



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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NOFORN NOCONTRACT  
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# National Intelligence Daily

Saturday  
2 March 1985

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Approved for Release  
Date JUN 1999

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
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
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CHINA-VIETNAM:

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
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
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EL SALVADOR:



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PAKISTAN:

Postelection Prospects

The high turnout in the provincial elections Thursday has reinforced the credibility of President Zia's moves toward civilian rule. [REDACTED] b3

The turnout for the provincial balloting was greater than the 52-percent vote in the National Assembly elections earlier this week. [REDACTED] b1, b3

Most of the new delegates to the National Assembly are linked to conservative and religious parties or are drawn from traditionally strong interest groups such as landowners and professionals. [REDACTED] b3  
[REDACTED] about 20 percent have or have had ties to the Pakistan People's Party that Zia removed from power. Fifty delegates are newcomers whose political leanings are unknown. [REDACTED] b3

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[REDACTED]


Zia's hand has been strengthened by the favorable turnout and the election of many new assemblymen likely to be amenable to his wishes, at least for the short term. He will have to move carefully, however, to avoid antagonizing the Assembly and fostering a revival of the opposition—now weak and divided. [REDACTED] b3

Zia probably is trying to gauge how much authority he can risk sharing. He probably will offer the Assembly some power over the budget and other domestic issues but will seek to circumscribe its activity in defense and foreign policy. [REDACTED] b3

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
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ANGOLA:

UNITA Keeps the Pressure Up



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POLAND:

Church-State Relations Cool

*The regime's anti-Church campaign is continuing, effectively slowing Church-state dialogue.* [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the regime has not yet responded to a sharply worded protest sent by the Episcopate two weeks ago demanding a halt to the anti-Church campaign. The government has yet to reply to a request last month by Cardinal Glomp to meet with Premier Jaruzelski. [REDACTED] b3

Government officials warned they would prosecute priests who violate the law. [REDACTED] the Episcopate remains worried about provocative antiregime sermons given by activist priests. One such priest, whom Glomp has already banned from public preaching in Warsaw, is now delivering "underground" sermons [REDACTED] b3 b1

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[REDACTED] regime obstruction of the Church-sponsored agricultural fund—along with the difficulties in collecting money in the West—has cooled support for the plan among the clergy. Many Church leaders believe the plan is too ambitious, and [REDACTED] predicts it will be scaled back. [REDACTED] b3 b3

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[REDACTED] the secretary to the Episcopate met with Internal Affairs Minister Kiszczak to seek the release of the three Solidarity leaders and their advisers under arrest in Gdansk. [REDACTED] b3

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[REDACTED] Jaruzelski appears determined to maintain his anti-Church campaign for awhile to placate the Soviets and the Polish security service over the Popieluszko trial. [REDACTED] b3

The meeting with the Episcopate secretary, however, indicates he is leaving his options open. Eventually Jaruzelski probably will ease up on the campaign and resume the appearance of trying to normalize conditions in Poland. He might want Church cooperation to help minimize a boycott of the parliamentary elections in October, for instance. A meeting between Glomp and Jaruzelski would signal a thaw in the relationship. [REDACTED] b3

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[REDACTED]

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**LEBANON-ISRAEL-US: Implications of UN Vote**

A US veto of a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israeli actions in southern Lebanon may serve as a pretext for further violence by radical Shia elements against US personnel—including the hostages held by the Hizballah. The Lebanese Government plans to introduce a resolution critical of the "iron fist" policy that the Israeli Army is pursuing as it withdraws from predominantly Shia southern Lebanon.

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[REDACTED]

**Comment:** Harsh Israeli measures in response to continuing attacks on Israeli troops have provoked strong reactions from nearly all Lebanese factions—particularly the Shias. Extremist elements almost certainly would label a US veto as implicit approval of the Israeli actions, and they might use it to justify attacks on US personnel or installations. Anonymous telephone callers last September, claiming to represent "Islamic Jihad," stated that the car bombing of the US Embassy Annex in East Beirut was their response to the US veto of a similar Lebanese resolution.

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**USSR: Salyut-7 Shutdown**

[REDACTED] that the planned program for the Salyut-7 space station has been fulfilled and the station has been deactivated.

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[REDACTED]

This appears to be an unplanned shutdown because the Soviets expected to reman the space station later this month. To avoid the possibility of bad publicity that resulted from the uncontrolled reentry of the US Skylab space station in 1979 and a Soviet satellite in 1983, the Soviets may now have to undertake a difficult mission to ensure that Salyut-7's reentry is controlled. Under present conditions, Salyut-7 would reenter Earth's atmosphere in approximately two years.

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
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


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TURKEY:

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PERU: Guerrilla Efforts To Disrupt Election?

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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In Brief

Americas

b3 — Nicaraguan President Ortega and large Sandinista delegation made [redacted] visit to Cuba last week [redacted] probably discussed Ortega's recent "peace initiative." [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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Middle East

[redacted]

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f Iraqi press confirms killing of Iraqi diplomat and his son in Kuwait by gunmen Thursday night ... [redacted] when culprits identified, Iraq likely to retaliate.

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[redacted]

Europe

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— Polish price increases set for Monday part of regime's middle-range proposal ... bread and wheat products to rise by 30 to 40 percent ... major protests seem unlikely ... authorities probably moving quickly to dispel any image of indecisiveness.

