



Directorate of Intelligence

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Terrorism Review

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25 March 1985

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Terrorism Review b3

25 March 1985

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This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor

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Terrorism Review

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25 March 1985

Focus

New Rash of Kidnapings in Lebanon

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Weeks of rising anti-Israeli and anti-Western sentiment and several recent bombings have culminated in a new spate of kidnapings and suspicious disappearances of Westerners in Lebanon:

- On 14 March, British metallurgist Geoffrey Nash was kidnaped by unidentified gunmen as he was walking to his office near the unoccupied US Embassy chancery in West Beirut.
- On the same day, the Reverend Nicolas Kluiters, a Dutch Jesuit priest, disappeared in the Bekaa Valley near Balabakk, the stronghold of the Lebanese Shia extremist groups. When the priest's car was found several days later, with it was found a note mentioning the "Vengeance Party," a group with which we are not familiar.
- On 15 March, British businessman Brian Levick was kidnaped by five gunmen as he was driving along a street in West Beirut.
- On 16 March, US citizen Terry Anderson, the chief Middle East correspondent for the Associated Press news service, was abducted in West Beirut by three men in a green Mercedes.
- On 22 March, French consular official Marcel Fontaine was abducted in West Beirut as he stopped at a shop to buy a newspaper; the three kidnapers took him away in a green BMW sedan.
- On the same day, French Embassy protocol officer Marcel Carton disappeared, along with his daughter, Danielle Perez, an Embassy secretary.

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On 17 March, an anonymous caller to a Western press agency in Beirut claimed that Islamic Jihad had been responsible for kidnaping Anderson and the two Britons, specifically naming all three. He did not mention the Dutch priest. The caller said that the kidnapings were "within the framework of our continuous operations against America and its agents," and he issued a "final warning to foreigners in the Lebanese capital against involving themselves in subversive activities."

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On 22 March, anonymous callers to a Western news agency took credit in the name of Islamic Jihad for kidnaping the three French diplomats as well. The first caller said Fontaine had been abducted because he was "an agent of French imperialism." He did not mention the other two missing French diplomats. The

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second caller, describing the first call as "incomplete," claimed that Islamic Jihad had also abducted Carton and Perez.¹ He demanded that the French Government halt negotiations to sell Mirage fighters to Saudi Arabia and stop selling arms to Iraq.

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Some of the abductions may have been opportunistic attacks on vulnerable targets. The kidnappings of Anderson and Fontaine, however, seem to have been planned operations. Anderson was with an AP photographer when he was captured, but, instead of taking the photographer as well, the kidnapers held him back at gunpoint. Moreover, [redacted] Anderson had been followed by men in a green Mercedes for two days before the kidnaping. Fontaine had the unwise habit of buying a newspaper from the same vendor every morning at precisely 0810, a fact the kidnapers obviously knew.

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Claims of responsibility in the name of Islamic Jihad usually indicate that some element of the Hizballah has been responsible, and we are inclined to accept these claims as genuine, although it may be that more than one group is involved. If Hizballah terrorists did kidnap Anderson, they probably did so without the knowledge of prominent Hizballah leader Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. Anderson had interviewed Fadlallah at the latter's home the day before he was kidnaped, and Fadlallah has told AP that he considers this incident a matter of "my own honor"—evidently meaning that after serving as Anderson's host he would neither have instigated nor countenanced any attack on Anderson. [redacted] has suggested that, rather than the Hizballah, a renegade faction of Amal may have kidnaped Anderson.

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[redacted] of course, that the actions of the Hizballah are inspired by, if not directed by, elements of the Iranian Government. At the same time, however, we suspect that the Lebanese Shia extremists have conducted many terrorist attacks on their own—including some against US targets. They have, after all, their own objections to US policies. They have less reason, however, to attack French targets: consequently, it seems relatively more likely that the attacks against French targets have been at the behest of Iran. The nature of the demands made by the ostensible spokesman for Islamic Jihad support this judgment.

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¹ Danielle Perez would be the only female captive among the as many as 11 hostages that Hizballah elements may now be holding. Hitherto, the Shia extremists have avoided targeting women, apparently out of religious principles.

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Highlights

Alert Item

Middle East
and Western Europe

Western Government Installations Targeted by Shia Terrorists

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Lebanese Shia extremist leader Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, for example, vowed that Hizballah would exact revenge for the devastating bombing near his home in Beirut on 8 March by attacking US and other Western installations in countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. Fadlallah told supporters that Iranian agents already in place in the Gulf states could carry out such attacks, and that Lebanese Shias would be sent to Amman if an attack there seemed feasible.

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Key Indicators

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Additionally, [REDACTED] the "Southern Operational" wing of I.P. 25 is contemplating surrendering to the Portuguese police en masse in order to benefit from a clause of the Portuguese counterterrorism law that provides for lighter sentences for those who cooperate with the authorities. Other members of the group who have recently returned from abroad are trying to dissuade them. [REDACTED]

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Significant Developments

Canada

ARA Members Seize Turkish Embassy

On 12 March in Ottawa, three members of the Armenian Revolutionary Army seized the Turkish Embassy, killing a guard in the process. Turkish Ambassador Coskum Kirca escaped by jumping out of an upper story window, but he was severely injured by the fall. After four hours, the terrorists were talked into surrendering. They have been charged with first-degree murder. The ARA has been associated with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, otherwise known as the Dashnak Party, the same organization that spawned the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide. [REDACTED]

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Lebanon

Bomb Destroys Shia Mosque in Southern Lebanon

On 4 March a bomb explosion at the main mosque in Marakah killed 11 persons and injured 28. No group claimed credit for the explosion, which occurred only hours after Israeli troops had searched the village and then departed. Among the dead were two prominent Amal leaders [redacted]—one of them because he had threatened that Amal would launch cross-border attacks into northern Israel.

