



Director of
Central
Intelligence

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National Intelligence Daily

Monday
25 March 1985

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25 March 1985
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
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CHAD:

Habre Stronger in the South

Président Habre has improved his political position in the south with some recent military successes and his first tour of the region, but deep-seated ethnic divisions and Libyan meddling are likely to prevent national reconciliation any time soon. [REDACTED] b3

b3 [REDACTED] b3 [REDACTED] widespread violence has subsided and that fighting between Habre's northern troops and southern rebels has become fairly localized and sporadic. Moreover, some 3,000 former dissidents in the south have joined the government's side since January. Habre was well received in principal southern cities on his recent tour, during which he promoted reconciliation and promised to curb mistreatment by northern officials and troops.

b3 [REDACTED]

b3 [REDACTED] if Habre can maintain the military initiative in the south and hold down the excesses of his troops, he may convince both southerners and France that only his leadership can bring peace to the region. Southern dissident groups remain militarily weak and fragmented. [REDACTED]

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The security situation remains fragile, however, because southerners still mistrust the predominantly northern regime. The rainy season—usually the rebels' most active period—begins soon, and the recent ralliers to the government may return to armed opposition when N'Djamena is unable to pay promised salaries. [REDACTED]

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Libya probably will try to undermine Habre's reconciliation campaign by stirring ethnic tensions and increasing its military support to the rebels. Paris is likely to continue its efforts to unite southern exile groups in order to increase pressure on Habre to negotiate with them.


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
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
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HONDURAS: Rising Political Tensions

Strong opposition to President Suazo's political efforts to exercise control over the elections scheduled for November is building in the Congress.

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Whether Suazo, through control over the Supreme Court, electoral tribunal, and other institutions, will be able to continue manipulating the political process is unknown. The constitutional questions involved, as well as the position of the Armed Forces, are unclear.



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Opposition to him, however, appears to be increasing, and he may have to make some compromises to avoid a damaging confrontation.

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GREECE: Second Round of Elections

Christos Sartzetakis, the presidential candidate of Prime Minister Papandreou's Socialist Party, received only 181 of the 200 parliamentary votes needed to win in the second round of balloting over the weekend. Those voting for Sartzetakis included 164 Socialists, 13 Communist, and four independent deputies. Acting President Alevras, a Socialist parliamentarian, did not participate, although the Socialist-dominated Parliament last week ruled he could do so. The Conservative opposition called the balloting a "sham" after the government unexpectedly introduced color-coded ballots to distinguish between those voting for Sartzetakis and those casting a blank vote. The third and final round is set for Friday, when it will take only 180 votes to elect a new president.


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Sartzetakis is favored to win the third round of elections—but only by a slim margin. Prime Minister Papandreou's use of color-coded ballots is an obvious attempt to enforce party discipline and thus maintain the winning edge. Under Greek law, balloting is supposed to be secret, and the Conservative opposition will use the government's latest ploy—along with the decision to allow Alevras to vote—to question the legality of the entire proceedings. The election of Sartzetakis may be a short-lived victory for the Socialists, who—as a result of recent events—could face a strong backlash from the electorate in the next parliamentary elections, due no later than

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October.

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


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
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
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
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
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In Brief

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Americas

- Former Director of Salvadoran National Guard, retired General Jose Medrano, assassinated Saturday . . . responsibility claimed by Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front . . . probably part of guerrilla campaign to show strength before elections. ~~_____~~ b (3)
- Bolivian labor confederation has ended prolonged general strike . . . despite wage increases, settlement represents victory for President Siles over radical labor leaders . . . improves chances for holding elections in July. ~~_____~~ b (3)

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Africa

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- Liberia to register two small moderate parties for elections but not larger leftist groups . . . Head of State Doe hopes elections will appear contested and legitimate . . . leftists may merge with legal parties and not resort to violence. ~~_____~~ b (3)

