financed by the State. The regime, however, probably has underestimated the investment resources required for housing construction as it did in the Fifth and Sixth Five-Year Plans. Under-estimation--believed to be at least 15 percent--could necessitate either reduction of the housing goal or an increase in investment in this area.

Transport

29. Railroad transport continues to be emphasized in the USSR, and in 1965 Soviet railroads will still move over 80 percent of intercity freight traffic. The ambitious program of electrification and dieselization will continue. Although the Soviet civil air fleet continues to be publicized and the new civil air plans include the construction and improvement of ninety airfields presumably to accommodate jet aircraft, the planned target for passengers carried for 1965 is only about one-third as great as the number US airlines may be expected to carry that year. Motor vehicle transport will remain at a low level, as will water transport.

Appendices: Your attention is invited to the appended tables which present preliminary tabulation of the quantitative information embodied in the "Theses."


OTTO E. GUTHE
Assistant Director
Research and Reports

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SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Theses on the Seven-Year Soviet
Economic Plan (1959-65)

APPENDIX A

THE STRUCTURE OF USSR STATE CAPITAL INVESTMENT

	<u>1952-58 Period</u>		<u>1959-65 Period</u>	
	Billions of 1955 Rubles	Percent of Total	Billions of 1955 Rubles	Percent of Total*
<u>"Productive" Investments</u>	821	76.6	1488-1539	76.7
Industrial	(580)	(54.1)	(1100-1126)**	(56.7)
Other Productive	(241)	(22.5)	(388-413)**	(20.0)
<u>"Non-Productive" Investment</u>	251	23.4	452-457	23.3
Housing and Communal	(208)	(19.4)	(375-380)	(19.3)
Education, Culture and Health	(43)	(4.0)	(77)	(4.0)
Totals	<u>1072</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>1940-1996</u>	<u>100.0</u>

*Computed on low end of range.
**Estimated.

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SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Theses on the Seven-Year Soviet
Economic Plan (1959-65)

APPENDIX B

CONSTRUCTION

	<u>Annual Increase (%)</u>		
	<u>1951-1955 Fifth 5- Year Plan</u>	<u>1952-1958 (7-year period)</u>	<u>1959-1965 7-Year Plan</u>
<u>Urban Housing</u>			
State	7	11	6
Private	5	15	5
Total	7	12	6
<u>Railroad Lines</u>	12.6	17.7	Neg.
<u>Airport*</u>			
<u>Pipeline</u>	14	14	17
<u>Telecommunication Cable</u>	17.1	15	10.4
<u>Microwave Relay Lines</u>	NA	NA	29.2
<u>Telephone Exchanges</u> <u>/Urban/</u>	6.2	5.5	14
<u>Television Stations</u>	43.1	10.4	15

*Ninety airports will be reconstructed or built.

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SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Theses on the Seven-Year Soviet Economic Plan (1959-65)

APPENDIX C

COMMODITIES

	Production			Annual Increase (%)		
	US	USSR		USSR		
	1957	1958 estimate	1965 7-Year Plan	1951-1955 Fifth Year Plan	1952-1958 (7-year period)	1959-65 7-Year Plan
I Industrial						
Ferrous Metal-						
lurgy /Mil MT/						
Raw Iron Ore	NA	109	230-245	NA	NA	11.2-12.2
Usable Iron Ore	107	87	150-160	12.6	7.4	8.1-8.7
Pig Iron	72	39.5	65-70	11.7	6.7	7.4-8.5
Crude Steel	102	55	86-91	10.6	6.9	6.6-7.4
Rolled Steel	77.9	42.5	65-70	11.1	6.8	6.3-7.4
Iron Castings	12.3	NA	14.7	NA	NA	NA
Steel Castings	1.6	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
Non Ferrous Metallurgy						
Copper /Thou MT/	1534	498	946	8.9	8.5	9.6
Aluminum /Thou MT/	1496	654	1830	22.9	19.1	15.8
Fuel and Power						
Crude Oil /Mil MT/	355	113	230-240	13.3	15.1	11.1
Natural Gas /Mil Cubic Meters/	306	29.5	150	9.2	25	26.2
Coal /Mil MT/	470	500	596-609	8.4	8.5	2.7
Electric Power /Bil. KWH/	760	233	500-520	13.3	12.1	11.8
Chemicals						
Ethyl Alcohol /Mil Dkl/	NA	158.8	202.8	8.3	10.1	3.6
Plastics Materials and Synthetic Resins						
/Thou MT/	2029	289	1936	15.7	19.1	31.2
Chemical Fibers /Thou MT/	750	163	620-652	35.5	25.7	21-22
Mineral Fertilizers /Mil MT/	28	12.5	37.5	11.9	11.3	17