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Shia Extremists Taste Own Medicine


On 8 March in south Beirut, an estimated 250 kilograms of explosives concealed in a car detonated near the home of Hizballah spiritual leader Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, killing 80 persons and wounding more than 250. It was the most lethal attack in Lebanon since the Islamic Jihad bombings of the US Marine and French military compounds in October 1983. Fadlallah, who was not injured, immediately blamed the United States and Israel and vowed revenge.

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Shia Attacks Moving Closer to Israel

On 10 March a suicide car bomb attack on an Israeli military convoy just north of the Israeli border killed 12 soldiers and wounded 14. The Lebanese National Resistance Front, "Islamic Resistance" (a hitherto unknown group), and—most credibly—Islamic Jihad all claimed credit for the bloody attack. The anonymous caller representing Islamic Jihad asserted that the target of the operation had been the Israeli village of Metulla, but owing to a "tactical mistake" the driver had attacked the convoy instead. This would have been the first major Shia attack inside Israel and would have represented a significant escalation of the guerrilla war against Israel. Threats of more such suicide attacks were telephoned the next day to a Western news agency in Beirut.


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Caribbean

President of Guadeloupe General Council Escapes Assassination

On 7 March a single rifle shot fired through the window of her secretary's office narrowly missed President Lucette Michaux-Chevry. French Caribbean separatists are believed responsible for the attempted assassination, which appears to have been carefully planned and probably was designed to influence local elections on 10 March. Previous attacks by separatists in Guadeloupe have been aimed at property rather than persons, so this shooting was a serious tactical escalation.

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El Salvador

CERF Murders Army Spokesman

On 7 March in San Salvador, chief Salvadoran Army spokesman Lt. Col. Ricardo Cienfuegos was shot to death as he played tennis at a local sports club. The Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front (CERF), an urban terrorist splinter of the Forces of Popular Liberation, claimed responsibility. As director of the Armed Forces Press Committee, Cienfuegos had been instrumental in strengthening the public affairs and media efforts of the Salvadoran Army. He met regularly with foreign newsmen, who regarded him as among the very few credible government sources of information.

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Ecuador

AVC Breaks Into Police Arsenal

On 12 March, 26 members of the subversive organization Alfaro Vive, Carajo! wearing police uniforms captured about 400 weapons and several thousand rounds of ammunition in an early morning raid on the Quito police arsenal. Previous operations by the group had consisted mainly of bank robberies and rather playful efforts at armed propaganda. As a result of this raid, the group has significantly enhanced its operational capabilities, suggesting it intends to escalate its antigovernment campaign.

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Honduras

FMLH Targets US Soldiers

On 8 March in Tegucigalpa, five persons were injured, including one US serviceman, by a bomb that exploded in a discotheque frequented by US servicemen. The Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras (FMLH) claimed credit. According to its communique, it sought "to kill military personnel participating in the Big Pine III military maneuvers." The FMLH, founded by a Communist splinter party in 1979, had not been active for several years and was thought to be defunct.

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Angola

UNITA Frees 27 Foreign Captives

President Jonas Savimbi of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola announced the release in Jamba as part of the celebration of the anniversary of the founding of UNITA. Most if not all of the hostages—two Americans, three Britons, five Portuguese, and 17 Filipinos—had been captured on 29 December when the rebels took over the town of Cafunfo. Subsequently, they had been forced to march some 650 kilometers to Jamba. Savimbi took the opportunity to announce that UNITA would no longer routinely free foreigners captured in war zones, but would now hold them indefinitely. The International Red Cross arranged for the freed hostages to fly to South Africa.

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What Next From the Euroterrorists?

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No significant terrorism has emanated from the Euroterrorist alliance since 1 February, the day the Red Army Faction (RAF) murdered West German industrialist Ernst Zimmermann and the RAF prisoners ended their hunger strike. This halt in activity was not forced upon the terrorists; instead, they stopped (or paused) of their own accord. None of the principal perpetrators has been apprehended, and there is no evidence that they have given up terrorism. Thus they retain the capability to resume their attacks at will, and we expect them to do so sooner or later.

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Hardly anyone would disagree with this general assessment: on the other hand, it is too vague to help those who are trying to defend themselves against the coming attacks. Since for well-known reasons we are rarely able to provide precise warning information, we usually compensate by making sure we do not underestimate (or understate) the threat. Customarily, then, we tend to dwell upon the capabilities and options of the terrorists, along with the multiplicity of possible targets and the impossibility of defending them all, rather than, say, upon the reasons why the terrorists might let up for a while. We are trying here to break that pattern by offering some admittedly speculative thoughts on the conduct and possible motivations of those who, perhaps too broadly, have been labeled the Euroterrorists. We hope thereby to shed a little light on what they are likely to do next—and when.

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First we should make clear whom we are talking about. [redacted] indicates that participation in the Euroterrorist alliance has hardly been universal. Leftwing West European groups, which we had feared might join up—Italy's Red Brigades, Portugal's Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25)—have apparently not done so; indeed, FP-25 went out of its way to emphasize its nonparticipation. Only the RAF, France's Action Directe, and Belgium's Communist Combatant Cells (CCC) appear to be

involved. [redacted] Action Directe and the CCC are believed to have still fewer terrorist operatives. Thus the Euroterrorist alliance probably consists of no more than [redacted] active terrorists, mostly West Germans.

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What Motivates the Euroterrorists?

One way to view the recent Euroterrorist campaign is simply as the latest manifestation of the sort of leftwing terrorism that has been prevalent in Western Europe since the early 1970s. In this light, the limited international cooperation to date would merely represent the evolutionary convergence of tactics among groups with similar ideology and goals rather than any dramatic new departure. But there are considerable grounds for believing it is more than that.

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In recent years, West European terrorist groups including the RAF have been frustrated by the improving capabilities of the counterterrorism authorities, who have arrested most of their members, narrowed their tactical options, reduced their targeting opportunities, and constricted their operational environment. Some of the communiques from imprisoned RAF terrorists seem to suggest that they believed it was "now or never" for their "anti-imperialist front," and that this campaign—conducted in the presumably favorable atmosphere of the aftermath of the failure of the West European peace movement to prevent INF deployment—was their last good chance to generate the massive and widespread support they sought.