Western Europe

- Danish Parliament debates SDI tomorrow . . . minority coalition government supports endorsing research program . . . Parliament likely to avoid stand on research or deployment and refer matter to study committee. ~~_____~~


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


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
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Special Analysis

LEBANON: • The Perils of West Beirut

West Beirut has become a battlefield contested by a variety of sectarian and ideological factions. Turf battles, terrorism, kidnappings, rampant street crime, and the lack of central authority have made the city extremely dangerous both for local residents and for foreigners. The Lebanese Government probably will remain powerless to reassert control over West Beirut, parts of which have already become strongholds of the radical Shia Hizballah movement. [REDACTED] b (3)

The mainstream Shia Amal movement nominally controls the largest area of West Beirut, but radical groups operate freely throughout Amal's territory. Druze, Sunni, and Shia fundamentalist militias also have staked out claims to specific neighborhoods. [REDACTED] b (3)

Shia fundamentalist groups associated with the radical Hizballah have grown particularly strong in many parts of the city. [REDACTED] (1) b (3)


Neither the Lebanese Army nor the Internal Security Force exercises any real control over West Beirut. The Army probably would split along sectarian lines if it were sent in to reassert authority there, and some Christian units probably would refuse even to enter the western part of the city. [REDACTED] b (3)

The absence of government authority has created an anarchic environment in which free-lance terrorism and street crime flourish. Lebanese and foreigners are being robbed and kidnaped by apolitical thugs, as well as by religious and political factions. The endemic violence poses a threat to everyone living or working in West Beirut and facilitates attempts by the Hizballah to target US citizens and other Westerners. [REDACTED] b (3)


Seats Won in the Last General Election

Belgium 1981 Total Seats: 212

Government Parties
Opposition Parties



Netherlands 1982 Total Seats: 150



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Special Analysis

NATO:

The INF Issue

The Belgian Government's decision to accept the first 16 ground-launched cruise missiles this month will keep the NATO deployment program generally on schedule. Continuing uncertainty about the Dutch deployment decision this November and Allied concern that Moscow will hold INF negotiations hostage to limits on the US Strategic Defense Initiative still provide the USSR with opportunities for undermining Allied unity on INF.

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The formula by which Prime Minister Martens's government accepted the initial flight of 16 cruise missiles last Friday will delay deployment of any of the remaining 32 missiles until late 1987, roughly a year later than the original NATO schedule. National elections that must be held by December will provide another opportunity for Belgian critics and the Soviets to attack the government's position on INF, particularly if the Cabinet keeps to its word that it will review its INF policy every six months.

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If the Flemish Socialists enter the next government, they will try to persuade other parties to reverse the INF deployment process. Moreover,

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[redacted] toughened their anti-INF rhetoric in the parliamentary debate last week declaring that they would join a government only if there were agreement on removing the missiles. Nonetheless, as long as the Social Christians make acceptance of INF a condition of participating in the governing coalition, most opposition parties—except the Flemish Socialists—probably will accept the March deployments as an accomplished fact.

The Dutch Decision

Belgian acceptance of INF missiles will not make the decision of the Christian Democratic-led coalition in The Hague to approve INF deployment in November any easier. Prime Minister Lubbers says the decision still has to be based on the Parliament's resolution of last June.

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Despite these conditions, the Lubbers government will view its INF decision this November mainly in light of how it will affect its members' prospects in the election due in May 1986. [redacted] a recent poll shows that the Dutch people are evenly

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split on whether the government should make a decision on INF this fall and that, moreover, a slight majority—53 percent—of Christian Democratic party supporters favors postponement. In any event, the government will face strong opposition on INF from the Labor Party which, according to the polls, is now the strongest party in the Netherlands.

Allied Responses

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The Allies' concern about Soviet tactics—particularly that Moscow may use negotiations on INF as leverage to limit SDI research—has led them to stress repeatedly the importance of close Allied consultation.

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The Soviets

The Brussels' decision notwithstanding, Moscow will persist in trying to prevent further NATO INF deployments.

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