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SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Theses on the Seven-Year Soviet Economic Plan (1959-65)

APPENDIX C

COMMODITIES

	US 1957	Production		Annual Increase (%)		
		USSR 1958 estimate	USSR 1965 7-Year Plan	USSR 1951-1955 Fifth 5- Year Plan	USSR 1952-1958 (7-year period)	USSR 1959-1965 7-Year Plan
II Manufactured Goods						
Heavy						
Rolling Mill Equipment (Thou MT)	NA	100	200-220	10.4	6.6	11.2
Press Forging Equipment (Thou MT)	14	25	36.2	16.5	13.7	5.5
Machine Tools (Thou Units)	62	140	140-200	10.7	10.3	5.
Electric Motors (Mil KW)	NA	14.4	32-34	5.5	10	12.6
Power Generators (Mil KW)	10.8	5.8	17.5-18.4	37	17	17.5
Steam, Hydraulic and Gas Turbines (Mil KW)	14.1	6.8	18.7-20.4	15.6	11.7	16.4
Chemical Equipment (Thou MT)	NA	140	475	20.9	12.9	19.1
Grain Combines (Thou Units)	44.7	80	60	.75	6	-4
Tractors (Thou Units)	303	220	142.8	8.5	13.3	-7
Motor Vehicles (Thou Units)	7221	500	750-856	4	8	6-8
Diesel and Electric Locomotives (Units)	1960	1100	2550-2700	7.5	23	13

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SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Theses on the Seven-Year Soviet Economic Plan (1959-65)

APPENDIX C

COMMODITIES (CONTINUED)

	Production			Annual Increase (%)		
	US	USSR		USSR		
	1957	1958 estimate	1965 7-Year Plan	1951-1955 Fifth 5- Year Plan	1952-1958 (7-year period)	1959-1965 7-Year Plan
<u>Light-durable</u>						
<u>Television</u>						
Receivers (Mil Units)	6.6	.9	4.14	109	50	25
Radio Receiv- ers (Mil Units)	9.7	4	6.8	28.5	18.2	8
Refrigerators (Thou Units)	3350	385	2156	163	59	28
Sewing Machines (Thou Units)	NA	2800	5880	26	23	11
Washing Machines (Thou Units)	4042	460	4048	211	119	35
Paperboard (Thou Tons)	14081	700	2800	13	11	22
Paper (Thou Tons)	13595	2188	3500	9.2	7.2	6.9
<u>Light-soft</u>						
Cotton Cloth (Bil Meters)	8.8	5.8	7.7-8	8.6	3	4.3-4.8
Silk Cloth (Mil Meters)	2083	814	1485	32	25	9
Wool Cloth (Mil Meters)	267	300	500	10.1	7.9	7.6
Linen Cloth (Mil Meters)	NA	480	635	1.5	6.3	4
Knit Outer- wear (Mil pieces)	NA	95	160	12.7	7.1	7.8
Knit Under- wear (Mil pieces)	NA	392	780	18.4	10.3	10.4
Hosiery (Mil Pairs)	1740	882	1250	10.8	5.8	5.2
Leather Foot- wear (Mil Pairs)	529	355	515	6.2	5.8	5.5

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SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Theses on the Seven-Year Soviet Economic Plan (1959-65)