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On the other hand, the current crop of European terrorists may be less concerned with making progress

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toward a goal, such as generating anti-NATO sentiment among the European populace, than with simply playing the terrorist game. For them, [redacted] has suggested, terrorism may have become an end in itself, with the terrorist act its own reward. The psychological benefits of participating in terrorist attacks may have become the prime motivation for conducting them. Like any organization, moreover, terrorist groups become dedicated to their own survival; rarely do they go out of business voluntarily. Instead, they continue to act in order to justify their continued existence. In other words, the members of terrorist groups tend to become "journeymen" whose ideological justifications for their actions are little more than rationalizations of what they just like doing—or must continue to do or disband. [redacted] b3

b3 *A Fantasy World.* Alternatively, [redacted] has also pointed out, terrorists are especially vulnerable to self delusion; they often make the mistake of believing their own propaganda. They tend to overestimate their own strength, their popular support, the weakness of the enemy, and the imminence of their victory. Though rational, they live in a fantasy world in which their armies and brigades wage a fantasy war on behalf of legions of supporters—constituencies that, like their military units, are largely imaginary. And though their efforts be unavailing or even counterproductive, they may continue to fight, for quitting is worse than admitting defeat—it is admitting irrelevance. [redacted] b3

This would explain the almost astonishing persistence of members of the RAF (and, to a lesser extent, of Action Directe) in the face of overwhelming evidence that their tactics have not advanced them at all toward their stated goals. Indeed, by arousing revulsion among their own countrymen and stimulating their own governments to improve their counterterrorism capabilities and cooperation with other governments, they have actually been losing ground. Rejected by their own countrymen, these terrorists seem more and more to be acting on behalf of an idealized, imaginary class of international victims of "imperialism." Positive reinforcement comes not from the people on whose behalf the terrorist actions are ostensibly undertaken but from

feelings of solidarity with (and expressions of solidarity from) other terrorist groups which, similarly estranged from their own societies, are acting on behalf of the same mythical international constituency. [redacted] b3

Why the Lull in Activity?

In contrast to the intense Euroterrorist activity in December and January, relative calm has prevailed since then. Nevertheless, even though no major incidents linked to the Euroterrorist alliance have occurred in nearly two months, potential victims have remained on tenterhooks awaiting the next blow. Concern has been heightened by information contained in RAF documents confiscated last summer indicating that the terrorist campaign would culminate in one or more "spectacular" actions. Judging that none of the actions that have taken place so far was especially spectacular, and remembering that the RAF has a reputation for following through with its plans even after they have been discovered by authorities, many analysts continue to expect a major event at any time—at least they do not believe any potential targets should yet relax. [redacted] b3

On the other hand, each day that passes without a major Euroterrorist event makes this thesis look a little less imposing. And there are counterarguments. For instance, in 1977, the year the RAF was most active and destructive, several months passed between some major incidents. For another thing, RAF literature shows the group is extremely conscious of the theatrical impact of its activities, and it must recognize that the most appropriate time for a culminating event has long since elapsed.¹ Moreover, the RAF makes many more plans than it ever carries out, and it does modify its plans if circumstances change. [redacted] b1

¹ Indeed, in retrospect, the most appropriate date was 1 February, the day prominent industrialist Ernst Zimmermann was murdered and the RAF hunger strike ended. The symbolic value of targeting Zimmermann—whose company makes engines for armored vehicles, among other items, and who served as titular head of West Germany's aerospace industry—may have been greater in RAF eyes than in ours. [redacted] b3

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The Surprising Absence of the Red Brigades

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Given the many reasons why association with the Euroterrorist alliance might be attractive to West European leftwing terrorist groups, it seems odd how few actually have been involved—apparently only the RAF, Action Directe, and the CCC. The attacks against NATO-country targets in Portugal and Greece that took place during the past few months do not appear to have been part of an internationally coordinated anti-NATO terrorist strategy. Indeed, FP-25 announced explicitly that its activities in Portugal were completely independent. Although the obscure group that claimed credit for the attempted bombing of the West German Embassy in Athens said the operation had been undertaken in solidarity with the RAF, Action Directe, and CCC, there is no evidence of instigation by any of those groups. Similarly, we have seen no indications of any involvement on the part of the leftwing terrorists in Italy, Spain, or Northern Ireland. b3

in the joint anti-NATO terrorist campaign is that it would have jeopardized their continued sanctuary in France—a sanctuary that was already threatened by the French Government's increasingly flexible attitude toward extraditing accused terrorists—as demonstrated by its extradition of Spanish Basque terrorists last year.

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Red Brigades members remaining in Italy may have been constrained by similarly practical considerations. Several hundred suspected terrorists, including some Red Brigades members, may be eligible for release by November, when the preventive detention reform law is set to take effect. Terrorist activities within Italy could lead the Italian Government to take legal steps to further detain them and to round up and reincarcerate the many accused terrorists who have been granted only provisional liberty. b3

Perhaps the most surprising absence from the Euroterrorist alliance has been that of the Red Brigades of Italy. The Red Brigades has suffered severe setbacks in recent years, but the remnants of the group undoubtedly retain the operational capability to carry out terrorist attacks. There are well-documented links between Italian terrorists and members of Action Directe. It was Italian terrorists who first used the name Communist Combatant Organization. Among the cornerstones of Red Brigades ideology have been opposition to NATO and support for international efforts to combat Western "imperialism." For many reasons, then, the Red Brigades would appear to have been natural participants in any Euroterrorist alliance. What has been holding the Italians back? b3

Harder to evaluate are possible intergroup conflicts rooted in personal, ideological, national, or cultural differences.

