

CIACO NID 81 [REDACTED]

October 19, 1981

POLAND: Party Policy Toughening

The replacement of party leader Kania by Prime Minister Jaruzelski foreshadows a tougher policy by the Polish party toward Solidarity that, while continuing the union-government dialogue, also increases the chances of confrontation. [REDACTED]

The acceptance of Kania's resignation--reportedly by 56 percent of the Central Committee members who voted--reflects heightened frustration within the party over its inability to contain Solidarity. Some moderates may have felt that Kania had to be sacrificed because he had become a symbol of inaction and thus an impediment to his own pragmatic policies. [REDACTED]

The selection of Jaruzelski seems intended to exploit popular respect for the military to the party's advantage and possibly to place the party in a position to manage any "state of emergency" more easily. It remains unclear whether Jaruzelski will retain his government posts as prime minister and defense minister. [REDACTED]

Jaruzelski is obligated to measures--laid out in a Central Committee resolution--that could bring the government directly into conflict with the union. The Central Committee demanded that parliament "temporarily" suspend the right to strike and called for renegotiation of all government-union agreements. The resolution also stated the party's intent to tighten control over the media, running directly counter to union demands for greater access. [REDACTED]

Jaruzelski seems likely, however, to move cautiously in using more forceful measures to deal with Solidarity. The Central Committee kept open the door for negotiations, proclaiming itself in favor of "the line of dialogue, accord, and cooperation." Continuing divisions within the party would make the quick reversal of this policy difficult. [REDACTED]

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Jaruzelski probably also realizes the importance of creating the right atmosphere for any declaration of martial law, both to gain popular support and to ensure the reliability of the troops who must enforce the action. [REDACTED]

Initial reactions from Solidarity were cautious, but the union apparently interprets the change as evidence of disarray in the party, rather than as a shift in regime policy. Union leader Walesa, who remains in France, has been reluctant to comment even though his aides are closely monitoring the situation. [REDACTED]

Soviet Commentary

Soviet reporting has been limited to factual coverage, but Moscow doubtless is pleased at the change in the Polish leadership. The Soviets have made clear their dissatisfaction with Kania's performance in recent months. [REDACTED]

Moscow will look for early indications that the new First Secretary is willing to act more firmly than his predecessor in strengthening central control of the party and suppressing what Moscow considers to be extremist elements in Solidarity. The Soviets probably will urge Jaruzelski to make greater use of the Polish military if warranted. [REDACTED]

Military Activity

The Poles have been considering contingency plans for the imposition of martial law for some time, and staff planning for the military units that would be involved probably is complete. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The two-month extension of the term of military service for conscripts scheduled to be discharged this week shows Warsaw's desire to be prepared should such a move be necessary. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] some Polish military and security units may have been augmented, but there has been no widespread callup of reservists. [REDACTED]

We have no indication that Soviet forces in and around Poland expect the Polish Government to institute martial law soon. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The semiannual troop rotation airlift for Soviet forces in Eastern Europe appears to be proceeding normally. [REDACTED]