APPENDIX C

COMMODITIES

	Production			Annual Increase (%)		
	US 1957	1958 estimate	USSR 1965 7-Year Plan	USSR 1951-1955 Fifth 5- Year Plan	USSR 1952-1958 (7-year period)	USSR 1959-1965 7-Year Plan
III Construction Materials						
Cement (Mil MT)	53.1	33.6	75-81	17.1	15.7	12.1-13.4
Pre-cast Concrete (Mil Cubic Meters)	NA	17.3	42-45	32.3	39.3	13.5-14.6
Asbestos-Cement Shingles (Slate) (Bil Standard Units)	NA	2.4	6	22.2	19.4	14.
Soft Roofing (Bil square meters)	NA	.628	1.3	12	10.3	11
Window Glass (Mil Square Meters)	NA	130	220	5.4	9.8	7.8
IV Agriculture (Mil MT)						
Grain	157.6	123	172(164-180)	4	6	5
Potatoes	10.9	88	147	-4	3	8
Sugar Beets	14.1	47	74(70-78)	8	10	7
Meat	15.8	5	16	5	7	12
Milk	57.3	50	102.5(100-105)	4	7	9
Cotton	7.3	4.3	5.9(5.7-6.1)	2	2	5
Wool	.122	.32	.548	8	8	8
Fiber Flax Neg'l.		.34	.580	8	11	8

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SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Theses on the Seven-Year Soviet Economic Plan (1959-65)

APPENDIX D

CHANGES IN USSR LABOR AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY
(IN PERCENT)

	<u>1958/1951</u>	<u>1965/1958</u>	<u>Average Annual Increases</u>	
			<u>1952-58</u>	<u>1959-65</u>
<u>Industry</u>				
Labor Force	127	123	3.5	3.0
Output	215	180	11.6	8.8
Labor Productivity	169	146	7.8	5.6
<u>Agriculture</u>				
Labor Force	105	91	0.7	-1.3
Output	135	170	4.4	7.9
Labor Productivity	129	189	3.7	9.5

FOREIGN TRADE

	<u>Turnover</u>		<u>Annual Increase (%)</u>		
	<u>USSR</u>		<u>USSR</u>		
	<u>1958</u> <u>estimate</u>	<u>1965</u> <u>7-Year</u> <u>Plan</u>	<u>1951-1955</u> <u>Fifth 5-</u> <u>Year Plan</u>	<u>1952-1958</u> <u>(7 year</u> <u>period)</u>	<u>1959-1965</u> <u>7-Year</u> <u>Plan</u>
<u>Bloc /Bil of Dol-</u> <u>lars/</u>	6.7	10	8.3	5	5.9
<u>Total World /Bil</u> <u>of Dollars/</u>	NA	NA	9.7	9.6	6

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SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Theses on the Seven-Year Soviet Economic Plan (1959-65)

APPENDIX E

TRANSPORT

	<u>Traffic</u>			<u>Annual Increase (%)</u>		
	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>		<u>USSR</u>		
	<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u> <u>estimate</u>	<u>1965</u> <u>7-Year</u> <u>Plan</u>	<u>1951-1955</u> <u>Fifth 5-</u> <u>Year Plan</u>	<u>1952-1958</u> <u>(7-year</u> <u>period)</u>	<u>1959-1965</u> <u>7-Year</u> <u>Plan</u>
I Freight						
Railroad						
/ <u>Bil Ton-KM</u> /	902	1298	1849	10.	9.8	5.1
Highway						
/ <u>Bil Ton-KM</u> /	370.5*	63.5	120.6	16.1	14.8	9.6
Inland Water						
/ <u>Bil Ton-KM</u> /	159.1*	81.3	130.1	8.	6.9	6.9
Maritime						
/ <u>Bil Ton-KM</u> /	-	101.8	203.6	11.7	14.1	10.4
Pipeline						
/ <u>Mil Ton</u> /	732*	107	600	27.8	27.8	27.9
II Passenger						
Civil Air						
/ <u>Mil passen-</u> <u>gers</u> /	50	6.7	40.2	13.1	22.9	23.6
Motor Bus						
/ <u>Bil passen-</u> <u>gers</u> /	13*	9.3	27.8	33.6	31.4	17

* 1956 data.

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