[REDACTED] some members of other West European leftwing extremist groups, including the Red Brigades, regard the RAF as arrogant and elitist. It may be that the central role played by the RAF has driven away more than one prospective participant in a Euroterrorist alliance. b3

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Several plausible explanations exist. For one thing, since last summer the Red Brigades has been all but immobilized by ideological disagreements, perhaps between the surviving members of the "old guard" and a new generation of terrorists. Another reason why at least some Red Brigades members may have declined to participate

Finally, the Red Brigades is known to be trying hard to establish and maintain strict compartmentation of its operational components, as part of a general effort to improve its organizational and personnel security practices. Fear of penetration or exposure may be causing the Red Brigades to avoid or at least limit contacts between its operatives and those of other, especially foreign groups. b3

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[REDACTED] those remaining at large may have had or may have since developed—a different agenda.

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More Than One Objective. There are some good reasons why the Euroterrorists may temporarily be satisfied with what they have accomplished already. For example, there is growing evidence that the RAF and Action Directe have viewed the establishment of international terrorist cooperation as a goal in itself—as a means of justifying their tactics and confirming the correctness of their strategy rather than simply as a means of improving their capabilities or striking at their perceived enemies. One of the main objectives of the terrorists may simply have been to stimulate international concern and gain respect.

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This was demonstrated, for example, in the statement by the RAF prisoners that appeared on 4 March in the leftwing West German newspaper *Tageszeitung*, in which they explained why they had ended their hunger strike. The reason was, the unidentified author said, that "the objective of five years of fighting . . . [namely] the breakthrough to a West European dimension of revolutionary practice" constituted such a "qualitative leap" as to overtake the parochial concerns of the RAF prisoners. Proudly taking note of US overtures to other NATO countries following "the Elizabeth van Dyck operation" (the murder of General Audran in Paris), as well as of subsequent remarks by US Secretary of State Schultz, the prisoners concluded that the Euroterrorist campaign had had such an enormous impact that the West German Government would gladly see them die before yielding to their demands (such as for colocation). Thus, they explained, they had ended their hunger strike in order to deny their captors that satisfaction.

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Of course this was typical RAF after-the-fact rationalization. The prisoners probably never intended to fast to the death nor expected to win colocation. But the statement nevertheless reveals a mindset concerned at least as much with achieving respect as with harming enemies. In other words, in waging the

terrorist campaign the RAF (and presumably its allies in the CCC and Action Directe) had important organizational and psychological as well as ideological goals. Regrettable as the deaths and damage caused by the Euroterrorist campaign have been, the actual harm to NATO has been insignificant—a fact so obvious that even those given to self-delusion must realize it. At the same time, though, the terrorists achieved a signal triumph with regard to their organizational and psychological needs. They obviously gained the attention they sought; they may have succeeded beyond their expectations. If so, they might take some time to reevaluate their position and decide how to proceed. This would explain the current lull in their terrorist activities.

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Regardless, a Continuing Threat

In summary, although all observers believe the terrorists will strike again, not enough [REDACTED] to indicate when or where the next attack will come. In any case, it is likely to be designed to cause rather than avoid casualties. Among potential hostage-taking operations, kidnaping attempts are more likely than skyjackings or hostage-and-barricade operations. The advantage lies entirely with the terrorists, who can pick the tactic, time, place, and target. Increased protection of some NATO facilities and key personnel may already have deterred some attacks, but the terrorists can always shift to less protected targets.

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Obviously, the most likely targets are senior NATO military officers and major NATO facilities (especially headquarters complexes), along with senior diplomats and government officials, especially those associated with military affairs. In addition, even though the terrorists may not feel under any pressure to act soon, a number of events coming up in the next several months offer them potential opportunities to strike in a spectacular way. Among these events are the NATO Nuclear Planning Meeting to be held in Luxembourg in late March, President Reagan's visit to Europe in conjunction with the 40th anniversary of V-E Day in early May, the Bonn Economic Summit on 2-4 May, and the Paris Air Show, which will begin

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in late May and continue into June. Against these theoretical opportunities we can array the known capabilities and likely inclinations of the terrorists:

- A major RAF operation seems most probable, although the attack would not necessarily take place in West Germany. The RAF currently has the personnel, weapons, funds, and support needed to attempt assassinations, major bombings, and kidnappings, as well as lesser acts of violence. In the past, RAF targeting has been sophisticated and imaginative, and casing has been thorough and professional. The group probably will avoid the most obvious targets because they are so well protected and strike instead at a less protected individual or installation whose significance to the RAF has been underestimated.

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the CCC seems to be primarily following the lead of the RAF in its operations in Belgium. The communique issued by the CCC after its last operation promised that after a pause the group would resume its attacks and implied that its next operation would be an assassination attempt on a senior NATO or US official.

- It is extremely difficult to forecast what Action Directe will do next, since its last operation was so out of character—the Audran assassination was its first premeditated murder. If a similar operation is planned for the near future, the target would probably be a key member of the French Government or of the defense sector. b3

It is possible that the next attack will be a joint operation involving some combination of two or perhaps all three groups. It is evident that the terrorists have been paying close attention to their own press coverage and that they regard their alliance with every bit as much seriousness as we do. Their future actions—at least those involving the RAF, probably will be intended to emphasize the growing closeness and strength of the alliance. If other groups can be induced to join, the price of admission—alternatively, the celebration—might involve a major terrorist attack. As has been the case so far, the attacks are likely to be designed mainly to garner publicity and stimulate reaction by senior government officials rather than to harm NATO capabilities per se or (though this will be the ostensible justification) to generate anti-NATO sentiment among the people. b3

Finally, it should be noted that the terrorists may try to strike a short time *in advance* of the event they are protesting or exploiting, in order to avoid the massive security precautions that will be taken at the event itself. b3

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**Lebanon's Khomeini:
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah**

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Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, a Shia fundamentalist cleric based in south Beirut, has become a key leader of the extremist Hizballah movement and is attracting the support of increasing numbers of Lebanese Shias. He visits Iran frequently, maintains ties with high-level members of the Khomeini regime, and advocates the establishment of an Iranian-style state in Lebanon. He is a charismatic orator who could eventually emerge as the dominant Shia figure in Beirut and attempt to incite a revolt among discontented Shias.

