

# 75 24

# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

### CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ [REDACTED]

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	STRATEGIC HAMLET SITUATION IN CENTRAL VIETNAM	DATE DISTR.	5 OCTOBER 1962
DATE OF INFO.	[REDACTED]	PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON [REDACTED]	REFERENCES	IN
APPRAISAL		FIELD REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED]

SAID [REDACTED] THAT MOST OF THE PROVINCES HAVE PLACED THE ENTIRE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM (SHP) ON THE INDIVIDUAL DISTRICT CHIEFS, FEW OF WHOM ARE EQUIPPED TO COPE WITH IT. IN TURN, THE DISTRICT CHIEFS DEPEND ON THE LOCAL POPULATION TO FINANCE THE PROGRAM, INCLUDING THE PROVISION OF FOOD AND LODGINGS FOR THE CIVIC ACTION TEAMS AND SELF-DEFENSE CORPS MEMBERS CHARGED WITH SHP RESPONSIBILITIES. AFTER PAYING THE COST, THERE IS USUALLY VERY LITTLE LEFT OVER FOR THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAM. THE VILLAGERS, MOREOVER, BECOME IRRITATED AT BEING FORCED TO CONTRIBUTE TO SOMETHING THAT PRODUCES NO TANGIBLE RESULTS. HOWEVER, IT HAS NOT BEEN DIFFICULT TO PREVENT THE GOVERNMENT FROM FINDING OUT THE TRUE SITUATION. PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS AND OTHERS CONCERNED

### CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ [REDACTED]

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	ORR	OBI	OO
STATE/DIR															

# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

24

DATE [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

FM

PAGE TWO

WITH THE SHP SYMPATHIZE WITH ONE ANOTHER AND CAN BE COUNTED ON NOT TO REVEAL THE TRUE SITUATION. FURTHERMORE, VISITORS DO NOT RELISH THE PROSPECT OF TRAVELING GREAT DISTANCES FROM THE PROVINCIAL CENTERS AND THEREFORE, CAN BE GUIDED TO ONLY THOSE AREAS WHICH THE LOCAL OFFICIALS WISH THEM TO SEE.

2. PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS OF CENTRAL VIETNAM CLAIM THAT MOST VILLAGES ARE TOO POOR TO PROVIDE MORE FUNDS FOR THE SHP, BUT THE OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH THE PROGRAM. THEY SUBMIT PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS AND ATTEND SHP OR RELATED TRAINING COURSES AS DIRECTED. THE REPORTS SHOW THAT OVER 250 STRATEGIC HAMLETS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED, WHEREAS ONLY FOUR ACTUALLY EXIST, AND ONLY ONE OF THE FOUR MEETS MOST OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A STRATEGIC HAMLET. THE FOUR HAMLETS ARE LOCATED IN TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT. MOST OF THE HAMLETS LISTED AS COMPLETED MEET ONLY ONE OR MORE OF THE VERY BASIC REQUIREMENTS, SUCH AS HAVING A FENCE AROUND THE HAMLET. WITH THE ADVENT OF THE POPULAR FORCES PROGRAM, LITTLE NOTICE IS BEING PAID TO THE SHP.

3. [REDACTED] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ [REDACTED]