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[redacted]

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Asia-Pacific

[REDACTED]

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— Short commentary in *China's People's Daily* criticized US policy toward Nicaragua . . . accused administration of "hegemonistic attitude" in Central America . . . effort to show independence from US by siding with Third World countries.

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South Asia

[REDACTED]

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Africa

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
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**Special Analysis**

**USSR:**

**Ukrainian Party Leader in Washington**

*The selection of Ukrainian party boss Vladimir Shcherbitskiy to head the Supreme Soviet delegation that arrives in Washington tomorrow reflects Moscow's wish to appear both reasonable and tough on the eve of the arms control talks in Geneva.* [redacted] b3

Shcherbitskiy is a full member of the Politburo and the highest ranking Soviet leader other than Foreign Minister Gromyko to visit the US since 1973. Previous delegations usually have been headed by Politburo candidate member Ponomarev. The decision to name a full member probably was driven by the timing of the arms control talks, Moscow's interest in getting a high-level reading of US policymakers' attitudes, and the precedent of senior party secretary Gorbachev's visit to London in December as head of a similar delegation. [redacted] b3

Shcherbitskiy is one of only four Politburo members other than Chernenko who hold official positions in the Supreme Soviet—the others are Kazakh party leader Kunayev, Moscow party chief Grishin, and senior party secretary Gorbachev—and who thus could have been candidates to head the delegation. Gorbachev's increased visibility [redacted] has been an irritant to General Secretary Chernenko, and presumably to Gorbachev's rivals, and may have weighed against his selection. Gorbachev himself may not have wanted to be away from Moscow because of Chernenko's poor health. [redacted] b3

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In his public statements on bilateral relations, Shcherbitskiy has been even more openly suspicious of US intentions toward the USSR than have some other Soviet leaders, such as Gorbachev. This attitude, combined with his senior position, probably recommended him to his colleagues as the appropriate representative to send at this time.

[redacted] b3

**Politburo's Emissary**

Despite Shcherbitskiy's apparent rigidity with respect to the US, he will be coming as an emissary of the Soviet leadership and may choose to soft-pedal his natural inclination toward toughness. [redacted] the speech he delivered on 12 February, in which he was less strident in his criticism of the US and emphasized the need for good will on both sides at the Geneva arms negotiations. [redacted]

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Shcherbitskiy has vigorously prosecuted the campaign against dissidents in the Ukraine and established strict standards for the approval of Jewish emigration applications.

He may be more forthcoming in Washington, however, in view of the renewed Soviet effort to remove US restrictions on bilateral trade. Shcherbitskiy probably will also stress the mutual advantages of US-Soviet trade, even though his writings indicate that he believes the Soviets have become too dependent on Western technology.

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**Political Ambitions**

Shcherbitskiy's demonstrations of political opportunism in recent years suggest ambitions for higher office. Although a protege of former party chief Brezhnev, he supported efforts near the end of Brezhnev's tenure to bring KGB chief Andropov into the party secretariat—a move that presaged Andropov's selection as party chief over Brezhnev's favorite, Chernenko.

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After Andropov's death, however, Shcherbitskiy is said to have backed Chernenko's candidacy for the top office. Now, as the end of Chernenko's tenure seems on the horizon, Shcherbitskiy already has begun to tone down his praise of the General Secretary, which suggests he is again trying to position himself to best advantage. He probably hopes that his trip to Washington, which follows his slippage in recent protocol rankings, will shore up his political prospects.

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Special Analysis

SOUTH KOREA:

Rougher Waters Ahead

The return of Kim Dae Jung and the strong showing by a new opposition party in the recent parliamentary elections mark the beginning of a critical period for President Chun. The government initially has sought to appear responsive to opposition demands for dialogue and reform, but it has signaled a readiness to crack down on activities that it believes threaten domestic stability. Opposition leaders, deeply suspicious of Chun's intentions, are seeking to capitalize on the momentum of the elections and will press hard for fundamental political reforms. When the university campuses reopen next week, all the elements will be in place for a confrontation. [redacted] b3

[redacted] are concerned that the momentum behind calls for profound reform will collide with hardline policies urged on Chun by his most conservative advisers and generate an escalating cycle of confrontation and reprisal. Perhaps with this gloomy assessment in mind, moderate elements in Chun's party have argued that genuine concessions are needed to deal with rising public aspirations for fundamental reform. [redacted] b1 b3

Early government actions have supported this line.

- Newly appointed Prime Minister Lho Shinyong, a moderate, already has met with the heads of the chief opposition parties.
- The new ruling party president, Roh Tae Woo, has called for a dialogue between the parties and possibly with dissidents Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam. [redacted]

[redacted] b3  
Chun's naming of a hardline military protege as chief of the National Security Planning Agency, the powerful civilian intelligence and security apparatus, suggests, however, that he is prepared to reinstate tough political controls if criticism of the government appears to be getting out of control. [redacted]

Balancing Competing Demands

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
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
Opposition leaders suspect the worst of Chun but apparently believe he is unlikely to take any actions that might jeopardize his visit to Washington in late April. In an apparent effort to exploit the perceived window of opportunity before the trip, the president of the main opposition party has called for the release of all political prisoners, lifting of the political activity ban on Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, and investigation of alleged electioneering irregularities as a precondition for a "normal" opening of the new National Assembly, scheduled to convene on 12 April.

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Prospects



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
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


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Special Analysis

NICARAGUA:



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
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