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Fadlallah was born in 1935 in the Shia holy city of An Najaf in Iraq, but his family came from a village in southern Lebanon. He studied Islamic jurisprudence until 1966 in An Najaf, where he may have come under the influence of Khomeini, who arrived there in 1964. He then returned to Lebanon and began to develop a following among Lebanese Shias seeking a return to Islamic values.

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Fadlallah's goal is to spark a Shia revolution in Lebanon that would overthrow the present government and replace it with a Shia-dominated Islamic republic. He rejects the National Pact of 1943, upon which the Lebanese political system is based, because it favors Christians over Muslims. Fadlallah argues that Shias now form a majority in Lebanon and should establish a government based on Islamic law.

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Increasing Influence

Fadlallah has become one of the most prominent figures in the pro-Iranian Shia fundamentalist movement in Lebanon. He maintains extensive

* The National Pact allocates Lebanese Government positions on the basis of the population of each religious sect, according to the national census of 1932. Christians and Sunni Muslims hold most of the key positions. Demographic changes since then, however, have produced a rapidly growing Shia plurality.


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contacts with Iranian leaders



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Fadlallah operates primarily through the Muslim Students Union, a radical organization that he commands in the predominantly Shia southern suburbs of Beirut. Its members proselytize and propagandize in the name of Islamic fundamentalism. The union, which functions both as a militia and as a political and religious group, almost certainly serves as a front organization for the covert Lebanese branch of the militant Dawa Party.



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Fadlallah has enlarged his base of support through social welfare programs aimed at the Shia masses. The Muslim Students Union, for example, provides financial assistance, schooling, and other charitable programs for poor Shia families.



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Terrorism as a Political Weapon


Fadlallah plays an important role in the Hizballah terrorist network that is waging a campaign of violence against US, West European, and Israeli personnel and facilities in Lebanon. Besides serving as a spiritual leader, he coordinates radical Shia activities in Beirut.



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


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has been spurred to action in recent years mainly by the inflammatory rhetoric and activism of strong religious leaders. Fadlallah's popularity and following almost certainly will grow in the next few years as long as most Lebanese Shias remain bitter and dissatisfied with their political and economic situation. b3

Fadlallah is a particularly dangerous figure because he operates successfully as a fundamentalist religious leader and masks his role as coordinator of terrorism. His pronouncements clearly have the capability to incite young Shias to violence and other forms of radical political activism. b3

An analogy between Fadlallah and Khomeini may be premature, but there are important similarities. Fadlallah's role in the Lebanese Hizballah movement is almost as central as that of Khomeini in the Iranian revolution. If the Shia radicals continue to gain strength, Fadlallah may lead the dominant majority political movement in Lebanon within a few years. b3



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
Fadlallah uses terrorism as a political weapon in his quest for an Islamic state. He has targeted foreign interests because his ideology postulates that the first step in the Shia revolution must be the removal of Western influence from Lebanon. It is likely that Fadlallah and his adherents will eventually expand their campaign of violence to include Lebanese Government—particularly Christian—officials and institutions.

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Implications

The continued growth of the radical Shia movement in Lebanon depends to a large extent on the charismatic leadership of clerics such as Fadlallah. The traditionally passive Lebanese Shia population

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Terrorism in Asia:
Patterns and Prospects 63

In 1984, as in most previous years, Asia saw only a small portion of the terrorist incidents that made headlines in the rest of the world. With a few exceptions, terrorism in Asia continued to be practiced mostly by insurgents or ethnic groups with grievances against their own governments. US citizens and facilities faced only a few threats in the region in 1984, and 1985 looks no different 63

Sri Lanka

The bloodiest, if not the best known, campaign of terrorism in Asia last year was conducted by the separatist Tamil insurgents against the Sinhalese central government in Sri Lanka. After rioting in mid-1983 that left hundreds of Tamils dead at the hands of the majority Sinhalese, the several guerrilla groups seeking a separate Tamil state turned increasingly to neighboring India for help. India, with its own large Tamil population in the south, had long sympathized with the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils, and in 1983 New Delhi encountered considerable domestic pressure to intervene in the internecine bloodletting. Accordingly, in 1984 India moved from a policy of acquiescing in state and local support for the rebels to providing national-level assistance to them.

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Perhaps the Sri Lankan Tamil groups were emboldened by this increased support, for in 1984 they attacked US targets for the first time:

- In May the previously then obscure Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) kidnaped a US AID employee and his wife. They were released unharmed five days later, after Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made a radio appeal on the eve of a visit by US Vice President Bush.

- In June unidentified Tamils set off a bomb in the downtown Colombo hotel that housed the Israeli Interests Section of the US Embassy. Later that month, other Tamils attempted to bribe a Tamil guard to take a package, suspected of being a bomb, into the US AID offices. 63

On 2 August unidentified Tamils attempted to put a bomb aboard an Air Lanka flight bound from Madras to Colombo. The suitcase containing the bomb exploded in the Madras airport, however, killing 29 people, mostly Sri Lankans. This was the bloodiest terrorist attack ever to occur at an airport, the death toll exceeding even that of the Japanese Red Army assault at Lod Airport in Tel Aviv in 1972. 63

In 1984 causing large numbers of casualties became the norm on both sides of the separatist struggle. Several times in the second half of the year Tamil insurgents killed dozens of soldiers or civilians in single attacks, each of which generated more casualties than the ambush in July 1983, which had sparked the communal rioting. Although the Sinhalese population did not take to the streets in 1984 as it had a year earlier, the Army engaged in apparently uncontrollable retaliation against Tamil civilians in areas where guerrillas had attacked, killing as many as 20 to 50 persons at a time. 63

By yearend it had become apparent that the decades-long insurgency had reached a new plateau of violence. Guerrillas killed soldiers and policemen almost daily and every week produced new reports of massacres by national security forces in retaliation. The government officially abandoned the search for a political solution late in December 1984. While no specific threats to US facilities and personnel had

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appeared as of early 1985, the possibility of bystander casualties and the fact that Tamils did target Americans in 1984 combine to make Sri Lanka currently one of the more dangerous spots for Americans in Asia. [redacted] b3

