


Ethiopia: Soviet Military and Oil Deliveries



Since early 1989 we estimate that Moscow has withdrawn some 1,200 military advisers from Ethiopia, largely in an effort to cut costs. In our view, the drawdown also reflects the Ethiopian military's effort to reduce Soviet involvement in operational planning, brought on partly by an increasing dislike of the Soviets. The remaining 350 Soviet advisers are involved primarily in logistic support, such as maintaining and flying two Soviet-owned Antonov 12s based in Addis Ababa that ferry Ethiopian military cargo to the central and southern regions.



For their part, the Soviets appear to have grown weary of supporting Mengistu and are not optimistic about the prospects for the survival of his regime. Moreover, the Soviets are reducing their military presence elsewhere in Africa and probably do not view the naval and air facilities in Ethiopia as significant enough to justify continued high levels of military assistance to Mengistu's regime. Moscow almost certainly will make further cuts in its advisory presence, and Soviet diplomats in Addis Ababa have indicated that the USSR will let its military aid agreement with Ethiopia expire.




The Soviets probably will be willing to continue limited arms supplies to Addis Ababa on ad hoc basis, but their primary goal is likely to be to push the Mengistu regime to negotiate with rebel forces and to position themselves to preserve a relationship with Ethiopia under any potential successor government.

On the economic front, Soviet oil deliveries in 1990 dropped by some 30 percent compared to the previous year. We believe that Moscow sent at least some 640,000 metric tons of oil—90 percent crude—to the port of Aseb, where Ethiopia has a refinery. The Soviets had delivered 915,000 metric tons of oil and oil products in 1989.



as usual, but at near-market prices. Soviet oil deliveries to Ethiopia in 1991 probably will depend largely on Addis Ababa's ability to pay for them.



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e. A likely increase in military activity during the next few months by the Tigray People's Liberation Front, which controls territory less than 125 kilometers north of the Ethiopian capital, would increase the EPLF's chances for success by diverting the Ethiopian military's attention and resources.

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