Japan

The only other continuing serious terrorist threat to Americans in Asia came in Japan at the hands of the leftist terrorist group Chukaku-ha (Nucleus Faction). Although the group has been in existence since 1963, only in the last couple of years has it become more of a threat to US interests than a nuisance. [redacted] b1 b3

[redacted] but it claims to have thousands of supporters. It has long opposed the construction (and now the expansion) of Narita Airport, the "militarization" of Japan, the US-Japanese security relationship, the presence of US bases, and visits by US nuclear-powered ships. It used to restrict itself to minor firebombings of empty offices, but it became more dangerous in 1984. [redacted] b3

Although Chukaku-ha continued to target only undefended facilities, it began to rely less on crude incendiaries and more on a fairly sophisticated improvised device: a truck-mounted flamethrower. This uniquely Japanese weapon system figured in a half dozen Chukaku-ha attacks in 1984, and although it only functioned as planned in about half the cases, its few successes were spectacular. On 20 September, for example, such a device caused more than \$2 million in damage to the Tokyo headquarters of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. [redacted] b1 b3

[redacted] Chukaku-ha is able to use it without risking the capture of any of its members. Although the truck device was not used against a US facility last year, in June Chukaku-ha did cause minor damage to two US military communications sites with more conventional firebombs. [redacted] b3

On New Year's Day 1985 the group claimed credit for an improvised attack against the US Consulate General in Kobe using improvised rockets, at least one of which was of an antipersonnel type. [redacted] b1 b3

[redacted] the group plans to use improved rockets during 1985 and to begin targeting personnel rather than just facilities. US targets probably will remain high on the group's list. [redacted] b3

India

By early 1984, Sikh extremists led by the charismatic Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale had kept the northwest state of Punjab in turmoil for two years, assassinating Hindus and more moderate Sikhs. Bhindranwale and his followers sought to sabotage negotiations between mainstream Sikhs and the central government over Sikh concerns for the Punjab and for their special status in Indian society. By May Bhindranwale's campaign had isolated and undercut the moderates to the extent that they hoped to recoup popular support with a statewide strike in early June. [redacted] b3

On 6 June the central government ordered Army troops to assault Bhindranwale's headquarters in the Golden Temple sanctuary in Amritsar, Sikhdom's most sacred shrine. The raid, during which Bhindranwale and more than 1,000 of his followers were killed, effectively ended organized Sikh terrorism, but left behind a smoldering residue of communal bitterness over the violation of the temple. Nevertheless, the only major acts of Sikh terrorism during the summer were two skyjackings. [redacted] b3

But the alienation of even mainstream Sikhs after the temple assault led to Asia's most spectacular act of terrorism in 1984—the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by two of her Sikh bodyguards on 31 October. With that act (and after the subsequent killing of some 2,000 Sikhs in retaliatory rioting) Sikh outrage seemed to have expended itself, at least for the moment, with most Sikhs waiting to see how the new government of Rajiv Gandhi would attempt reconciliation. [redacted] b3

Pakistan

The only noteworthy terrorist threat in Pakistan in 1984 came from the antigovernment group Al-Zulfikar. Compared to the early 1980s, Al-Zulfikar was not very active within Pakistan in 1984; indeed, the most significant Al-Zulfikar incident occurred in Europe. In the spring, about 10 ill-trained members of the group plotted to take hostage large numbers of diplomats, first in Athens, then in Rome, and finally in Vienna. They had hoped to trade these hostages for more than 200 prisoners in Pakistani jails, but when [redacted]

they finally attempted an operation in Vienna, they botched it and were arrested. The captured terrorists showed a remarkable lack of sophistication for a group attempting an attack so far afield. Nevertheless, even this inept attempt almost succeeded, and Al-Zulfikar may try again to seize important hostages. Thus the group continues to pose a medium-level threat to US interests in 1985.

[REDACTED]

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Philippines

Insurgents in the Philippines continued in 1984 to engage in terrorism only on a limited, sporadic basis. The New People's Army (NPA) of the Communist Party of the Philippines regularly attacked military and police forces and extorted funds from businessmen but avoided attacks on US and other foreign facilities. The NPA was suspected [REDACTED] in several instances of urban terrorism—a high-level military assassination, two attempted bombings of the Japanese Embassy, and several hotel fires. No evidence had surfaced by yearend, however, to suggest that the NPA had used its [REDACTED] well-developed urban terrorist infrastructure in any of these attacks or had abandoned its policy of restraint toward US targets.

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It now appears that the Islamic Solidarity consists of a number of small conservative Muslim groups rather than a single organization. Members of several such groups have been implicated in some of the incidents last fall. Others are suspected in the early 1985 bombing of the major Buddhist shrine at Borobudur—the most prominent national landmark—and in the burning of the palace of the Sultan of Solo. These Muslim fundamentalists are reportedly upset with the central government's secular policies and may instigate further violence against the government and other religious groups this year.

[REDACTED]

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New Caledonia

So far, very little of the separatist agitation, loyalist backlash, and sporadic mayhem in this French territory that began in 1984 and continued into 1985 can be called terrorism. Some terrorist-type bombings related to the Melanesian separatist movement have taken place in France, but violence in the territory itself has generally consisted of spontaneous riots and isolated acts of economic sabotage. However, after the killing of the military chief of the separatist Kanak National Socialist Liberation Front (FLNKS) by police last January, the positions of the FLNKS and the European settlers have further polarized. More violence is likely this year, and FLNKS may conceivably turn to acts of terrorism as its frustration level rises.

[REDACTED]

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The insurgency of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) heated up slightly in 1984, but its actions impinged only slightly on US interests. Most of the MNLF attacks were conducted against the traditional police, army, and local political targets. In December, however, units of the MNLF in Jolo kidnaped two missionaries—an American and a West German—and they were still being held at the end of the year. The MNLF has periodically kidnaped foreigners and seizes American citizens every few years. It has not harmed its foreign hostages, however, and they are generally released after the MNLF achieves its ransom or propaganda goals.

b3

Indonesia

In late 1984 Jakarta suffered a sudden onslaught of urban violence and apparent terrorism. After communal riots in September left as many as 160 dead, in early October bombs went off in several ethnic-Chinese-owned banks and businesses, killing two persons. In the weeks that followed, a rash of fires, bomb threats, and accidents occurred.

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Unclaimed Terrorist Events **b3**

b3 [REDACTED]

If, as we commonly say, terrorists use violence to create psychological effects that will translate into political results, then it would seem that to be truly effective an act of terrorism and the identity of its perpetrators must be known about by an audience beyond the actual victim of the violence. Otherwise, it might appear, there will be no psychological effects or political results to speak of. Claiming credit for an act of terrorism is the principal method by which terrorists attempt to specifically influence the behavior of their target audience. It may therefore seem paradoxical that nearly half of all terrorist incidents are unclaimed and that the responsibility for about a fourth of them cannot be reliably attributed to anyone.

Most of the unclaimed incidents are low-level actions, such as early-morning bombings not intended to cause casualties. More puzzling is the major terrorist event that is not claimed. Except perhaps when an act is committed merely to sustain the group, such as a bank robbery, one would think that terrorists would always want the world to know, when they have committed a terrorist act, that it was they who committed it. (It is, incidentally, in this respect that they differ most clearly from common criminals who are only interested in loot, and who therefore do not want to be identified as the perpetrators after they have committed an action.) To the extent that the terrorists successfully hide their identity, they would appear to have conducted an action that has served no purpose, like an advertising campaign that does not name the product.

On the other hand, the anonymity of the perpetrators may enhance the confusion and tension surrounding an attack. The intense desire to know "who" and "why" causes speculation to abound and theories of

attribution to be batted back and forth. In the absence of a credible genuine claim, spurious claims may surface to mislead the authorities and confuse the public. For weeks after an anonymous attack, the fear of a repeat performance may remain. The mysterious perpetrators may appear more sophisticated and effective than any who are known. Or the most feared or infamous of probable culprits may be blamed. This public response was in evidence in Paris during the summer of 1982. Because of a signed threat by the notorious terrorist Carlos, several major unclaimed attacks that occurred during the following months were attributed to him although supporting evidence was lacking.

Upon closer examination, it can be seen that unclaimed terrorist actions may nevertheless serve several useful purposes for the perpetrators. Terrorists might be fully satisfied if, after a bombing, the population merely speculates about who was responsible while worrying about the likelihood of additional bombings. Since common criminals are not likely to be responsible, as bombing provides them with no gain and only presents expense and risk, an unclaimed bombing will rightly be interpreted by the population as being of terrorist origin. If the goal of the terrorists is merely to instill concern in the public and demonstrate that the government cannot stop them, they can do this anonymously.

Unclaimed terrorist acts may be even more effective in other circumstances. If, for example, a judge who has sentenced terrorists to long prison terms should be attacked, most people would conclude that the crime was perpetrated by a terrorist group even if there was no trace of evidence. The direct fear created in the legal community by such an event might well be heightened by the anonymity of the attackers. (One must watch out not just for the offended terrorists but for all terrorists as well as their associates and supporters.)

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25 March 1985 **b3**

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Finally, anonymity protects terrorists against police and court action the same way it protects other criminals. It is easier, after all, to prosecute arrested terrorists for acts they have publicly admitted than to prove their responsibility for acts unclaimed. All in all, considering the advantages of anonymity, it is not surprising that so many terrorist acts are unclaimed.

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Chronology of Terrorism—1985

Below are described noteworthy foreign and international terrorist events and counterterrorism developments that have occurred or come to light since our last issue. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.

10 February

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22 February

Lebanon: Bomb dismantled near IUM mosque in Tripoli. It was the third attack against hardline Sunni leader Shaykh Shaban's Islamic Unification Movement in February. The IUM blamed the Christian Phalangist Party.

b3

27 February

Bolivia: Bomb explosion outside Bolivian-American bank causes severe damage but no casualties. No one claimed responsibility.

b3

1 March

Bolivia: Bomb explodes at home of former Mayor of La Paz and current campaign manager of former President Hugo Banzer. No one was hurt in the bombing, which was probably related to the Bolivian national elections scheduled for 16 June.

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Italy: Libyan citizen murdered in his jewelry shop in Rome.

[REDACTED]

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Philippines: Military rescue operation fails to free foreign hostages of MNLF in Jolo. After weeks of fruitless negotiations to win the release of an American, a West German, and a Japanese held by elements of the Moro National Liberation Front, the Philippine Army sent troops to try to locate and free the hostages, to equally little avail.

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2 March

France: Bomb explodes outside Ministry of Overseas Departments and Territories, damaging nearby vehicles but causing no injuries. No group claimed credit, but [REDACTED] Caribbean separatists.

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2 March

Greece: Attempt to firebomb West German Embassy fails. A group calling itself the Revolutionary Group of International Solidarity Christos Kasimis—last heard of in 1979—claimed responsibility for the incident, stating it was done in "unity" with the Red Army Faction of West Germany.

b3

3 March

Philippines: Local government officials attacked by NPA. The Mayor of Bulan, Camarines Sur, was shot and wounded in a roadside attack by four unidentified men. The chief of police of Butuan was shot dead by unidentified attackers while he was attending Mass with his wife and children. In both cases, the New People's Army is suspected.

b3

4 March

Sudan: Ugandan students escape rebel captivity. Four of five Ugandans captured by the Sudan People's Liberation Army during an attack on a steamer in December escaped and found their way to Sudanese Army forces. The fifth reportedly died in captivity.

b3

5 March

Pakistan: Al-Zulfikar skyjacking accomplice hanged in Karachi. The man had bought the tickets for the group that hijacked a Pakistani airliner to Kabul in 1981.

b3

Australia: Weapons destined for New Caledonian antiseparatists intercepted. In Yatala, in eastern Australia, four Frenchmen were arrested when weapons and ammunition were found concealed on board their yacht. The materiel, which was probably intended for antiseparatist French residents of New Caledonia, consisted of 40 pump shotguns, 27 semiautomatic shotguns, four assault rifles, 173 ammunition magazines, and 32,000 rounds of ammunition.

b3

7 March

Pakistan: 54 Al-Zulfikar members each sentenced to 25 years in prison. They had been convicted of murders, hijackings, and other terrorist endeavors. Another 40 Al-Zulfikar members, including leaders Murtaza and Shahnawaz Bhutto, were convicted in absentia, but it is not clear what their sentences were.

b3

France: President Mitterrand's chief technical adviser on terrorism promoted. Christian Prouteau, founder of the Intervention Group of the National Police, was recently named Commissioner of the Republic.

b3

France: Bombing in Bordeaux in support of New Caledonian separatists damages several cars. A note left at the scene condemned the "Bordeaux bourgeois slave mentality, which is an accomplice of the assassination of Machoro"—a reference to Eloi Machoro, the militant Kanak leader who was killed in New Caledonia last January.

b3

Spain: ETA car bomb kills Basque police chief near Vittoria. The group claimed that Lt. Col. Carlos Diaz Arcocha was killed as "part of ETA's offensive against Spain's occupation army."

b3

8 March

Greece: Six members of "Zyrimis Group" convicted in 1980 of establishing a terrorist group acquitted in retrial. The conviction was overturned because the 1978 law on which it was based was changed in 1984 legislation passed by the Socialist government.

b3

New Caledonia: French gendarme killed while dismantling roadblock. The victim was struck down by a machete blow in the back. Members of the separatist Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS) are believed responsible.

b3

Philippines: NPA guerrillas overrun town of Mainit in Mindanao, killing five soldiers and a policeman. The guerrillas wounded another five soldiers and burned down the townhall.

b3

9 March

Pakistan: Trial of five Sikhs who hijacked Indian airliner in 1981 begins. No trial has yet been scheduled for another group of Sikhs who hijacked a similar craft last July.

b3

France: Two improvised time bombs found in Biarritz. One had been placed near a golf course, the other at a restaurant. Neither exploded, owing to defective timers. No group claimed credit, but French Basque terrorists are suspected.

b3

9-10 March

Guadeloupe: One firebomb and two explosive devices detonate the night before elections. Five persons were injured. French Caribbean separatists probably were responsible.

b3

10 March

Thailand: Burmese drug traffickers capture four border policemen. Elements of the Shan United Army (SUA) intercepted them while they searched for missing Thai villagers in the border area. The SUA has offered to release them if the Thai Government confirms that their mission was not drug related.

b3

11 March

Peru: Sendero Luminoso guerrillas kill Lima police detective. The victim was sprayed with automatic weapons fire from a speeding car. The police said this was the first such blatant, daylight SL attack in the capital.

b3

Israel: Bomb explodes on Israeli bus in Rehovot. Prior to the explosion, the bus driver had noticed a suspicious-looking package on the bus and ordered all of the passengers to disembark; consequently, no one was hurt, and there was only minor damage. No group has claimed responsibility.

b3

Portugal: FP-25 targets foreign businesses in bombing spree. In Lisbon, bombs caused extensive damage to the bank Credit Franco-Portugais, the British insurance firm Newstead Porter, and a branch of the French bank Credit Lyonnais. In Evora, bombs damaged the home of the manager of a blue jeans factory and the homes of two executives of the telex plant, a Portuguese subsidiary of the West German company Siemens. FP-25 claimed responsibility.

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11 March

West Berlin: RAF sympathizers bomb storage lot of firm that built the new maximum security section of Maabit prison. Several pieces of heavy construction equipment were severely damaged by the explosions of three improvised bombs; two other devices failed to explode. This was the second recent attack on targets related to the new section, which houses three female Red Army Faction members. Last month someone tried to bomb a car owned by the architect of the section. A previously unknown group called the "Struggling Dyslexics" claimed credit for the bombings in a letter, declaring solidarity with the women who had participated in the RAF hunger strike.

b3

Lebanon: Shia religious leader Shamsaddin escapes assassination attempt by unidentified gunmen in West Beirut. Shamsaddin was not hurt, but one of his bodyguards was killed and two others were seriously wounded.

b3

12 March

Italy: Director of Cosenza Prison shot and killed by the "Revolutionary Communist Committees." In its announcement of responsibility, the previously unknown group indicated the murder was to avenge the killing of an alleged member of Autonomia by police three days earlier.

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West Germany: Bomb next to US officer's club at Boeblingen defused. The bomb was found after its location was reported to a vicarage in an anonymous telephone call.

b3

13 March

West Germany: Two leading RAF members sentenced to life imprisonment. After an 18-month trial, both had been convicted of involvement in the 1977 murders by the Red Army Faction of industrialist Hanns Martin Schleyer and financier Jurgen Ponto, among other crimes. Adelheid Schulz received three concurrent life sentences and Rolf Clemens Wagner two. Wagner, however, will be returned to Switzerland to continue serving a life sentence there.

b3

14 March

Portugal: FP-25 bombs Lisbon property owners' association. The bombing preceded a parliamentary debate over whether to change a rent-freeze law that has been in effect for several years. There were no casualties.

b3

Cyprus: Bomb causes moderate damage to headquarters of Cyprus affiliate of Exxon. Local speculation ties the explosion either to the US veto of the UN resolution on Israeli actions in Lebanon or to a recently concluded labor dispute with the Exxon officials.

b3

Guadeloupe: Bomb explodes at lunchtime in crowded Point-a-Pitre restaurant, killing one and injuring 11. Four Americans were slightly injured. No group claimed responsibility for the incident, but the separatist Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance is suspected.

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17 March

Spain: ETA-M commandeers taxi to carry bomb to military horse-breeding installation in San Sebastian. Neither horses nor persons were hurt in the ensuing explosion, and the taxi driver—who had been confined in the trunk—was subsequently released unharmed.

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